If a man should jeer you and say that you are a dunce and illiterate,
upon this motive you ought to apply your mind to the taking of pains
in the study of philosophy and all kinds of learning. If he abuses you
for a coward, then raise up your mind to a courageous manliness and
an undaunted boldness of spirit. If he tells you you are lascivious
and wanton, this scandal may be wiped off by having your mind barred
up against all impressions of lust, and your discourse free from the
least obscenity. These are allowable returns, and the most cutting
strokes you can give your enemy; there being nothing that carries in it
more vexation and disgrace, than that scandalous censures should fall
back upon the head of him who was the first author of them. For as the
beams of the sun reverberated do most severely affect and punish weak
eyes, so those calumnies are most vexatious and intolerable which truth
retorts back upon their first broachers. For as the north-east wind
gathers clouds, so does a vicious life gather unto itself opprobrious
speeches.
5. Insomuch that Plato, when he was in company with any persons that
were guilty of unhandsome actions, was wont thus to reflect upon
himself and ask this question, Am I of the like temper and disposition
with these men? In like manner, whosoever passes a hard censure upon
another man’s life should presently make use of self-examination, and
enquire what his own is; by which means he will come to know what
his failings are, and how to amend them. Thus the very censures and
backbitings of his enemy will redound to his advantage, although in
itself this censorious humor is a very vain, empty, and useless thing.
For every one will laugh at and deride that man who is humpbacked and
baldpated, while at the same time he makes sport with the natural
deformities of his brethren; it being a very ridiculous unaccountable
thing to scoff at another for those very imperfections for which you
yourself may be abused. As Leo Byzantinus replied upon the humpbacked
man, who in drollery reflected on the weakness of his eyes, You mock me
for a human infirmity, but you bear the marks of divine vengeance on
your own back.
Wherefore no man should arraign another of adultery, when he himself
is addicted to a more bestial vice. Neither may one man justly accuse
another of extravagance or looseness, when he himself is stingy and
covetous. Alcmaeon told Adrastus, that he was near akin to a woman
that killed her husband; to which Adrastus gave a very pat and sharp
answer,—Thou with thy own hands didst murder thy mother.[129] After
the same sarcastical way of jesting did Domitius ask Crassus whether
he did not weep for the death of the lamprey that was bred in his
fish-pond; to which Crassus makes this present reply,—But have I not
heard that you did not weep when you carried out three wives to their
burial.
Whence we may infer that it behooves every man who takes upon him to
correct or censure another not to be too clamorous or merry upon his
faults, but to be guilty of no such crime as may expose him to the
chastisement and reproach of others. For the great God seems to have
given that commandment of _Know thyself_ to those men more especially
who are apt to make remarks upon other men’s actions and forget
themselves. So, as Sophocles hath well observed, They often hear that
which they would not, because they allow themselves the liberty of
talking what they please.
6. This is the use that may be lawfully made of censuring and judging
our enemies; that we may be sure we are not culpable for the same
misdemeanors which we condemn in them. On the contrary, we may reap
no less advantage from our being judged and censured by our enemies.
In this case Antisthenes spake incomparably well, that if a man
would lead a secure and blameless life, it was necessary that he
should have either very ingenuous and honest friends, or very furious
enemies, because the first would keep him from sinning by their kind
admonitions, the latter by their evil words and vehement invectives.
But for as much as in these times friendship is grown almost
speechless, and hath left off that freedom it did once use, since it is
loquacious in flattery and dumb in admonition, therefore we must expect
to hear truth only from the mouths of enemies. As Telephus, when he
could find no physician that he could confide in as his friend, thought
his adversary’s lance would most probably heal his wound; so he that
hath no friend to give him advice and to reprove him in what he acts
amiss must bear patiently the rebukes of an enemy, and thereby learn to
amend the errors of his ways; considering seriously the object which
these severe censures aim at, and not what the person is who makes
them. For as he who designed the death of Prometheus the Thessalian,
instead of giving the fatal blow, only lanced a swelling that he had,
which did really preserve his life and free him from the hazard of
approaching death; just so may the harsh reprehensions of enemies
cure some distempers of the mind that were before either unknown or
neglected, though these angry speeches do originally proceed from
malice and ill-will. But many, when they are accused of a crime, do not
consider whether they are guilty of the matter alleged against them,
but are rather solicitous whether the accuser hath nothing that may be
laid to his charge; like the combatants in a match at wrestling, they
take no care to wipe off the dirt that sticks upon them, but they go on
to besmear one another, and in their mutual strugglings they wallow and
tumble into more dirt and filthiness.
It is a matter of greater importance and concern to a man when he is
lashed by the slanders of an enemy, by living virtuously to prevent
and avert all objections that may be made against his life, than it
is to scour the spots out of his clothes when they are shown him. And
even if any man with opprobrious language object to you crimes you
know nothing of, you ought to enquire into the causes and reasons
of such false accusations, that you may learn to take heed for the
future and be very wary, lest unwittingly you should commit those
offences that are unjustly attributed to you, or something that comes
near them. Lacydes, king of the Argives, was abused as an effeminate
person, because he wore his hair long, used to dress himself neatly,
and his mien was finical. So Pompey, though he was very far from any
effeminate softness, yet was reflected upon and jeered for being used
to scratch his head with one of his fingers. Crassus also suffered
much in the like kind, because sometimes he visited a vestal virgin
and showed great attention to her, having a design to purchase of her
a little farm that lay conveniently for him. So Postumia was suspected
of unchaste actions, and was even brought to trial, because she would
often be very cheerful and discourse freely in men’s company. But she
was found clear of all manner of guilt in that nature. Nevertheless at
her dismission, Spurius Minucius the Pontifex Maximus gave her this
good admonition, that her words should be always as pure, chaste,
and modest as her life was. Themistocles, though he had offended in
nothing, yet was suspected of treachery with Pausanias, because he
corresponded familiarly with him, and used every day to send him
letters and messengers.
7. Whenever then any thing is spoken against you that is not true, do
not pass it by or despise it because it is false, but forthwith examine
yourself, and consider what you have said or done, what you have ever
undertaken, or what converse you have ever had that may have given
likelihood to the slander; and when this is discovered, decline for the
future all things that may provoke any reproachful or foul language
from others.
For if troubles and difficulties, into which some men fall either by
chance or through their own inadvertency and rashness, may teach others
what is fit and safe for them to do,—as Merope says.
Fortune hath taken for her salary
My dearest goods, but wisdom she hath given;[130]
why should not we take an enemy for our tutor, who will instruct us
gratis in those things we knew not before? For an enemy sees and
understands more in matters relating to us than our friends do; because
love is blind, as Plato[131] says, in discerning the imperfections of
the thing beloved. But spite, malice, ill-will, wrath, and contempt
talk much, are very inquisitive and quick-sighted. When Hiero was
upbraided by his enemy for having a stinking breath, he returned home
and demanded of his wife why she had not acquainted him with it. The
innocent good woman makes this answer: I thought all men’s breath had
that smell. For those things in men that are conspicuous to all are
sooner understood from the information of enemies than from that of
friends and acquaintance.
8. Furthermore, an exact government of the tongue is a strong evidence
of a good mind, and no inconsiderable part of virtue. But since every
man naturally is desirous to propagate his conceits, and without a
painful force can not smother his resentments, it is no easy task to
keep this unruly member in due subjection, unless such an impetuous
affection as anger be thoroughly subdued by much exercise, care, and
study. For such things as “saying let fall against our will,” or “a
word flying by the range of our teeth,”[132] or “a speech escaping us
by accident,” are all likely to happen to those whose ill-exercised
minds (as it were) fall and waste away, and whose course of life
is licentious; and we may attribute this to hasty passion or to
unsettled judgment. For divine Plato tells us that for a word, which
is the lightest of all things, both Gods and men inflict the heaviest
penalties.[133] But silence, which can never be called to account,
doth not only, as Hippocrates hath observed, extinguish thirst, but it
bears up against all manner of slanders with the constancy of Socrates
and the courage of Hercules, who was no more concerned than a fly at
what others said or did. Now it is certainly not grander or better than
this for a man to bear silently and quietly the revilings of an enemy,
taking care not to provoke him, as if he were swimming by a dangerous
rock; but the practice is better. For whosoever is thus accustomed to
endure patiently the scoffs of an enemy will, without any disturbance
or trouble, bear with the chidings of a wife, the rebukes of a friend,
or the sharper reproofs of a brother. When a father or mother corrects
you, you will not be refractory or stubborn under the rod. Xanthippe,
though she was a woman of a very angry and troublesome spirit, could
never move Socrates to a passion. By being used to bear patiently this
heavy sufferance at home, he was ever unconcerned, and not in the least
moved by the most scurrilous and abusive tongues he met withal abroad.
For it is much better to overcome boisterous passions and to bring the
mind into a calm and even frame of spirit, by contentedly undergoing
the scoffs, outrages, and affronts of enemies, than to be stirred up to
choler or revenge by the worst they can say or do.
9. Thus we may show a meek and gentle temper and a submissive bearing
of evil in our enmities; and even integrity, magnanimity, and goodness
of disposition are also more conspicuous here than in friendship. For
it is not so honorable and virtuous to do a friend a kindness, as it is
unworthy and base to omit this good office when he stands in need; but
it is an eminent piece of humanity, and a manifest token of a nature
truly generous, to put up with the affronts of an enemy when you have a
fair opportunity to revenge them. For if any one sympathizes with his
enemy in his affliction, relieves him in his necessities, and is ready
to assist his sons and family if they desire it, any one that will
not love this man for his compassion, and highly commend him for his
charity, “must have a black heart made of adamant or iron,” as Pindar
says.
When Caesar made an edict that the statues of Pompey which were
tumbled down should be rebuilt and restored to their former beauty and
magnificence, Tully tells him that by setting up again Pompey’s statues
he has erected one for himself, an everlasting monument of praise and
honor to after ages. So that we must give to every one his due, to an
enemy such respect and honor as he truly deserves. Thus a man that
praises his enemy for his real deserts shall himself obtain the more
honor by it; and whenever he shall correct or censure him, he will be
credited in what he does, because every one will believe that he does
it out of a dislike and just abhorrence of his vice and not of his
person.
By this practice we shall be brought at length to perform the most
honorable and worthy actions; for he who is wont to praise and speak
the best things of his enemies will never repine at the prosperity or
success of his friends and acquaintance; he is never troubled, but
rather rejoices, when they thrive and are happy. And what virtue can
any man exercise that will be more profitable and delightful to him
than this, which takes away from him the bitterness of malice, and doth
not only break the teeth of envy, but, by teaching him to rejoice at
another man’s felicity, doth double his own enjoyment and satisfaction.
As in war many things, although they are bad and evil in themselves,
yet have become necessary, and by long custom and prescription have
obtained the validity of a law, so that it is not easy to root them
out, even by those who thereby suffer much harm; just so doth enmity
usher in the mind a long train of vices, meagre envy coupled with
grim hatred, restless jealousy and suspicion, unnatural joy at other
men’s miseries, and a long remembrance of injuries. Fraud, deceit,
and snares, joined to these forces of wickedness, work infinite
mischief in the world, yet they appear as no evils at all when they
are exerted against an enemy. By this means they make a deep entrance
into the mind; they get fast hold of it, and are hardly shaken off. So
that, unless we forbear the practice of these ill qualities towards
our enemies, they will by frequent acts become so habitual to us,
that we shall be apt to make use of them to the manifest wrong and
injury of our friends. Wherefore, if Pythagoras was highly esteemed
for instructing his disciples to avoid all manner of cruelty against
beasts themselves,—so that he himself would redeem them out of their
captivity in either the fowler’s or the fisherman’s net, and forbade
his followers to kill any creature,—it is surely much better and more
manly in our differences with men to show ourselves generous, just,
and detesters of all falsehood, and to moderate and correct all base,
unworthy, and hurtful passions; that in all our conversation with our
friends we may be open-hearted, and that we may not seek to overreach
or deceive others in any of our dealings.
For Scaurus was a professed enemy and an open accuser of Domitius;
whereupon a treacherous servant of Domitius comes to Scaurus before
the cause was to be heard, and tells him that he has a secret to
communicate to him in relation to the present suit, which he knows
not of, and which may be very advantageous on his side. Yet Scaurus
would not permit him to speak a word, but apprehended him, and sent
him back to his master. And when Cato was prosecuting Murena for
bribery, and was collecting evidence to support his charge, he was
accompanied (according to custom) by certain persons in the interest
of the defendant, who watched his transactions. These often asked him
in the morning, whether he intended on that day to collect evidence or
make other preparation for the trial; and so soon as he told them he
should not, they put such trust in him that they went their way. This
was a plain demonstration of the extraordinary deference and honor they
paid to Cato; but a far greater testimony, and one surpassing all the
rest, is it to prove that, if we accustom ourselves to deal justly and
uprightly with our enemies, then we shall not fail to behave ourselves
so towards our friends.
10. Simonides was wont to say that there was no lark without its
crest; so the disposition of men is naturally pregnant with strife,
suspicion, and envy, which last (as Pindar observes) is “the companion
of empty-brained men.” Therefore no man can do any thing that will tend
more to his own profit and the preservation of his peace than utterly
to purge out of his mind these corrupt affections, and cast them off as
the very sink of all iniquity, that they may create no more mischief
between him and his friends. This Onomademus, a judicious and wise
man, understood well, who, when he was of the prevailing side in a
civil commotion at Chios, gave this counsel to his friends, that they
should not quite destroy or drive away those of the adverse party,
but let some abide there, for fear they should begin to fall out among
themselves as soon as their enemies were all out of the way. Therefore,
if these uneasy dispositions of the mind be spent and consumed upon
enemies, they would never molest or disquiet our friends. Neither doth
Hesiod approve of one potter or one singer’s envying another, or that
a neighbor or relation or brother should resent it ill that another
prospers and is successful in the world.[134] But if there be no other
way whereby we may be delivered from emulation, envy, or contention,
we may suffer our minds to vent these passions upon the prosperity of
our enemies, and whet the edge and sharpen the point of our anger upon
them. For as gardeners that have knowledge and experience in plants
expect their roses and violets should grow the better by being set
near leeks and onions,—because all the sour juices of the earth are
conveyed into these,—so an enemy by attracting to himself our vicious
and peevish qualities, may render us less humorsome and more candid and
ingenuous to our friends that are in a better or more happy state than
ourselves.
Wherefore let us enter the lists with our enemies, and contend with
them for true glory, lawful empire, and just gain. Let us not so much
debase ourselves as to be troubled and fret at any possessions they
enjoy more than we have. Let us rather carefully observe those good
qualities wherein our enemies excel us, so that by these motives we may
be excited to outdo them in honest diligence, indefatigable industry,
prudent caution, and exemplary sobriety; as Themistocles complained
that the victory Miltiades got at Marathon would not let him sleep.
But whosoever views his adversary exalted far above him in dignities,
in pleading of great causes, in administration of state affairs, or
in favor and friendship with princes, and doth not put forth all
his strength and power to get before him in these things,—this man
commonly pines away, and by degrees sinks into the sloth and misery
of an envious and inactive life. And we may observe, that envy and
hatred do raise such clouds in the understanding, that a man shall not
be able to pass a right judgment concerning things which he hates;
but whosoever with an impartial eye beholds, and with a sincere mind
judges, the life and manners, discourses, and actions of his enemy,
will soon understand that many of those things that raise his envy were
gotten by honest care, a discreet providence, and virtuous deeds. Thus
the love of honorable and brave actions may be kindled and advanced in
him, and an idle and lazy course of life may be contemned and forsaken.
11. But if our enemies arrive at high places in the courts of princes
by flattery or frauds, by bribery or gifts, we should not be troubled
at it, but should rather be pleased in comparing our undisguised and
honest way of living with theirs which is quite contrary. For Plato,
who was a competent judge, was of opinion that virtue was a more
valuable treasure than all the riches above the earth or all the mines
beneath it. And we ought evermore to have in readiness this saying of
Solon:[135] But we will not give up our virtue in exchange for their
wealth. So will we never give up our virtue for the applause of crowded
theatres, which may be won by a feast, nor for the loftiest seats among
eunuchs, concubines, and royal satraps. For nothing that is worth any
one’s appetite, nothing that is handsome or becoming a man, can proceed
from that which is in itself evil and base. But, as Plato repeats once
and again, the lover cannot see the faults of the thing or person that
he loves, and we apprehend soonest what our enemies do amiss; therefore
we must let neither our joy at their miscarriages nor our sorrow at
their successes be idle and useless to ourselves, but we are bound to
consider in both respects, how we may render ourselves better than they
are, by avoiding what is faulty and vicious in them, and how we may not
prove worse than they, if we imitate them in what they do excel.