Now this speech both announces and exhibits Mephistopheles's nature.

Without even knowing the language, one could hardly hear the original read

as Mephistopheles's without seeing in it shamelessness, impudence,

volubility, cleverness, a sneering, sarcastic disposition, want of heart,

want of sentiment, want of earnestness, want of purpose, complete,

confirmed, irrecoverable devilishness. And, besides, Mephistopheles

candidly describes himself in it. When, in sly and sarcastic allusion to

the song of the Archangels, he tells that _he_ has not the gift of talking

fine, he announces in effect that he is not going to be Miltonic. _He_ is

not going to speak of suns and universes, he says. Raphael, Gabriel, and

Michael, are at home in that sort of thing; but _he_ is not. Leaving them,

therefore, to tell how the universe is flourishing on the grand scale, and

how the suns and the planets are going on as beautifully as ever, he will

just say a word or two as to how human nature is getting on down yonder;

and, to be sure, if comparison be the order of the day, the little godkin,

Man, is quite as odd as on the day he was made. And at once, with

astounding impudence, he launches into a train of remark the purport of

which is that everything down below is at sixes and sevens, and that in

his opinion human nature has turned out a failure. And, heedless of the

disgust of his audience, he would go on talking for ever, were he not

interrupted.

And is this the Satan of the _Paradise Lost_? Is this the Archangel

ruined? Is this the being who warred against the Almighty, who lay

floating many a rood, who shot upwards like a pyramid of fire, who

navigated space wherever he chose, speeding on his errands from star to

star, and who finally conceived the gigantic scheme of assaulting the

universe where it was weakest, and impregnating the new creation with the

venom of his spirit? Yes, it is he; but oh, how changed! For six thousand

years he has been pursuing the walk he struck out at the beginning, plying

his self-selected function, dabbling devilishly in human nature, and

abjuring all interest in the grander physics; and the consequence is, as

he himself anticipated, that his nature, once great and magnificent, has

become small, virulent, and shrunken,

"Subdued

To what it works in, like the dyer's hand."

As if he had been journeying through a wilderness of scorching sand, all

that was left of the Archangel has long since evaporated. He is now a dry,

shrivelled up, scoffing spirit. When, at the moment of scheming out his

future existence and determining to become a Devil, he anticipated the

ruin of his nature, he could not help thinking with what a strange feeling

he should then appear before his old co-equals, Raphael, Gabriel, and

Michael. But now he stands before them disgustingly unabashed, almost

ostentatious of not being any longer an Archangel. Even in the days of his

glory he was different from them. They luxuriated in contemplation; he in

the feeling of innate all-sufficient vigour. And lo, now! They are

unchanged, the servants of the Lord, revering the day's gentle going. He,

the scheming, enthusiastic Archangel, has been soured and civilized into

the clever cold-hearted Mephistopheles.

Mephistopheles is the Spirit of Evil in modern society. Goethe's _Faust_

is an illustration of this spirit's working in the history of an

individual. The case selected is a noble one. Faust, a man of grand and

restless nature, is aspiring after universality of feeling. Utterly

dissatisfied and disgusted with all human method and all human

acquisition, nay, fretting at the constitution of human nature itself, he

longs to spill out his soul, so that, mingling with the winds, it may

become a part of the ever-thrilling spirit of the universe and know the

essence of everything. He has been contemplating suicide. To this great

nature struggling with itself Mephistopheles is linked. It is to be noted

that throughout the whole drama there is no evidence that it was an object

of very earnest solicitude with Mephistopheles to gain possession of the

soul of Faust. Of course, he desired this, and had it in view. Thus, he

exacted a bond from Faust; and we find him also now and then chuckling

when alone in anticipation of Faust's ultimate ruin. But on the whole he

is constant to no earnest plan for effecting it. In fact, he is constant

to no single purpose whatever. The desire of doing devilry is his motive

all through. Going about with Faust was but being in the way of business

and having a companion at the same time. He studies his own gratification,

not Faust's, in all that he does. Faust never gets what he had a right to

expect from him. He is dragged hither and thither through scenes he has no

anxiety to be in, merely that Mephistopheles may enjoy some new and

_piquant_ piece of devilry. The moment he and Faust enter any place, he

quits Faust's side and mixes with the persons present, to do some mischief

or other; and, when it is done, he comes back to Faust, who has been

standing, with his arms folded, gloomily looking on, and asks him if he

could desire any better amusement than this. Now this is not the conduct

of a devil intent upon nothing so much as gaining possession of the soul

of his victim. A Miltonic devil would have pressed on to the mark more. He

would have been more self-denying, and would have kept his victim in

better humour. But Mephistopheles is a devil to the very core. He is a

devil in his conduct to Faust. What he studies is not to gratify Faust,

but to find plenty of congenial occupation for himself, to perpetrate as

great a quantity of evil as possible in as short a time as possible. It

seems capable of being inferred from this peculiarity in the character of

Mephistopheles that Goethe had in his mind all through the poem a certain

under-current of allegoric meaning. One sees that Mephistopheles, though

acting as a dramatic personage, represents an abstract something or other.

The character of Mephistopheles is brought out all through the drama. In

the first and second parts we have Faust and him brought into a great

variety of situations and into contact with a great variety of

individuals; and in watching how Mephistopheles conducts himself in these

we obtain more and more insight into his devilish nature. He manifests

himself in two ways--by his style of speaking, and by his style of acting.

That is to say, Mephistopheles, in the first place, has a habit of making

observations upon all subjects, and throwing out all kinds of general

propositions in the course of his conversation, and by attending to the

spirit of these one can perceive very distinctly his mode of looking at

things; and, in the second place, he acts a part in the drama, and this

part is, of course, characteristic.

The distinguishing feature in Mephistopheles's conversation is the amazing

intimacy which it displays with all the conceivable ways in which crime

can be perpetrated. There is positively not a wrong thing that people are

in the habit of doing that he does not seem to be aware of. He is profound

in his acquaintance with iniquity. If there is a joint loose anywhere in

society, he knows of it; if the affairs of the State are going into

confusion because of some blockhead's mismanagement, he knows of it. He is

versed in all the forms of professional quackery. He knows how pedants

hoodwink people, how priests act the hypocrite, how physicians act the

rake, how lawyers peculate. In all sorts of police information he is a

perfect Fouche. He has gone deep enough into one fell subject to be able

to write a book like Duchatelet's. And not only has he accumulated a mass

of observations, but he has generalized those observations, and marked

evil in its grand educational sources. If the human mind is going out into

a hopeless track of speculation, he has observed and knows it. If the

universities are frittering away the intellect of the youth of a country

in useless and barren studies, he knows it. If atheistic politicians are

vehemently defending the religious institutions of a country, he has

marked the prognostication. Whatever promises to inflict misery, to lead

people astray, to break up beneficial alliances, to make men flounder on

in error, to cause them to die blaspheming at the last, he is thoroughly

cognisant of it all. He could draw up a catalogue of social vices. He

could point out the specific existing grievances to which the

disorganization of a people is owing, and lay his finger on the exact

parent evils which the philanthropist ought to exert himself in exposing

and making away with. But here lies the diabolical peculiarity of his

knowledge. It is not in the spirit of a philanthropist that he has

accumulated his information; it is in the spirit of a devil. It is not

with the benevolent motive of a Duchatelet that he has descended into the

lurking-places of iniquity; it is because he delights in knowing the whole

extent of human misery. The doing of evil being his function, it is but

natural that he should have a taste for even the minutest details of his

own profession. Nay more, as the Spirit of all evil, who had been working

from the beginning, how could he fail to be acquainted with all the

existing varieties of criminal occupation? It is but as if he kept a

diary. Now, in this combination of the knowledge of evil with the desire

of producing it lies the very essence of his character. The combination is

horrible, unnatural, unhuman. Generally the motive to investigate deeply

into what is wrong is the desire to rectify it; and it is rarely that

profligates possess very valuable information. But in every one of

Mephistopheles's speeches there is some profound glimpse into the

rottenness of society, some masterly specification of an evil that ought

to be rooted out; and yet there is not one of those speeches in which the

language is not flippant and sarcastic, not one in which the tone is

sorrowful or philanthropic. Everything is going wrong in the world;

twaddle and quackery everywhere abounding; nothing to be seen under the

sun but hypocritical priests, sharking attorneys, unfaithful wives,

children crying for bread to eat, men and women cheating, robbing,

murdering each other: hurrah! This is exactly a burst of Mephistophelic

feeling. In fact it is an intellectual defect in Mephistopheles that his

having such an eye for evil and his taking such an interest in it prevent

him from allowing anything for good in his calculations. To Mephistopheles

the world seems going to perdition as fast as it can, while in the same

universal confusion beings like the Archangels recognise the good

struggling with the evil.

Respecting the part which Mephistopheles performs in the drama we have

already said something. Going about the world, linked to Faust, is to him

only a racy way of acting the devil. Having as his companion a man so

flighty in his notions did but increase the flavour of whatever he engaged

in. All through he is laughing in secret at Faust, and deriving a keen

enjoyment from his transcendental style of thinking. Faust's noble

qualities are all Greek and Gaelic to his cold and devilish nature. He

has a contempt for all strong feeling, all sentiment, all evangelism. He

enjoys the Miltonic vastly. Thus in the "Prologue in Heaven" he quizzes

the Archangels about the grandiloquence of their song. Not that he does

not understand that sort of thing intellectually, but that it is not in

his nature to sympathize with anything like sentiment. Hence, when he

assumes the sentimental himself and mimicks any lofty strain, although he

does it full justice in as far as giving the whole intellectual extent of

meaning is concerned, yet he always does so in words so inappropriate

emotionally that the effect is a parody. He must have found amusement

enough in Faust's company to have reconciled him in some measure to losing

him finally.

But to go on. Mephistopheles acts the devil all through. In the first

place he acts the devil to Faust himself, for he is continually taking his

own way and starting difficulties whenever Faust proposes anything. Then

again in his conduct towards the other principal personages of the drama

it is the same. In the murder of poor Margaret, her mother, her child, and

her brother, we have as fiendish a series of acts as devil could be

supposed capable of perpetrating. And, lastly, in the mere filling up and

side play, it is the same. He is constantly doing unnecessary mischief. If

he enters Auerbach's wine-cellar and introduces himself to the four

drinking companions, it is to set the poor brutes fighting and make them

cut off each other's noses. If he spends a few minutes in talk with

Martha, it is to make the silly old woman expose her foibles. The Second

Part of Faust is devilry all through, a tissue of bewilderments and

devilries. And while doing all this Mephistopheles is still the same cold,

self-possessed, sarcastic being. If he exhibits any emotion at all, it is

a kind of devilish anger. Perhaps, too, once or twice we recognise

something like terror or flurry. But on the whole he is a spirit bereft of

feeling. What could indicate the heart of a devil more than his words to

Faust in the harrowing prison scene?

"Komm, komm, ich lasse dich mit ihr im Stich."

* * * * *

And now for a word or two describing Milton's Satan and Goethe's

Mephistopheles by each other:--Satan is a colossal figure; Mephistopheles

an elaborated portrait. Satan is a fallen Archangel scheming his future

existence; Mephistopheles is the modern Spirit of Evil. Mephistopheles has

a distinctly marked physiognomy; Satan has not. Satan has a sympathetic

knowledge of good; Mephistopheles knows good only as a phenomenon. Much of

what Satan says might be spoken by Raphael; a devilish spirit runs through

all that Mephistopheles says. Satan's bad actions are preceded by noble

reasonings; Mephistopheles does not reason. Satan's bad actions are

followed by compunctious visitings; Mephistopheles never repents. Satan is

often "inly racked;" Mephistopheles can feel nothing more noble than

disappointment. Satan conducts an enterprise; Mephistopheles enjoys an

occupation. Satan has strength of purpose; Mephistopheles is volatile.

Satan feels anxiety; Mephistopheles lets things happen. Satan's greatness

lies in the vastness of his motives; Mephistopheles's in his intimate

acquaintance with everything. Satan has a few sublime conceptions;

Mephistopheles has accumulated a mass of observations. Satan declaims;

Mephistopheles puts in remarks. Satan is conversant with the moral aspects

of things and uses adjectives; Mephistopheles has a preference for nouns,

and uses adjectives only to convey significations which he _knows_ to

exist. Satan may end in being a devil; Mephistopheles is a devil

irrecoverably.

* * * * *

Milton's Satan and Goethe's Mephistopheles are literary performances; and,

for what they prove, neither Milton nor Goethe need have believed in a

Devil at all. Luther's Devil, on the other hand, was a being recognised by

him as actually existing--as existing, one might say, with a vengeance.

The strong conviction which Luther had on this point is a feature in his

character. The narrative of his life abounds in anecdotes showing that the

Devil with him was no chimera, no mere orthodoxy, no fiction. In every

page of his writings we have the word _Teufel_, _Teufel_, repeated again

and again. Occasionally there occurs an express dissertation upon the

nature and functions of the Evil Spirit; and one of the longest chapters

in his _Table Talk_ is that entitled "The Devil and his Works"--indicating

that his conversation with his friends often turned on the subject of

Satanic agency. _Teufel_ was actually the strongest signification he had;

and, whenever he was excited to his highest emotional pitch, it came in to

assist his utterance at the climax, and give him a correspondingly

powerful expression. "This thing I will do," it was common for him to say,

"in spite of all who may oppose me, be it duke, emperor, priest, bishop,

cardinal, pope, or Devil." Man's heart, he says, is a "Stock, Stein,

Eisen, Teufel, hart Herz," ("a stock, stone, iron, Devil, hard heart").

And it was not a mere vague conception he had of this being, such as

theology might oblige. On the contrary, he had observed him as a man would

his personal enemy, and in so doing had formed a great many conclusions

respecting his powers and his character. In general, Luther's Devil may be

defined as a personification, in the spirit of Scripture, of the resisting

medium which Luther had to toil his way through--spiritual fears,

passionate uprisings, fainting resolutions within himself; error,

weakness, envy, in those around him; and, without, a whole world howling

for his destruction. It is in effect as if Luther had said, "Scripture

reveals to me the existence of a great accursed Being, whose function it

is to produce evil. It is for me to ascertain the character of this Being,

whom I, of all men, have to deal with. And how am I to do so except by

observing him working? God knows I have not far to go in search of his

manifestations." And thus Luther went on filling up the Scriptural

proposition with his daily experience. He was constantly gaining a clearer

conception of his great personal antagonist, constantly stumbling upon

some more concealed trait in the Spirit's character. The Being himself was

invisible; but men were walking in the midst of his manifestations. It was

as if there were some Being whom we could not see, nor directly in the

ordinary way have any intercourse with, but who every morning, before it

was light, came and left at our doors some exquisite specimen of his

workmanship. It would, of course, be difficult under such disadvantages to

become acquainted with the character of our invisible correspondent and

nightly visitant; still we could arrive at a few conclusions respecting

him, and the more of his workmanship we saw the more insight we should

come to have. Or again, in striving to realize to himself the Scriptural

proposition about the Devil, Luther, to speak in the language of the

"Positive Philosophy," was but striving to ascertain the laws according to

which evil happens. Only the Positive Philosophy would lay a veto on any

such speculation, and pronounce it fundamentally vicious in this

respect--that there are not two courses of events, separable from each

other, in history, the one good and the other evil, but that evil comes of

good and good of evil; so that, if we are to have a science of history at

all, the most we can have is a science of the laws according to which, not

evil follows evil, but events follow each other. But History to Luther was

not a physical course of events. It was God acting, and the Devil

opposing.

So far Luther did not differ from his age. Belief in Satanic agency was

universal at that period. We have no idea now how powerful this belief

was. We realize something of the truth when we read the depositions in an

old book of trials for witchcraft. But it is sufficient to glance over any

writings of the period to see what a real meaning was then attached to the

words "Hell" and "Devil." The spirit of these words has become obsolete,

chased away by the spirit of exposition. That was what M. Comte calls the

Theological period, when all the phenomena of mind and matter were

referred to the agency of Spirits. The going out of the belief in Satanic

agency (for even those who retain it in profession allow it no force in

practice) M. Comte would attribute to the progress of the spirit of that

philosophy of which he is the apostle. We do not think, however, that the

mere progress of the scientific spirit--that is, the mere disposition of

men to pursue one mode of thinking with respect to all classes of

phenomena--could have been sufficient of itself to work such an alteration

in the general mind. We are fond of accounting for it, in part at least,

by the going out, in the progress of civilization, of those sensations

which seem naturally fitted to nourish the belief in supernatural beings.

The tendency of civilization has been to diminish our opportunities of

feeling terror, of feeling strongly at all. The horrific plays a much less

important part in human experience than it once did. To mention but a

single instance: we are exempted now, by mechanical contrivances for

locomotion, &c., from the necessity of being much in darkness or wild

physical solitude. This is especially the case with those who dwell in

cities, and therefore exert most conspicuously an intellectual influence.

The moaning of the wind at night in winter is about their highest

experience of the kind; and is it not a corroboration of the view now

suggested that the belief in the supernatural is always strongest at the

moment of this experience? Scenes and situations our ancestors were in

every day are strange to us. We have not now to travel through forests at

the dead of night, nor to pass a lonely spot on a moor where a murderer's

body is swinging from a gibbet. Tam o' Shanter, even before he came to

Allowa' Kirk, saw more than many of us see in a life-time.

"By this time he was 'cross the ford

Whaur in the snaw the chapman smoored,

And past the birks and muckle stane

Whaur drunken Charlie brak's neck-bane,

And through the whins and by the cairn

Whaur hunters fand the murdered bairn,

And near the thorn aboon the well

Whaur Mungo's mither hanged hersel'."

This effect of civilization in reducing all our sensations to those of

comfort is a somewhat alarming circumstance in the point of view we are

now taking. It is necessary, for many a reason, to resist the universal

application of the "Positive Philosophy," even if we adopt and adore it as

an instrument of explication. The "Positive Philosophy" commands us to

forbear all speculation into the inexplicable. For the sake of many things

this order must be disregarded. Speculation into the metaphysical is the

invariable accompaniment of strong feeling; and the moral nature of man

would starve upon such chopped straw as the mere intellectual relations of

similitude and succession. Nor does it meet the demands of the case to say

that the "Positive Philosophy" would be always far in arrear of the known

phenomena, and that here would be mystery enough. No! the "Positive

Philosophy" would require to strike a chasm in itself under the title of

the Liberty of Hypothesis. We do not mean the liberty of hypothesis merely

as a means of anticipating theory, but for spiritual and imaginative

purposes. It is in this light that one would welcome Animal Magnetism, or

any thing else whatever that would but knock a hole through the paper wall

that incloses our mode of being, snub the self-conceit of our present

knowledge, and give us other and more difficult phenomena to explain.

The Three Devils: Luther's, Milton's, and Goethe's; With Other Essays · 第 2 / 18 段