ARISTOCRACY
We have here two quite distinct moral persons, the government and
the Sovereign, and in consequence two general wills, one general in
relation to all the citizens, the other only for the members of the
administration. Thus, although the government may regulate its internal
policy as it pleases, it can never speak to the people save in the
name of the Sovereign, that is, of the people itself, a fact which must
not be forgotten.
The first societies governed themselves aristocratically. The heads
of families took counsel together on public affairs. The young bowed
without question to the authority of experience. Hence such names
as _priests, elders, senate_, and _gerontes_. The savages of North
America govern themselves in this way even now, and their government is
admirable.
But, in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions
became predominant over natural inequality, riches or power[1] were put
before age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission
of the father's power along with his goods to his children, by creating
patrician families, made government hereditary, and there came to be
senators of twenty.
There are then three sorts of aristocracy--natural, elective and
hereditary. The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the
worst of all governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy
properly so called.
Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two
powers, it presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular
government, all the citizens are born magistrates; but here magistracy
is confined to a few, who become such only by election.[2] By this
means uprightness, understanding, experience and all other claims to
pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of
wise government.
Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and
carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State
is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude
that is unknown or despised.
In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest
should govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern
for its profit, and not for their own. There is no need to multiply
instruments, or get twenty thousand men to do what a hundred picked men
can do even better, but it must not be forgotten that corporate interest
here begins to direct the public power less under the regulation of the
general will, and that a further inevitable propensity takes away from
the laws part of the executive power.
If we are to speak of what is individually desirable, neither should
the State be so small, nor a people so simple and upright, that the
execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will, as
it does in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so great that
the rulers have to scatter in order to govern it and are able to play
the Sovereign each in his own department, and, beginning by making
themselves independent, end by becoming masters.
But if aristocracy does not demand all the virtues needed by popular
government, it demands others which are peculiar to itself; for
instance, moderation on the side of the rich and contentment on that
of the poor; for it seems that thorough-going equality would be out of
place, as it was not found even at Sparta.
Furthermore, if this form of government carries with it a certain
inequality of fortune, this is justifiable in order that as a rule the
administration of public affairs may be entrusted to those who are most
able to give them their whole time, but not, as Aristotle maintains, in
order that the rich may always be put first. On the contrary, it is of
importance that an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people
that the deserts of men offer claims to pre-eminence more important
than those of riches.
[1] It is clear that the word _optimates_ meant, among the ancients,
not the best, but the most powerful.
[2] It is of great importance that the form of the election of
magistrates should be regulated by law; for if it is left at the
discretion of the prince, it is impossible to avoid falling into
hereditary aristocracy, as the Republics of Venice and Berne actually
did. The first of these has therefore long been a State dissolved; the
second, however, is maintained by the extreme wisdom of the senate, and
forms an honourable and highly dangerous exception.