_The Introduction._
1. I have sent, Nicander, the reflections of some spare hours
concerning Hearing, digested into the following short essay, that
being out of the hands of governors and come to man’s estate, you may
know how to pay a proper attention to those who would advise you. For
that libertinism which some wild young fellows, for want of more happy
education, mistake for liberty, subjects them to harder tyrants than
their late tutors and masters, even to their own vicious inclinations,
which, as it were, break loose upon them. And as Herodotus observes of
women, that they put off modesty with their shift,[182] so some young
men lay aside with the badges of minority all the sense of shame or
fear, and divested of the garment of modesty which sat so well upon
them are covered with insolence. But you, who have often heard that
to follow God and to obey reason are all one, cannot but believe that
men of best sense in passing from minority to manhood do not throw
off the government, but simply change their governor. In the room of
some mercenary pedant, they receive that divine guide and governor
of human life, reason, under whose subjection alone men are properly
said to live in freedom. For they only live at their own will who have
learned to will as they ought; and that freedom of will which appears
in unconstrained appetites and unreasonable actions is mean and narrow,
and accompanied with much repentance.
2. For as newly naturalized citizens who were entire strangers and
aliens are apt to disrelish many administrations of the government;
while those who have previously lived in the country, bred up under
the constitution and acquainted with it, act without difficulty in
their several stations, well satisfied with their condition; in like
manner, a man should for a long time have been bred up in philosophy,
and accustomed from his earliest years to receive his lessons and
instruction mingled with philosophic reason, that so he may come at
last as a kind and familiar friend to philosophy, which alone can
array young men in the perfect manly robes and ornaments of reason.
Therefore, I believe, some directions concerning hearing will not be
ill received by you.
_Remarks about Hearing in general._
Of this Theophrastus affirms, that it is the most sensitive of all the
senses. For the several objects of sight, tasting, and feeling do not
excite in us so great disturbances and alterations as the sudden and
frightful noises which assault us only at the ears. Yet in reality this
sense is more rational than sensitive. For there are many organs and
other parts of the body which serve as avenues and inlets to the soul
to give admission to vice; there is but one passage of virtue into
young minds, and that is by the ears, provided they be preserved all
along free from the corruptions of flattery and untainted with lewd
discourses. For this reason Xenocrates was of opinion that children
ought to have a defence fitted to their ears rather than fencers or
prize-players, because the ears only of the latter suffered by the
blows, but the morals of the former were hurt and maimed by words. Not
that he thereby recommended deafness, or forbade that they should be
suffered to hear at all; but he advised only that debauchery might be
kept out, till better principles, like so many guardians appointed
by philosophy, had taken charge of that part which is so liable to
be drawn aside and corrupted by discourse. And Bias of old, being
ordered by Amasis to send him the best and withal the worst part of
the sacrifice, sent the tongue; because the greatest benefits and
disadvantages are derived to us thereby. Thus again many diverting
themselves with children touch their ears, bidding them return the like
again; by which they seem to intimate to them that such best deserve
their love and esteem whose obligations enter at the ears. This is
evident, that he that has lain fallow all his days, without tasting
instruction, will not only prove barren and unfruitful of virtue,
but very inclinable to vice; for an uncultivated mind, like untilled
ground, will soon be overrun with weeds. For if that violent propensity
of the mind to pleasure, and jealousy of all that carries any show of
pain,—which proceed not from external causes or received prejudices,
but are the natural springs of evil affections and infinite diseases
of the mind,—are suffered to take their course, and not restrained,
or diverted some other way by wholesome instructions, there can be no
beast so savage that it may not be called tame and civilized in respect
of such a man.
_More General Rules about Hearing._
3. Since then it appears that hearing is of so great use and no less
danger to young men, I think it a very commendable thing for such a one
to reflect continually with himself, and consult often with others, how
he may hear with benefit. And in this particular we may observe many to
have been mistaken, that they practise speaking before they have been
used enough to hearing. Speaking they think will require some study
and attention, but hearing cannot be a thing of any difficulty. Those
indeed who play the game of tennis learn at the same time how to throw
and how to catch the ball; but in the exercise of the tongue, we ought
to practise how to talk well before we pretend to return, as conception
and retention of the foetus precede childbirth. When fowls let fall
wind-eggs, it is usually said that they are the rudiments of imperfect
fruits which will never quicken and have life; and when young men
either hear not at all or retain not what they hear, their discourse
comes from them altogether as useless and full of wind,
And vain and unregarded turns to air.
In filling one vessel from another, they take care to incline and
turn it so that nothing be spilled, and that it may be really filling
and not emptying; but they think it not worth the heeding to regulate
their attention and apply themselves with advantage to a speaker, that
nothing of importance may fall beside or escape them. Yet, what is
beyond comparison ridiculous, if they happen upon any one who has a
knack at describing an entertainment or a show, or can relate his dream
well, or give an handsome account of a quarrel between himself and
another, such a one they hear with the greatest attention, they court
him to proceed, and importune him for every circumstance. Whereas, let
another call them about him for any thing useful, to exhort to what is
decent or reprehend what is irregular, or to make up a quarrel, they
have not temper enough to away with it, but they fight with all their
might to put him down by argument, if they are able, or if not, they
haste away to more agreeable fopperies; as if their ears, like faulty
earthen vessels, might be filled with any thing but what is useful or
valuable. But as jockeys take great care in breeding horses to bring
them to rein right and endure the bit, so such as have the care of
educating children should breed them to endure hearing, by allowing
them to speak little and hear much. And Spintharus, speaking in
commendation of Epaminondas, says he scarce ever met with any man who
knew more and spoke less. Some again make the observation, that Nature
has given every man two ears and but one tongue, as a secret intimation
that he ought to speak less than he hears.
_Directions concerning Attention._
4. Well then, silence is at all times a singular ornament of a youth,
but especially if he does not interrupt the speaker nor carp and except
at every thing he says, but patiently expects the conclusion, though
his discourse be none of the best; and when he has done, if he does not
presently come over him with an objection, but (as Aeschines directs)
allows time to add, if he please, to what has been said, or to alter,
or retract. Whereas such as turn too suddenly upon a speaker neither
hear nor are heard themselves, but senselessly chatter to one another,
and sin against the laws and rules of decorum. But he that brings along
with him a modest and unwearied attention has this advantage, that
whatever is beneficial in the discourse he makes his own, and he more
readily discovers what is false or impertinent, appearing all the while
a friend to truth rather than to squabbling or rashness. Therefore
it was not ill said, that such as design to infuse goodness into
the minds of youth must first exclude thence pride and self-conceit
more carefully than we squeeze air out of bladders which we wish to
fill with something useful; because, while they are puffed up with
arrogance, there is no room to admit any thing else.
5. Thus again, envy and detraction and prejudice are in no case good,
but always a great impediment to what is so; yet nowhere worse than
when they are made the bosom friends and counsellors of a hearer,
because they represent the best things to him as unpleasant and
impertinent, and men in such circumstances are pleased with any thing
rather than what deserves their applause. Yet he that grieves at the
wealth, glory, or beauty of any is but simply envious, for he repines
only at the good of others; but he that is ill-natured to a good
speaker is an enemy to his own happiness. For discourse to an hearer,
like light to the eye, is a great benefit, if he will make the best use
of it. Envy in all other instances carries this pretence with it, that
it is to be referred to the depraved and ungovernable affections of
the mind, but that which is conceived against a speaker arises from an
unjust presumption and vain-glorious affectation of praise.
In such a case, the man has not leisure to attend to what he hears;
his soul is in continual hurry and disturbance, at one time examining
her own habits and endowments, if any way inferior to the speaker;
anon, watching the behavior and inclination of others, if inclined to
praise or admire his discourse; disordered at the praise and enraged
at the company, if he meet with any encouragement. She easily lets
slip and willingly forgets what has been said, because the remembrance
is a pain and vexation to her; she hears what is to come with a great
deal of uneasiness and concern, and is never so desirous that the
speaker should hasten to an end, as when he discourses best. After all
is over, she considers not what was said, but has respect only to the
common vogue and disposition of the audience; she avoids and flies
like one distracted such as seem to be pleased, and herds among the
censorious and perverse. If she finds nothing to pervert, then she puts
forward other speakers, who (as she asserts) have spoken better and
with greater force of argument on the same subject. Thus, by abusing
and corrupting what was said, she defeats the use and effect of it on
herself.
6. He therefore who comes to hear must for the time come to a kind
of truce and accommodation with vain-glory, and preserve the same
evenness and cheerfulness of humor he would bring with him if he were
invited to a festival entertainment or the first-fruits’ sacrifice,
applauding the orator’s power when he speaks to the purpose, and where
he fails receiving kindly his readiness to communicate what he knows
and to persuade others by what wrought upon himself. Where he comes
off with success, he must not impute it to chance or peradventure,
but attribute all to study and diligence and art, not only admiring
but studiously emulating the like; where he has done amiss, he must
pry curiously into the causes and origin of the mistake. For what
Xenophon says of discreet house-keepers, that they make an advantage
of their enemies as well as their friends, is in some sort true of
vigilant and attentive hearers, who reap no less benefit from an ill
than a good orator. For the meanness and poverty of a thought, the
emptiness and flatness of an expression, the unseasonableness of a
figure, and the impertinence of falling into a foolish ecstasy of joy
or commendation, and the like, are better discovered by a by-stander
than by the speaker himself. Therefore his oversight or indiscretion
must be brought home to ourselves, that we may examine if nothing of
the same kind has skulked there and imposed on us all the while. For
there is nothing in the world more easy than to discover the faults
of others; but it is done to no effect if we do not make it useful to
ourselves in correcting and avoiding the like failures. When therefore
you animadvert upon other men’s miscarriages, forget not to put that
question of Plato to yourself, Am not I such another? We must trace out
our own way of writing in the discourses of other men, as in another’s
eyes we see the reflection of our own; that we may learn not to be too
free in censuring others, and may use more circumspection ourselves in
speaking. To this design the following method of comparison may be very
instrumental; if upon our return from hearing we take what seemed to
us not well or sufficiently handled, and attempt it afresh ourselves,
endeavoring to fill out one part or correct another, to vary this
or model that into a new form from the very beginning. And thus
Plato examined the oration of Lysias. For it is a thing of no great
difficulty to raise objections against another man’s oration,—nay,
it is a very easy matter,—but to produce a better in its place is a
work extremely troublesome; as the Spartan, who was told Philip had
demolished the city Olynthus, made this reply, But he cannot raise such
another. When then it appears, upon handling the same topic, that we do
not much excel those who undertook it before, this will abate much of
our censorious humor, and our pride and self-conceit will be exposed
and checked by such comparisons.
_Caution about Admiration._
7. To contempt is opposed admiration, which indeed argues a more
candid and better disposition; but even in this case no small care is
to be observed, and perhaps even greater. For although such as are
contemptuous and self-conceited receive but little good from what they
hear, yet the good-natured and such as are given to admire every thing
take a great deal of harm. And Heraclitus was not mistaken when he said
that a fool was put in a flutter at every thing he heard. We ought
indeed to use all the candor imaginable in praising the speaker, yet
withal as great caution in yielding our assent to what he says; to look
upon his expression and action with a favorable construction, but to
inspect the usefulness and truth of his doctrine with the nicest and
most critical judgment; that speakers may cease to be malicious, and
that what they say may do no mischief. For many false and dangerous
principles steal upon us through the authority of the speaker and our
own credulity. The Spartan Ephors, approving the judgment of one of
an ill conversation, ordered it to be communicated to the people by a
person of better life and reputation; thereby wisely and politicly
using them to give more deference to the morals than to the words of
such as pretend to advise them. But now in philosophy the reputation
of the speaker must be pulled off, and his words examined naked and
without a mask; for in hearing as in war there are many false alarms.
The hoary head of the speaker or his gesture, his magisterial look
or his assuming pride, and above all the noise and clapping of the
auditory, bear great sway with a raw and inexperienced hearer, who is
easily carried away with the tide. The very expression, if sweet and
full and representing things with some pomp and greatness, has a secret
power to impose upon us. For, as many lapses in such as sing to an
instrument escape the hearers, so luxuriancy and pomp of style dazzle
the hearer so that he cannot see clearly the argument in hand. And
Melanthius, as it is said, being asked his opinion concerning a tragedy
of Diogenes, made answer that the words intercepted his sight of it.
But most Sophists in their declamations and speeches not only make use
of words to veil and muffle their design; but with affected tone and
softness of voice they draw aside and bewitch their followers, for the
empty pleasure which they create reaping a more empty glory. So that
the saying of Dionysius is very applicable to them, who, being one day
extremely pleased with an harper that played excellently well before
him, promised the fellow a great reward, yet afterwards would give him
nothing, pretending he had kept his word; For, said he, as long as you
pleased me by your playing, so long were you pleased by hope of the
reward. And such also is the reward this kind of harangues bring to the
authors. The hearers admire as long as they are pleased and tickled,
but the satisfaction on one hand and glory on the other conclude with
the oration; and the hearers lose their time idly, and the speakers
their whole life.
_How to separate the Useful Part of a Discourse._
8. No, we must separate the trash and trumpery of an oration, that we
may come at the more fruitful and useful part; not imitating those
women who busy themselves in gathering nosegays and making garlands,
but the more useful industry of bees. The former indeed plat and weave
together the sweetest and gayest flowers, and their skill is mighty
pretty; but it lasts for one day only, and even then is of little or
no use; whereas the bees, passing by the beds of violets and roses and
hyacinth, fix on the prickly and biting thyme, and settle upon this
“intent on the yellow honey,”[183] and taking thence what they need
for their work, they fly home laden. In like manner, a well-meaning
sincere hearer ought to pass by the flowers of an oration, leaving
the gaudy show and theatrical part to entertain dronish Sophists;
and, diving into the very mind of the speaker and the sense of his
speech, he must draw thence what is necessary for his own service;
remembering withal that he is not come to the theatre or music-meeting,
but is present at the schools and auditories of philosophy, to learn
to rectify his way of life by what he hears. In order thereunto, he
ought to inspect diligently and try faithfully the state and temper of
his mind after hearing, if any of his affections are more moderate, if
any afflictions grow lighter, if his constancy and greatness of spirit
are confirmed, if he feels any divine emotions or inward workings of
virtue and goodness upon his soul. For it becomes us but ill, when we
rise from the barber’s chair, to be so long in consulting the mirror,
or to stroke our heads and examine so curiously the style in which our
hair is trimmed and dressed, and then, at our return from hearing in
the schools, to think it needless to look into ourselves, or examine
whether our own mind has discharged any turbulent or unprofitable
affections and is grown more sedate and serene. For, as Ariston was
wont to say, The bath and a discourse are of no use unless they are
purgative.
9. Let then a young man be pleased and entertained with a discourse;
but let him not make his pleasure the only end of hearing, nor think
he may come from the school of a philosopher singing and sportive; nor
let him call for perfumes and essences when he has need of a poultice
and fomentations. But let him learn to be thankful to him that purges
away the darkness and stupidity of his mind, though (as we clear
beehives by smoking) with an offensive or unpalatable discourse. For
though it lies upon a speaker to take some care that his expression be
pleasing and plausible, yet a hearer ought not to make that the first
thing he looks after. Afterward, indeed, when he has satisfied his
appetite with the substance and has taken breath, he may be allowed
the curiosity of examining the style and expression, whether it has
any thing delicate or extraordinary; as men quench their thirst before
they have time to admire the embossing of the bowl. But now such a one
as is not intent on the subject-matter, but demands merely that the
style shall be plain and pure Attic, is much of his foolish humor who
refuses an antidote unless it be mixed in Attic porcelain, or who will
not put on a coat in the winter because the cloth is not made of Attic
wool; but who can yet sit still, doing nothing and stirring not, under
such a thin and threadbare cloak as an oration of Lysias. That extreme
dearth of judgment and good sense, and that abundance of subtilty
and sophistry which is crept into the schools, is all owing to these
corruptions of the youngsters; who, observing neither the lives nor
public conversation of philosophers, mind nothing but words and jingle,
and express themselves extravagantly upon what they think well said,
without ever understanding or enquiring if it be useful and necessary,
or needless and vain.
_Of asking Questions._
10. After this, it will be convenient to lay down some directions
touching asking of questions. For it is true, he that comes to a great
collation must eat what is set before him, not rudely calling for what
is not to be had nor finding fault with the provision. But he that
is invited to partake of a discourse, if it be with that proviso,
must hear with silence; for such disagreeable hearers as occasion
digressions by asking impertinent questions and starting foolish
doubts are an hindrance both to the speaker and the discourse, without
benefiting themselves. But when the speaker encourages them to propose
their objections, he must take care that the question be of some
consequence. The suitors in Homer scorned and derided Ulysses.—
To no brave prize aspired the worthless swain,
’Twas but for scraps he asked, and asked in vain,[184]
because they thought it required a great and heroic soul no less to
ask than to bestow great gifts. But there is much better reason to
slight and laugh at such a hearer as can please himself in asking
little trifling questions. Thus some young fellows, to proclaim their
smattering in logic and mathematics, upon all occasions enquire
about the divisibility of the infinite, or about motion through a
diagonal or upon the sides. But we may answer them with Philotimus,
who, being asked by a consumptive phthisical person for a remedy
against a whitlow, and perceiving the condition he was in by his
color and his shortness of breath, replied, Sir, you have no reason
to be apprehensive of that. So we must tell them, You have no reason,
young gentlemen, to trouble yourselves about these questions; but
how to shake off your conceit and arrogance, to have done with your
intrigues and fopperies, and to settle immediately upon a modest and
well-governed course of life, is the question for you.
11. Great regard is to be had also to the genius and talent of a
speaker, that we may enquire about such things as are in his way, and
not take him out of his knowledge; as if one should propose physical or
mathematical queries to a moral philosophy reader, or apply himself to
one who prides himself on his knowledge of physics to give his opinion
on conditional propositions or to resolve a fallacy in logic. For,
as he that goes about to cleave wood with a key or to unlock a door
with an axe does not so much mis-employ those instruments as deprive
himself of the proper use of them, so such as are not content with what
a speaker offers them, but call for such things as he is a stranger
to, not only are disappointed, but incur the suspicion of malice and
ill-nature.
12. Be cautious also how you ask questions yourself, or ask too often;
for that betrays somewhat of conceit and ostentation. But to wait
civilly while another proposes his scruples argues a studious spirit
and willingness that others should be informed, unless some sudden
perturbation of mind require to be repressed or some distemper to
be assuaged. For perhaps, as Heraclitus says, it is an ill thing to
conceal even a man’s ignorance; it must be laid open, that the remedy
may be applied. So also if anger or superstition or a violent quarrel
with your domestics or the mad passion of love,—
Which doth the very heart-strings move,
That ne’er were stirred before,—
excite any commotion in your mind, you are not, for fear of being
galled by reproof, to fly to such as are treating of other arguments;
but you must frequent those places where your particular case is
stating, and after lecture address yourself privately to the speaker
for better information and fuller satisfaction therein. On the
contrary, men commonly flatter themselves, and admire the philosopher
so long as he discourses of indifferent things; but if he come home
to themselves and deal freely with them about their real interests,
this they think is beyond all enduring, or at best a needless piece
of supererogation. For they naturally think that they ought to
hear philosophy in the schools, like actors on the stage, while in
matters out of the school they believe them to be no better men than
themselves; and, to confess the truth, they have but reason to think so
of many Sophists, who, having once left the desk and laid aside their
books, in the serious concerns of human life are utterly insignificant
and even more ignorant than the vulgar. But they do not know that even
the austerity or raillery of real philosophers, their very nod or look,
their smile or frown, and especially their admonitions directed to
particular persons, are of weighty importance to such as can brook or
attend to them.
_Directions concerning Praising._
13. As for commendation, some caution and mean is to be observed in it;
because to be either deficient or excessive in that particular shows
a base spirit. He is but a morose and rigid hearer whom no part of an
oration can work upon or move, one who is full of a secret presumptuous
opinion of himself, and of an inbred conceit that he could do better
things himself; one who dares not alter his countenance as occasion
requires, or let fall the least word to testify his good wishes, but
with silence and affected gravity hunts after the reputation of a
sagacious and profound person, and thinks that all the praise is lost
to himself which he bestows on others, as if it were money. For many
wrest that sentence of Pythagoras, who used to say that he had learned
by philosophy to admire nothing; but these men think that to admire
nobody and to honor nobody consists in despising everybody, and they
aim at seeming grave by being contemptuous. Philosophy indeed removes
that foolish admiration and surprise which proceeds from doubt or
ignorance, by laying open to us the causes of things, but endeavors not
to destroy all good-nature and humanity. And those who are truly good
take it for their greatest honor and commendation to be just in paying
honor and commendation where it is due to others; and for a man to
adorn another is a most glorious ornament, proceeding from a generous
abundance of glory and honor in himself; while those who are niggardly
in praising others only betray how poor and bare they are of praises at
home.
_Not to be too prone to commend._
Yet to use no consideration at all, but to stand up and make a
clamor at every word or syllable, is to offend in the other extreme.
Such fluttering fellows for the most part oblige not the speakers
themselves, and are always a plague and common grievance to the
hearers, exciting them many times against their inclination, and
forcing them for very shame to join in the tumult. In the end, he that
raised the disturbance receives no benefit by the discourse, but goes
away with the character of a scoffer or flatterer or novice. A judge,
it is true, ought to hear and determine without favor or ill-will,
regarding only what is just and equitable; but in philosophical
proceedings the case is altered, where neither law nor oaths tie us up
from being favorable to the speaker. And the ancients in their temples
were wont to place the statue of Mercury among the Graces, intimating
that orators ought to find a propitious and good-natured audience. For
they thought it passed all belief, that any man could prove so much a
blockhead or come so wide of the purpose, that, though he should make
no remarks of his own and quote none of others worthy taking notice
of, or though the argument and design of his discourse might not be
commendable, yet at least the order and disposition or the style should
not deserve some applause;—
As oft amidst the furze and thorny brakes
The tender violets more securely peep.
For if some have undertaken successfully to speak in commendation of
vomiting or a fever, and have even made an encomium on a porridge-pot
not without some acceptance, certainly a discourse from one that has
the least pretence to philosophy cannot but afford some opportunity,
though it be a slight one, for commendation to a well-disposed
auditory. Plato says that all who are in their bloom in some way
excite the amorous man;—the fair are the children of the Gods, the
black are manly, the hook-nosed have a look of majesty, the flat-nose
gives a graceful air, even the sallow complexion is complimented for
looking like honey; in spite of all their defects, he cherishes and
loves them all.[185] Thus love, like ivy, must needs find something or
other to lay hold on. But much more will a studious hearer and scholar
be sure to find some not unworthy reason for praising every speaker.
For Plato in an oration of Lysias, disliking the invention and utterly
condemning the disposition as confused, yet praised the style and
elocution, because every word was wrought off cleverly and cleanly
turned. Thus a man may see cause enough to disapprove the argument of
Archilochus, the verse of Parmenides, the poverty of Phocylides, the
eternal talk of Euripides, and inequality of style in Sophocles; and
among the orators, one has no manner, another is not moving, a third
has nothing of ornament; yet every one has his peculiar power of moving
and exciting, for which he is praised. Some again do not require of
us to testify our acceptance by the voice; a pleasing eye or cheerful
look, or a behavior without any thing of pain or uneasiness, is all
that they desire. For the following favors are nowadays bestowed of
course upon every oration, though the speaker may speak to no purpose
at all,—sitting modestly without lolling from one side to the other,
looking earnestly on the speaker, in the posture of an attentive
listener, and with a countenance which betrays not only no contempt or
ill-will but not even a mind otherwise employed. For as the beauty and
excellence of every thing consists in the concurrence of many different
accidents, which contribute to the symmetry and harmony of the whole,
so that, if but one inconsiderable part be away or absurdly added,
deformity immediately follows; in like manner, not only a supercilious
look or forbidding mien or roving eyes or waving the body to and fro or
indecent crossing of the legs, but even a nod, a whisper to another, a
scornful smile, a sleepy yawn, hanging of the head, or the like, are
all likewise great indecorums and to be avoided with particular care.
14. Yet some there are who can assign a speaker his part, and think no
duty incumbent on themselves all the while; who will have him prepare
and premeditate what he has to deliver, and yet throw themselves into
an auditory without any preparation or consideration, as if they were
invited to a feast, to revel and take their pleasures at another’s
cost. Yet it is known that even a guest has some things required of him
to make him suitable and agreeable, and certainly a hearer has much
more; because he ought to be a sharer in the discourse and an assistant
to the speaker. Neither will it become him to be severe at all turns
upon every slight miscarriage or perpetually putting the speaker’s
elocution and action to the test, while he himself is guilty of grosser
enormities in hearing, without danger or control. But as at tennis he
that takes the ball turns and winds his body according to the motion
of the server, so a kind of proportion is to be observed between the
speaker and the hearer, if both will discharge their several duties.
_Care to be observed in Praising Persons of all Qualities._
15. Neither ought we to use any expressions of praise indifferently.
For it is an ill thing which Epicurus relates, that, upon reading any
epistles from his friends, those about him broke out into tumultuous
applauses; and such as daily introduce new forms into our auditories,
as Divinely said! Superhuman! Inimitable! (as if those used by
Plato, Socrates, and Hyperides, Well! Wisely! Truly said! were not
sufficiently expressive), exceed the bounds of decency and modesty,
nay indeed, do but affront the speaker, as though he were fond of such
extravagant praises. Nor are they less odious and troublesome who
confirm approbation with impertinent oaths, as if they were giving
their testimony for a speaker in a court of judicature. And so likewise
is it with such as observe not to give just deference to the quality
of persons, who to a philosopher are apt to cry out, Smartly said! or
to a reverend gentleman, Wittily! Floridly! applying to philosophy
such trifles as are proper to scholastic exercises and declamations,
and giving meretricious applause to a sober discourse,—as if a man
should compliment the conqueror in the Olympic games with a garland of
lilies or roses, instead of laurel or wild olive. Euripides the poet
one day at a rehearsal instructing the chorus in a part that was set
to a serious air, one of the company unexpectedly fell out a laughing;
Sir, said he, unless you were very stupid and insensible, you could
not laugh while I sing in the grave mixolydian mood. In like manner a
master of philosophy and politics may put a stop to the unseasonable
levity and pertness of a youngster, by telling him, You seem to be a
madman and unacquainted with all manner of civility, otherwise you
would not hum over your tunes or practise your new steps while I am
discoursing of Gods, or the laws, or the supreme magistrate. For
consider seriously what a very scandalous thing it is that, while a
philosopher is in his discourse, the passengers in the street, from
the clamor and hooting of the hearers, should have reason to make it
a question whether some piper or harper or morris-dancer were got in
among them.
_Of bearing Admonitions and Reproofs._
16. Admonitions and reprimands ought to be taken neither altogether
insensibly nor yet sheepishly. For such as carry off a disgrace from
a philosopher carelessly and without due concern, so as to grin at
his reprehensions or scoffingly to praise him for them, as sharping
parasites applaud the scurrilous reflection of their cullies,—such,
I say, are shameless and insolent, and betray only their invincible
impudence, which is no good or true argument of courage. Yet to
bear handsomely without passion an innocent jest in raillery is not
unbecoming the breeding of a gentleman, but a good accomplishment and
altogether worthy of a Spartan. But when an exhortation to amendment
of manners, like a bitter potion, is made up of harsh and unpleasant
words, in such a case for a youth—instead of hearing submissively
and running into a sweat or being seized with dizziness, when the
mind is on fire with shame and confusion—to remain unmoved or sneer
or dissemble his concernment is the certain sign of a dissolute and
ill-bred man, one whose soul, like callous flesh, being hardened with
a course of debauchery, will receive no scar or impression. Some young
men indeed there are of a contrary disposition, who having undergone
one rebuke fly off without ever looking back, turn renegades, and
quite desert philosophy. These being naturally very modest have a
good disposition toward an healthful habit of mind, but vitiate it by
too much tenderness and effeminacy, which disables them for bearing
a reproof or manfully submitting to a correction, and run after more
pleasing harangues wherewith some flatterers and Sophists soothe and
bewitch them, without any benefit or advantage. For as he that flies
from the surgeon after incision, and will not suffer the ligature to
be applied, endures that part of his skill only which is painful,
rejecting what would give him ease; so such a one as being lanced and
scarified by a sharp oration has not patience till the wound be skinned
over, goes away from philosophy tortured and harassed, without that
benefit he might receive thereby. For not only Telephus’s wound was
cured by rusty filings of the spear (as Euripides has it), but whatever
pain philosophy may occasion to a meek disposition will be cured and
removed by the same discourse that gave the wound. He therefore that is
reprehended must endure awhile and away with some pain, not presently
be discouraged or out of heart. Let him behave himself as though he
were to be initiated into the mysteries of philosophy, still hoping,
after the lustrations and more troublesome ceremonies are undergone,
he shall enjoy some considerable effect of his present troubles and
inconveniences. Or suppose he be wrongfully chidden, it is but handsome
to expect the conclusion; after that he may make his defence, and
desire that such freedom and violence may be reserved to repress some
other misdemeanor which really deserves it.
_The Difficulties in Philosophy vincible._
17. But besides this,—as in grammar, music, and the exercises of
activity, there are many things which to young beginners appear
troublesome, laborious, and obscure, which yet a fuller knowledge, like
acquaintance among men, makes more agreeable, ready, and feasible,—in
like manner, though philosophy in its first terms and notions may
seem uncouth and strange, yet a man must not be so far discouraged at
the first elements as to throw it up altogether, but he must bid at
all and ply his business hard and patiently expect that acquaintance
which will make all easy and pleasant; and that will not be long in
coming, bringing great light into things and exciting ardent affections
to virtue; without which to endure to live, after one has through
his own effeminacy fallen from philosophy, is an argument of a mean
spirit and servile disposition. I must confess there is some difficulty
in the things themselves which is not easily conquered by raw and
unexperienced beginners; yet the greatest part of the difficulty they
bring upon themselves by their own ignorance and inadvertency, falling
into the same error from two contrary causes. For some, out of a
foolish bashfulness and desire to be easy to the speaker, are loath to
be inquisitive or have the thing made plain to them, and so they nod
their assent to every thing that is said, as if they fully comprehended
it. And others out of unseasonable vain-glory, and vying with their
fellows that they may vaunt their readiness of wit and quickness of
apprehension, pretend to understand things before they do, and never
understand them at all. Now the consequence in both cases is this; the
modest go away in a great deal of anxiety and doubt, and are forced in
the end, with greater disgrace, to interrupt the speaker to be informed
again; and the vain-glorious are troubled to keep close and conceal the
ignorance they carry about them.
18. Therefore all such sheepishness and self-conceit being set aside,
let us learn to lay up in our minds whatever is usefully said, enduring
to be laughed at by such as set up for wits and railers. This course
took Cleanthes and Xenocrates, who being somewhat slower than their
fellows did not therefore give over hearing or despond; but prevented
the jests of others, by comparing themselves to narrow-mouthed vessels
and to copper plates; because, though they received learning with some
difficulty, yet they retained it surely. For he that will be a good man
must not only, as Phocylides says,—