_Direct._ XXXVIII. The question is much harder, whether the

violation of every human penal law be a sin against God, though a man

submit to the penalty. (And the desert of every sin is death.) Master

Richard Hooker's last book unhappily ended, before he gave us the full

reason of his judgment in this case, these being the last words:

"Howbeit, too rigorous it were, that the breach of every human law

should be a deadly sin: a mean there is between those extremities, if

so be we can find it out--."[85] Amesius hath diligently discussed it,

and many others. The reason for the affirmative is, because God

bindeth us to obey all the lawful commands of our governors; and

suffering the penalty, is not obeying; the penalty being not the

primary intention of the lawgiver, but the duty; and the penalty only

to enforce the duty: and though the suffering of it satisfy man, it

satisfieth not God, whose law we break by disobeying. Those that are

for the negative, say, That God binding us but to obey the magistrate,

and his law binding but _aut ad obedientiam, aut ad pœnam_, I

fulfil his will, if I either do or suffer: if I obey not, I please him

by satisfying for my disobedience. And it is none of his will, that my

choosing the penalty should be my sin or damnation. To this it is

replied, That the law bindeth _ad pœnam_, but on supposition

of disobedience; and that disobedience is forbidden of God: and the

penalty satisfieth not God, though it satisfy man. The other rejoins,

That it satisfieth God, in that it satisfieth man; because God's law

is but to give force to man's, according to the nature of it. If this

hold, then no disobedience at all is a sin in him that suffereth the

penalty. In so hard a case, because more distinction is necessary to

the explication, than most readers are willing to be troubled with, I

shall now give you but this brief decision.[86] There are some

penalties which fulfil the magistrate's own will as much as obedience,

which indeed have more of the nature of a commutation, than of

penalty: (as he that watcheth not or mendeth not the highways, shall

pay so much to hire another to do it: he that shooteth not so oft in a

year, shall pay so much: he that eateth flesh in Lent, shall pay so

much to the poor: he that repaireth not his hedges, shall pay so

much:) and so in most amercements, and divers penal laws; in which we

have reason to judge, that the penalty satisfieth the lawgiver fully,

and that he leaveth it to our choice. In these cases I think we need

not afflict ourselves with the conscience or fear of sinning against

God. But there are other penal laws, in which the penalty is not

desired for itself, and is supposed to be but an imperfect

satisfaction to the lawgiver's will, and that he doth not freely leave

us to our choice, but had rather we obeyed than suffered; only he

imposeth no greater a penalty, either because there is no greater in

his power, or some inconvenience prohibiteth; in this case I should

fear my disobedience were a sin, though I suffered the penalty. (Still

supposing it an act that he had power to command me.)

_Direct._ XXXIX. Take heed of the pernicious design of those

atheistical politicians, that would make the world believe, that all

that is excellent among men, is at enmity with monarchy, yea, and

government itself; and take heed on the other side, that the most

excellent things be not turned against it by abuse.

Here I have two dangers to advertise you to beware: the first is of

some Machiavelian, pernicious principles, and the second of some

erroneous, unchristian practices.

For the first, there are two sorts of atheistical politicians guilty

of them. The first sort are some atheistical flatterers, that to

engage monarchs against all that is good, would make them believe that

all that is good is against them and their interest. By which means,

while their design is to steal the help of princes, to cast out all

that is good from the world, they are most pernicious underminers of

monarchy itself. For what readier way to set all the world against it,

than to make them believe that it standeth at enmity to all that is

good. These secret enemies would set up a leviathan to be the butt of

common enmity and opposition.

The other sort are the professed enemies of monarchy, who in their

zeal for popular government, do bring in all that is excellent, as if

it were adverse to monarchy. 1. They would (both) set it at enmity

with politicians. 2. With lawyers. 3. With history. 4. With learning.

5. With divines. 6. With all christian religion. 7. And with humanity

itself.

_Object._ I. The painters of the leviathan scorn all politics, as

ignorant of the power of monarchs, except the atheistical inventions

of their own brains. And the adversaries of monarchy say, The reading

of politics will satisfy men against monarchy; for in them you

ordinarily find that the _majestas realis_ is in the people, and

the _majestas personalis_ in the prince; that the prince

receiveth all his power from the people, to whom it is first given,

and to whom it may be forfeited and escheat: with much more of the

like, as is to be seen in politicians of all religions.

_Answ._ 1. It is not all politics that go upon those principles:

and one mistake in writers is no disgrace to the true doctrine of

politics, which may be vindicated from such mistakes. 2. As almost all

authors of politics take monarchy for a lawful species of government,

so most or very many (especially of the moderns) do take it to be the

most excellent sort of unmixed government. Therefore they are no

enemies to it.

_Object._ II. For lawyers, they say, That, 1. Civilians set up

reason so high, that they dangerously measure the power of monarchs by

it; insomuch, that the most famous pair of zealous and learned

defenders of monarchy, Barclay and Grotius, do assign many cases, in

which it is lawful to resist princes by arms, and more than so.[87] 2.

And the common lawyers, they say, are all for the law, and ready to

say as Hooker, _Lex facit regem_; and what power the king hath,

he hath it by law, The bounds are known, p. 218. He is _singulis

major, et universis minor, &c._

_Answ._ 1. Sure the Roman civil laws were not against monarchy,

when monarchs made so many of them. And what power reason truly hath,

it hath from God, whom none can over-top; and that which reason is

abused unjustly to defend, may be well contradicted by reason indeed.

2. And what power the laws of the land have, they have by the king's

consent and act: and it is strange impudence to pretend, that his own

laws are against him. If any misinterpret them, he may be confuted.

_Object._ III. For historians, say they, Be but well-versed in

ancient history, Greek and Roman, and you shall find them speak so ill

of monarchy, and so much for popularity, and liberty, and magnifying

so much the defenders of the people's liberty against monarchs, that

it will secretly steal the dislike of monarchy, and the love of

popular liberty into your minds.[88]

_Answ._ It must be considered in what times and places the

ancient Greek and Roman historians did live.[89] They that lived where

popular government was in force and credit, wrote according to the

time and government which they lived under; yet do they extol the

virtues and heroic acts of monarchs, and often speak of the vulgar

giddiness and unconstancy. And for my part, I think he that readeth in

them those popular tumults, irrationalities, furies, unconstancies,

cruelties, which even in Rome and Athens they committed, and all

historians record, will rather find his heart much alienated from such

democratical confusions. And the historians of other times and places

do write as much for monarchy, as they did for democracy.

_Object._ IV. Some of them revile at Aristotle and all universities,

and say, That while multitudes must be tasters and pretenders to the

learning which they never can thoroughly attain, they read many

dangerous books, and receive false notions; and these half-witted men

are the disturbers of all societies. Do you not see, say they, that

the two strongest kingdoms in the world, are kept up by keeping the

subjects ignorant. The Greek and Latin empires were ruined by the

contention of men that did pretend to learning. The Turk keepeth all

in quiet by suppressing it: and the pope confineth it almost all to

his instruments in government, and keepeth the common people in

ignorance; which keepeth them from matter of quarrel and

disobedience.[90]

_Answ._ I hope you will not say, that Rome or Athens of old did

take this course. And we will not deny, but men of knowledge are more

subject to debates, and questionings, and quarrels about right and

wrong, than men of utter ignorance are. Beasts fall not out about

crowns or kingdoms, as men do. Dogs and swine will not scramble for

gold, as men will do, if you cast it among them: and it is easier to

keep swine or sheep, than men; and yet it is not better to be swine or

sheep, than men; nor to be governors of beasts, than men. Dead men are

quieter than the living, and blind men will submit to be led more

easily than those that see; and yet it is not better to be a king of

brutes, or blind men, or dead men, than of the living that have their

sight. A king of men that have many disagreements, is better than a

king of beasts that all agree. And yet true knowledge tendeth to

concord, and to the surest and constantest obedience.

_Object._ V. But their chief calumniations are against divines.

They say, That divines make a trade of religion; and under pretence of

divine laws, and conscience, and ecclesiastical discipline, they

subjugate both prince and people to their will, and set up courts

which they call ecclesiastical, and keep the people in dependence on

their dictates, and teach them to disobey upon pretence that God is

against the matter of their obedience; and also by contending for

their opinions, or for superiority and domination over one another,

they fill kingdoms with quarrels, and break them into sects and

factions, and are the chief disturbers of the public peace.[91]

_Answ._ We cannot deny that carnal, ignorant, worldly, proud,

unholy pastors, have been and are the great calamity of the churches:

but that is no more disgrace to their office, or to divinity, than it

is to philosophy or reason, that philosophers have been ignorant,

erroneous, divided, and contentious; nor than it is to government,

that kings and other rulers have been imperfect, bad, contentious, and

filled the world with wars and bloodshed. Nay, I rather think that

this is a proof of the excellency of divinity: as the reason of the

aforesaid imperfections and faultiness of philosophers and rulers, is

because that philosophy and government are things so excellent, that

the corrupt, imperfect nature of man, will not reach so high, as to

qualify any man to manage them, otherwise than with great

defectiveness; so also divinity, and the pastoral office, are things

so excellent and sublime, that the nature of lapsed man will not reach

to a capacity of being perfect in them. So that the faultiness of the

nature of man, compared with the excellency of the things to be known

and practised by divines, is the cause of all these faults that they

complain of; and nature's vitiosity, if any thing, must be blamed.

Certainly, the pastoral office hath men as free from ignorance,

worldliness, pride, and unquietness, as any calling in the world. To

charge the faults of nature upon that profession, which only

discovereth, but never caused them, yea, which would heal them, if

they are to be healed on earth, judge whether this dealing be not

foolish and injurious, and what will be the consequents if such

unreasonable persons may be heard. And therefore, though leviathan and

his spawn, among all that is good, bring down divines, and the zealots

for democracy have gloried of their new forms of commonwealths, as

inconsistent with a clergy, their glory is their shame to all but

infidels. Let them help us to take down and cure the ignorance, pride,

carnality, worldliness, and contentiousness of the clergy, and we will

be thankful to them; but to quarrel with the best of men for the

common pravity of nature, and to reproach the most excellent science

and function, because depraved nature cannot attain or manage them in

perfection, this is but to play the professed enemies of mankind.

_Object._ VI. These atheists or infidels also do spit their venom

against christianity and godliness itself, and would make princes

believe, that the principles of it are contrary to their interest, and

to government and peace: and they fetch their cavils, 1. From the

Scripture's contemptuous expressions of worldly wealth and greatness.

2. From its prohibition of revenge and maintaining our own right. 3.

From the setting it above all human laws; and by its authority and

obscurity, filling the minds of men with scrupulosity. 4. From the

divisions which religion occasioneth in the world: and, 5. From the

testimonies of the several sects against each other. I shall answer

them particularly, though but briefly.

_Object._ I. Say the infidel politicians, How can subjects have

honourable thoughts of their superiors, when they believe that to be

the word of God, which speaketh so contemptuously of them?[92] As Luke

vi. 24, "Woe to you that are rich! for ye have received your

consolation." Jam. v. 1-3, "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for

your miseries that shall come upon you." Ver. 5, 6, "Ye have lived in

pleasure on earth, and been wanton--Ye have condemned and killed the

just."--Luke xii. 21. Chap. xvi. the parable of the rich man and

Lazarus, is spoken to make men think of the rich as miserable, damned

creatures. Ezek. xxi. 25, "Thou profane, wicked prince of Israel."

Prov. xxv. 5, "Take away the wicked from before the king." Prov. xxix. 12,

"If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked:" the

contempt of greatness is made a part of the christian religion.

_Answ._ 1. As if there were no difference between the contempt of

riches and worldly prosperity, and the contempt of government. He is

blind that cannot see that riches and authority are not the same: yea,

that the overvaluing of riches is the cause of seditions, and the

disturbance of governments, when the contempt of them removeth the

chief impediments of obedience and peace. 2. And may not governors be

sufficiently honoured, unless they be exempted from the government of

God? and unless their sin must go for virtue? and unless their duty,

and their account, and the danger of their souls, be treacherously

concealed from them? God will not flatter dust and ashes; great and

small are alike to him. He is no respecter of persons: when you can

save the greatest from death and judgment, then they may be excepted

from all those duties which are needful to their preparation. 3. And

is it not strange, that God should teach men to contemn the power

which he himself ordaineth? and which is his own? Hath he set officers

over us, for the work of government, and doth he teach us to despise

them? There is no show of any such thing in Scripture: there are no

principles in the world that highlier advance and honour magistracy,

than the christian principles, unless you will make gods of them, as

the Roman senate did of the Antonines, and other emperors.

_Object._ II. How can there be any government, when men must

believe that they must not resist evil, but give place to wrath, and

turn the other cheek to him that smiteth them, and give their coat to

him that taketh away their cloak, and lend, asking for nothing again?

Is not this to let thieves and violent, rapacious men rule all, and

have their will, and go unpunished? What use is there then for courts

or judges? And when Christ commandeth his disciples, that though the

kings of the nations rule over them, and exercise authority, and are

called benefactors, yet with them it shall not be so.[93]

_Answ._ These were the old cavils of Celsus, Porphyry, and

Julian; but very impudent. As though love and patience were against

peace and government. Christ commandeth nothing in all these words,

but that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and love his soul above

our wealth, and that we do as we would be done by, and use not private

revenge, and take not up the magistrate's work: and is this doctrine

against government? It is not magistrates, but ministers and private

christians, whom he commandeth not to resist evil, and not to exercise

lordship, as the civil rulers do. When it will do more hurt to the

soul of another, than the benefit amounteth to, we must not seek our

own right by law, nor must private men revenge themselves. All

law-suits, and contentions, and hurting of others, which are

inconsistent with loving them as ourselves, are forbidden in the

gospel. And when was government ever disturbed by such principles and

practices as these? Nay, when was it disturbed but for want of these?

When was there any sedition, rebellion, or unlawful wars, but through

self-love, and love of earthly things, and want of love to one

another? How easily might princes rule men, that are thus ruled by

love and patience!

_Object._ III. Christianity teacheth men to obey the Scriptures

before their governors, and to obey no law that is contrary to the

Bible; and when the Bible is so large, and hath so many passages hard

to be understood, and easily perverted, some of these will be always

interpreted against the laws of men; and then they are taught to fear

no man against God, and to endure any pains or death, and to be

unmoved by all the penalties which should enforce obedience; and to

rejoice in this as a blessed martyrdom, to the face of kings; and

those that punish them, are reproached as persecutors, and threatened

with damnation, and made the vilest men on earth, and represented

odious to all.[94]

_Answ._ The sum of all this objection is, That there is a God.

For if that be not denied, no man can deny that he is the Universal

Governor of the world; and that he hath his proper laws and judgment,

and rewards and punishments, or that magistrates are his ministers,

and have no power but from him; and consequently, that the commands,

and threats, and promises of God, are a thousand-fold more to be

regarded, than those of men.[95] He is a beast, and not a man, that

feareth not God more than man, and that feareth not hell more than

bodily sufferings: and for the Scriptures, 1. Are they any harder to

be understood than the law of nature itself? Surely the characters of

the will of God _in natura rerum_, are much more obscure than in

the Scriptures. Hath God sent so great a messenger from heaven, to

open to mankind the mysteries of his kingdom, and tell them what is in

the other world, and bring life and immortality to light, and yet

shall his revelation be accused as more obscure than nature itself is?

If an angel had been sent from heaven to any of these infidels

by name, to tell them but the same that Scripture telleth us, sure

they would not have reproached his message with such accusations. 2.

And are not the laws of the land about smaller matters, more

voluminous and difficult? And shall that be made a reproach to

government? And for misinterpretation, it is the fault of human

nature, that is ignorant and rash, and not of the Scriptures. Will you

tell God, that you will not obey him, unless he will make his laws so,

as no man can misinterpret them? When or where were there ever such

laws? God will be God, and Judge of the world, whether you will or

not; and he will not be an underling to men, nor set their laws above

his own, to avoid your accusations. If there be another life of joy or

misery, it is necessary that there be laws according to which those

rewards and punishments are to be adjudged. And if rulers oppose those

who are appointed to promote obedience to them, they must do it at

their perils; for God will render to all according to their works.

_Object._ IV. Doth not experience tell the world, that christianity

every where causeth divisions, and sets the world together by the

ears? What a multitude of sects are there among us at this day; and

every one thinketh that his salvation lieth upon his opinion! And how

can princes govern men of so contrary minds, when the pleasing of one

party is the losing of the rest? We have long seen that church

divisions shake the safety of the state. If it were not that few that

are called christians are such indeed, and serious in the religion

which themselves profess, there were no quietness to be expected; for

those that are most serious, are so full of scruples, and have

consciences still objecting something or other against their

obedience, and are so obstinate in their way, as thinking it is for

their salvation, that all ages and nations have been fain to govern

them by force as beasts, which they have called persecution.[96]

_Answ._ 1. There is no doctrine in the world so much for love, and

peace, and concord as the doctrine of Christ is. What doth it so much

urge and frequently inculcate? What doth it contain but love and peace

from end to end? Love is the sum and end of the gospel, and the

fulfilling of the law. To love God above all, and our neighbours as

ourselves, and to do as we would be done by, is the epitome of the

doctrine of Christ and his apostles. 2. And therefore christianity is

only the occasion, and not the cause of the divisions of the earth. It

is men's blindness and passions and carnal interests rebelling against

the laws of God, which is the make-bate of the world, and filleth it

with strife. The wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable,

gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits; it

blesseth the peace-makers and the meek. But it is the rebellious

wisdom from beneath, that is earthly, sensual, and devilish, which

causeth envy and strife, and thereby confusion and every evil work,

James iii. 15-17; Matt. v. 6-8. So that the true, genuine christian is

the best subject and peaceablest man on earth. But seriousness is not

enough to make a christian; a man may be passionately serious in an

error; understanding must lead and seriousness follow. To be zealous

in error is not to be zealous in christianity; for the error is

contrary to christian verity. 3. As I said before, it is a testimony

of the excellency of religion that it thus occasioneth contention.

Dogs and swine do not contend for crowns and kingdoms, nor for

sumptuous houses or apparel; nor do infants trouble the world or

themselves with metaphysical, or logical, or mathematical disputes;

idiots do not molest the world with controversies, nor fall thereby

into sects and parties. Nor yet do wise and learned persons contend

about chaff, or dust, or trifles. But as excellent things are matter

of search, so are they matter of controversy, to the most excellent

wits. The hypocritical christians that you speak of, who make God and

their salvation give place to the unjust commands of men, are indeed

no christians, as not taking Christ for their sovereign Lord; and it

is not in any true honour of magistracy that they are so ductile, and

will do any thing, but it is for themselves, and their carnal

interest; and when that interest requireth it, they will betray their

governors, as infidels will do. If you can reduce all the world to be

infants, or idiots, or brutes, yea, or infidels, they will then

trouble the state with no contentions for religion or matters of

salvation. But if the governed must be brutified, what will the

governors be? 4. All true christians are agreed in the substance of

their religion; there is no division among them about the necessary

points of faith or duty. Their agreement is far greater than their

disagreement; which is but about some smaller matters, where

differences are tolerable; therefore they may all be governed without

any such violence as you mention. If the common articles of faith, and

precepts of christian duty, be maintained, then that is upheld which

all agree in; and rulers will not find it needful to oppress every

party or opinion save one, among them that hold the common truths.

Wise and sober christians lay not men's salvation upon every such

controversy; nor do they hold or manage them unpeaceably to the wrong

of church or state, nor with the violation of charity, peace, or

justice. 5. Is there any of the sciences which afford not matter of

controversy? If the laws of the land did yield no matter of

controversy, lawyers and judges would have less of that work than now

they have. And was there not greater diversity of opinions and worship

among the heathens than ever was among christians? What a multitude of

sects of philosophers and religions had they! And what a multitude of

gods had they to worship! And the number of them still increased as

oft as the senate pleased to make a god of the better sort of their

emperors when they were dead. Indeed one emperor, (of the religion of

some of these objectors,) Heliogabalus, bestirred himself with all his

power to have reduced all religion to unity, that is, he would have

all the worship brought to his god to whom he had been priest: saith

Lampridius in his life, _Dicebat Judæorum et Samaritanorum religiones

et christianam devotionem, illuc transferendam, &c._ And therefore he

robbed, and maimed, and destroyed the other gods, _id agens ne quis

Romæ Deus nisi Heliogabalus coleretur_. But as the effect of his

monstrous, abominable filthiness of life was to be thrust into a

privy, killed, and dragged about the streets, and drowned in the

Tiber; so the effect of his desired unity, was to bring that one god

or temple into contempt, whereto he would confine all worship. The

differences among christians are nothing in comparison of the

differences among heathens.[97] The truth is, religion is such an

illustrious, noble thing, that dissensions about it, like spots in the

moon, are much more noted by the world, than about any lower, common

matters. Men may raise controversies in philosophy, physic, astronomy,

chronology, and yet it maketh no such noise, nor causeth much offence

or hatred in the world; but the devil and corrupted nature have such

an enmity against religion, that they are glad to pick any quarrel

against it, and blame it for the imperfections of all that learn it,

and should practise it. As if grammar should be accused for every

error or fault that the boys are guilty of in learning it; or the law

were to be accused for all the differences of lawyers, or contentions

of the people; or physic were to be accused for all the differences or

errors of physicians; or meat and drink were culpable because of men's

excesses and diseases. There is no doctrine or practice in the world,

by which true unity and concord can be maintained, but by seriousness

in the true religion. And when all contention cometh for want of

religion, it is impudence to blame religion for it, which is the only

cure. If rulers will protect all that agree in that which is justly to

be called the christian religion, both for doctrine and practice; and

about their small and tolerable differences, will use no other

violence but only to compel them to live in peace, and to suppress the

seditious, and those that abuse and injure government or one another;

they will find that christianity tendeth not to divisions, nor to the

hinderance or disturbance of government or peace. It is passion, and

pride, and selfishness that doth this, and not religion; therefore let

these and not religion be restrained. But if they will resolve to

suffer none to live in peace, but those that in every punctilio are

all of one opinion, they must have but one subject that is sincere in

his religion, (for no two will be in every thing of the same

apprehension, no more than of the same complexion,) and all the rest

must be worldly hypocrites, that while they are heartily true to no

religion, will profess themselves of any religion which will serve

their present turns; and these nominal christians will be ready to

betray their rulers, or do any mischief which their carnal interest

requireth.[98]

_Object._ V. What witness need we more than their own accusations

of one another?[99] For the papists, how many volumes have the

protestants written against them as enemies to all civil government;

alleging even the decrees of their general councils, as Later. sub

Innoc. III. Can. 3. And for the protestants, they are as deeply

charged by the papists, as you may see in the "Image of both

Churches," and "Philanax Anglicus," and abundance more. For Calvin and

the presbyterians and puritans, let the prelates tell you how

peaceable they are. And the papists and puritans say that the

prelatists are of the same mind, and only for their own ends pretend

to greater loyalty than others. There are no two among them more

famous for defending government, than Hooker and Bilson. And what

Hooker saith for popular power, his first and eighth books abundantly

testify: and even Bishop Bilson himself defendeth the French and

German protestant wars; and you may judge of his loyal doctrine by

these words, p. 520, "Of Christian Subjection:" "If a prince should go

about to subject his kingdom to a foreign realm, or change the form of

the commonwealth from impery to tyranny, or neglect the laws

established by common consent of prince and people, to execute his own

pleasure; in these and other cases which might be named, if the nobles

and commons join together to defend their ancient and accustomed

liberty, regimen, and laws, they may not well be counted rebels."[100]

_Answ._ 1. If it be clear that christianity as to its principles,

is more for love, and concord, and subjection, than any other rational

doctrine in the world, then if any sect of christians shall indeed be

found to contradict these principles, so far they contradict

christianity: and will you blame religion because men contradict it?

or blame Christ's doctrine because men disobey it? Indeed every sect

that hath something of its own to make a sect, besides christian

religion, which maketh men mere christians, may easily be guilty of

such error as will corrupt the christian religion. And as a sect, they

have a divided interest which may tempt them to dividing principles;

but none more condemn such divisions than Christ. 2. And indeed,

though a christian as such is a credible witness; yet a sect or

faction as such, doth use to possess men with such an envious,

calumniating disposition, that they are little to be believed when

they accuse each other! This factious zeal is not from above, but is

earthly, sensual, and devilish; and therefore where this is, no wonder

if there be strife, and false accusing, and confusion, and every evil

work. But as these are no competent witnesses, so whether or no they

are favoured by Christ, you may judge if you will read but those three

chapters, Matt. v. Rom. xii. James iii. I may say here as Bishop

Bilson in the place which is accused, p. 521. "IT IS EASY FOR A

RUNNING AND RANGING HEAD TO SIT AT HOME IN HIS CHAMBER AND CALL MEN

REBELS, HIMSELF BEING THE RANKEST." 3. For the papists I can justify

them from your accusation, so far as they are christians; but as they

are papists let him justify them that can. Indeed usurpation of

government is the very essence of popery; for which all other

christians blame them; and therefore there is small reason that

christianity should be accused for them. 4. And for the protestants,

both episcopal and disciplinarians, the sober and moderate of them

speak of one another in no such language as you pretend. For the

episcopal, I know of none but railing papists, that accuse them

universally of any doctrines of rebellion: and for the practices of

some particular men, it is not to be alleged against their doctrine.

Do you think that Queen Elizabeth, to whom Bishop Bilson's book was

dedicated, or King Charles, to whom Mr. Hooker's book was dedicated,

took either of them to be teachers of rebellion? It is not every

different opinion in politics that proveth men to be against

subjection. He that can read such a book as Bilson's for "Christian

Subjection against Antichristian Rebellion," and yet deny him to be a

teacher of subjection, hath a very hard forehead. For the

controversies, I shall say no more of them here, but what I have said

before to Mr. Hooker. And as for Calvin and the disciplinarians, or

puritans, as they are called, they subscribe all the confessions for

magistracy, and take the same oaths of allegiance and supremacy, as

others do; and they plead and write for them: so that for my part I

know not of any difference in their doctrine. Hear what Bishop Andrews

saith, (who was no rebel,) in his "Tortura Torti," p. 379, 380.

_Calvinus autem ut papam regem; ita regem papam non probavit; neque

nos quod in papa detestamur, in rege approbamus; at et ille nobiscum,

et nos cum illo sentimus, easdem esse in ecclesia christiana regis

Jacobi partes, quæ Josiæ fuerunt in Judaica; nec nos ultra quicquam

fieri ambimus_--: that is, "But Calvin neither liked a pope-king, nor

a king-pope; nor do we approve of that in the king, which we detest in

the pope. But he with us, and we with him, do judge, that King James

hath as much to do in the christian church, as Josias had in the

Jewish church; and we go not about to get any more." And after, _Sub

primatus nomine, papatum novum rex non invehit in ecclesiam; sic enim

statuit, ut non Aaroni pontifici, ita nec Jeroboamo regi, jus ullum

esse conflatum a se vitulum populo proponendi, ut adoret, (id est,)

non vel fidei novos articulos, vel cultus divini novas formulas

procudendi_: that is, "The king doth not bring into the church a new

papacy, under the name of primacy; for thus he judgeth, (or

determineth,) that neither Aaron the priest, nor Jeroboam the king,

had any right to propose the calf which they had made, to the people

to be adored; that is, neither to hammer (or make) new articles of

faith, or new forms of divine worship." And p. 379, 380. _Quos vero

puritanos appellat, si regium primatum detestantur, detestandi ipsi.

Profitentur enim, subscribunt, jurant indies; sed et illi quod faciunt

ingenue faciunt, et societatem in hoc Torti, ipsumque adeo Tortum,

tanquam mendacem hominem, (et alibi de aliis, et hic de se,) ac

sycophantem egregium detestantur_: that is, "And for those he calleth

puritans, if they detest the king's supremacy, they are to be

detested; for they daily profess, subscribe, and swear to it; and what

they do, they do ingenuously; and they detest the society of Tortus in

this, and Tortus himself, as a lying man, (elsewhere of others, and

here of themselves,) and an egregious sycophant." By these testimonies

judge what protestants think of one another in point of loyalty.

5. And why are not all the other christians taken into your

enumeration? the Armenians, Abassins, and all the Greek churches? whom

the papists so frequently reproach as flatterers or servile, because

they still gave so much to their emperors. Have you any pretence for

your accusation as against them? Unless perhaps from the tumults which

Alexandria in its greatness was much addicted to, which is nothing to

the doctrine of christianity, nor to the practice of all the rest.

[Sidenote: Christianity is most for loyalty and subjection.]

Having answered these cavils of the late atheistical or infidel

politicians, I shall next show, though briefly, yet by plentiful

evidence, that christianity and true godliness is the greatest

strength of government, and bond of subjection, and means of peace,

that ever was revealed to the world: which will appear in all these

evidences following.

1. Christianity teacheth men to take the higher powers as ordained of

God, and to obey them as God's ministers or officers, having an

authority derived immediately from God; so that it advanceth the

magistrate as God's officer, as much higher than infidels advance him,

(who fetch his power no higher than force or choice,) as a servant of

God is above a servant of men; which is more than a man is above a

dog.[101]

2. Christianity telleth us that our obedience to magistrates is God's

own command, and so that we must obey him by obeying them. And as

obedience to a constable is more procured by the king's laws than by

his own commands, so obedience to a king is far more effectually

procured by God's laws than by his own. If God be more above a king,

than a king is above a worm, the command of God must be a more

powerful obligation upon every understanding person, than the king's.

And what greater advantage can a king have in governing, than to have

subjects whose consciences do feel themselves bound by God himself, to

obey the king and all his officers.

_Object._ But this is still with exception, if it be not in

things forbidden of God; and the subjects are made judges whether it

be so or no.

_Answ._ And woe to that man that grudgeth that God must be obeyed

before him; and would be himself a god to be obeyed in things which

God is against! The subjects are made no public judges, but private

discerners of their duties; and so you make them yourselves: or else

they must not judge whether the king or a usurper were to be obeyed;

or whether the word of a king or of a constable, if they be

contradictory, is to be preferred. To judge what we must choose or

refuse is proper to a rational creature: even brutes themselves will

do something like it by instinct of nature, and will not do all things

according to your will. You would have us obey a justice of peace no

further than our loyalty to the king will give leave: and therefore

there is greater reason that we should obey the higher powers no

further than our loyalty to God will give leave.[102] But if men

pretend God's commands for any thing which he commandeth not,

magistrates bear not the sword in vain, and subjects are commanded by

God not to resist. If they punish them rightfully, God will bear the

rulers out in it; if they punish them wrongfully or persecute them for

well doing, God will severely punish them, who so wronged his subjects,

and abused the authority which he committed to their trust.

3. The christian religion bindeth subjects to obedience upon sorer

penalties than magistrates can inflict; even upon pain of God's

displeasure, and everlasting damnation, Rom. xiii. 2, 3. And how great

a help this is to government it is so easy to discern, that the

simpler sort of atheists do persuade themselves, that kings devised

religion to keep people in obedience with the fears of hell. Take away

the fears of the life to come, and the punishment of God in hell upon

the wicked, and the world will be turned into worse than a den of

serpents and wild beasts; adulteries, and murders, and poisoning

kings, and all abomination, will be freely committed, which wit or

power can think to cover or bear out! Who will trust that man that

believeth not that God doth judge and punish?

4. The christian religion doth encourage obedience and peace with the

promise of the reward of endless happiness (_cæteris paribus_);

heaven is more than any prince can give. If that will not move men,

there is no greater thing to move them. Atheism and infidelity have no

such motives.

5. Christianity teacheth subjects to obey not only good rulers but bad

ones, even heathens themselves, and not to resist when we cannot obey.

Whereas among heathens, princes ruled no longer than they pleased the

soldiers or the people; so that Lampridius marvelled that Heliogabalus

was no sooner butchered, but suffered to reign three years: _Mirum

fortasse cuipiam videatur Constantine venerabilis, quod hæc clades

quam retuli loco principum fuerit; et quidem prope triennio, ita ut

nemo inventus fuerit qui istum a gubernaculis Romanæ majestatis

abduceret, cum Neroni, Vitellio, Caligulæ cæterisque hujusmodi nunquam

tyrannicida defuerit_.[103]

6. Christianity and godliness do not only restrain the outward acts,

but rule the very hearts, and lay a charge upon the thoughts, which

the power of princes cannot reach. It forbiddeth to curse the king in

our bedchamber, or to have a thought or desire of evil against him; it

quencheth the first sparks of disloyalty and disorder; and the rule of

the outward man followeth the ordering of the heart; and therefore

atheism, which leaveth the heart free and open to all desires and

designs of rebellion, doth kindle that fire in the minds of men, which

government cannot quench; it corrupteth the fountain; it breaketh the

spring that should set all a going; it poisoneth the heart of

commonwealths.[104]

7. Christianity and godliness teach men patience, that it may not seem

strange to them to bear the cross, and suffer injuries from high and

low; and therefore that impatience which is the beginning of all

rebellion being repressed, it stayeth the distemper from going any

further.

8. Christianity teacheth men self-denial as a great part of their

religion;[105] and when selfishness is mortified, there is nothing

left to be a principle of rebellion against God or our superiors.

Selfishness is the very predominant principle of the ungodly; it is

only for themselves that they obey when they do obey; no wonder

therefore if the author of Leviathan allow men to do any thing when

the saving of themselves requireth it. And so many selfish persons as

there be in a kingdom, so many several interests are first sought,

which for the most part stand cross to the interests of others: the

godly have all one common centre; they unite in God, and therefore

may be kept in concord; for God's will is a thing that may be

fulfilled by all as well as one; but the selfish and ungodly are every

one his own centre, and have no common centre to unite in, their

interests being ordinarily cross and inconsistent.

9. Christianity teacheth men by most effectual arguments, to set light

by the riches and honours of the world, and not to strive for

superiority; but to mind higher things, and lay up our treasure in a

better world, and to condescend to men of low degree. It forbiddeth

men to exalt themselves lest they be brought low; and commandeth them

to humble themselves that God may exalt them; and he that knoweth not

that pride and covetousness are the great disquieters of the world,

and the cause of contentions, and the ruin of states, knoweth nothing

of these matters. Therefore if it were but by the great urging of

humility and heavenly-mindedness, and the strict condemning of

ambition and earthly-mindedness, christianity and godliness must needs

be the greatest preservers of government, and of order, peace, and

quietness in the world.[106]

10. Christianity teacheth men to live in the love of God and man. It

maketh love the very heart, and life, and sum, and end of all other

duties of religion. Faith itself is but the bellows to kindle in us

the sacred flames of love. Love is the end of the gospel, and the

fulfilling of the law. To love all saints with a special love, even

with a pure heart and fervently, and to love all men heartily with a

common love; to love our neighbour as ourselves; and to love our very

enemies; this is the life which Christ requireth, upon the penalty of

damnation; and if love thus prevail, what should disturb the

government, peace, or order of the world?

11. Christianity teacheth men to be exact in justice, distributive and

commutative; and to do to others as we would they should do to us: and

where this is followed kings and states will have little to molest

them, when _gens sine justitia est sine remige navis in unda_.

12. Christianity teacheth men to do good to all men as far as we are

able, and to abound in good works, as that for which we are redeemed

and new made; and if men will set themselves wholly to do good, and be

hurtful and injurious to none, how easy will it be to govern such!

13. Christianity teacheth men to forbear and to forgive, as ever they

will be forgiven of God, and the strong to bear the infirmities of the

weak, and not to please themselves, but one another to their

edification; not to be censorious, harsh, or cruel, nor to place the

kingdom of God in meats, and drinks, and days, but in righteousness,

peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; to bear one another's burdens, and

to restore them with the spirit of meekness that are overtaken in a

fault, and to be peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of

mercy and good fruits, without partiality and hypocrisy, and to speak

evil of no man; and where this is obeyed, how quietly and easily may

princes govern![107]

14. Christianity setteth before us the perfectest pattern of all this

humility, meekness, contempt of worldly wealth and greatness,

self-denial and obedience, that ever was given in the world. The

eternal Son of God incarnate, would condescend to earth and flesh, and

would obey his superiors after the flesh, in the repute of the world;

and would pay tribute, and never be drawn to any contempt of the

governors of the world, though he suffered death under the false

accusation of it. He that is a christian, endeavoureth to imitate his

Lord: and can the imitation of Christ, or of his peaceable apostles,

be injurious to governors? Could the world but lay by their serpentine

enmity against the holy doctrine and practice of christianity, and not

take themselves engaged to persecute it, nor dash themselves in pieces

on the stone which they should build upon, nor by striving against it

provoke it to fall on them and grind them to powder, they never need

to complain of disturbances by christianity or godliness.[108]

15. Christianity and true godliness containeth, not only all those

precepts that tend to peace and order in the world, but also strength,

and willingness, and holy dispositions for the practising of such

precepts. Other teachers can speak but to the ears, but Christ doth

write his laws upon the heart; so that he maketh them such as he

commandeth them to be: only this is the remnant of our unhappiness,

that while he is performing the cure on us, we retain a remnant of our

old diseases, and so his work is yet imperfect: and as sin in strength

is it that setteth on fire the course of nature, so the relics of it

will make some disturbance in the world, according to its degree; but

nothing is more sure than that the godliest christian is the most

orderly and loyal subject, and the best member (according to his parts

and power) in the commonwealth; and that sin is the cause, and

holiness the cure of all the disorders and calamities of the world.

16. Lastly, Consult with experience itself, and you will find, that

all this which I have spoken, hath been ordinarily verified.[109] What

heathenism tendeth to, you may see even in the Roman government (for

there you will confess it was at the best). To read of the tumults,

the cruelties, the popular unconstancy, faction, and injustice; how

rudely the soldiers made their emperors, and how easily and

barbarously they murdered them, and how few of them from the days of

Christ till Constantine did die the common death of all men, and

escape the hands of those that were their subjects; I think this will

satisfy you, whither men's enmity to christianity tendeth: and then to

observe how suddenly the case was altered, as soon as the emperors and

subjects became christian (till in the declining of the Greek empire,

some officers and courtiers who aspired to the crown did murder the

emperors): and further to observe, that the rebellious doctrines and

practices against governors, have been all introduced by factions and

heresies, which forsook christianity so far before they incurred such

guilt; and that it is either papal usurpation (which is in its nature

an enemy to princes) that hath deposed and trampled upon emperors and

kings, or else some mad enthusiastics that overrun religion and their

wits, that at Munster, (and in England some lately,) by the advantage

of their prosperity, have dared to do violence against sovereignty;

but the more any men were christians and truly godly, the more they

detested all such things; all this will tell you that the most serious

and religious christians, are the best members of the civil societies

upon earth.

II. Having done with the first part of my last direction, I shall say

but this little of the second; let christians see that they be

christians indeed, and abuse not that which is most excellent to be a

cloak to that which is most vile. 1. In reading politics, swallow not

all that every author writeth in conformity to the polity that he

liveth under. What perverse things shall you read in the popish

politics (Contzen, and abundance such)! What usurpation on

principalities, and cruelties to christians, under the pretence of

defending the church, and suppressing heresies!

2. Take heed in reading history that you suffer not the spirit of your

author to infect you with any of that partiality which he expresseth

to the cause which he espouseth. Consider in what times and places all

your authors lived, and read them accordingly with the just allowance.

The name of liberty was so precious, and the name of a king so odious

to the Romans, Athenians, &c., that it is no wonder if their

historians be unfriendly unto kings.

3. Abuse not learning itself to lift you up with self-conceitedness

against governors! Learned men may be ignorant of polity; or at least

unexperienced, and almost as unfit to judge, as of matters of war or

navigation.

4. Take heed of giving the magistrate's power to the clergy, and

setting up secular, coercive power under the name of the power of the

keys: and it had been happy for the church if God had persuaded

magistrates in all ages to have kept the sword in their own hands, and

not have put it into the clergy's hands, to fulfil their wills

by:[110] for, 1. By this means the clergy had escaped the odium of

usurpation and domineering, by which atheistical politicians would

make religion odious to magistrates for their sakes. 2. And by this

means greater unity had been preserved in the church, while one

faction is not armed with the sword to tread down the rest: for if

divines contend only by dint of argument, when they have talked

themselves and others aweary they will have done; but when they go to

it with dint of sword, it so ill becometh them, that it seldom doth

good, but the party often that trusteth least to their reason, must

destroy the other, and make their cause good by iron arguments. 3. And

then the Romish clergy had not been armed against princes to the

terrible concussions of the christian world, which histories at large

relate, if princes had not first lent them the sword which they turned

against them. 4. And then church discipline would have been better

understood, and have been more effectual; which is corrupted and

turned to another thing, and so cast out, when the sword is used

instead of the keys, under pretence of making it effectual: none but

consenters are capable of church communion: no man can be a christian,

or godly, or saved against his will; and therefore consenters and

volunteers only are capable of church discipline: as a sword will not

make a sermon effectual, no more will it make discipline effectual:

which is but the management of God's word to work upon the conscience.

So far as men are to be driven by the sword to the use of means, or

restrained from offering injury to religion, the magistrate himself is

fittest to do it. It is noted by historians as the dishonour of Cyril

of Alexandria, (though a famous bishop,) that he was the first bishop

that like a magistrate used the sword there, and used violence against

heretics and dissenters.

5. Above all, abuse not the name of religion for the resistance of

your lawful governors: religion must be defended and propagated by no

irreligious means. It is easy before you are aware, to catch the fever

of such a passionate zeal as James and John had, when they would have

had fire from heaven to consume the refusers and resisters of the

gospel: and then you will think that any thing almost is lawful, which

doth but seem necessary to the prosperity of religion. But no means

but those of God's allowance do use to prosper, or bring home that

which men expect: they may seem to do wonders for awhile, but they

come to nothing in the latter end, and spoil the work, and leave all

worse than it was before.

_Direct._ XL. Take heed of mistaking the nature of that liberty

of the people, which is truly valuable and desirable, and of

contending for an undesirable liberty in its stead.[111] It is

desirable to have liberty to do good, and to possess our own, and

enjoy God's mercies, and live in peace: but it is not desirable to

have liberty to sin, and abuse one another, and hinder the gospel, and

contemn our governors. Some mistake liberty for government itself; and

think it is the people's liberty to be governors: and some mistake

liberty for an exemption from government, and think they are most

free, when they are most ungoverned, and may do what they list: but

this is a misery, and not a mercy, and therefore was never purchased

for us by Christ. Many desire servitude and calamity under the name of

liberty: _optima est reipublicæ forma_, saith Seneca, _ubi

nulla libertas deest, nisi licentia pereundi_. As Mr. R. Hooker

saith, lib. viii. p. 195, "I am not of opinion, that simply in kings

the most, but the best limited, power is best, both for them and the

people: the most limited is that which may deal in fewest things: the

best, that which in dealing is tied to the soundest, perfectest, and

most indifferent rule, which rule is the law: I mean not only the law

of nature and of God, but the national law consonant thereunto:

happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest things,

than that whose king is himself their law."

Yet no doubt but the lawgivers are as such, above the law as an

authoritative instrument of government, but under it as a man is under

the obligation of his own consent and word: it ruleth subjects in the

former sense; it bindeth the _summam potestatem_ in the latter.

_Direct._ XLI. When you have done all that you can in just

obedience, look for your reward from God alone. Let it satisfy you

that he knoweth and approveth your sincerity. You make it a holy work

if you do it to please God; and you will be fixed and constant, if you

take heaven for your reward (which is enough, and will not fail you);

but you make it but a selfish, carnal work, if you do it only to

please your governors, or get preferment, or escape some hurt which

they may do you, and are subject only in flattery, or for fear of

wrath, and not for conscience sake. And such obedience is uncertain

and unconstant; for when you fail of your hopes, or think rulers deal

unjustly or unthankfully with you, your subjection will be turned into

passionate desires of revenge. Remember still the example of your

Saviour, who suffered death as an enemy to Cæsar, when he had never

failed of his duty so much as in one thought or word. And are you

better than your Lord and Master? If God be all to you, and you have

laid up all your hopes in heaven, it is then but little of your

concernment (further than God is concerned in it) whether rulers do

use you well or ill, and whether they interpret your actions rightly,

or what they take you for, or how they call you; but it is your

concernment that God account you loyal, and will judge you so, and

justify you from men's accusations of disloyalty, and reward you with

more than man can give you. Nothing is well done, especially of so

high a nature as this, which is not done for God and heaven, and which

the crown of glory is not the motive to.

I have purposely been the larger on this subject, because the times in

which we live require it, both for the settling of some, and for the

confuting the false accusations of others, who would persuade the

world that our doctrine is not what it is; when through the sinful

practices of some, the way of truth is evil spoken of, 2 Pet. ii. 2.

_Tit. 2. A fuller resolution of the cases, 1. Whether the laws of

men do bind the conscience? 2. Especially smaller and penal laws?_

The word conscience signifieth either, 1. In general according to the

notation of the word, The knowledge of our own matters;

_conscire_; the knowledge of ourselves, our duties, our faults,

our fears, our hopes, our diseases, &c. 2. Or more limitedly and

narrowly, The knowledge of ourselves and our own matters in relation

to God's law and judgment; _Judicium hominis de seipso prout

subjicitur judicio Dei_, as Amesius defineth it.

2. Conscience is taken, 1. Sometimes for the act of self-knowing. 2.

Sometimes for the habit. 3. Sometimes for the faculty, that is, for

the intellect itself, as it is a faculty of self-knowing. In all these

senses it is taken properly. 4. And sometimes it is used (by custom)

improperly, for the person himself, that doth _conscire_; or for

his will (another faculty).

3. The conscience may be said to be bound, 1. Subjectively, as the

_subjectum quod_, or the faculty obliged. 2. Or objectively, as

_conscire_, the act of conscience, is the thing _ad quod_,

to which we are obliged.

And upon those necessary distinctions I thus answer to the first

question.

_Prop._ 1. The act or the habit of conscience is not capable of

being the subject obliged; no more than any other act or duty: the act

or duty is not bound, but the man to the act or duty.

2. The faculty or judgment is not capable of being the object, or

_materia ad quam_, the thing to which we are bound. A man is not

bound to be a man, or to have an intellect, but is made such.

3. The faculty of conscience (that is, the intellect) is not capable

of being the immediate or nearest _subjectum quod_, or subject

obliged. The reason is, Because the intellect of itself is not a

free-working faculty, but acteth necessarily per _modum naturæ_

further than it is under the empire of the will; and therefore

intellectual and moral habits are by all men distinguished.

4. All legal or moral obligation falleth directly upon the will only:

and so upon the person as a voluntary agent; so that it is proper to

say, The will is bound, and The person is bound.

5. Improperly and remotely it may be said, The intellect (or faculty

of conscience) is bound, or the tongue, or hand, or foot is bound; as

the man is bound to use them.

6. Though it be not proper to say, That the conscience is bound, it is

proper to say, That the man is bound to the act and habit of

conscience, or to the exercise of the faculty.

7. The common meaning of the phrase, that we are bound in conscience,

or that conscience is bound, is that we are bound to a thing by God,

or by a divine obligation, and that it is a sin against God to violate

it; so that divines use here to take the word conscience in the

narrower theological sense, as respect to God's law and judgment doth

enter the definition of it.

8. Taking conscience in this narrower sense, to ask, Whether man's law

as man's do bind us in conscience, is all one as to ask, Whether man

be God.[112]

9. And taking conscience in the large or general sense, to ask,

Whether man's laws bind us in conscience subjectively, is to ask,

Whether they bind the understanding to know our duty to man? And the

tenor of them will show that, while they bind us to an outward act, or

from an outward act, it is the man that they bind to or from that act,

and that is, as he is a rational, voluntary agent; so that a human

obligation is laid upon the man, on the will, and on the intellect, by

human laws.

10. And human laws, while they bind us to or from an outward act, do

thereby bind us as rational free agents, knowingly to choose or refuse

those acts; nor can a law which is a moral instrument any otherwise

bind the hand, foot, or tongue, but by first binding us to choose or

refuse it knowingly, that is, conscientiously, so that a human bond is

certainly laid on the mind, soul, or conscience, taken in the larger

sense.

11. Taking conscience in the stricter sense, as including essentially

a relation to God's obligation, the full sense of the question plainly

is but this, Whether it be a sin against God to break the laws of man?

And thus plain men might easily understand it. And to this it must be

answered, That it is in two respects a sin against God to break such

laws or commands as rulers are authorized by God to make; 1. Because

God commandeth us to obey our rulers: therefore he that (so) obeyeth

them not, sinneth against a law of God. God obligeth us in general to

obey them in all things which they are authorized by him to command;

but their law determineth of the particular matter; therefore God

obligeth us (in conscience of his law) to obey them in that

particular. 2. Because by making them his officers, by his commission

he hath given them a certain beam of authority, which is divine as

derived from God; therefore they can command us by a power derived

from God: therefore to disobey is to sin against a power derived from

God. And thus the general case is very plain and easy, How man sinneth

against God in disobeying the laws of man, and consequently how (in a

tolerable sense of that phrase) it may be said, that man's laws do or

do not bind the conscience, (or rather, bind us in point of

conscience,) or by a divine obligation. Man is not God; and therefore,

as man, of himself can lay no divine obligation on us. But man being

God's officer, 1. His own law layeth on us an obligation derivatively

divine (for it is no law which hath no obligation, and it is no

authoritative obligation which is not derived from God). 2. And God's

own law bindeth us to obey man's laws.

_Quest._ II. But is it a sin to break every penal law of man?

_Answ._ 1. You must remember that man's law is essentially the

signification of man's will; and therefore obligeth no further than it

truly signifieth the ruler's will.

2. That it is the act of a power derived from God; and therefore no

further bindeth, than it is the exercise of such a power.

3. That it is given, 1. Finally for God's glory and pleasure, and for

the common good (comprehending the honour of the ruler and the welfare

of the society ruled). And therefore obligeth not when it is, (1.)

Against God. (2.) Or against the common good. 2. And it is subordinate

to God's own laws, (in nature and Scripture,) and therefore obligeth

not to sin, or to the violation of God's law.[113]

4. You must note that laws are made for the government of societies as

such universally; and so are fitted to the common case, for the common

good. And it is not possible but that a law which prescribeth a duty

which by accident is so to the most, should meet with some particular

subject to whom the case is so circumstantiated as that the same act

would be to him a sin: and to the same man it may be ordinarily a

duty, and in an extraordinary case a sin. Thence it is that in some

cases (as Lent fasts, marriages, &c.) rulers oft authorize some

persons to grant dispensations in some certain cases: and hence it is

said, that necessity hath no law.

Hereupon I conclude as followeth:

1. It is no sin to break a law which is no law, as being against God,

or not authorized by him, (as of a usurper, &c.) See R. Hooker,

Conclus. lib. viii.

2. It is no law so far as it is no signification of the true will of

the ruler, whatever the words be: therefore so far it is no sin to

break it.

3. The will of the ruler is to be judged of, not only by the words,

but by the ends of government, and by the rules of humanity.

4. It being not possible that the ruler in his laws can foresee and

name all exceptions, which may occur, it is to be supposed that it is

his will that the nature of the thing shall be the notifier of his

will, when it cometh to pass; and that if he were present, and this

case fell out before him, which the sense and end of the law extendeth

not to, he would say, This is an excepted case.

5. There is therefore a wide difference between a general law, and a

personal, particular mandate; as of a parent to a child, or a master

to a servant; for this latter fully notifieth the will of the ruler

in that very case, and to that very person. And therefore it cannot be

said that here is any exception, or that it is not his will; but in a

universal or general law, it is to be supposed that some particular

excepted cases will fall out extraordinarily, though they cannot be

named; and that in those cases, the ruler's will dispenseth with it.

6. Sometimes also the ruler doth by the mere neglect of pressing or

executing his own laws, permit them to grow obsolete, and out of use;

and sometimes he forbeareth the execution of them for some time, or to

some sort of persons; and by so doing, doth notify that it was not his

will that at such a time, and in such cases, they should oblige. I say

not that all remissness of execution is such a sign; but sometimes it

is: and the very word of the lawgiver may notify his dispensation or

suspending will. As for instance, upon the burning of London, there

were many laws (about coming to parish churches, and relief of the

poor of the parish, and the like) that the people became uncapable of

obeying; and it was to be supposed, that the ruler's will would have

been to have excepted such cases if foreseen; and that they did

dispense with them when they fell out.

7. Sometimes also the penalty of violating a law, is some such mulct

or service, which the ruler intendeth as a commutation for the duty,

so that he freely leaveth it to the choice of the subject which he

will choose. And then it is no sin to pay the mulct, and omit the

action; because it crosseth not the lawgiver's will.

8. Sometimes also the law may command this principally for some men's

sake, which so little concerns others, that it should not extend to

them at all, were it not lest the liberty of them should be an

impediment to the obedience of others, and consequently of the common

good. In which case, if those persons so little concerned, do but omit

the action secretly, so as to be no scandal or public hurt, it seemeth

that they have the implicit consent of the rulers.

9. Sometimes particular duties are commanded with this express

exception, "Unless they have just and reasonable impediment." As for

coming every Lord's day to church, &c.; which seemeth to imply, that

(though in cases where the public good is concerned, the person

himself shall not be judge, nor at all as to the penalty, yet that) in

actions of an indifferent nature in themselves, this exception is

still supposed to be implied, "unless we have just and reasonable

impediments," of which in private cases, as to the crime, we may

judge.

10. I need not mention the common, natural exceptions: as that laws

bind not to a thing when it becometh naturally impossible; or

_cessante materia, rel capacitate subjecti obligati_, &c.

11. Laws may change their sense in part by the change of the lawgiver;

for the law is not formally to us his law that is dead and was once

our ruler, but his that is alive and is now our ruler. If Henry the

Eighth make a law about the outward acts of religion, (as for coming

to church, &c.) and this remain unrepealed in King Edward's, Queen

Mary's, Queen Elizabeth's, King James's days, &c., even till now; as

we are not to think that the lawgivers had the same sense and will, so

neither that the law hath the same sense and obligation; for if the

general words be capable of several senses, we must not take it as

binding to us in the sense it was made in, but in the sense of our

present lawgivers or rulers, because it is their law.

12. Therefore if a law had a special reason for it at the first

making, (as the law for using bows and arrows,) that reason ceasing,

we are to suppose the will of the lawgiver to remit the obligation, if

he urge not the execution, and renew not the law.

13. By these plain principles many particular difficulties may be

easily resolved, which cannot be foreseen and named, e. g. the law

against relieving a beggar bindeth not, when he is like to die if he

be not relieved; or in such a case as after the burning of London,

when there was no parish to bring him to. A law that is but for the

ordering of men's charity, (to soul or body, by preaching or alms,)

will not disoblige me from the duties of charity themselves, in cases

where Scripture or nature proveth them to be imposed by God. A law for

fasting will not bind me, when it would be destructive to my body;

even on God's sabbaths duties of mercy were to be preferred to rest

and sacrifices.

14. If God's own laws must be thus expounded, that When two duties

come together, and both cannot be done, the lesser ceaseth at that

time to be a duty, and the greater is to be preferred, man's laws must

also be necessarily so expounded: and the rather, because man's laws

may be contradictory, when God's never are so, rightly understood.

15. Where the subject is to obey, so far he must discern which of the

laws inconsistent is to be preferred; but in the magistratical

execution, the magistrate or judge must determine.

E. g. One law commandeth that all the needy poor be kept on the parish

where they were born or last lived. Another law saith, that

nonconformable ministers of the gospel, who take not the Oxford oath,

shall not come within five miles of city or corporation, (though they

were born there,) or any place where they have been preachers. In case

of necessity what shall they do? _Answ._ Whither they shall go

for relief, they must discern as well as they can; but whither they

shall be carried or sent, the magistrate or constable must discern and

judge.

Also whether he shall go with a constable that by one law bringeth him

to a place, which by the other law he is forbid on pain of six months'

imprisonment in the common gaol to come to? _Answ._ If he be not

voluntary in it, it is not his fault: and if one bring him thither by

force, and another imprison him for being there, he must patiently

suffer it.

16. But out of such excepted cases, the laws of our rulers (as the

commands of parents) do bind us as is afore explained; and it is a sin

against God to violate them.

17. Yea, when the reason of the law reacheth not our particular case

and person, yet when we have reason to judge, that it is the ruler's

will that all be bound for the sake of some, and the common order and

good will be hindered by our exemption, we must obey to our corporal

detriment, to avoid the public detriment, and to promote the public

good.

[36] Nihil Deo qui omnem mundum hunc regit, acceptius, quam concilia

cœcusque nominum quæ civitates appellantur. Cicero.

[37] Grotius de Imper. Sum. Potest. c. i. p. 7, 8. Sunt qui objiciant

reges quædam imperare non posse, nisi consensus ordinum accesserit:

sed hi non vident quibus in locis id juris est, ibi summum imperium

non esse penes reges, sed aut penes ordines, aut certe penes id

corpus, quod rex et juncti constituunt, ut Bodinus, Suarezius,

Victoria, aliique, aliunde demonstrarunt: certum summum imperium

totum, et aliquid imperare non posse, ideo tantum quod alter vetet

aut intercedat, plane sunt ἀσύστατα.

[38] So foolish and bad is the multitude too often, that it made

Aristippus hold it as probable, that a wise man should not endanger

himself for his country, because wisdom is not to be cast away for

the commodity of fools. Laert. in Aristip. But a wise man must be

wise for others, and not only for himself.

[39] It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, Vendendi

filium patri potestas esto. But this law rather giveth the father

that power, than declareth it to be naturally in him. Nature alloweth

him no other selling of him, than what is for his child's own good.

[40] So p. 23. The same error of the original of power hath Acosta,

1. ii. c. 2. p. 208. with many other Jesuits and papists.

[41] Bishop Andrews in Tortur. Tort. p. 385. Actuus homo non

distinguit inter formam, atque authoritatem regiminis; forma de

hominibus esse potest: de cœlo semper est authoritas. An rex sit

supra leges, Vid. Seb. Fox. lib. ii. de Instit. Reg.

[42] Dion Cass. saith, that when Euphates the philosopher would kill

himself, Veniam dederat ei Adrianus citra ignominiam et infamiam, ut

cicutam tum propter senectutem, tum etiam propter gravem morbum,

bibere possit. In vita Adrian.

[43] Against the people's being the givers of power, by conjoining

all their own in one, in church or state, see Mr. D. Cawdry's Review

of Mr. Hooker's Survey, p. 154, &c.

[44] So lib. viii. p. 211, 218, 220.

[45] Lib. viii. p. 195. Trita in scholis, neminem sibi imperare

posse; neminem sibi legem posse dicere, a qua mutata voluntate

nequeat recedere: summum ejus esse imperium qui ordinario jure

derogare valeat. Et quibus evincitur jus summæ potestatis non

limitari per legem positivum. Hinc et Augustinus dixit imperatorem

non esse subjectum legibus suis.--Grotius de Imp. p. 149, 150.

[46] Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam. Legem nec hominum

ingeniis excogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum; sed æternum

quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique

sapientia. Cicero de Leg.

[47] How considerable a part of England is London! Yet in this

convocation, which hath made the new changes in the liturgy and book

of ordination, London had not one clerk of their choosing: for being

to choose but two, they chose only Mr. Calamy and myself; who were

neither of us accepted, or ever there. Now if your opinion be true;

Quær. 1. Whether you make not this convocation's decrees to be but

counsels to us? 2. Or at least whether the city of London, or the

London ministers, be not made free from detriment, as not consenters?

You will free them and me, especially from detriment for our not

conforming to this convocation's acts as such; upon reasons which I

do not own myself, as generally by you laid down.

[48] Potestas maritalis est a Deo: applicatio ejus potestatis ad

certam personam ex consensu venit quo tamen ipsum jus non datur. Nam

si ex consensu daretur, posset consensu etiam dissolvi matrimonium,

aut conveniri ne maritus fœminæ imperaret. Quod minime verum est.

Imperatoria potestas non est penes electores: ergo nec ab ipsis

datur; sed ab ipsis tamen certæ personæ applicatur. Jus vitæ et necis

non est penes cives antequam in rempublicam coeant. Privatus enim jus

vindictæ non habet: ab iisdem tamen applicatur ad cœtum aut

personam aliquam. Grotius de Imperio, p. 270.

[49] Greg. Nazianzen cited by Bilson of Subjection, p. 361. Thou

reignest together with Christ; rulest with him; thy sword is from

him; thou art the image of God.

[50] Victor. Utic. saith of Victorianus proconsul of Carthage, that

even to an Arian persecuting, usurping tyrant, Pro rebus sibi

commissis semper fidelissimus habebatur; and the like of Sebastian

and others, p. 460.

[51] Mark vii. 10; x. 19.

[52] Lamprid. saith of Alex. Severus that, Amavis literatos homines,

vehementer eos etiam reformidans, nequid de se asperum scriberent.

Universal. Histor. p. 132. Tiberius bellua luto et sanguine macerata;

sui tegendi peritissimus artifex; totus tamen posteritatis oculis

patuit, Deo hypocrisim detractione larvæ; plectente.

[53] Matt. xviii. 6; Mark ix. 42; Luke xvii. 2; Jude 7-9.

[54] Sext. Aurel. Victor, de Calig. De quo nescio an decuerit memoriæ

prodi, nisi forte quia juvat de principibus nosse omnia, ut improbi

saltem famæ metu talia declinent.

[55] They are dangerous passages which Petrarch hath, though a good,

learned, and moderate man. Dial. 49. Non tot passim essent domini nec

tam late furerent, nisi populi insanirent et cuique civium pro se

charior foret res privata quam publica; voluptas quam gloria, pecunia

quam libertas, vita quam virtus--Et statim--Et sane si vel unum

patria civem bonum habeat, malum dominum diutius non habebit. The

meaning is too plain; abundance of the most learned writers have such

passages which must be read with caution; though I would draw none to

the other extreme. Petrarch's 68 Dial. and 85 Dial. de bono domino,

is as smart as the former; but yet speaketh not all that contra

reges, which he doth contra dominos. However he says that, Inter

regem et tyrannum non discernunt Graii, &c.----So Sir Thomas More in

his Poems: Regibus e multis regnum bene qui reget unum: vix tamen

unus erit, si tamen unus erit. And that of Senec. Trag. ult. Tantum

ut noceat, cupit esse potens.--

[56] Bias interrogatus, quidnam esset difficile? Ferre, inquit,

fortiter mutationem rerum in deterius. Laert. p. 55.

[57] Phil. iii. 7, 8, 11, 12.

[58] Univers. Hist. p. 140. Dicas imperatorem orbis Epictetum,

Neronem mancipium: irrisum esse summo fastigio, cum servaret dignus,

imperaret indignus; nullumque esse malum, quin aliqua boni gutta

cordiatus.

[59] Numb. xvi.

[60] Psal. xii. 6, 7; Prov. xvi. 18; xix. 13.

[61] Matt. vii. 1-3.

[62] Object. Si id juris orbis obtineat status religionis erit

instabilis; mutato regis animo religio mutabitur. Resp. Unicum hic

solatium in Divina est providentia; omnium animos Deus in potestate

sua habet; sed speciali quodam modo cor regis in manu Domini. Deus et

per bonos et per malos reges opus suum operatur. Interdum

tranquillitas, interdum tempestas ecclesiæ utilior. Nempe si pius est

qui impepat, si diligens lector sacræ Scripturæ, si assiduus in

precibus, si Ecclesiæ Catholicæ reverens, si peritos attente audiens,

multum per ilium proficit veritas. Sin distorto est et corrupto

judicio, pejus id ipsi cedit quam ecclesiæ. Nam ipsum grave manet

judicium regis ecclesiæ, qui ecclesiam inultam non sinet. Grotius de

Imper. p. 210. John xviii. 36.

[63] Dicunt Stoici, sapientes non modo liberos esse verum et reges:

cum sit regnum imperium nemini obnoxium, quod de sapientibus solis

asseritur. Statuere enim oportere principem de bonis et malis; hæc

autem malorum scire neminem. Similiter ad magistratus, et judicia et

oratoriam solos illos idoneos, neminemque malorum. Laert. in Zenone.

[64] Eam rempublicam optimam dicunt Stoici, quæ sit mixta ex regno et

populari dominatu, optimorumque potentia. Laert. in Zenone.

[65] Bad people make bad governors: in most places the people are so

wilful and tenacious of their sinful customs, that the best rulers

are not able to reform them. Yea many a ruler hath cast off his

government, being wearied with mutinous and obstinate people. Plato

would not meddle with government in Athens. Quia plebs altis

institutis et moribus assueverat. Laert. in Platone. And many other

philosophers that were fittest for government, refused it on the same

account, through the disobedience of the people.

[66] Of these things see my propositions of the difference of the

magistrate's and pastor's power to Dr. Lud. Moul.

[67] The Rex sacrorum among the Romans, was debarred from exercising

any magistracy. Plut. Rom. Quest. 63.

[68] See Bilson of Subject. p. 238, 256. Princes only be governors in

things and causes ecclesiastical; that is, with the sword. But if you

infer, ergo, Bishops be no governors in those things, meaning, no

dispensers, guiders, nor directors of those things, your conclusion

is larger, &c. So p. 256.

[69] It was somewhat far that Carolus Magnus went to be actual guide

of all in his chapel in reading even in all their stops, as it is at

large declared by Abbas Usperg. Chron. pag. 181.

[70] Bishop Bilson, pag. 313. We grant they must rather hazard their

lives, than baptize princes which believe not, or distribute the

Lord's mysteries to them that repent not, but give wilful and open

signification of impiety, &c. Beda Hist. Eccles. lib. ii. c. 5,

telleth us, that Melitus bishop of London, (with Justus,) was

banished by the heirs of king Sabereth, because he would not give

them the sacrament of the Lord's supper, which they would needs have

before they were baptized.

[71] Bishop Andrews in Tort. Tort. p. 383. Cohibeat Regem Diaconus,

si cum indignus sit, idque palam constet, accedat tamen ad

sacramentum: cohibeat et medicus si ad noxium quid vel insalubre

manum admoveat: cohibeat et equiso inter equitandum adigat equum per

locum præruptum, vel solebrosum, cui subsit periculum: etiamne

medico? etiamne equisoni suo subjectus rex? Sed de majori potestate

loquitur; sed ea, ad rem noxiam procul arcendam. Qua in re charitatis

semper potestas est maxima. Here you see what church government is,

and how kings are under it, and how not, in Bishop Andrews' sense.

[72] Bilson, p. 399, saith, The election of bishops in those days

belonged to the people, and not the prince, and though Valens by

plain force placed Lucius there, yet might the people lawfully reject

him as no bishop, and cleave to Peter their pastor.

[73] Too many particular laws about little matters breed contention.

Alex. Severus would have distinguished all orders of men by their

apparel: sed hoc Ulpiano, et Paulo displicuit; dicentibus plurimum

rixarum fore, si faciles essent homines ad injurias. And the emperor

yielded to them. Lamprid. in Alex. Severus. Lipsius, ubi leges multæ,

ibi lites multæ et vita moresque pravi. Non multæ leges bonos mores

faciunt, sed paucæ fideliter servatæ.

[74] N. B. Quæ habet Andrews Tort. Tort. p. 310. Quando et apud vos

dictio juris exterior, clavis proprie non sit: eamque vos multis sæpe

mandatis, qui liacorum in sorte sunt, exortes sane sacri ordinis

universi.

[75] Lege Epist. Caroli Calvi ad Papam inter Hinc mari Rhemensis

Epistolas Cont. Papæ Usurpationes. Isidor. Hispal. sent. iii. cap.

51. Cognoscant principes seculi, Deo debere se rationem reddere

propter ecclesiam quam a Christo tuendam suspiciunt. Nam sive

augeatur pax et disciplina ecclesiæ per fideles principes, sive

solvatur, ille ab eis rationem exigit, qui eorum potestati suam

ecclesiam credidit. Leo Epist. ad Leonem Imp. Debes incunctantur

advertere, regiam potestatem, tibi non solum ad mundi regimen, sed

maxime ad ecclesiæ præsidium esse collatam. See the judgment of Jo.

Parisiensis, Franciscus Victoria, and Widdrington in Grot. de Imper.

pag. 23. Lege Lud. Molinæi Discourse of the Powers of the Cardinal

Chigi.

[76] Perjurii pœna divina exitium, humana dedecus. Cicero.

Agesilaus sent thanks to his enemies for their perjury, as making

then no question of their overthrow. Perjuri numinis contemptores.

Plutarch. Theodosius execrabatur cum legisset superbiam dominantium,

præcipue perfidos et ingratos. Paul. Diaconus, 1. 2.

[77] See the instance of loyalty in Mascelzer against his own brother

Gildo (a rebel). Paul. Diacon. lib. iii. initio.

[78] Bilson of Subject, p. 236. Princes have no right to call or

confirm preachers, but to receive such as be sent of God, and give

them liberty for their preaching, and security for their persons: and

if princes refuse so to do, God's labourers must go forward with that

which is commanded them from heaven; not by disturbing princes from

their thrones, nor invading their realms, as your holy father doth,

and defendeth he may do; but by mildly submitting themselves to the

powers on earth, and meekly suffering for the defence of the truth,

what they shall inflict. So he.

[79] Prov. xvi. 7.

[80] Rom. xiii. 1-4; xi. 36.

[81] Si aliquid; jusserit proconsul, aliud jubeat imperator, nunquid

dubitatur, illo contempto, illi esse serviendum? Ergo si aliud

imperator, aliud jubeat Deus, quid judicatur? Major potestas Deus: da

veniam O imperator. August, de Verb. Domin. Matth. Serm. 6.

[82] Vetus est verumque dictum, Miser est imperator cui vera

reticentur. Grotius de Imp. p. 245. Principi consule non dulciora,

sed optima; is one of Solon's sentences in Laert. de Solon. Therefore

it is a horrid villany of the Jesuits, which is expressed in Secret.

Instruct. in Arcanis Jesuit. p. 5-8, 11. To indulge great men and

princes in those opinions and sins which please them, and to be on

that side that their liberty requireth to keep their favour to the

society. So Maffæinus, 1. iii. c. 11. in vita ipsius Loyolæ.

Alexander Severus so greatly hated flatterers, that Lampridius saith,

Siquis caput flexisset aut blandius aliquid dixisset, uti adulator,

vel abjiciebatur, si loci ejus qualitas pateretur; vel ridebatur

ingeuti cachinno, si ejus dignitas graviori subjacere non posset

injuriæ Venit ad Attilam post victoriam Marullus poeta ejus temporis

egregius, compositumque in adulationem carmen recitavit: in quo ubi

Attila per interpretem cognovit se Deum et Divina stirpe ortum

vanissime prædicari, aspernatus sacrilegæ adulationis impudentiam,

cum autore carmen exuri jusserat. A qua severitate subinde

temperavit, ne scriptores cæteri a laudibus ipsius celebrandis

terrerentur. Callimach. Exp. in Attila, p. 353.

[83] Melch. Adam. in vit. Barth. Pitisci.

[84] It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, Justa imperia

sunto, iisque cives modeste ac sine recusatione parento.

[85] Eccl. Polit. lib. viii. p. 224.

[86] On second thoughts this case is fullier opened afterward.

[87] Leg. quæ de Grotio post, p. 731.

[88] So Hollingshed maketh parliaments so mighty as to take down the

greatest kings, &c.

[89] As Aug. Traj. the Antonines, &c. It is confessed that most

historians write much for liberty against tyranny. But the heathens

do it much more than the christians.

[90] Langius saith, that in his own hearing, Jodocus Præses Senat.

Mechlin. Magna contentione tuebatur, neminem posse vel unius legis

intelligentiam consequi, qui quicquam sciret in bonis literis, et

addebat, vix esse tres in orbe qui leges Cæsareas intelligerent.

[91] Read Bishop Andrews Tort. Tort., Bishop Bilson of Christian

Subjection, Robert Abbot, Jewel, Field, &c., who will fully show that

true church power is no way injurious to kings. De regum authoritate,

quod ex jure divino non sit Tortus probat: asseri enim scriptorum

sententia communi: at nec omnium, nec optimorum. Andr. Tort. Tort.

p. 384.

[92] Just such occasions as papists bring against the reformers, did

the heathens bring against the christians, as you may see in Eunapius

in Ædesio. At egregii illi viri et bellicosi confusis perturbatisque

rebus omnibus debellasse Deos incruentis quidem, sed ab avaritiæ

crimine non puris manibus gloriabantur, sacrilegium et impietatis

crimen laudi sibi assumentes, idem postea in sacra loca invexerunt

Monachos, sic dictos homines quidem specie, sed vitam turpem porcorum

more exigentes, qui in popatulo infinita et infanda scelere

committebant, quibus tamen pietatis pars videbatur, sacri loci

reverentiam proculcari. O partiality!

[93] Rom. xii. 17, 19, 20; Luke vi. 28-30; Matt. v. 39-41;

Luke xx. 25, 26.

[94] Le Blanc in his Travels, p. 88, saith of some heathen kings,

They are all jealous of our religion, holding, that the christians

adore one God, great above the rest, that will not suffer any others;

and that he sets a greater esteem and value upon innocent, poor, and

simple people, than upon the rich, kings and princes; and that

princes had need to preserve to themselves the affections and esteem

of their subjects, to reign with greater ease.

[95] So Bishop Bilson of Subject, p. 243. Princes be supreme; not in

respect that all things be subject to their wills, which were plain

tyranny, not christian authority: but that all persons within their

realms are bound to obey their laws, or abide their pains. So p. 242.

[96] The differences are oft among the lawyers which set the

commonwealth on fire, and then they are charged on divines, e. g.

Grotius de Imper. p. 55. Si arma in eos reges sumpta sunt in quos

totum populi jus translatum erat, ac qui proinde non precario sed

proprio jure imperabant, laudari salva pietate non possunt,

quemcunque tandem prætextum aut eventum habuerint. Sin alicubi reges

tales fuere qui pactis, sive positivis legibus, et senatus alicujus

aut ordinum decretis astringerentur, in hos ut summum imperium non

obtinent, arma ex optimatum tanquam superiorum sententia, sumi,

justis de causis potuerint. Multi enim reges, etiam qui sanguinis

jure succedunt, reges sunt nomine magis quam imperio--Sed fallit

imperitos quod illam quotidianam et maxime in oculos incurrentem

rerum administrationem, quæ sæpe in optimatum statu penes unum est,

ab interiore reipublicæ constitutione non satis discernunt. Quod de

regibus dixi, idem multo magis de iis acceptum volo, qui et re et

nomine non reges sed principes fuere, h. e. non summi, sed primi. p.

54.

[97] Jactavit caput inter præcisos phanaticos et genitalia sibi

devinxit, &c. Lamprid.

[98] Eunapius saith of his master Chrysanthius, that when Julian had

made him, Primarium pontificem totius illius ditionis, in munere

tamen suo non morose ac superbe se gessit; junioribus urgendo haud

gravis (sicut plerique omnes in unum consentientes, callide

ferventerque faciundum censebant); neque christianis molestus

admodum: quippe tanta erat morum in eo lenitas atque simplicitas, ut

per Lydiam propemodum ignorata fuerit sacrorum in pristinum

restitutio. Eo factum est, ut cum priora aliter cecidissent, nihil

innovatum neque mutatio insignis accepta videretur, sed præter

expectationem cuncta placide sapirentur. Moderation in a heathen was

his benefit.

[99] Vestra doctrina est, nisi princeps vobis ex animo sit,

quantumvis legitimus hæres sit, regno excludi, alium eligi posse.

Posse dixi? immo oportere. Hæc Clementina vestra fuit. Bishop Andrews

of the Papists, Tort. Tort. p. 327.

[100] So p. 381, 382. "If others do but stand on their guard to keep

their lives and families from the bloody rage of their enemies,

seeking to put whole towns and provinces of them to the sword,

against all law and reason, and to disturb the kingdoms in the

minority of the right governors: or if they defend their ancient and

christian liberties, covenanted and agreed on by those princes, to

whom they first submitted themselves, and ever since confirmed and

allowed by the kings that have succeeded: if in either of these two

cases the godly require their right, and offer no wrong, impugn not

their princes, but only save their own lives, you cry, Rebellious

heretics, rebellious Calvinists, fury, frenzy, mutiny; and I know not

what. You may pursue, depose, and murder princes, when the bishop of

Rome biddeth you, and that without breach of duty, law, or

conscience, to God or man, as you vaunt, though neither life nor

limbs of yours be touched. We may not so much as beseech princes that

we may be used like subjects, not like slaves; like men, not like

beasts, that we may be convented by laws before judges, not murdered

in corners by inquisitors. We may not so much as hide our heads, nor

pull our necks out of the greedy jaws of that Romish wolf, but the

foam of your unclean mouth is ready to call us by all the names you

can devise." So far Bilson.

[101] Rom. xv. 1-4.

[102] Bishop Bilson ubi sup. p. 259. As bishops ought to discern

which is truth before they teach; so must the people discern who

teacheth right before they believe. Pag. 261, 262. Princes as well as

others must yield obedience to bishops speaking the word of God; but

if bishops pass their commission, and speak beside the word of God,

what they list, both prince and people may despise them. See him

further, p. 259-262, proving that all have a _judicium discretionis_.

[103] Cicero saith, that every good man was in his heart, or as much

as in him lay, one that killed Cæsar.

[104] 1 Pet. iv. 12.

[105] Luke xiv. 9, 33.

[106] Ungebantur reges non per dominum, sed qui cæteris crudeliores

existerent, et paulo post ab unctoribus non pro veri examinatione,

trucidabantar, aliis electis trucioribus. Gildas de exc. Brit.

[107] Rom. xiv.; xv. 1; Gal. vi. 1-4; James iii. 15-17; Tit. iii. 2.

[108] Luke xx. 18; Matt. xxi. 42, 44; Acts iv. 11; 1 Pet. ii. 7, 8;

Zech. xii. 3.

[109] Read the lives of all the philosophers, orators, and famous men

of Greece or Rome, and try whether the christians or they were more

for monarchy. Arcesilaus regum neminem magnopere coluit: quamobrem

legatione ad Antigonum fungens pro patria, nihil obtinuit. Hesich. in

Arces. It is one of Thales's sayings in Laert. Quid difficile? Regem

vidisse tyrannum senem. Chrysippus videtur aspernator regum modice

fuisse. Quod cum tam multa scripserit (libros 705.) nulli unquam regi

quicquam adscripserit. Seneca saith (Traged. de Here. fur.)

perilously, Victima haud ulla amplior potest, magisque opima mactari

Jovi, Quam rex iniquus. Cicero pro Milon. Non se obstrinxit scelere

siquis tyrannum occidat, quamvis familiarem. Et 5. Tusc. Nulla nobis

cum tyrannis societas est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum quem

honestum est necare. Plura habet similia.

[110] See Bilson of Subject, p. 525, 526. Proving from Chrysostom,

Hilary, Origen, that pastors may use no force or terror, but only

persuasion, to recover their wandering sheep. Bilson, ibid. p. 541.

Parliaments have been kept by the king and his barons, the clergy

wholly excluded, and yet their acts and statutes good: and when the

bishops were present, their voices from the Conquest to this day were

never negative. By God's law you have nothing to do with making laws

for kingdoms and commonwealths: you may teach, you may not command:

persuasion is your part, compulsion is the prince's, &c. Thus Bishop

Bilson. So p. 358.

[111] 1 Pet. ii. 16; Gal. v. 13; 2 Pet. ii. 19; Gal. iv. 26;

2 Cor. iii. 17.

[112] Having spoken of this controversy, in my "Life of Faith," as an

easy thing, in which I thought we were really agreed, while we seemed

to differ, which I called a pitiful case, some brethren (who say

nothing against the truth of what I said) are offended at me as

speaking too confidently, and calling that so easy which Bishop

Sanderson and so many others did make a greater matter of; I retract

the words, if they be unsuitable either to the matter or the readers:

but as to the matter and the truth of the words, I desire the reader

but to consider how easy a case Mr. P. maketh of it, Eccl. Pol. and

how heinous a matter he maketh of our supposed dissent: and if after

all this it shall appear, that the nonconformists do not at all

differ from Hooker, Bilson, and the generality of the conformists in

this point, let him that is willing to be represented as odious and

intolerable to rulers and to mankind, for that in which we do not

differ, proceed to backbite me for saying that it is a pitiful case;

and pretending that we are agreed.

[113] It is not Mr. Humphrey alone that hath written that laws bind

not in conscience to obedience which are against the public good. The

greatest casuists say the same, excepting the case of scandal: he

that would see this in them may choose but these two special authors,

Bapt. Fragos. de Regimine Reipublicæ, and Greg. Sayrus in his Clavis

Regia, and in them he shall find enough more cited. Though I think

some further cautions would make it more satisfactory.