CHAPTER VIII.

[Sidenote: 1813. June.]

The basin into which the king had now poured all his troops, his

parcs, convoys, and encumbrances of every kind, was about eight

miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end.

The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very

near that town, runs towards the Ebro with many windings and divides

the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A

traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter

the basin by the pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows

between two very high and rough mountain ridges, the one on his right

hand being called the heights of Puebla, that on his left hand the

heights of Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the river,

and on emerging from the pass, on the left hand at the distance of

about six miles would be seen the village of Subijana de Morillas,

furnishing that opening into the basin which Reille defended while

the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The spires of Vittoria

would appear about eight miles distant, and from that town the road

to Logroño goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao by Murgia

and Orduña on the left hand crossing the Zadora at a bridge near the

village of Ariaga; further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna

branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the left, and between

them the royal causeway leads over the great Arlaban ridge into the

mountains of Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. But of

all these roads, though several were practicable for guns, especially

that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could suffice for the

retreat of such an encumbered army. And as the allies were behind the

hills forming the basin on the right bank of the Zadora, their line

being parallel to the great causeway, it followed that by prolonging

their left they would infallibly cut off the French from that route.

Joseph felt the danger and his first thought was to march by Salinas

to Durango, with a view to cover his communications with France, and

to rally Foy’s troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay.

But in that rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry,

on which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of

the allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he

would have to send them into France; and if pressed by Wellington

in front and surrounded by all the bands in a mountainous region,

favourable for those irregulars, he could not long remain in Spain.

It was then proposed if forced from the basin of Vittoria, to retire

by Salvatierra to Pampeluna and bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza;

but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication with France,

because the Spanish regular army, aided by all the bands, could

seize Tolosa while Wellington operated against him on the side of

Navarre. It was replied that troops detached from the army of the

north and from that of Portugal might oppose them; still the king

hesitated, for though the road to Pampeluna was called practicable

for wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass of guns

and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria.

One large convoy had already marched on the 19th by the royal

causeway for France, another, still larger was to move on the 21st

under escort of Maucune’s division; the fighting men in front of the

enemy were thus diminished and yet the plain was still covered with

artillery parcs and equipages of all kinds, and Joseph shut up in the

basin of Vittoria, vacillating and infirm of purpose, continued to

waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary’s movements. Hence

on the 19th nothing was done, but the 20th some infantry and cavalry

of the army of Portugal passed the Zadora to feel for the allies

towards Murguia, and being encountered by Longa’s Spaniards at the

distance of six miles, after some successful skirmishing recrossed

the Zadora with the loss of twenty men. On the 21st at three o’clock

in the morning Maucune’s division, more than three thousand good

soldiers, marched with the second convoy, and the king took up a new

line of battle.

[Sidenote: See plan 8.]

Reille’s army reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry,

and by Digeon’s division of dragoons from the army of the south,

now formed the extreme right, having to defend the passage of the

Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges

of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge;

the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed forward to Durana on the royal

road, and was supported by a French battalion and a brigade of light

horsemen; Digeon’s dragoons and a second brigade of light cavalry

were in reserve behind the Zadora, near Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad.

The centre of the king’s army, distant six or eight miles from

Gamara, following the course of the Zadora, was on another front,

because the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights of

Margarita descends to the defile of Puebla, nearly at right angles

with its previous course. Here covered by the river and on an easy

open range of heights, for the basin of Vittoria is broken by a

variety of ground, Gazan’s right extended from the royal road to an

isolated hill in front of the village of Margarita. His centre was

astride the royal road, in front of the village of Arinez; his left

occupied more rugged ground, being placed behind Subijana de Alava

on the roots of the Puebla mountain facing the defile of that name,

and to cover this wing a brigade under general Maransin was posted on

the Puebla mountain. D’Erlon’s army was in second line. The principal

mass of the cavalry with many guns, and the king’s guards formed a

reserve, behind the centre, about the village of Gomecha, and fifty

pieces of artillery were massed in the front, pointing to the bridges

of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclares.

While the king was making conjectures, Wellington was making various

dispositions for the different operations which might occur. He knew

that the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos in a few days, and

thinking that Joseph would not fight on the Zadora, detached Giron

with the Gallicians on the 19th to seize Orduña. Graham’s corps was

at first destined to follow Giron but finally penetrated through

difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from

Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. However the rear

of the army had been so much scattered in the previous marches that

Wellington halted on the 20th to rally his columns, and taking that

opportunity to examine the position of the French armies, observed

that they seemed steadfast to fight; whereupon immediately changing

his own dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily

recalled Giron from Orduña.

The long expected battle was now at hand, and on neither side were

the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The allies had

lost about two hundred killed and wounded in the previous operations,

and the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, was left

at Medina de Pomar; hence only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese

sabres and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually

in the field, but the Spanish auxiliaries were above twenty

thousand, and the whole army, including serjeants and artillery-men,

exceeded eighty thousand combatants. For the French side, as the

regular muster-roll of their troops was lost with the battle, an

approximation to their strength must suffice. The number killed and

taken in different combats, from the Esla and Tormes to the Zadora,

was about two thousand men, and some five thousand had marched to

France with the two convoys. On the other hand Sarrut’s division,

the garrison of Vittoria, and the many smaller posts relinquished by

the army of the north, had increased the king’s forces, and hence,

by a comparison with former returns, it would appear, that in the

gross, about seventy thousand men were present. Wherefore deducting

the officers, the artillery-men, sappers, miners, and non-combatants,

which are always borne on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and

bayonets would scarcely reach sixty thousand, but in the number and

size of their guns the French had the advantage.

The defects of the king’s position were apparent both in the general

arrangement and in the details. His best line of retreat was on the

prolongation of his right flank, which being at Gamara Mayor, close

to Vittoria, was too distant to be supported by the main body of the

army; and yet the safety of the latter depended upon the preservation

of Reille’s position. Instead of having the rear clear, and the field

of battle free, many thousand carriages and impediments of all kinds

were heaped about Vittoria, blocking all the roads, and creating

confusion amongst the artillery parcs. Maransin’s brigade placed

on the heights above Puebla was isolated and too weak to hold that

ground. The centre indeed occupied an easy range of hills, its front

was open, with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries seemed to

bar all access by the bridges; nevertheless many of the guns being

pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of the Zadora, were

within musket-shot of a wood on the right bank, which was steep and

rugged, so that the allies found good cover close to the river.

There were seven bridges within the scheme of the operations, namely,

the bridge of La Puebla on the French left beyond the defile; the

bridge of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava and the French end of

the defile of Puebla; then three bridges which, placed around the

deep loop of the river before mentioned, opened altogether upon the

right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being highest up the

stream, that of Vellodas lowest down the stream, and that of Tres

Puentes in the centre; lastly the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga

on the Upper Zadora, opposite Vittoria, which were guarded by Reille,

completed the number, and none of the seven were either broken or

entrenched.

Wellington having well observed these things formed his army for

three distinct battles.

Sir Thomas Graham moving from Murguia, by the Bilbao road, was to

fall on Reille, and if possible to force the passage of the river

at Gamara Mayor and Ariaga; by this movement the French would be

completely turned and the greatest part of their forces shut up

between the Puebla mountains on one side and the Zadora on the other.

The first and fifth Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Bradford’s and

Pack’s independent Portuguese brigades, Longa’s Spanish division,

and Anson’s and Bock’s cavalry, in all near twenty thousand men

with eighteen pieces of cannon, were destined for this attack, and

Giron’s Gallicians, recalled from Orduña, came up by a forced march

in support.

Sir Rowland Hill was to attack the enemy’s left, and his corps, also

about twenty thousand strong, was composed of Morillo’s Spaniards,

Sylveira’s Portuguese, and the second British division together with

some cavalry and guns. It was collected on the southern slope of the

ridge of Morillas, between the Bayas and the Lower Zadora, pointing

to the village of Puebla, and was destined to force the passage of

the river at that point, to assail the French troops on the heights

beyond, to thread the defile of La Puebla and to enter the basin of

Vittoria, thus turning and menacing all the French left and securing

the passage of the Zadora at the bridge of Nanclares.

The centre attack, directed by Wellington in person, consisted

of the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry,

the great mass of the artillery, the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s

Portuguese horsemen, in all nearly thirty thousand combatants. They

were encamped along the Bayas from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre,

and had only to march across the ridges which formed the basin of

Vittoria on that side, to come down to their different points of

attack on the Zadora, that is to say, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres

Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares. But so rugged was the country and

the communications between the different columns so difficult, that

no exact concert could be expected and each general of division was

in some degree master of his movements.

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

At day-break on the 21st the weather being rainy, with a thick

vapour, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas, and the

centre of the army, advancing by columns from the right and left

of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering the basin of

Vittoria slowly approached the Zadora. The left-hand column pointed

to Mendoza, the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas on

the other side of which Hill was marching, and that general, having

seized the village of Puebla about ten o’clock, commenced passing the

river there. Morillo’s Spaniards led and their first brigade moving

on a bye way assailed the mountain to the right of the great road;

the ascent was so steep that the soldiers appeared to climb rather

than to walk up, and the second Spanish brigade, being to connect

the first with the British troops below, ascended only half-way;

little or no opposition was made until the first brigade was near

the summit when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo was

wounded but would not quit the field; his second brigade joined him,

and the French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced

Maransin with a fresh regiment. Then Hill succoured Morillo with the

seventy-first regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, both under

colonel Cadogan, yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British

secured the summit, and gained ground along the side of the mountain,

Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell, and Gazan calling

Villatte’s division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour of

his side; and so strongly did these troops fight that the battle

remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their

ground. Hill however again sent fresh troops to their assistance,

and with the remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, threaded the

long defile of Puebla and fiercely issuing forth on the other side

won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan’s line; he

thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and

maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy’s vigorous

efforts to dislodge him.

Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and light divisions, the

heavy cavalry, the hussars and D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, from

Subijana Morillas, and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the Zadora.

The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the

light division opposite the bridge of Villodas, both well covered by

rugged ground and woods; and the light division was so close to the

water, that their skirmishers could with ease have killed the French

gunners of the advanced post in the loop of the river at Villodas.

The weather had cleared up, and when Hill’s battle began, the

riflemen of the light division, spreading along the bank, exchanged a

biting fire with the enemy’s skirmishers, but no serious effort was

made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough

ground, had not reached their point of attack; and it would have been

imprudent to push the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge

of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body of troops in front of the

Puebla defile before the other divisions were ready to attack the

right and centre of the enemy.

While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington that the bridge

of Tres Puentes on the left of the light division, was unguarded,

and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt’s brigade of the

light division was instantly directed towards this point, and being

concealed by some rocks from the French, and well led by the brave

peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a

steep curving rise of ground, and halted close under the crest on

the enemy’s side of the river, being then actually behind the king’s

advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle.

Some French cavalry immediately approached and two round shots were

fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose

courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as

no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the fifteenth hussars

over the river, and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge

one by one, horseman after horseman, and still the French remained

torpid, shewing that there was an army there but no general.

It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the village of Subijana

de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up

the Zadora on the enemy’s extreme right, being followed by the dull

sound of distant guns shewed that Graham’s attack had also commenced.

Then the king finding both his flanks in danger caused his reserve

about Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave Gazan orders to

retire by successive masses with the army of the south. But at that

moment the third and seventh divisions having reached their ground

were seen moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza, the enemy’s

artillery opened upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge,

and the French light troops which were very strong there commenced

a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the French cannon

from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt’s forward position

was instantly made manifest; for colonel Andrew Barnard springing

forward, led the riflemen of the light division, in the most daring

manner, between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light

troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the

English artillery-men, thinking his darkly clothed troops were

enemies, played upon both alike.

This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass

the bridge of Mendoza without opposition; the other brigade forded

the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur’s brigade

of the light division followed. The French advanced post immediately

abandoned the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle which had

before somewhat slackened revived with extreme violence. Hill pressed

the enemy harder, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares,

the smoke and sound of Graham’s attack became more distinct, and

the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. However

the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte’s

division and having their confidence shaken by the king’s order

to retreat, were in evident perplexity, and no regular retrograde

movement could be made, the allies were too close.

The seventh division, and Colville’s brigade of the third division

which had forded the river, formed the left of the British, and they

were immediately engaged with the French right in front of Margarita

and Hermandad. Almost at the same time lord Wellington, seeing the

hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of

Villatte’s troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division

in close columns of regiments at a running pace diagonally across

the front of both armies towards that central point; this attack

was headed by Barnard’s riflemen, and followed by the remainder of

Kempt’s brigade and the hussars, but the other brigade of the light

division acted in support of the seventh division. At the same time

general Cole advanced with the fourth division from the bridge of

Nanclares, and the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, also passing the

river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground

between Cole’s right and Hill’s left.

The French thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for

retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty

pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this

fire Wellington brought over several brigades of British guns, and

both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under

cover of which the French retired by degrees to the second range of

heights, in front of Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted,

but they still held the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s

troops headed by the riflemen, plunged into that village amidst a

heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and in an instant three guns

were captured; but the post was important, fresh French troops came

down, and for some time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing

of the fire-arms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed

with the thundering of the guns, were terrible, yet finally the

British troops issued forth victorious on the other side. During this

conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur’s brigade of

the light division, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of

Margarita, until the fifty-second regiment, led by colonel Gibbs,

with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the

village, and at the same time the eighty-seventh under colonel Gough

won the village of Hermandad. Then the whole advanced fighting on

the left of Picton’s attack, and on the right hand of that general

the fourth division also made way, though more slowly because of the

rugged ground.

When Picton and Kempt’s brigades had carried the village of Arinez

and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava

were turned, and being hard-pressed on their front, and on their

left flank by the troops on the summit of the mountain, fell back

for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great

line of retreat to Vittoria. It was thought that some cavalry

launched against them at the moment would have totally disorganized

the whole French battle and secured several thousand prisoners,

but this was not done, the confused multitude shooting ahead of

the advancing British lines recovered order, and as the ground was

exceedingly diversified, being in some places wooded, in others open,

here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches vineyards and

hamlets, the action for six miles resolved itself into a running

fight and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled

all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria.

Many guns were taken as the army advanced, and at six o’clock

the French reached the last defensible height, one mile in front

of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood,

and beyond the city, thousands of carriages and animals and

non-combatants, men women and children, were crowding together, in

all the madness of terror, and as the English shot went booming over

head the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement,

while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no

hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation.

However the courage of the French soldier was not yet quelled,

Reille on whom every thing now depended, maintained his post on the

Upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on

their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made

their muskets flash like lightning, while more than eighty pieces

of artillery, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar,

that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke,

amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen,

bounding with a frantic energy.

This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and

scarcely could the third division, which was still the foremost and

bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. Again

the battle became stationary, and the French generals had commenced

drawing off their infantry in succession from the right wing, when

suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the hill on

the French left, and the heights were at once abandoned. It was at

this very moment that Joseph, finding the royal road so completely

blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated

the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went

off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on

its left. The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry

galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat, which

was through a marsh, but this road also was choked with carriages

and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains. Thus

all became disorder and mischief, the guns were left on the edge

of the marsh, the artillery-men and drivers fled with the horses,

and, breaking through the miserable multitude, the vanquished troops

went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra; however their cavalry still

covered the retreat with some vigour, and many of those generous

horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the

dreadful scene.

The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of whose battle it

is now time to treat, in great danger. His advanced troops under

Sarrut had been placed at the village of Aranguis, and they also

occupied some heights on their right which covered both the bridges

of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor, but they had been driven from both the

village and the height a little after twelve o’clock, by general

Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham’s column, consisting of the

fifth division, Longa’s Spaniards, and Pack’s Portuguese. Longa then

seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, while another detachment

gained the royal road still further on the left, and forced the

Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this

side had deprived the king of his best line of retreat and confined

him to the road of Pampeluna. However Sarrut recrossed the river in

good order and a new disposition was made by Reille. One of Sarrut’s

brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco

beyond it; the other was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La

Martiniere who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village

of that name beyond the river. Digeon’s dragoons were formed behind

the village of Ariaga, and Reille’s own dragoons being called up from

Hermandad and Zuazo, took post behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade

of light cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain the

Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the Upper Zadora in front of

Betonio, and the remainder of the light cavalry under general Curto

was on the French left extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and

Govea.

Oswald commenced the attack at Gamara with some guns and Robinson’s

brigade of the fifth division. Longa’s Spaniards were to have led and

at an early hour when Gamara was feebly occupied, but they did not

stir, and the village was meanwhile reinforced. However Robinson’s

brigade being formed in three columns made the assault at a running

pace. At first the fire of artillery and musketry was so heavy that

the British troops stopped and commenced firing also, and the

three columns got intermixed, yet encouraged by their officers,

and especially by the example of general Robinson an inexperienced

man but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge,

broke through the village and even crossed the bridge. One gun was

captured, and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille suddenly

turned twelve pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere rallying his

division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge; it was

with difficulty the allied troops could even hold the village until

they were reinforced. Then a second British brigade came down, and,

the royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but again these

new troops were driven back in the same manner as the others had

been. Thus the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile

attacked the village of Abechuco which covered the bridge of Ariaga,

and it was carried at once by colonel Halkett’s Germans, who were

supported by Bradford’s Portuguese and by the fire of twelve guns;

yet here as at Gamara the French maintained the bridge, and at both

places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal

fire of artillery and small arms.

Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, continued to

interdict the passage of the river, until the tumult of Wellington’s

battle, coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part

of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear.

Digeon’s dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and some

time before, Reille, seeing the retrograde movement of the king,

had formed a reserve of infantry under general Fririon at Betonia

which now proved his safety. For Sarrut was killed at the bridge

of Ariaga, and general Menne the next in command, could scarcely

draw off his troops while Digeon’s dragoons held the British cavalry

at point, but with the aid of Fririon’s reserve Reille covered the

movement and rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make

head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from

Ariaga from Durana and from Vittoria, yet he fought his way to

Metauco on the Salvatierra road covering the general retreat with

some degree of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue,

and neither the resolute demeanour of the French cavalry, which

was covered on the flanks by some light troops and made several

vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their

victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared

all obstacles, and passing Metauco got beyond the reach of further

injury. Thus ended the battle of Vittoria; the French escaped indeed

with comparatively little loss of men, but to use Gazan’s words,

“they lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure,

all their stores, all their papers, so that no man could prove how

much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike

were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were

barefooted.”

Never was an army more hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers

were not half beaten, and never was a victory more complete. The

trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces

of artillery from the battle. Jourdan’s baton of command, a stand

of colours, one hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred

of which had been used in the fight, all the parcs and dépôts from

Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure,

every thing fell into the hands of the victors. The loss in men

did not however exceed six thousand, exclusive of some hundreds of

prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross

numbers being five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, killed

wounded and missing. Of these one thousand and forty-nine were

Portuguese and five hundred and fifty-three were Spanish; hence the

loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and

Spaniards together, and yet both fought well, and especially the

Portuguese, but British troops are the soldiers of battle. Marshal

Jourdan’s baton was taken by the eighty-seventh regiment, and the

spoil was immense; but to such extent was plunder carried principally

by the followers and non-combatants, for with some exceptions the

fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver

without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and a half of

dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money-chests,

not one dollar came to the public, and Wellington sent fifteen

officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing

the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully

carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined to

ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the

mob and contending for the disgraceful gain.

[Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges.]

On the 22d the allies followed the retreating enemy, and Giron and

Longa entered Guipuscoa, by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy

which had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy

cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese remained at Vittoria, and general

Pakenham with the sixth division came up from Medina Pomar; the

remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had

continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night.

The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard

having neither time nor materials to destroy the bridges set fire to

the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o’clock in

the morning of the 22d Reille had rallied his two divisions and all

his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, where he halted until he was

assured that all the French had passed, and then continued his march

to Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of

battle. Joseph was that day at Yrursun, a town, situated behind one

of the sources of the Arga, and from which roads branched off to

Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Esteban on the other.

At this place he remained all the 23d sending orders to different

points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours for

his suffering army, and he directed Reille to proceed rapidly by

St. Estevan to the Bidassoa with the infantry, six hundred select

cavalry, the artillery-men and horses of the army of Portugal;

meanwhile Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s army marched upon Pampeluna intending

to cross the frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph reached

Pampeluna the 24th, but the army bivouacked on the glacis of the

fortress, and in such a state of destitution and insubordination that

the governor would not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines

were indeed reduced very low by Mina’s long blockade, and some

writers assert that it was even proposed to blow up the works and

abandon the place; however by great exertions additional provisions

were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison was encreased to

three thousand men, and the army marched towards France leaving a

rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off.

The 23d Wellington having detached Graham’s corps to Guipuscoa by the

pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued

the king with the rest of the army.

On the 24th the light division and Victor Alten’s cavalry came

up with the French rear-guard; two battalions of the riflemen

immediately pushed the infantry back though the pass, and then Ross’s

horse artillery galloping forward, killed several men and dismounted

one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria.

The 25th the enemy covered by the fortress of Pampeluna went up the

valley of Roncevalles. He was followed by the light division which

turned the town as far as Vilalba, and he was harassed by the Spanish

irregular troops now swarming on every side.

Meanwhile Foy and Clauzel were placed in very difficult positions.

The former had reached Bergara the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao

and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini’s, had

reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at

Bergara, and Maucune was with the second at Montdragon. The 22d the

garrison of Castro went off to Santona; the same day the fugitives

from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the

forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the passes

into Guipuscoa were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them

without hindrance.

Foy who had only one battalion of his division in hand, immediately

rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made

some prisoners and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he

ordered the convoy to move day and night, towards France; the troops

at Durango to march upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other

posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage,

and sick men were now hastening from every side; and to cover their

concentration Foy, reinforcing himself with Maucune’s troops, gave

battle to Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, at

Montdragon; the Spaniards had the advantage and the French fell back,

yet slowly and fighting, to Bergara, but they lost two hundred and

fifty men and six guns.

[Sidenote: Graham’s despatch.]

[Sidenote: General Boyer’s official Journal, MSS.]

On the 23d Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, and that evening

the head of Graham’s column having crossed the Mutiol mountain by

the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then as near to

Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter’s situation became critical; yet

such were the difficulties of passing the mountain, that it was late

on the 24th ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson’s light

cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry, and Halket’s Germans,

could move towards Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune’s divisions

which composed the French rear, were just entering Villa Franca as

Graham came in sight, and to cover that town they took post at the

village of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. Halket’s

Germans, aided by Pack’s Portuguese, immediately drove Maucune’s

people from the village with the loss of two hundred men, and

Bradford’s brigade having engaged the Italians on the French right,

killed or wounded eighty, yet the Italians claimed the advantage; and

the whole position was so strong, that Graham had recourse to flank

operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron and Longa now came

up by the great road, and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of

Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.

The 25th Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, but Graham

turned his left with Longa’s division and Mendizabel turned his right

from Aspeytia; while they were in march, colonel Williams, with

the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies of Pack’s

Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front, and the

fight was then purposely prolonged by skirmishing, until six o’clock

in the evening, when the Spaniards having reached their destination

on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides. The French

being cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed by the infantry

in front, while Longa with equal vigour drove their left from the

heights, were soon forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town

was strongly entrenched as a field-post and they maintained it until

Graham brought up his guns and bursting one of the gates opened a

passage for his troops; nevertheless Foy profiting from the darkness

made his retreat good with a loss of only four hundred men killed and

wounded, and some prisoners who were taken by Mendizabel and Longa.

These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not

known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than four hundred killed and

wounded in the two days’ operations, and Graham himself was hurt.

The 26th and 27th the allies halted to hear of lord Wellington’s

progress, the enemy’s convoys entered France in safety, and Foy

occupied a position between Tolosa and Ernani behind the Anezo. His

force was now encreased by the successive arrival of the smaller

garrisons to sixteen thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and ten

pieces of artillery, and the 28th he threw a garrison of two thousand

six hundred good troops into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia.

The 29th he passed the Oyarsun, and halted the 30th, leaving a small

garrison at Passages, which however surrendered the next day to Longa.

On the 1st of July the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St.

Sebastian, and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with

Giron’s Gallicians; but Reille’s troops were now at Vera and Viriatu,

they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne, and thus

twenty-five thousand men of the army of Portugal occupied a defensive

line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, the approaches to which

last were defended by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St.

Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his own artillery and

that of a British battery upon the block-house of Behobie obliged the

French to blow it up and destroy the bridge.

While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, Clauzel was in more

imminent danger. On the evening of the 22d he had approached the

field of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by a way which

falls into the Estella road, at Aracete and not far from Salvatierra.

Pakenham with the sixth division was then at Vittoria, and the French

general, learning the state of affairs soon retired to Logroño, where

he halted until the evening of the 25th. This delay was like to have

proved fatal, for on that day, Wellington who before thought he was

at Tudela, discovered his real position, and leaving general Hill

with the second division to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched

himself by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and the third,

fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry. The fifth and sixth

divisions and the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese marched

at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logroño; and

Mina also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near

Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez’ cavalry, followed

hard on Clauzel’s rear.

[Sidenote: July.]

The French general moving by Calahorra, reached Tudela on the evening

of the 27th, and thinking that by this forced march of sixty miles in

forty hours with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all pursuers,

would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla. Wellington was

already in possession of those places expecting him, but an alcalde

gave Clauzel notice of the danger, whereupon recrossing the Ebro he

marched upon Zaragoza in all haste, and arriving the 1st of July,

took post on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait until

Suchet, or the king, if the latter retook the offensive, should come

up. Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as

far as Caseda, and could still with an exertion have intercepted

Clauzel by the route of Jacca, but he feared to drive him back upon

Suchet and contented himself with letting Mina press the French

general. That chief acted with great ability; for he took three

hundred prisoners, and having every where declared that the whole

allied army were close at hand in pursuit he imposed upon Clauzel,

who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his artillery and heavy

baggage, and leaving the rest at Zaragoza retired to Jacca.

During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had sent the army of the

south again into Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan,

which was very fertile and full of strong positions. But O’Donnel,

count of Abispal, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo, partly by

capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna;

wherefore general Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place,

moved two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of

Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Gazan

from all his positions, cleared the valley with a loss of only one

hundred and twenty men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier from

Ronscevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa river was thus occupied by

the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invested.

Joseph’s reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head, and

after years of toils, and combats which had been rather admired than

understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the

Peninsula struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrennees a recognised

conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangor of his trumpets

pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genius appeared as a

flaming beacon to warring nations.

OBSERVATIONS.

[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.]

1º. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington, with one hundred

thousand men, marched six hundred miles, passed six great rivers,

gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove a

hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. This immense

result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon’s

instructions; Wellington could not then have turned the line of

the Duero. It could not have been attained if Joseph had acted

with ordinary skill after the line of the Duero was passed. Time

was to him most precious, yet when contrary to his expectations he

had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carion, he made

no effort to delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an unfit

position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have

obliged Wellington to lose a day there, perhaps two or three, and

behind the Upper Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more.

Reille who was with the army of Portugal on the right of the king’s

line complained that he could find no officers of that army who

knew the Pisuerga sufficiently to place the troops in position; the

king then had cause to remember Napoleon’s dictum, namely, that “to

command an army well a general must think of nothing else.” For why

was the course of the Pisuerga unknown when the king’s head-quarters

had been for several months within a day’s journey of it?

2º. The Carion and the Pisuerga being given up, the country about the

Hormaza was occupied and the three French armies were in mass between

that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington’s right wing only, that is

to say, only twenty-three thousand infantry, and three brigades of

cavalry, drove Reille’s troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of

Burgos was abandoned. This was on the 12th, the three French armies,

not less than fifty thousand fighting men, had been in position

since the 9th, and the king’s letters prove that he desired to

fight in that country, which was favourable for all arms. Nothing

then could be more opportune than Wellington’s advance on the 12th,

because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers,

whose impatient courage leads them always to attack, and the news

of Napoleon’s victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their

ardour. Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive on the

12th at the moment when Wellington approached the Hormaza, and as the

left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez,

the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one march distant,

the twenty-six thousand men immediately under Wellington, would

probably have been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the king would

have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clauzel to join him. Did the

English general then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary’s

fault rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the

king’s military capacity, he had seen the haste, the confusion, the

trouble of the enemy, and knowing well the moral power of rapidity

and boldness in such circumstances, had acted, daringly indeed, but

wisely, for such daring is admirable, it is the highest part of war.

3º. The manner in which Wellington turned the line of the Ebro was a

fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain of success,

yet failure would have still left great advantages. He was certain of

gaining Santander and fixing a new base of operations on the coast,

and he would still have had the power of continually turning the

king’s right by operating between him and the coast; the errors of

his adversary only gave him additional advantages which he expected,

and seized with promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his

army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño road on his left, had

kept only cavalry on the latter route and on the main road in front

of Pancorbo; if he had massed his army to his right pivoting upon

Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads towards the sources

of the Ebro with the utmost diligence, the allies could never have

passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would have

marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao, but Joseph could by the road

of Orduña have met them there, and with his force increased by Foy’s

and Sarrut’s divisions and the Italians. Meanwhile Clauzel would have

come down to Vittoria, and the heaped convoys could have made their

way to France in safety.

4º. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, the king should,

on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora,

and covered others with field-works to enable him to sally forth upon

the attacking army; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla,

and occupied the heights above in strength; his position on the Lower

Zadora would then have been formidable. But his greatest fault was

in the choice of his line of operation. His reasons for avoiding

Guipuscoa were valid, his true line was on the other side, down the

Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile

and more friendly than any other province of Spain. It is true that

by taking this new line of operations he would have abandoned Foy;

but that general, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would

have had twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian as a

support, and Wellington must have left a strong corps of observation

to watch him. The king’s army would have been immediately increased

by Clauzel’s troops, and ultimately by Suchet’s, which would have

given him one hundred thousand men to oppose the allied army,

weakened as that would have been by the detachment left to watch

Foy. And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter, for the

reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without such

trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious

as to oblige the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new

combinations would have been made all over Europe which it is useless

to speculate upon.

5º. In the battle the operations of the French, with the exception of

Reille’s defence of the bridges of Gamara and Ariaga, were a series

of errors, the most extraordinary being the suffering Kempt’s brigade

of the light division, and the hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres

Puentes and establish themselves close to the king’s line of battle,

and upon the flank of his advanced posts at the bridges of Mendoza

and Villodas. It is quite clear from this alone that he decided upon

retreating the moment Graham’s attack commenced against his right

flank, and his position was therefore in his own view untenable.

The fitting thing then was to have occupied the heights of Puebla

strongly, but to have placed the bulk of his infantry by corps, in

succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria, while his cavalry

and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile; in

this situation he could have succoured Reille, or marched to his

front, according to circumstances, and his retreat would have been

secure.

[Sidenote: See Wellington’s despatch.]

6º. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage and convoys and

parcs behind Vittoria requires no comment, but the king added another

and more extraordinary error, namely the remaining to the last moment

undecided as to his line of retreat. Nothing but misfortunes could

attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was

not more terrible is owing entirely to an error which Wellington

and Graham seem alike to have fallen into, namely, that Reille had

two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the Upper Zadora.

They knew not that Maucune’s division had marched with the convoy,

and thought Clauzel had only one division of the army of Portugal

with him, whereas he had two, Taupin’s and Barbout’s. Reille’s

reserves were composed not of divisions but of brigades drawn from

La Martiniere’s and Sarrut’s divisions, which were defending the

bridges; and his whole force, including the French-Spaniards who were

driven back from Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and two

thousand five hundred cavalry. Now Graham had, exclusive of Giron’s

Gallicians, nearly twenty thousand of all arms, and it is said that

the river might have been passed both above and below the points of

attack; it is certain also that Longa’s delay gave the French time

to occupy Gamara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first.

Had the passage been won in time, very few of the French army could

have escaped from the field; but the truth is Reille fought most

vigorously.

[Sidenote: Despatch.]

7º. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point

of attack at the time calculated upon, the battle was probably not

fought after the original conception of lord Wellington; it is likely

that his first project was to force the passage of the bridges, to

break the right centre of the enemy from Arinez to Margarita, and

then to envelope the left centre with the second, fourth, and light

divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions

pursued the others. But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay, which

gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to

understand how Gazan’s left escaped from Subijana de Alava, seeing

that when Picton broke the centre at Arinez, he was considerably

nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the

main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. The having no

cavalry in hand to launch at this time and point of the battle has

been already noticed; lord Wellington says, that the country was

generally unfavourable for the action of that arm, and it is certain

that neither side used it with much effect at any period of the

battle; nevertheless there are always some suitable openings, some

happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been one which

was neglected.

8º. Picton’s sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the

village of Arinez, with one brigade, has been much praised, and

certainly nothing could be more prompt and daring, but the merit of

the conception belongs to the general in chief, who directed it in

person. It was suggested to him by the denuded state of the hill in

front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion it is

to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages. For the brigade which

thus crossed a part of the front of both armies to place itself in

advance, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed

if the French cavalry had been prompt and daring, to a charge in

flank; it also prevented the advance of the other troops in their

proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the

action. However these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules,

they are good or bad according to the result. This was entirely

successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishmen’s

hill, not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration

of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster

which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between

Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the

Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights sir Thomas and sir

William Felton took post with two hundred companions, and being

surrounded by Don Tello with six thousand, all died or were taken

after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance.

9º. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been

also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle

Wellington should have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon

Bayonne instead of chasing Clauzel and Foy on the right and left;

and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state of

defence and must have fallen, there can be little question that the

criticism is just, because the fugitive French army having lost

all its guns and being without musket ammunition, could not have

faced its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne had resisted, and

it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition,

much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and

Clauzel coming down upon the field of Vittoria would have driven away

if they did not destroy the sixth division; they would have recovered

all the trophies; the king’s army returning by Jacca into Aragon,

would have reorganized itself from Suchet’s dépôts, and that marshal

was actually coming up with his army from Valencia; little would then

have been gained by the battle. This question can however be more

profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle

of Vittoria have been described.

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 1.

Explanatory Sketch

_of the_

SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ.

May 1812.

_The Scene of Action Enlarged._]

[Illustration: _Vol. 5. Nº. 2._

_Explanatory_

Sketch

_of the_

Sieges of the Fort

_and_ Operations, _round_

SALAMANCA.

1812.]

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 3.

Battle of

SALAMANCA,

with

SKETCH of OPERATIONS

before and after the

Action.]

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 4.

_Explanatory_

Sketch

_of the_

SIEGE OF BURGOS.

1812.]

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 5.

Sketch of the Retreat

_from_ Madrid _and_

Burgos.

1812.]

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 6.

Explanatory Sketch

_of the_

POSITION OF THE PARTIDAS.

And of Lord Wellington’s March from the

AGUEDA to the PYRENEES.

1813.]

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 7.

Battle of Castalla

_and operations_

before the Action.]

[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 8.

Battle of

VITTORIA,

_with the_

Operations

_before and after_

The Action.]

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

The following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future

cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to shew how difficult

it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when

eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

_Extract of a memoir by sir Charles Dalbiac, who was one of Le

Marchant’s brigade of heavy cavalry._

“Throughout these charges upon the enemy, _the heavy brigade was

unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry whatever_; but was

followed, as rapidly as it was possible for infantry to follow, by

the third division which had so gloriously led the attack in the

first instance and had so effectually turned the enemy’s extreme

left.”

_Extract from a memoir by colonel Money, who was one of general

Anson’s brigade of light cavalry._

“The third division moved to the right, and _the cavalry, Le

Marchand’s and Anson’s_, were ordered to charge as soon as the

tirailleurs of the third division began to ascend the right flank

of the hill.”—“The rapid movement of the cavalry which now began

to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French), they

run into the wood, which separated them from the army; _we_ (Anson’s

light cavalry) _charged them under a heavy fire of musketry and

artillery from another height_; near two thousand threw down their

arms in different parts of the wood, and we continued our charge

through the wood until our brigade came into an open plain of

ploughed fields, where the dust was so great we could see nothing,

and halted; when it cleared away, we found ourselves within three

hundred yards of a large body of French infantry and artillery,

formed on the declivity of a hill. A tremendous battle was heard on

the other side, which prevented the enemy from perceiving us. At last

they opened a fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good

order and without any loss.”

_Extract of a letter from sir Henry Watson, commanding the first

regiment of Portuguese cavalry under general D’Urban._

“When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his left, lord

Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the first and tenth

Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the British cavalry under

captain Townsend, now lieutenant-colonel Townsend, formed a part

under sir B. D’Urban. The cavalry was pushed forward in contiguous

columns, and were protected from the enemy by a small rising ground,

which, as soon as I had passed, I was ordered to wheel up, and

charge the front in line. _The enemy had formed a square_, and gave

us a volley as we advanced, the eleventh and fourteenth remained en

potence. _In this charge we completely succeeded_, and the enemy

appeared panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting

and thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about

to withdraw; then a soldier, at not more than six or eight paces,

levelled his musquet at me, and shot me through the shoulder, which

knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the whole of

our infantry had passed over.”

_Extract from a letter of colonel Townsend, 14th Dragoons._

“At the battle of Salamanca I perfectly recollect seeing D’Urban’s

cavalry advance up the hill, and charge the French infantry. _They

were repulsed_, and left Watson (now sir Henry), who led his

regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the field.”—“_I am

almost positive the French were not in square, but in line, waiting

to receive the attack of the leading brigade of the third division_,

which gallantly carried every thing before it.”

No. II.

_Copies de deux dépêches de l’empereur au ministre de la guerre

relatives au duc de Raguse._

_Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812._

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE,

Je vous renvois la correspondance d’Espagne. Ecrivez au duc de Raguse

que c’est le roi qui doit lui donner des directions, que je suppose

qu’il s’est retiré devant lord Wellington selon les règles de la

guerre, en l’obligéant à se masser, et non en se reployant devant sa

cavalerie légère; qu’il aura conservé des têtes de pont sur l’Agueda,

ce qui peut seul lui permettre d’avoir des nouvelles de l’ennemi tous

les jours, et de le tenir en respect. Que si au contraire il a mis

trente lieues d’intervalle entre lui et l’ennemi, comme il l’a déjà

fait deux fois contre tous les principes de la guerre, il laisse le

général Anglais maître de se porter où il veut, il perd constamment

l’initiative, et n’est plus d’aucun poids dans les affaires

d’Espagne, que la Biscaye et le nord sont dans des dispositions

facheuses par les suites de l’évacuation des Asturias par la division

Bonnet, que la réoccupation de cette province n’a pas encore eu lieu,

que le nord est exposé à de grands malheurs, que Santona et St.

Sebastian sont compromis, que les libres communications des guerillas

avec la Galice et les Asturies par la mer les rendront formidables,

que s’il ne fait pas réoccuper promptement les Asturies, sa position

ne peut s’ameliorer.

Recommandez au général Caffarelli de réunir davantage ses troupes, et

d’avoir toujours une colonne dans la main.

Ecrivez au général L’Huillier d’avoir l’œil sur St. Sebastian, et

d’avoir toujours 3000 hommes dans la main pour les diriger sur cette

place si elle avoit besoin d’être secourue.

En général pour parer à la mauvaise manœuvre et à la mauvaise

direction que le duc de Raguse donne à nos affaires il est nécessaire

d’avoir beaucoup de monde à Bayonne. Activez la marche du 3^e et du

106^{me} et de la 5^e demi brigade provisoire sur cette place. Tenez

y deux généraux de brigade afin que le général L’Huillier puisse

toujours disposer des forces pour être en mesure d’agir selon les

circonstances.

Réunissez un millier d’hommes des dépôts de cavalerie de l’armée

d’Espagne, et dirigez les en régimens de marche sur Bayonne.

Prescrivez au général L’Huillier de tenir ses troupes dans la vallée

de Bastan, à Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, et Irun, en les munissant

bien, les barraquant, les exerçant, et les formant. Ce sera au moyen

de cette ressource que si le due de Raguse continue à faire des

bévues on pourra empêcher le mal de devenir extrême.

Sur ce, je prie Dieu, &c.

(Signé) NAPOLEON.

[_For second despatch, see_ Appendix No. VII.]

No. III.

_Lettre de M. le duc de Dalmatie au roi._

_Seville, 12 Août, 1812._

Je n’avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres qu’elle

m’a fait l’honneur m’écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. Enfin

je viens de récevoir celle datée de Segovie le 29 du même mois.

Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m’avaient déjà instruit des

évènemens survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement

exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet mes

idées. Je déplore les pertes que l’armée de Portugal a éprouvées.

Dans l’etât ou étaient les affaires d’Espagne une bataille ne devait

se donner qu’à la dernière extrémité, mais tout n’est pas perdu. V.

M. après m’avoir communiqué les dispositions qu’elle a faites depuis

le 6 (date de la dernière lettre) au 19 Juillet m’ordonne comme une

ressource d’évacuer l’Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolêde. Je ne

puis dissimuler que cette disposition me parait fort extraordinaire.

J’étais loin de penser que V. M. s’y serait déterminée. Le sort de

l’Espagne est-il done décidé? V. M. veut elle sacrifier le royaume

à la capitale? et a-t-elle la certitude de la conserver en prenant

ce parti? Enfin l’évacuation de l’Andalousie et ma marche sur Tolêde

sont elles l’unique ressource qui nous reste? Je vais me préparer

à cette disposition que je regarde comme des plus funestes pour

l’honneur des armes impériales, le bien du service de l’empereur

et l’intérêt de V. M. dans l’espoir qu’avant qu’elle s’exécute V.

M. l’aura changée ou modifiée suivant les propositions que j’ai eu

l’honneur de lui faire le 19 Juillet, le 8 de ce mois, et par M. le

colonel Desprez.

J’ai l’honneur d’adresser à votre Majesté triplicata de ma lettre du

8 de ce mois. En me référant aux observations et propositions qu’elle

renferme, si V. M. ne prend pas des dispositions en conséquence,

je considére que l’évacuation de toute l’Espagne est decidée, car

il faut que V. M. se persuade que du moment que mon mouvement sera

commencé je serai suivi par soixante mille ennemis lesquels ne me

donneront pas le tems ni la liberté de prendre la direction que V.

M. m’indique et qui se réuniront à ceux qui ont penétré en Castille

et m’empécheront de séjourner sur le Tage encore moins d’arriver à

Madrid. Il n’y a qu’un moyen pour rétablir les affaires: que V. M.

vienne en Andalousie et qu’elle y améne toutes les troupes de l’armée

du centre, de l’armée de Portugal, de l’armée d’Arragon auxquelles

ses ordres pourront parvenir, quand bien même tout le royaume de

Valence devrait être évacué. Qu’importe à V. M. de conserver Madrid

si elle perd le royaume? Philippe V. en sortit trois fois et y rentra

en souverain. Du moment que nous aurons 70 ou 80 mille Français

réunis dans le midi de l’Espagne, le théâtre de la guerre est changé;

l’armée de Portugal se trouve dégagée et elle peut se reporter

successivement jusqu’au Tage. D’ailleurs ce serait sans inconvénient

qu’elle gardât Burgos et la rive gauche de l’Ebre et que tout

l’espace compris entre elle et le Sierra Morena fut à la disposition

des ennemis jusqu’à ce que des renforts vinssent de France et que

l’empereur eût pu prendre des dispositions. Le sacrifice une fois

fait il n’y a plus de moyen d’y remédier. Les armées impériales en

Espagne repassent l’Ebre d’ou peut-être la famine les chassera,

les affaires de l’empereur dans le nord de l’Europe peuvent s’en

ressentir, l’Amerique qui vient de déclarer la guerre à l’Angleterre

fera peut-être la paix. V. M. a sans doute refléchi à toutes les

conséquences d’un pareil changement; la perte momentanée de Madrid et

des Castilles est nulle pour la politique de l’empereur, elle peut

se réparer en plus ou moins de tems. La perte d’une bataille par

l’armée de Portugal n’est qu’un grand duel qui se répare également,

mais la perte de l’Andalousie et la levée du siége de Cadiz sont des

évènemens dont les effets seront ressentis dans toute l’Europe et

dans le nouveau monde. Enfin en fidèle sujet de l’empereur je dois

déclarer à V. M. que je ne crois pas les affaires d’Espagne assez

désespérées pour prendre un parti aussi violent. J’entrevois encore

du remède si V. M. veut prendre les dispositions que j’ai proposées;

tout en me préparant à l’exécution de ses ordres je me permets de lui

demander de nouvelles instructions. J’ai surtout l’honneur de prier

V. M. d’ordonner que les communications de l’Andalousie avec Toléde

soient rétablies et quelque évènement qui survienne de vouloir bien

faire prendre à l’armée du centre, la direction de Despeña Perros

ou d’Almaden pour se joindre à l’armée du midi. Alors je reponds de

tout, et j’exécuterai les dispositions que j’ai enoncées dans ma

lettre du 8 de ce mois.

Je, &c. &c. &c.

No. IV.

_Lettre de M. le maréchal due de Dalmatie à M. le Ministre de la

guerre à Paris._

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Toute communication de l’Andalousie avec la France étant interrompue

et n’ayant rien réçu depuis les premiers jours de Mai; depuis un mois

le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui étoient dans la Manche et

ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, j’entreprens de faire parvenir

mes rapports à votre excellence par la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment

que je fais à cet effet partir de Malaga peut arriver à Marseille,

l’empereur sera plutôt instruit de ce qui se passe dans le midi de

l’Espagne et de la position de son armée.

A ce sujet j’ai l’honneur d’adresser à votre excellence copie des

derniers rapports que j’ai faits au roi, lesquels contiennent les

représentations que j’ai cru devoir soumettre à sa majesté pour le

bien du service de l’empereur, la conservation des conquêtes et

l’honneur des armées impériales.

Je ne suis instruit des malheurs que l’armée de Portugal a éprouvés

que par les bruits populaires et les rapports de l’ennemi; car le

roi en m’écrivant le 29 Juillet de Ségovie ne m’en a donné aucun

détail. Je dois donc m’imaginer que les pertes que nous avons faites

en Castile sont beaucoup exagérées et j’en tire la conséquence que

les affaires de l’empereur en Espagne ne sont pas aussi desespérées

que le roi parait en être persuadé. Cependant sa majesté après être

resté 23 jours sans m’écrire, lorsque les ennemis étoient on plein

mouvement et que sa majesté se portoit avec 14,000 hommes de l’armée

du centre à la rencontre du duc de Raguse qui sans l’attendre s’etoit

engagé precipitamment et éprouvait une défaite; le roi dis-je en

me faisant part le 29 Juillet de ses mouvemens me donna l’ordre

formel d’évacuer l’Andalousie et me diriger sur Tolede, et il me dit

expressément que c’est l’unique ressource qui nous reste.

Je suis loin de partager l’avis de sa majesté, je crois fermement

qu’il est possible de mieux faire et que tout peut s’arranger en

attendant que d’après les ordres de l’empereur V. E. ait pû mettre

les armées qui sont dans le nord de l’Espagne à même de reprendre les

opérations, ainsi que j’en fais la proposition à sa majesté dans les

lettres dont je mets ci-joint copies. Mais mon devoir est d’obéïr

et je me chargerais d’une trop grande responsibilité si j’éludais

l’exécution de l’ordre formel d’évacuer que le roi m’a donné.

Je vais donc me préparer à exécuter cette disposition que je regarde

comme funeste, puisqu’elle me force à livrer aux ennemis des places

de guerre susceptibles d’une bonne défense tout aprovisionnées, les

établissemens et un matériel d’artillerie immense et de laisser dans

les hôpitaux beaucoup de malades que leur situation et le manque de

transport ne permettent point d’emmener. Je ne ferai cependant mon

mouvement que progressivement et je ne négligerai aucun soin pour

qu’il ne reste en arrière rien de ce qui peut être utile à l’armée.

Je ne puis encore assurer que je ne ferai ce mouvement par Tolede,

car du moment qu’il sera entrepris je serai suivi par 60,000 ennemis

qui se joindront aux divisions que lord Wellington aura déjà portées

sur le Tage. Ainsi il est possible que je me dirige par Murcie sur

Valence suivant ce que j’apprendrai ou les nouveaux ordres que je

recevrai du roi.

Dans cet état de choses, je ne puis dissimuler à V. E. que je regarde

l’évacuation de l’Espagne au moins jusqu’à l’Ebre comme décidée du

moment que le roi m’ordonna d’évacuer l’Andalousie et de me diriger

sur Toléde, car il est bien certain qu’il ne sera pas possible de

rester en position sur le Tage ni dans les Castilles et que dès-lors

les conquêtes des armes impériales en Espagne dont l’empereur avait

ordonné la conservation, sont sacrifiées.

A ce sujet je ne puis me défendre de réflechir sur d’autres évènemens

qui se passent. J’ai lu dans les journaux de Cadiz, que l’ambassadeur

du roi en Russie avait joint l’armée Russe, que le roi avait fait

des insinuations au gouvernement insurgent de Cadiz, que la Suéde

avait fait un traité avec l’Angleterre, et que le prince héréditaire

avait demandé à la regence de Cadiz 250 Espagnols pour sa garde

personelle. (Avant hier un parlementaire que le général Semélé avait

envoyé à l’escadre Anglaise pour réclamer des prisonniers resta

pendant quelques instans à bord de l’amiral, lequel lui montra une

frégate, qui, dit il, est destinée a porter en Angleterre et ensuite

en Suéde les 250 Espagnols que le prince Bernadotte demande pour sa

garde personelle.) Enfin j’ai vu dans les mêmes journaux que Moreau

et Blucher étaient arrivés à Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-camp

de Moreau, était à Londres. Je ne tire aucune conséquence de tous

ces faits, mais j’en serai plus attentif. Cependant j’ai cru devoir

déposer mes craintes entre les mains de six généraux de l’armée,

après avoir exigé d’eux le serment qu’ils ne révéleront ce que je

leur ai dit qu’à l’empereur lui-même ou aux personnes que S. M. aura

specialement déléguées pour en reçevoir la déclaration, si auparavant

je ne puis moi-même en rendre compte. Il est pourtant de mon devoir

de manifester à V. E. que je crains que le bût de toutes les fausses

dispositions que l’on a prises et celui des intrigues qui ont lieu ne

soient de forcer les armées impériales qui sont en Espagne à repasser

au moins l’Ebre et ensuite de présenter cet évènement comme l’unique

ressource (expression du roi, lettre du 20 Juillet) dans l’espérance

d’en profiter par quelque arrangement.

Mes craintes sont peut-être mal fondées, mais en pareille situation

il vaut mieux les pousser à l’extremité que d’être négligent,

d’autant plus que ces craintes et ma sollicitude tournent au bien du

service de l’empereur et à la sureté de l’armée dont le commandement

m’est confié.

J’ai l’honneur de prier V. E. de vouloir bien si ma lettre lui

parvient, la mettre le plutôt possible sous les yeux de l’empereur et

d’assurer S. M. que moi et son armée du midi serons toujours dignes

de sa suprême confiance. Je désire bien vivement que V. E. puisse me

faire savoir que mes dépêches lui sont parvenues et surtout recevoir

par elle les ordres de sa majesté.

J’ai l’honneur, &c.

(Signé) DALMATIE.

_Seville, 12 Août, 1812._

No. V.

SIRE,

Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur le champ

présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la lettre

de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le maréchal Jourdan. S. E. m’a

questionné sur les affaires d’Espagne, mais sans me demander mes

dépêches pour l’empereur. Elle m’a, suivant les intentions de V. M.,

pourvu des ordres dont j’ai besoin pour poursuivre ma route avec

célérité.

Ce matin le ministre m’a fait appeler et j’ai eu avec lui une longue

conférence. Il m’a pressé de m’expliquer avec franchise sur ce que

j’avais pu remarquer pendant mon séjour en Andalousie, m’a témoigné

quelque inquiétude sur l’influence que pouvoit exercer le maréchal

tant sur l’armée que sur les autorités civiles. Il a rappelé les

intrigues de Portugal et a conclu en me disant qu’il dépouillait

devant moi le caractère de ministre pour causer avec un homme de

votre confiance, et que les services que vous lui aviez rendus à

l’époque de sa disgrâce devaient être pour V. M. une garantie du

désir qu’il avait d’agir suivant ses intentions. Quelque franches

que m’aient parus ces ouvertures, je n’ai pas cru devoir parler de

la partie la plus délicate de ma mission. J’ai seulement répondu que

l’armée du midi serait toujours celle de l’empereur, que lorsque S.

M. enverrait ses ordres déterminés, elle serait obéie, et que tout

ce que j’avais entendu en Andalousie ne me laissait à ce sujet aucun

doute. Au reste ma conversation avec le duc de Feltre m’a prouvé

qu’aucune lettre de la nature de celle dont je suis porteur ne lui

etait encore parvenue et cela est pour ma mission une circonstance

favorable.

J’ai causé avec S. E. de la résistance que les chefs de l’armée

française en Espagne avaient toujours opposée aux ordres de V.

M. Il a declaré que tous avaient été mis sous vos ordres et sans

aucune restriction, qu’avant son départ l’empereur avait témoigné

son étonnement sur les doutes que manifestaient à cet égard les

lettres de V. M. et qu’il avait ordonné que l’on fit connaître ses

intentions d’une manière encore plus positive. J’ai cité la lettre ou

le maréchal Suchet s’autorise d’une phrase du Prince de Neufchatel,

celles du général Dorsenne et du général Caffarelli, il parait que

tous les obstacles qui pouvaient entraver l’exécution de vos ordres

ont été levés par des instructions adressées postérieurement aux

généraux en chef. Quant à la désobeissance formelle du maréchal

Soult S. E. a dit d’abord que V. M. avait le droit de lui ôter

le commandement, mais elle est convenue ensuite qu’une démarche

semblable ne pouvait être faite que par l’ordre exprès de l’empereur.

Le ministre est aussi entré dans quelques détails sur les affaires

militaires, les ordres donnés par V. M. et par le maréchal Jourdan

aux diverses époques de la campagne, ont eu, m’a-t-il dit,

l’approbation générale et ce qu’a écrit l’empereur depuis qu’il a

appris la bataille de Salamanque prouve qu’il donne entièrement droit

à V. M. l’opinion publique à cet égard est encore plus prononcée que

celle des hommes en place, et je ne puis exprimer à V. M. avec quelle

rigueur sont jugés en France les maréchaux Soult et Marmont.

Le duc de Feltre m’a parlé du mouvement sur Blasco Sancho. Peut-être

a-t-il dit, l’empereur reprochera un peu d’hésitation; exécuté deux

jours plutôt il aurait produit les plus heureux effets. V. M. se

rappelle que j’avais prévu cette objection et je ne serai point

embarrassé pour y répondre.

S. E. a cru que j’allais auprès de l’empereur pour solliciter de

nouveaux renforts; elle m’a dit que la guerre de Russie avait jusqu’à

présent absorbé tous les moyens, qu’il était loin de pouvoir envoyer

les troupes sur lesquelles paraissait compter M. le maréchal Jourdan,

que l’on pourrait seulement pourvoir à la perte matérielle faite par

l’armée de Portugal, il parait que les nouvelles troupes envoyées en

Espagne ne s’élélvent pas au-delà de vingt mille hommes, au reste la

grande victoire remportée par l’empereur fera probablement prendre

des dispositions plus favorables aux affaires de la Peninsule.

Le duc de Feltre à reçu des nouvelles du général Clauzel. Ce général

annonce que l’armée anglaise marche vers le nord, que lord Wellington

s’est de sa personne porté vers le Duero, que l’armée de Portugal

s’est ralliée, que ses pertes sont beaucoup moindres qu’on ne l’avait

cru, que le général Foy avait fait un mouvement pour délivrer Astorga

et Tordesillas, mais que déja ces deux places s’étaient rendues

que l’on pourrait accuser de faiblesse les deux gouverneurs et que

peut-être la conduite de celui de Tordesillas devait être jugée plus

sévèrement encore.

J’ai parlé au ministre de la position embarrassante dans laquelle

me mettait le décret du 26 Août, il a répondu que je pouvais sans

inconvénient me présenter à l’empereur avec les décorations du grade

que m’a donné V. M. que ce n’était point contre les officiers à

votre service que le décret avait été dirigé et qu’il serait modifié

en leur faveur.

J’ai l’honneur de prévenir V. M. que je partirai ce soir de Paris,

je poursuivrai sans m’arrêter ma route jusqu’au quartier général de

l’empereur.

J’ai l’honneur de mettre aux pieds de V. M. l’hommage de mon profond

respect et de mon entier dévouement.

(Signé) LE COLONEL DESPRES.

_Paris, 22 Septembre, 1812._

No. VI. A.

_Lettre confidentielle écrite au roi par monsieur le duc de Feltre._

_Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812._

SIRE,

La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m’a écrite de Requeña le 18 Octobre,

m’est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l’ai sur le champ

transmise à l’empereur qui ne la recevra toute fois que 19 jours

après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance ou

l’empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses sur lesquelles

la politique force à fermer les yeux: du moins momentanement. Si la

conduite de monsieur le marechal duc de Dalmatie est équivoque et

cauteleuse; si ses démarches présentent le même aspect que celles

qu’il paroît avoir faites et qui ont précédé l’abandon du Portugal

après la prise d’Oporto, il viendra un moment ou l’empereur pourra

l’en punir s’il le juge convenable, et peut-être est-il moins

dangereux où il est qu’il ne le serait ici où quelques factieux ont

pu du sein même des prisons qui les renfermaient méditer en l’absence

de l’empereur, une révolution contre l’empereur et sa dynastie,

et presque l’exécuter, le 2 et 3 Octobre dernier. Je pense donc,

sire, qu’il est prudent de ne pas pousser à bout le maréchal duc de

Dalmatie tout en contrariant sous main les démarches ambitieuses

qu’il pourrait tenter, et en s’assurant de la fidelité des principaux

officiers de l’armée du midi envers l’empereur et même de celle des

Espagnols qu’il traine à sa suite. L’arme du ridicule qu’il est

facile de manier en cette occasion suffira, ce me semble, pour

déjouer ses coupables projets s’ils existent, et le ramener à son

devoir, sauf à faire prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu’il

ne s’en écarte jamais.

Quoiqu’il en soit je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité

d’attendre les ordres de l’empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de

V. M. datée de Requeña le 18 Oct. Elle voit par la présente que je

partage ses sentimens sur l’objet dont elle traite; je viens d’être

assez heureux pour donner à l’empereur et a sa famille de nouvelles

preuves de ma fidelité et de mon attachement, et je suis assuré que

si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le 2 et 3 Octobre, elle

la trouvera conforme aux sentimens que je me suis fait un plaisir de

lui exprimer en faveur de l’empereur et de sa famille au moment ou

j’ai pris congé de V. M. à Luneville il y a quelques années, &c. &c.

_Note._—It is only necessary to add to this letter that

notwithstanding the duke of Feltre’s professions of attachment he was

soon afterwards one of the most zealous courtiers of the Bourbons and

the most bitter enemy of the emperor.

The constancy with which the duke of Dalmatia served that great man

is well known.

No. VI. B.

_Colonel Desprez to the King._

_Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813._

SIRE,

J’ai eu l’honneur d’annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. Mais

j’ai dû en me servant de la voie de l’estafette user d’une extrême

discrétion. La reine m’ayant conseillé de vous écrire avec quelque

détail et ayant daigné m’offrir de faire partir ma lettre par le

premier courier qu’elle expédierait, j’en profite pour rendre

compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une partie des

évènements dont j’ai été témoin.

Je suis arrivé à Moscou le 18 Octobre au soir. L’empereur venait

d’apprendre que l’avant garde commandée par le roi de Naples

avait été attaquée et forcée à la retraite avec une partie de son

artillerie. Déja le départ était résolu et les troupes se mettaient

en mouvement. On m’annonça à S. M. qui répondit d’abord d’une manière

peu favorable. Cependant au milieu de la nuit on me fit appeler. Je

remis à l’empereur les dépêches dont V. M. m’avait chargé, et sans

les ouvrir, il me questionna sur leur contenu. Puis il fit sur les

opérations de la campagne une partie des objections qu’avait prévues

V. M.

Il dit que le mouvement en faveur de l’armée de Portugal avait été

commencé trop tard, qu’il aurait pu être fait un mois plutôt, que

lui-même avait daté la conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance

lorsqu’en 1808 il avait sans hésiter quitté Madrid pour marcher aux

Anglais qui s’étaient avancés jusqu’à Valladolid. Je répondis que V.

M. s’était mise en marche peu d’heures après la division Palombini,

qu’elle avait dû attendre cette division pour conduire vers l’armée

de Portugal un renfort tel que le succès ne pût être douteux; qu’elle

avait d’autant moins cru devoir précipiter son mouvement, que M. le

maréchal Marmont avait écrit plusieurs fois qu’il se croyait trop

faible pour lutter seul contre l’armée Anglaise, que ce maréchal

avait été maître du tems, qu’il n’avait point été battu dans sa

position sur le Duero, mais bien sur un champ de bataille dans lequel

rien ne l’avait forcé de s’engager. L’empereur prétendit ensuite que

V. M. après avoir appris la perte de la bataille de Salamanque aurait

dû se porter sur le Duero et rallier l’armée de Portugal. Je rappelai

alors le mouvement fait du Guadarama vers Ségovie et la position

critique dans laquelle vous avez laissé la duc de Raguse qui avait

lui-même propose ce mouvement. L’empereur dit qu’il connaissait très

bien tous les reproches qu’à cet égard on pouvait faire au maréchal

Marmont. Il ajouta que l’armée du centre ayant fait sa retraite sur

Madrid elle aurait du garder plus longtems les défilés du Guadarama,

qu’on avait trop tôt passé le Tage, que du moins ce mouvement ayant

été resolu, il fallait ne point laisser de garnison au Retiro,

briser tous les affuts, emporter les aigles et bruler les effets

d’habillement; qu’il n’avait jamais considéré ce poste que comme

propre à contenir la population de Madrid, que l’ennemi étant maître

de la campagne, on devait l’abandonner et que de toutes les fautes de

la campagne c’était celle qu’il avait le moins conçue. Je répondis à

cette objection ainsi que j’en étais convenu avec V. M. L’empereur

en venant ensuite à la lettre du duc de Dalmatie me dit qu’elle

lui était déja parvenue par une autre voie, mais qu’il n’y avait

attaché aucune importance; que le maréchal Soult s’était trompé,

qu’il ne pouvait s’occuper de semblables _pauvretés_ dans un moment

où il _était à la tête de cinq cent mille hommes et faisait des

choses immenses_. Ce sont ses expressions, qu’au reste les soupçons

du duc de Dalmatie ne l’étonnaient que faiblement; que beaucoup de

généraux de l’armée d’Espagne les partageaient et pensaient que

V. M. préférait l’Espagne à la France; qu’il savait parfaitement

qu’elle avait le cœur françois mais que ceux qui la jugeaient par

ses discours devaient avoir une autre opinion. Il ajouta que le

maréchal Soult était la seule tête militaire qu’il eut en Espagne,

qu’il ne pouvait l’en retirer sans compromettre l’armée, que

d’ailleurs il devait être parfaitement tranquille sur ses intentions

puisqu’il venait d’apprendre par les journaux anglais qu’il évacuait

l’Andalousie et se réunissait aux armées du centre et d’Aragon, que

cette réunion opérée on devait être assez en force pour reprendre

l’offensive; que d’ailleurs il n’avait point d’ordres à envoyer,

qu’il ne savait point en donner de si loin, qu’il ne se dissimulait

point l’étendue du mal et qu’il regrettait plus que jamais que V.

M. n’ait point suivi le conseil qu’il lui avait donné de ne pas

retourner en Espagne; qu’il était inutile que je repartisse, que

je resterai à l’armée ou l’on m’emploieroit. J’insistai alors pour

être renvoyé à V. M. d’une manière qui parut faire sur l’empereur

quelque impression, et il finit par me dire que je serai expédié mais

que je ne pouvais l’être dans ce moment, qu’ayant besoin de repos

je resterais à Moscou, et que puisque j’étais officier du génie,

je serais chargé de diriger sous les ordres du duc de Trevise les

travaux et la défense du Kremlin. Je reçus en consequence un ordre

écrit du Prince de Neufchatel. Lorsqu’après l’entière évacuation de

Moscou le corps de M. le M. Mortier eut rejoint l’armée, je demandai

et j’obtins d’y rester attaché jusqu’à ce que je fusse expédié. Je

craignais que si je restais au quartier général on ne m’y désignât

des fonctions qui seraient un nouvel obstacle à mon retour. Je

pensai que peut-être on éviterait d’envoyer à V. M. un témoin des

évènements qui se passaient, et je préférai attendre qu’une occasion

favorable se présentât. Etant arrivé à Wilna peu de tems après

le départ de l’empereur, je demandai au duc de Bassano, et il me

donna l’autorisation de venir attendre des ordres à Paris. J’ai eu

l’honneur d’annoncer à V. M. dans un autre lettre que l’altération de

ma santé me forçait à suspendre mon retour en Espagne.