THE day now had come when, after the custom of the artillery service,
the regiment must be broken up and scattered in its isolated posts along
shore. General Merritt was relieved of the command of the Department of
the East on May 20th, to go to the far East as commanding officer of the
Philippine expedition. His successor was General Frank, U.S.V., promoted
from the colonelcy of the First United States Artillery, who lost no
time in issuing orders (S.O., 112, H.Q., D.E., 23rd May) for the final
distribution of the regiment to its stations. The text of this order
read:
"The following assignment to stations of the First Regiment
Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, now at Fort Warren—Colonel Pfaff,
commanding—is hereby ordered: Colonel Pfaff, with headquarters and two
batteries, to Salem, and to command the various fortifications and
points on the North Shore of Massachusetts where batteries of his
regiment are placed. The Lieutenant-Colonel, and two batteries, to
Clark's Point, Mass. Major Frye, with 'E,' 'F,' 'I,' and 'M' Batteries,
will remain on duty at Fort Warren, as heretofore designated by
telegraphic orders. The four remaining batteries, one each to
Gloucester, Marblehead, Nahant, and Plum Island, Mass. Colonel Pfaff
will designate the unassigned field officers and batteries for stations
to the points other than Fort Warren, as he shall deem advisable,
notifying these headquarters of the letters of batteries, and the
officers so assigned, to the respective stations. The troops will take
tents, camp equipage, and ten days' rations."
This order ended for the time being all speculation as to the
destination of the regiment in the immediate future, and though it
certainly failed to please everybody, it yet was received with little
comment by those whom it concerned. It was recognized that artillery
posts must vary from good to indifferent, or even from indifferent to
bad, and the officers spent their leisure moments in pleasant
conjectures as to undesirability of the assignments which were destined
to fall to their lot.
On May 30th Colonel Pfaff issued the orders for the distribution of the
First and Second Battalions. "G" (Chick's) and "L" (Whiting's)
Batteries, with Lieutenant Paine, range officer, and Lieutenant Bryant,
assistant surgeon, were ordered to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Woodman,
to take station at New Bedford. For the garrison at Salem, "C"
(Nutter's) and "D" (Frothingham's) Batteries were designated, under
Major Dyar as commanding officer of the post, to whom was to report
Lieutenant Rolfe, assistant surgeon, so soon as relieved from his detail
as post surgeon at Fort Warren. Major Quinby, with "K" (Howes') Battery,
and Hospital Steward White, were assigned to the defenses at Gloucester.
Captain Lombard, with "B" Battery, and Hospital Steward Phillips, were
ordered to Newburyport, to establish a post at the entrance of the
harbor. Captain Pratt, with "H" Battery, was assigned to the works at
Marblehead. Captain Bordman, with "A" Battery, was directed to take
station at Nahant, for the protection of the mining casemate at that
point.
Preparation for these movements began promptly, but stormy weather and
delay in securing transportation made it over a week before the last of
the departing batteries was able to leave Fort Warren. Meanwhile the
posts for which these detachments from the regiment were destined had
been garrisoned temporarily by the militia—commanded at first by General
Mathews, and later by General Bancroft. Influenced by the prevailing
uneasiness, Governor Wolcott, on May 7th, had prudently ordered his
remaining State troops into the field for the protection of the coast
until such time as the general Government should assume the
responsibility, and the Fifth Infantry, the First and Second Battalions
of Cadets, with the three light batteries, had been rendering valuable
service at exposed points, from Hull to the mouth of the Merrimac.
Unable to enter the volunteer service, under the limits imposed by the
call of the President, these commands eagerly had responded to the call
of the Commonwealth, and they most certainly are entitled to recognition
for the faithful work performed, under most trying conditions as to
weather, during the thirty days of their tour.
[Illustration:
Photograph by T. E. Marr, Boston.
GARRISON ENCAMPMENT, FORT PICKERING.
]
On June 1st, Lieutenant-Colonel Woodman and his command left for New
Bedford, proceeding from Boston by rail; while, on the 3rd, Colonel
Pfaff and the officers of his staff established regimental headquarters
at Salem. On the 6th, Major Quinby and "A," "C," "D," and "H" Batteries
left for their stations, followed on the 7th by "B" and "K" Batteries.
All these latter commands were furnished with transportation by water,
and it may be noted that the small steamers employed for the purpose
were well loaded down by the troops and their baggage. It so happened
that the departure of the detachments took place during a period of very
heavy weather, and more than one anxious watcher stood on the parapet at
Warren, to follow through field-glasses the course of the receding
transports, as they rolled and pitched across the bay and towards the
North Shore.
The widely scattered detachments of the First now settled themselves as
best they might at their respective coast-guard stations, and prepared
to make the most of the scanty materials for defence which they found at
hand. Under the final assignments, the distribution of the regimental
strength was as follows:
STATION. Officers. Men. Total.
Defenses of Newburyport 3 59 62
Stage Fort, Gloucester 4 59 63
Fort Sewall, Marblehead 3 58 61
Fort Pickering, Salem 13 121 134
Mining Casemate, Nahant 3 58 61
Fort Warren, Boston 13 232 245
Fort Rodman, New Bedford 9 116 125
-- --- ---
Aggregate for duty 48 703 751
Hardly had the regiment begun to adapt itself to the new conditions,
when telegraphic orders from the War Department arrived directing that
the batteries be at once recruited to full artillery strength, two
hundred enlisted men each—or an aggregate of sixty officers and
twenty-four hundred men for the entire command, since an additional
second lieutenant would be appointed to each battery when on a war
footing. It is needless to say that this order was hailed with delight
by both officers and men: to the former it gave promise of more active
service, while to the latter it meant unlimited promotion, since over
two hundred and fifty additional sergeants and corporals would be
required in the expanded batteries. No time was lost in preparing to
comply with this order. Major Dyar was detailed as chief recruiting
officer, with Captains Williamson and Nutter as assistants, and plans
were made for opening recruiting offices in Boston, New Bedford,
Brockton, and Salem. Battery commanders immediately attempted to get
into communication with the men whom they had left behind, under former
conditions, in the hope of finding that not all of them had yet enlisted
in the regulars or in other volunteer regiments. Everything was ready
for beginning the work of recruiting—when word came by telegraph from
Washington that the whole matter was a mistake, and that the recruiting
order had been meant to apply alone to the Massachusetts infantry
regiments. It was a bitter disappointment. The regiment stood sadly in
need of recruits, since its strength as organized barely sufficed for
the performance of routine garrison duty, and when the President, on May
25th, issued his call for seventy-five thousand additional volunteers,
the officers of the First felt that from the allotment of Massachusetts
they should at least secure enough men to bring the regimental enrolment
up to twelve hundred. But for a second time they were destined to see
their command passed by without consideration. The pressure exerted to
bring the Fifth Infantry into the volunteer service, or it may be some
other cause yet remaining to be explained, left the faithful First still
serving with skeleton ranks.
In spite of all disappointments, however, the command never slackened in
the performance of its appointed work. There were many problems to be
solved, and of these the most perplexing was how to evolve an efficient
defence from ridiculously inadequate materials. In his command on the
North Shore Colonel Pfaff found himself confronted by a grave situation
of affairs. To him had been entrusted the defence of five important
points, among them four towns aggregating over eighty-five thousand
inhabitants, and with property interests to be reckoned by tens of
millions; and, to state unpleasant facts with relentless exactness,
every modern and effective appliance for defensive operations had been
denied him. Newburyport, Gloucester, Marblehead, and Salem were all
liable to bombardment from the open sea, and the fire of heavy guns
alone could give even a promise of immunity from that form of attack;
but there were no heavy guns mounted at any of these points. Eight
3-inch, muzzle-loading rifles (type of 1862) had been brought to the
coast by two of the militia light batteries, and these had been turned
over to the volunteers relieving them, while sixteen Driggs-Schroeder
rapid-fire guns, ranging in calibre from one-to six-pounders, hastily
purchased by the State from its war emergency appropriation, also had
been placed in the hands of the batteries of the First. Beyond these
there was nothing in the way of ordnance—not a gun, not a round of
ammunition was supplied by the general Government for these five posts
to which it had seen fit to order artillery garrisons!
After making a rapid study of the situation, it became apparent that
serious resistance to anything like a resolute fleet attack could not be
made, but it was confidently believed that, with the means at hand, at
least three other forms of naval attack might be successfully parried.
Dispositions accordingly were made to meet sudden descents by Spanish
auxiliary cruisers, dashes into harbors by torpedo-boats, or any
attempts at operations by landing parties; and it should be said here
that nothing was left undone towards providing, with the material
available, all possible protection to the points garrisoned by these
volunteer batteries.
FORT PICKERING AND THE "NORTH
SHORE" DEFENSES