PHÆDON.
[Side-note: The Phædon is affirmative and expository.]
The Phædon is characterised by Proklus as a dialogue wherein Sokrates
unfolds fully his own mental history, and communicates to his
admirers the complete range of philosophical cognition.[1] This
criticism is partly well founded. The dialogue generally is among the
most affirmative and expository in the Platonic list. Sokrates
undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, delivers the various
reasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction, and
confutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others. In regard
to the exposition, however, we must consider ourselves as listening
to Plato under the name of Sokrates: and we find it so conducted as
to specify both certain stages through which the mind of Plato had
passed, and the logical process which (at that time) appeared to him
to carry conviction.
[Footnote 1: Proklus, in Platon. Republ. p. 392. [Greek: e)n
Phai/dôni me\n ga\r o(/pou diaphero/ntôs o( Sôkra/tês tê\n e(autou=
zôê\n a)naploi=, kai\ pa=n to\ tê=s e)pistê/mês plê=thos a)noi/gei
toi=s e(autou= zêlôtai=s], &c. Wyttenbach thinks (note, ad p. 108
E) that Plato was young when he composed the Phædon. But no
sufficient grounds are given for this: and the concluding sentence of
the dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years
after the death of Sokrates--[Greek: ê)/de ê( teleutê/, ô)=
E)che/krates, tou= e(tai/rou ê(mi=n e)ge/neto, a)ndro/s, ô(s ê(mei=s
phai=men a)/n, _tô=n to/te_ ô(=n e)peira/thêmen a)ri/stou, kai\
a)/llôs phronimôta/tou kai\ dikaiota/tou.] The phrase [Greek: tô=n
to/te] which may probably have slipped unconsciously from Plato,
implies that Sokrates belonged to the past generation. The beginning
of the dialogue undoubtedly shows that Plato intended to place it
shortly after the death of Sokrates; but the word [Greek: to/te] at
the end is inconsistent with this supposition, and comes out
unconsciously as a mark of the real time.]
[Side-note: Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon.
Pathetic interest which they inspire.]
The interest felt by most readers in the Phædon, however, depends,
not so much on the argumentative exposition (which Wyttenbach[2]
justly pronounces to be obscure and difficult as well as
unsatisfactory) as on the personality of the expounding speaker, and
the irresistible pathos of the situation. Sokrates had been condemned
to death by the Dikastery on the day after the sacred ship, memorable
in connection with the legendary voyage of Theseus to Krete, had been
dispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island
of Delos. The Athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded
from putting any one to death by public authority, during the absence
of the ship on this mission. Thirty days elapsed between her
departure and her return: during all which interval, Sokrates
remained in the prison, yet with full permission to his friends to
visit him. They passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his
conversation.[3] In the Phædon, we read the last of these
conversations, after the sacred vessel had returned, and after the
Eleven magistrates had announced to Sokrates that the draught of
hemlock would be administered to him before sunset. On communicating
this intelligence, the magistrates released Sokrates from the fetters
with which he had hitherto been bound. It is shortly after such
release that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last
time. One of the number, Phædon, recounts to Echekratês not only the
conduct and discourse of Sokrates during the closing hours of his
life, but also the swallowing of the poison, and the manner of his
death.
[Footnote 2: See the Prolegomena prefixed to Wyttenbach's edition of
the Phædon, p. xxi. p. 10.]
[Footnote 3: Plato, Phædon, pp. 58-50.
It appears that Kriton became bail before the Dikasts, in a certain
sum of money, that Sokrates should remain in prison and not escape
(Plat. Phædon, p. 115 D; Kriton, 45 B). Kriton would have been
obliged to pay this money if Sokrates had accepted his proposition to
escape, noticed already in chap. x.]
[Side-note: Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with
Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates.]
More than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at
this last scene: but the only two who take an active part in the
debate, are, two young Thebans named Kebês and Simmias.[4] These
friends, though deeply attached to Sokrates, and full of sorrow at
the irreparable loss impending over them, are represented as overawed
and fascinated by his perfect fearlessness, serenity and dignity.[5]
They are ashamed to give vent to their grief, when their master is
seen to maintain his ordinary frame of mind, neither disquieted
nor dissatisfied. The fundamental conception of the dialogue is, to
represent Sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial;
unmoved by the situation--not feeling that any misfortune is about to
happen to him--equally delighting in intellectual debate--equally
fertile in dialectic invention. So much does he care for debate, and
so little for the impending catastrophe, that he persists in a great
argumentative effort, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by
Kriton from the gaoler, that if he heated himself with talking, the
poison might perhaps be languid in its operation, so that two or
three draughts of it would be necessary instead of one.[6] Sokrates
even advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit
rather than a misfortune, and that every true philosopher ought to
prefer death to life, assuming it to supervene without his own
act--suicide being forbidden by the Gods. He is represented as "placidus
ore, intrepidus verbis; intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens"--to
borrow a phrase from Tacitus's striking picture of the last hours of
the Emperor Otho.[7] To see him thus undisturbed, and even welcoming
his approaching end, somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled
friends, who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so
soon losing him. Sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as
he had done before the Dikasts; and to show good grounds for his
belief, that death is not a misfortune, but a benefit, to the
philosopher.[8] Simmias and Kebês, though at first not satisfied with
the reasonings, are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts,
from fear of mortifying him in his last moments: but Sokrates
protests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his
existing frame of mind.[9] He is now the same man as he was before,
and he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired.
[Footnote 4: Plato, Phædon, pp. 59 B, 89 A. [Greek: tô=n neani/skôn
to\n lo/gon], &c. (p. 89 A).]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Phædon, pp. 58-59.]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Phædon, p. 63 D.]
[Footnote 7: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 48.]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Phædon, p. 63.]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Phædon, p. 84 D-E.]
[Side-note: Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of
debate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each
reasoner.]
Indeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search--the paramount
value of "reasoned truth"--the necessity of keeping up the force of
individual reason by constant argumentative exercise--and the right
of independent judgment for hearer as well as speaker--stand
emphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher.
He does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of
imperative orthodoxy; which men, whether satisfied with the proofs or
not, must believe, or must make profession of believing, on pain of
being shunned as a moral pestilence, and disqualified from giving
testimony in a court of justice. He sets forth his own conviction,
with the grounds on which he adopts it. But he expressly recognises
the existence of dissentient opinions: he invites his companions to
bring forward every objection: he disclaims all special purpose of
impressing his own conclusions upon their minds: nay, he expressly
warns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies, then wound
up to the highest pitch, towards himself. He entreats them to
preserve themselves from becoming tinged with _misology_, or the
hatred of free argumentative discussion: and he ascribes this mental
vice to the early habit of easy, uninquiring, implicit, belief: since
a man thus ready of faith, embracing opinions without any
discriminative test, presently finds himself driven to abandon one
opinion after another, until at last he mistrusts all opinions, and
hates the process of discussing them, laying the blame upon
philosophy instead of upon his own intellect.[10]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Phædon, pp. 89 C-D, 90.
[Greek: Prô=ton eu)labêthô=me/n ti pa/thos mê\ pa/thômen. To\ poi=on,
ê)=n d' e)gô/? Mê\ genô/metha, ê)=| d' o(/s, miso/logoi, ô(/sper oi(
misa/nthrôpoi gigno/menoi; ô(s ou)k e)/stin, e)/phê, o(/, ti a)/n tis
mei=zon tou/tou kako\n pa/thoi ê)\ lo/gous misê/sas.] p. 90 B.
[Greek: e)peida/n tis pisteu/sê| lo/gô| tini\ a)lêthei= ei)=nai,
a)/neu tê=s peri\ tou\s lo/gous te/chnês, ka)/peita o)li/gon
u(/steron au)tô=| do/xê| pseudê\s ei)=nai, e)ni/ote me\n ô)/n,
e)ni/ote d' ou)k ô)/n, kai\ au)=this e(/teros kai\ e(/teros],
&c.]
[Side-note: Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on
their guard against being influenced by his authority--that they
shall follow only the convictions of their own reason.]
"For myself" (says Sokrates) "I fear that in these my last hours I
depart from the true spirit of philosophy--like unschooled men, who,
when in debate, think scarcely at all how the real question stands,
but care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the
auditors. Between them and me there is only thus much of difference.
I regard it as a matter of secondary consequence, whether my
conclusions appear true to my hearers; but I shall do my best to make
them appear as much as possible true to myself.[11] My
calculation is as follows: mark how selfish it is. If my conclusion
as to the immortality of the soul is true, I am better off by
believing it: if I am in error, and death be the end of me, even then
I shall avoid importuning my friends with grief, during these few
remaining hours: moreover my error will not continue with me--which
would have been a real misfortune--but will be extinguished very
shortly. Such is the frame of mind, Simmias and Kebês, with which I
approach the debate. Do you follow my advice: take little thought of
Sokrates, but take much more thought of the truth. If I appear to you
to affirm any thing truly, assent to me: but if not, oppose me with
all your powers of reasoning: Be on your guard lest, through earnest
zeal, I should deceive alike myself and you, and should leave the
sting in you, like a bee, at this hour of departure."
[Footnote 11: Plato, Phædon, p. 91 A-C. [Greek: Ou) ga\r o(/pôs toi=s
parou=sin a)\ e)gô\ le/gô do/xei a)lêthê= ei)=nai, prothumê/somai, ei)
mê\ ei)/ê pa/rergon, a)/ll' o(/pôs au)tô=| e)moi\ o(/ ti ma/lista
do/zei ou(/tôs e)/chein. logi/zomai ga/r, ô)= phi/le e(/taire--kai\
the/asai ô(s pleonektikô=s--ei) me\n tugcha/nei a)lêthê= o)/nta a(\
le/gô, kalô=s dê\ e)/chei to\ peisthê=nai; ei) de\ mêde/n e)sti
teleutê/santi, a)ll' ou)=n tou=to/n ge to\n chro/non au)to\n to\n
pro\ tou= thana/tou ê(=tton toi=s parou=sin a)êdê\s e)/somai
o)duro/menos . . . u(mei=s me/ntoi, a)\n e)moi\ pei/thêsthe,
_smikro\n phronti/santes Sôkra/tous, tê=s de\ a)lêthei/as polu\
ma=llon, e)a\n me/n ti u(mi=n dokô= a)lêthe\s le/gein,
xunomologê/sate; ei) de\ mê/, panti\ lo/gô| a)ntitei/nete_,
eu)labou/menoi o(/pôs mê\ e)gô\ u(po\ prothumi/as a(/ma e)mauto/n te
kai\ u(ma=s e)xapatê/sas, ô(/sper me/litta to\ ke/ntron e)gkatalipô\n
oi)chê/somai.]]
[Side-note: Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for
reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent.]
This is a remarkable passage, as illustrating the spirit and purpose
of Platonic dialogues. In my preceding Chapters, I have already
shown, that it is no part of the aim of Sokrates to thrust dogmas of
his own into other men's minds as articles of faith. But then, most
of these Chapters have dwelt upon Dialogues of Search, in which
Sokrates has appeared as an interrogator, or enquirer jointly with
others: scrutinising their opinions, but disclaiming knowledge or
opinions of his own. Here, however, in the Phædon, the case is
altogether different. Sokrates is depicted as having not only an
affirmative opinion, but even strong conviction, on a subject of
great moment: which conviction, moreover, he is especially desirous
of preserving unimpaired, during his few remaining hours of life. Yet
even here, he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction into the
minds of his friends, except as a result of their own
independent scrutiny and self-working reason. Not only he does not
attempt to terrify them into believing, by menace of evil
consequences if they do not--but he repudiates pointedly even the
gentler machinery of conversion, which might work upon their minds
through attachment to himself and reverence for his authority. His
devotion is to "reasoned truth": he challenges his friends to the
fullest scrutiny by their own independent reason: he recognises the
sentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid _for them_,
whether concurrent with himself or adverse. Their reason is for them,
what his reason is for him: requiring, both alike (as Sokrates here
proclaims), to be stimulated as well as controlled by all-searching
debate--but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one
of the debaters. The stress laid by Plato upon the full liberty of
dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate--is one of the
most memorable characteristics of the Phædon. When we come to the
treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear), we shall find a
totally opposite view of sentiment. In the tenth book of that
treatise Plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox
persecutor, who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all.
[Side-note: Phædon and Symposion--points of analogy and
contrast.]
The natural counterpart and antithesis to the Phædon, is found in the
Symposion.[12] In both, the personality of Sokrates stands out with
peculiar force: in the one, he is in the fulness of life and
enjoyment, along with festive comrades--in the other, he is on the
verge of approaching death, surrounded by companions in deep
affliction. The point common to both, is, the perfect self-command of
Sokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances. In the Symposion,
we read of him as triumphing over heat, cold, fatigue, danger,
amorous temptation, unmeasured potations of wine, &c.:[13]
in the Phædon, we discover him rising superior to the fear of
death, and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him.
Still, his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of
absorbing meditation, which seize him at moments sudden and
unaccountable, and chain him to the spot for a long time. There is
moreover, in both dialogues, a streak of eccentricity in his
character, which belongs to what Plato calls the philosophical
inspiration and madness, rising above the measure of human temperance
and prudence.[14] The Phædon depicts in Sokrates the same intense
love of philosophy and dialectic debate, as the Symposion and
Phædrus: but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment, and
passionate admiration of youthful beauty, with which, according to
those two dialogues, the mental fermentation of the philosophical
aspirant is asserted to begin.[15] Sokrates in the Phædon describes
the initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study:[16]
but the process is one purely intellectual, without reference to
personal converse with beloved companions, as a necessity of the
case. His discourse is that of a man on the point of death--"abruptis
vitæ blandimentis"[17]--and he already looks upon his body, not as
furnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by
gymnastic discipline (as it appears in the Republic), but as an
importunate and depraving companion, of which he is glad to get rid:
so that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free
expansion and fellowship with the intelligible world, apart from
sense and its solicitations.
[Footnote 12: Thus far I agree with Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum
Phædon, p. 9, &c.); though I do not think that he has shown
sufficient ground for his theory regarding the Symposion and the
Phædon, as jointly intended to depict the character of the
philosopher, promised by Plato as a sequel to the Sophist and the
Statesman. (Plato, Sophist. p. 217; Politic. p. 257.)]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, pp. 214 A, 219 D, 220-221-223 D:
compare Phædon, p. 116, c. 117. Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) compares on
this point his father Antoninus Pius to Sokrates: both were capable
of enjoyment as well as of abstinence, without ever losing their
self-command. [Greek: E)pharmo/seie d' a)\n au)tô=|] (Antoninus P.)
[Greek: to\ peri\ tou= Sôkra/tous mnêmoneuo/menon, o(/ti kai\
a)pe/chesthai kai\ a)polau/ein e)du/nato tou/tôn, ô(=n polloi\ pro/s
te ta\s a)pocha\s a)sthenô=s, kai\ pro\s ta\s a)polau/seis
e)ndotikô=s, e)/chousin. To\ de\ i)schu/ein, kai\ e)/ti karterei=n
kai\ e)nnê/phein e(kate/rô|, a)ndro\s e)/stin a)/rtion kai\ a)êttêton
psuchê\n e)/chontos.]]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, pp. 174-175-220 C-D. Compare Phædon,
pp. 84 C, 95 E.]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Sympos. p. 215 A, p. 221 D. [Greek: oi(=os de\
ou(tosi\ ge/gone tê\n _a)topi/an_ a)/nthrôpos, kai\ au)to\s kai\
oi( lo/goi au)tou=, ou)d' e)ggu\s a)\n eu(/roi tis zêtô=n], &c.
p. 218 B: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r kekoinônê/kate tê=s philoso/phou
mani/as te kai\ bakchei/as], &c. About the [Greek: philo/sophos
mani/a], compare Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-250.
Plato, Phædrus, pp. 251-253. Symposion, pp. 210-211. [Greek: o(/tan
tis a)po\ tô=nde dia\ to\ o)rthô=s paiderastei=n e)paniô\n e)kei=no
to\ kalo\n a)/rchêtai kathora=|n], &c. (211 B).]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Phædon, p. 96 A. [Greek: e)gô\ ou)=n soi\
di/eimi peri\ au)tô=n ta/ g' e)ma\ pa/thê], &c.]
[Footnote 17: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 53. "Othonis libertus, habere se
suprema ejus mandata respondit: ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed
solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."]
[Side-note: Phædon--compared with Republic and Timæus. No
recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and
body.]
We have here one peculiarity of the Phædon, whereby it stands
distinguished both from the Republic and the Timæus. The antithesis
on which it dwells is that of the soul or mind, on one hand--the
body on the other. The soul or mind is spoken of as one and
indivisible: as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned
in the body. It is not distributed into distinct parts, kinds, or
varieties: no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which
is so much insisted on in the Republic and Timæus:--the rational or
intellectual (encephalic) soul, located in the head--the courageous
or passionate (thoracic), between the neck and the diaphragm--the
appetitive (abdominal), between the diaphragm and the navel. In the
Phædon, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love
of wisdom or knowledge, exclusively: all that belongs to passion and
appetite, is put to account of the body:[18] this is distinctly
contrary to the Philêbus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that
desire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to the
soul. In Phædon, nothing is said about the location of the rational
soul, in the head,--nor about the analogy between its rotations in
the cranium and the celestial rotations (a doctrine which we read
both in the Timæus and in the Republic): on the contrary, the soul is
affirmed to have lost, through its conjunction with the body, that
wisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of
pre-existence, while completely apart from the body, and while in
commerce with those invisible Ideas to which its own separate nature
was cognate.[19] That controul which in the Republic is exercised by
the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the
Phædon exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over
the body.[20] In the Republic and Timæus, the soul is a tripartite
aggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Phædon, Sokrates
asserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his
argument.[21] Again, in the Phædon, the soul is pronounced to be
essentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in
antithesis with the body, which is perpetually changing: while
we read, on the contrary, in the Symposion, that soul and body alike
are in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the
other ever continuing in the same condition.[22]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Phædon, p. 66. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 35,
C-D.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Phædon, p. 76.]
[Footnote 20: Compare Phædon, p. 94 C-E, with Republic, iv. pp. 439
C, 440 A, 441 E, 442 C.]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Phædon, p. 78. [Greek: a)xu/ntheton, monoeide\s]
(p. 80 B), contrasted with the [Greek: tri/a ei)dê tê=s psuchê=s]
(Republic, p. 439). In the abstract given by Alkinous of the Platonic
doctrine, we read in cap. 24 [Greek: o(/ti trimerê/s e)stin ê(
psuchê\ kata\ ta\s duna/meis, kai\ kata\ lo/gon ta\ me/rê au)tê=s
to/pois i)di/ois dianene/mêtai]: in cap. 25 that the [Greek: psuchê\]
is [Greek: a)su/nthetos, a)dia/lutos, a)ske/dastos].]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Phædon, pp. 79-80; Symposion, pp. 207-208.]
[Side-note: Different doctrines of Plato about the soul.
Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul
alone.]
The difference which I have here noted shows how Plato modified his
doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul
would have been found inconvenient in the Phædon, where the argument
required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as
possible. Assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to
the soul, as well as reason--Sokrates will not shake them off when he
becomes divorced from the body. He believes and expects that the
post-existence of the soul will be, as its pre-existence has been, a
rational existence--a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce
with the eternal Ideas: in this there is no place for passion and
appetite, which grow out of its conjunction with the body. The soul
here represents Reason and Intellect, in commerce with their
correlates, the objective Entia Rationis: the body represents passion
and appetite as well as sense, in implication with their correlates,
the objects of sensible perception.[23] Such is the doctrine of the
Phædon; but Plato is not always consistent with himself on the point.
His ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed,
whether, when he vindicated the immortality of the soul, he meant to
speak of the rational soul only, or of the aggregate soul with its
three parts as above described. There are passages which countenance
both suppositions.[24] Plato seems to have leaned sometimes to the
one view, sometimes to the other: besides which, the view taken
in the Phædon is a third, different from both--_viz._: That the
two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive, are not
recognised as existing.
[Footnote 23: This is the same antithesis as we read in Xenophon,
ascribed to Cyrus in his dying address to his sons--[Greek: o(
a)/kratos kai\ katharo\s nou=s--to\ a)/phron sô=ma], Cyropæd. viii.
7, 20.]
[Footnote 24: Alkinous, Introduct. c. 25. [Greek: o(/ti me\n ou)=n
ai( logikai\ psuchai\ a)tha/natoi u(pa/rchousi kata\ to\n a)/ndra
tou=ton, bebaiô/sait' a)/n tis; ei) de\ kai\ ai( a)/logoi, tou=to
tô=n a)mphisbêtoume/nôn u(pa/rchei.] Galen considers Plato as
affirming that the two inferior souls are mortal--[Greek: Peri\ tô=n
tê=s psuchê=s ê)thô=n], T. iv. p. 773, Kühn.
This subject is handled in an instructive Dissertation of K. F.
Hermann--De Partibus Animæ Immortalibus secundum Platonem--delivered
at Göttingen in the winter Session, 1850-1851. He inclines to the
belief that Plato intended to represent only the rational soul as
immortal, and the other two souls as mortal (p. 9). But the passages
which he produces are quite sufficient to show, that Plato sometimes
held one language, sometimes the other; and that Galen, who wrote an
express treatise (now lost) to prove that Plato was inconsistent with
himself in respect to the soul, might have produced good reasons for
his opinion. The "inconstantia Platonis" (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 12)
must be admitted here as on other matters. We must take the different
arguments and doctrines of Plato as we find them in their respective
places. Hermann (p. 4) says about the commentators--"De irrationali
animâ, alii ancipites hæserunt, alii claris verbis mortalem
prædicarunt: quumque Neoplatonicæ sectæ principes, Numenius et
Plotinus, non modo brutorum, sed ne plantarum quidem, animas
immortalitate privare ausi sunt,--mox insequentes in alia omnia
digressi aut plane perire irrationales partes affirmarunt, aut mediâ
quâdam viâ ingressi, quamvis corporum fato exemptis, mortalitatem
tamen et ipsi tribuerunt." It appears that the divergence of opinion
on this subject began as early as Xenokrates and Speusippus--see
Olympiodorus, Scholia in Phædonem, § 175. The large construction
adopted by Numenius and Plotinus is completely borne out by a passage
in the Phædon, p. 70 E.
I must here remark that Hermann does not note the full extent of
discrepancy between the Phædon and Plato's other dialogues,
consisting in this--That in the Phædon, Plato suppresses all mention
of the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive:
insomuch that if we had only the Phædon remaining, we should not have
known that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul, or
the co-existence of the three souls.
I transcribe an interesting passage from M. Degérando, respecting the
belief in different varieties of soul, and partial immortality.
Degérando--Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie, vol. i. p.
213.
"Les habitans du Thibet, du Gröenland, du nord de l'Amérique
admettent deux âmes: les Caräibes en admettent trois, dont une,
disent-ils, celle qui habite dans la tête, remonte seule au pays des
âmes. Les habitans du Gröenland croient d'ailleurs les âmes des
hommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux: ils supposent
que les divers individus peuvent changer d'âmes entre eux pendant la
vie, et qu'après la vie ces âmes exécutent de grands voyages, avec
toutes sortes de fatigues et de périls. Les peuples du Canada se
représentent les âmes sous la forme d'ombres errantes: les Patagons,
les habitans du Sud de l'Asie, croient entendre leurs voix dans
l'écho: et les anciens Romains eux-mêmes n'étaient pas étrangers à
cette opinion. Les Négres s'imaginent que la destinée de l'âme après
la vie est encore liée à celle du corps, et fondent sur cette idée
une foule de pratiques."]
[Side-note: The life and character of a philosopher is a
constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone
enables him to do this completely.]
The philosopher (contends Sokrates) ought to rejoice when death comes
to sever his soul altogether from his body: because he is, throughout
all his life, struggling to sever himself from the passions,
appetites, impulses and aspirations, which grow out of the body; and
to withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses,
which teach no truth, and lead only to deceit or confusion: He is
constantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing
completely--to prosecute pure mental contemplation, as the only way
of arriving at truth: to look at essences or things in themselves, by
means of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body.[25] Until
his mind be purified from all association with the body, it
cannot be brought into contact with pure essence, nor can his
aspirations for knowledge be satisfied.[26] Hence his whole life is
really a training or approximative practice for death, which alone
will enable him to realise such aspirations.[27] Knowledge or wisdom
is the only money in which he computes, and which he seeks to receive
in payment.[28] He is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary
sense: for the courageous man, while holding death to be a great
evil, braves it from fear of greater evils--and the temperate man
abstains from various pleasures, because they either shut him out
from greater pleasures, or entail upon him disease and poverty. The
philosopher is courageous and temperate, but from a different motive:
his philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities, and makes
him indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body:
each of which, in proportion to its intensity, corrupts his
perception of truth and falsehood, and misguides him in the search
for wisdom or knowledge.[29] While in the body, he feels imprisoned,
unable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by
the deceptive media of sense. From this durance philosophy partially
liberates him,--purifying his mind, like the Orphic or Dionysiac
religious mysteries, from the contagion of body[30] and sense:
disengaging it, as far as may be during life, from sympathy with the
body: and translating it out of the world of sense, uncertainty, and
mere opinion, into the invisible region of truth and knowledge. If
such purification has been fully achieved, the mind of the
philosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the
body, and passes clean away by itself, into commerce with the
intelligible Entities or realities.
[Footnote 25: Plato, Phædon, p. 66 E. [Greek: ei) me/llome/n pote
katharô=s ti ei)/sesthai, a)pallakte/on au)tou= (tou= sô/matos) kai\
au)tê=| tê=| psuchê=| theate/on au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata.]]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Phædon, p. 67 B. [Greek: mê\ katharô=| ga\r
katharou= e)pha/ptesthai mê\ ou) themito\n ê)=|.]]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Phædon, p. 64 A. [Greek: kinduneu/ousi ga\r
o(/soi tugcha/nousin o)rthô=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lelêthe/nai
tou\s a)/llous o(/ti ou)de\n a)/llo au)toi\ e)pitêdeu/ousin ê)\
a)pothnê/skein te kai\ tethna/nai.] P. 67 E [Greek: oi( o)rthô=s
philosophou=ntes a)pothnê/skein meletô=sin.]]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Phædon, p. 69 A. [Greek: a)ll' ê)=| e)kei=no
mo/non to\ no/misma o)rtho/n, a)nth' ou(= dei= a(/panta tau=ta
katalla/ttesthai, phro/nêsis.]]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Phædon, p. 69-83-84.]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Phædon, p. 82 E.]
[Side-note: Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass
after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher
alone is relieved from all communion with body.]
On the contrary, the soul or mind of the ordinary man, which has
undergone no purification and remains in close implication with the
body, cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death,
but remains encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments,
so as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally
belongs. Such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which
haunt tombs; and which become visible, because they cling to the
visible world, and hate the invisible.[31] Not being fit for separate
existence, they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh
bodies, of different species of men or animals, according to the
particular temperament which they carry away with them.[32] The souls
of despots, or of violent and rapacious men, will pass into the
bodies of wolves or kites: those of the gluttonous and drunkards,
into asses and such-like animals. A better fate will be reserved for
the just and temperate men, who have been socially and politically
virtuous, but simply by habit and disposition, without any philosophy
or pure intellect: for their souls will pass into the bodies of other
gentle and social animals, such as bees, ants, wasps,[33] &c., or
perhaps they may again return into the human form, and may become
moderate men. It is the privilege only of him who has undergone the
purifying influence of philosophy, and who has spent his life in
trying to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the
body--to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh
embodiment, that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its
own separate nature: passing out of the world of sense, of transient
phenomena, and of mere opinion, into a distinct world where it will
be in full presence of the eternal Ideas, essences, and truth; in
companionship with the Gods, and far away from the miseries of
humanity.[34]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Phædon, p. 81 C-D. [Greek: o(\ dê\ kai\
e)/chousa ê( toiau/tê psuchê\ baru/netai/ te kai\ e(/lketai pa/lin
ei)s to\n o(rato\n to/pon, pho/bô| tou= a)eidou=s te kai\ A(/idou,
ô(/sper le/getai, peri\ ta\ mnê/mata/ te kai\ tou\s ta/phous
kulindoume/nê, peri\ a(\ dê\ kai\ ô)/phthê a)/tta psuchô=n skotoeidê=
pha/smata] [al. [Greek: skioeodê= phanta/smata]], [Greek: oi(=a
pare/chontai ai( toiau=tai psuchai\ ei)/dôla, ai( mê\ katharô=s
a)poluthei=sai a)lla\ tou= o(ratou= mete/chousai, dio\ kai\
o(rô=ntai.]]
[Footnote 32: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-84.]
[Footnote 33: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n
eu)daimone/statoi kai\ tou/tôn ei)si\ kai\ ei)s be/ltiston to/pon
i)o/ntes oi( tê\n dêmotikê\n te kai\ politikê\n a)retê\n
e)pitetêdeuko/tes, ê(\n dê\ kalou=si sôphrosu/nên te kai\
dikaiosu/nên, e)x e)/thous te kai\ mele/tês gegonui=an a)/neu
philosophi/as te kai\ nou=? . . . O(/ti tou/tous ei)ko/s e)stin ei)s
toiou=ton pa/lin a)phiknei=sthai politiko/n te kai\ ê(/meron ge/nos,
ê)/pou melittô=n ê)\ sphêkô=n ê)\ murmê/kôn], &c.]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82 B, 83 B, 84 B. Compare p. 114 C:
[Greek: tou/tôn de\ au)tô=n oi( philosophi/a| i(kanô=s kathêra/menoi
a)/neu te sôma/tôn zô=si to\ para/pan ei)s to\n e)/peita chro/non],
&c. Also p. 115 D.]
[Side-note: Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the
Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers.]
Such is the creed which Sokrates announces to his friends in the
Phædon, as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction
with which he welcomes death. It is upon the antithesis between soul
(or mind) and body, that the main stress is laid. The partnership
between the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief: and
the only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the
partnership altogether, so as to attain a distinct, disembodied,
existence. Conformably to this doctrine, the line is chiefly drawn
between the philosopher, and the multitude who are not philosophers--not
between good and bad agents, when the good agents are not
philosophers. This last distinction is indeed noticed, but is kept
subordinate. The unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to
pass after death into the body of a bee, or an ant, instead of that
of a kite or ass;[35] but he does not attain the privilege of
dissolving connection altogether with body. Moreover the distinction
is one not easily traceable: since Sokrates[36] expressly remarks
that the large majority of mankind are middling persons, neither good
nor bad in any marked degree. Philosophers stand in a category by
themselves: apart from the virtuous citizens, as well as from the
middling and the vicious. Their appetites and ambition are indeed
deadened, so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from
injustice: but this is not their characteristic feature. Philosophy
is asserted to impart to them a special purification, like that of
the Orphic mysteries to the initiated: detaching the soul from both
the body and the world of sense, except in so far as is indispensable
for purposes of life: replunging the soul, as much as possible, in
the other world of intelligible essences, real forms or Ideas, which
are its own natural kindred and antecedent companions. The process
whereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical. It
is the process of learning, or (in the sense of Sokrates) the revival
in the mind of those essences or Ideas with which it had been
familiar during its anterior and separate life: accompanied by the
total abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations.[37] Only
by such love of learning, which is identical with philosophy
([Greek: philo/sophon, philomathe\s]), is the mind rescued from the
ignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense.
[Footnote 35: Plato, Phædon, pp. 81-82.]
[Footnote 36: Plato, Phædon, p. 90 A.]
[Footnote 37: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-115.--[Greek: ta\s de\ (ê(dona\s)
peri\ to\ mantha/nein e)spou/dase], &c. (p. 114 E).
These doctrines, laid down by Plato in the Phædon, bear great analogy
to the Sanskrit philosophy called _Sankhyâ_, founded by Kapila,
as expounded and criticised in the treatise of M. Barthélemy St.
Hilaire (Mémoire sur le Sankhyâ, Paris, 1852, pp. 273-278)--and the
other work, Du Bouddhisme, by the same author (Paris, 1855), pp.
116-137, 187-194, &c.]
[Side-note: Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the
immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by
asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate.]
In thus explaining his own creed, Sokrates announces a full
conviction that the soul or mind is immortal, but he has not yet
offered any proof of it: and Simmias as well as Kebês declare
themselves to stand in need of proof. Both of them however are
reluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts. An opportunity is thus
provided, that Sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity--his
unimpaired argumentative readiness--his keen anxiety not to relax the
grasp of a subject until he has brought it to a satisfactory
close--without the least reference to his speedily approaching death.
This last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue,
remarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality.[38] We are
thus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon
which Sokrates relies.
[Footnote 38: Plato, Phædon, p. 89 B-C,--the remark made by Sokrates,
when stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of Phædon,
in allusion to the cutting off of all this hair, which would be among
the acts of mourning performed by Phædon on the morrow, after the
death of Sokrates: and the impressive turn given to this remark, in
reference to the solution of the problem then in debate.]
[Side-note: Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the
pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence.
Doctrine--That the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates.]
If the arguments whereby Sokrates proves the immortality of the soul
are neither forcible nor conclusive, not fully satisfying even
Simmias[39] to whom they are addressed--the adverse arguments, upon
the faith of which the doctrine was denied (as we know it to have
been by many philosophers of antiquity), cannot be said to be
produced at all. Simmias and Kebês are represented as Sokratic
companions, partly Pythagoreans; desirous to find the doctrine true,
yet ignorant of the proofs. Both of them are earnest believers in the
pre-existence of the soul, and in the objective reality of Ideas or
intelligible essences. Simmias however adopts in part the opinion,
not very clearly explained, "That the soul is a harmony or
mixture": which opinion Sokrates refutes, partly by some other
arguments, partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the
supposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body, and that Simmias
must make his election between the two. Simmias elects without
hesitation, in favour of the pre-existence: which he affirms to be
demonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust:
while the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy, not
certified by conclusive reasons.[40] Kebês again, while admitting
that the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body,
and that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with
many different bodies--still expresses his apprehension that though
durable, it is not eternal. Accordingly, no man can be sure that his
present body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be
linked; so that immediately on his death, it will pass away into
nothing. The opinion of Kebês is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how
constantly the metempsychosis, or transition of the soul from one
body to another, was included in all the varieties of ancient
speculation on this subject.[41]
[Footnote 39: Plato, Phædon, p. 107 B.]
[Footnote 40: Plato, Phædon, p. 92.]
[Footnote 41: Plato, Phædon, pp. 86-95. [Greek: kra=sin kai\
a(rmoni/an], &c.
"Animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant, sed aliam alii,
et diversâ ratione," says Wyttenbach ad Phædon. p. 86. Lucretius as
well as Plato impugns the doctrine, iii. 97.
Galen, a great admirer of Plato, though not pretending to determine
positively wherein the essence of the soul consists, maintains a
doctrine substantially the same as what is here impugned--that it
depends upon a certain [Greek: kra=sis] of the elements and
properties in the bodily organism--[Greek: Peri\ tô=n tê=s psuchê=s
ê)thô=n], vol. iv. pp. 774-775, 779-782, ed. Kühn. He complains much
of the unsatisfactory explanations of Plato on this point.]
[Side-note: Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or
wanderings through which his mind had passed.]
Before replying to Simmias and Kebês, Sokrates is described as
hesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a
sketch of[42] his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it
stands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed
mind not exactly coincident with either--we cannot be certain: the
final stage however must belong to Plato himself.
[Footnote 42: Plato, Phædon, pp. 96-102.
The following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of
thought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact
words, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have
provided room for a literal translation.]
[Side-note: First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons
why he rejected it.]
"You compel me (says Sokrates) to discuss thoroughly the cause of
generation and destruction.[43] I will tell you, if you like, my own
successive impressions on these subjects. When young, I was
amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the
investigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the
causes of every thing--through what every thing is either generated,
or destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to
discover first of all such matters as these--Is it a certain
putrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say),
which brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood
through which we think--or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the
other, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight,
hearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated:
then, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and
memory when permanently fixed?[44] I tried to understand destructions
as well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena.
But I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly
unfit for the enquiry. Nay--I even lost all the knowledge of that
which I had before believed myself to understand. For example--From
what cause does a man grow? At first, I had looked upon this as
evident--that it was through eating and drinking: flesh being thereby
added to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and
a short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former
was taller than the latter by the head--that ten were more than eight
because two were added to them[45]--that a rod of two cubits was
greater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a
half. Now--I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of
these matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such
addition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one.
In this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to
make the two: in another case, the opposite cause,
_disjunction_, is said also to make two--when one body is
bisected.[46] How two opposite causes can produce the same
effect--and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two,
where there were not two before--I do not understand. In fact, I
could not explain to myself, by this method of research, the
generation, or destruction, or existence, of any thing; and I looked
out for some other method.
[Footnote 43: Plato, Phædon, pp. 95 E--96. [Greek: Ou) phau=lon
pra=gma zêtei=s; o(/lôs ga\r dei= peri\ gene/seôs kai\ phthora=s tê\n
ai)ti/an diapragmateu/sasthai. e)gô\ ou)=n soi\ di/eimi, e)a\n
bou/lê|, ta/ g' e)ma\ pa/thê], &c.]
[Footnote 44: Phædon, p. 96 B. [Greek: e)k de\ mnê/mês kai\ do/xês,
labou/sês to\ ê)remei=n, kata\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pistê/mên.]
This is the same distinction between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek:
e)pistê/mê], as that which Sokrates gives in the Menon, though not
with full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See suprà, chap. xxii. p.
241.]
[Footnote 45: Plato, Phædon, p. 96 E. [Greek: kai\ e)/ti ge tou/tôn
e)narge/stera, ta\ de/ka moi e)do/kei tô=n o)ktô\ plei/ona ei)=nai,
dia\ to\ du/o au)toi=s prosei=nai, kai\ to\ di/pêchu tou= pêchuai/ou
mei=zon ei)=nai dia\ to\ ê(mi/sei au)tou= u(pere/chein.]]
[Footnote 46: Plato, Phædon, p. 97 B.]
[Side-note: Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of
Anaxagoras.]
"It was at this time that I heard a man reading out of a book, which
he told me was the work of Anaxagoras, the affirmation that Nous
(Reason, Intelligence) was the regulator and cause of all things. I
felt great satisfaction in this cause; and I was convinced, that if
such were the fact, Reason would ordain every thing for the best: so
that if I wanted to find out the cause of any generation, or
destruction, or existence, I had only to enquire in what manner it
was best that such generation or destruction should take place. Thus
a man was only required to know, both respecting himself and
respecting other things, what was the best: which knowledge, however,
implied that he must also know what was worse--the knowledge of the
one and of the other going together.[47] I thought I had thus found a
master quite to my taste, who would tell me, first whether the earth
was a disk or a sphere, and would proceed to explain the cause and
the necessity why it must be so, by showing me how such arrangement
was the best: next, if he said that the earth was in the centre,
would proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in
the centre. Respecting the Sun, Moon, and Stars, I expected to hear
the like explanation of their movements, rotations, and other
phenomena: that is, how it was better that each should do and suffer
exactly what the facts show. I never imagined that Anaxagoras, while
affirming that they were regulated by Reason, would put upon them any
other cause than this--that it was best for them to be exactly as
they are. I presumed that, when giving account of the cause, both of
each severally and all collectively, he would do it by setting forth
what was best for each severally and for all in common. Such was
my hope, and I would not have sold it for a large price.[48] I took
up eagerly the book of Anaxagoras, and read it as quickly as I could,
that I might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse.
[Footnote 47: Plato, Phædon, p. 97 C-D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis
bou/loito tê\n ai)ti/an eu(rei=n peri\ e(ka/stou, o(/pê| gi/gnetai
ê)\ a)po/llutai ê)\ e)/sti, tou=to dei=n peri\ au)tou= eu(rei=n,
o(/pê| be/ltiston au)tô=| e)stin ê)\ ei)=nai ê)\ a)/llo o(tiou=n
pa/schein ê)\ poiei=n; e)k de\ dê\ tou= lo/gou tou/tou ou)de\n a)/llo
skopei=n prosê/kein a)nthrô/pô| kai\ peri\ au(tou= kai\ peri\ tô=n
a)/llôn, a)ll' ê)\ to\ a)/riston kai\ to\ be/ltiston; a)nagkai=on de\
ei)=nai to\n au)to\n tou=ton kai\ to\ chei=ron ei)de/nai; tê\n
au)tê\n ga\r ei)=nai e)pistê/mên peri\ au)tô=n.]]
[Footnote 48: Plato, Phædon, p. 98 B. [Greek: kai\ ou)k a)\n
a)pedo/mên pollou= ta\s e)lpi/das, a)lla\ pa/nu spoudê=| labô\n ta\s
bi/blous ô(s ta/chista oi(=o/s t' ê)=n a)negi/gnôskon, i(/n' ô(s
ta/chista ei)dei/ên to\ be/ltiston kai\ to\ chei=ron.]]
[Side-note: Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow
out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes
efficient and causes co-efficient.]
"Great indeed was my disappointment when, as I proceeded with the
perusal, I discovered that the author never employed Reason at all,
nor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally: that
the causes which he indicated were, air, æther, water, and many other
strange agencies. The case seemed to me the same as if any one, while
announcing that Sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason, should
next attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings
severally:[49] As if he affirmed, for example, that the cause why I
am now sitting here is, that my body is composed of bones and
ligaments--that my bones are hard, and are held apart by commissures,
and my ligaments such as to contract and relax, clothing the bones
along with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together--that
when the bones are lifted up at their points of junction, the
contraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my
limbs--and that this is the reason why I am now seated here in my
present crumpled attitude: or again--as if, concerning the fact of my
present conversation with you, he were to point to other causes of a
like character--varieties of speech, air, and hearing, with numerous
other similar facts--omitting all the while to notice the true
causes, _viz._[50]--That inasmuch as the Athenians have deemed
it best to condemn me, for that reason I too have deemed it best and
most righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence
which they impose. For, by the Dog, these bones and ligaments would
have been long ago carried away to Thebes or Megara, by my
judgment of what is best--if I had not deemed it more righteous and
honourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence, rather than to
run away. It is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name
of _causes_. Certainly, if a man affirms that unless I possessed
such joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me, I
should not be able to execute what I have determined on, he will
state no more than the truth. But to say that these are the causes
why I, a rational agent, do what I am now doing, instead of saying
that I do it from my choice of what is best--this would be great
carelessness of speech: implying that a man cannot see the
distinction between that which is the cause in reality, and that
without which the cause can never be a cause.[51] It is this last
which most men, groping as it were in the dark, call by a wrong name,
as if it were itself the cause. Thus one man affirms that the earth
is kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around
it: another contends that the air underneath supports the earth, like
a pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough: but none of them ever
look out for a force such as this--That all these things now occupy
that position which it is best that they should occupy. These
enquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force,
believing that they can find some other Atlas stronger, more
everlasting, and more capable of holding all things together: they
think that the Good and the Becoming have no power of binding or
holding together any thing.
[Footnote 49: Plato, Phædon, p. 98 C. [Greek: kai\ moi\ e)/doxen
o(moio/taton peponthe/nai ô(/sper a)\n ei)/ tis le/gôn o(/ti
Sôkra/tês pa/nta o(/sa pra/ttei nô=| pra/ttei, ka)/peita
e)picheirê/sas le/gein ta\s ai)ti/as e(ka/stôn ô(=n pra/ttô, le/goi
prô=ton me\n o(/ti dia\ tau=ta nu=n e)ntha/de ka/thêmai, o(/ti
xugkeitai/ mou to\ sô=ma e)x o)stô=n kai\ neu/rôn, kai\ ta\ me\n
o)sta= e)sti sterea\ kai\ diaphua\s e)/chei chôri\s a)p' a)llê/lôn],
&c.]
[Footnote 50: Plato, Phædon, p. 98 E. [Greek: a)melê/sas ta\s ô(s
a)lêthô=s ai)ti/as le/gein, o(/ti e)pei/dê A)thênai/ois e)/doxe
be/ltion ei)=nai e)mou= katapsêphi/sasthai, dia\ tau=ta dê\ kai\
e)moi\ be/ltion au)= de/doktai e)ntha/de kathê=sthai], &c.]
[Footnote 51: Plato, Phædon, p. 99 A. [Greek: a)ll' ai)/tia me\n ta\
toiau=ta kalei=n li/an a)/topon; ei) de/ tis le/goi, o(/ti a)/neu
tou= ta\ toiau=ta e)/chein kai\ o(sta= kai\ neu=ra kai\ o(/sa a)/lla
e)/chô, ou)k a)\n oi(=o/s t' ê)=n poiei=n ta\ do/xanta/ moi, a)lêthê=
a)\n le/goi; ô(s me/ntoi dia\ tau=ta poiô=, kai\ tau/tê| nô=|
pra/ttô, a)ll' ou) tê=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei, pollê\ a)\n kai\
makra\ r(athumi/a ei)/ê tou= lo/gou. to\ ga\r mê\ diele/sthai oi(=o/n
t' ei)=nai, o(/ti a)/llo me/n ti/ e)sti to\ ai)/tion tô=| o)/nti,
a)/llo d' e)kei=no a)/neu ou)= to\ ai)/tion ou)k a)/n pot' ei)/ê
ai)/tion], &c.]
[Side-note: Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic
principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it,
and embraced a third doctrine about cause.]
"Now, it is this sort of cause which I would gladly put myself under
any one's teaching to learn. But I could neither find any teacher,
nor make any way by myself. Having failed in this quarter, I took the
second best course, and struck into a new path in search of
causes.[52] Fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and
perceptions of sense, I looked out for images or reflections of
them, and turned my attention to words or discourses.[53] This
comparison is indeed not altogether suitable: for I do not admit that
he who investigates things through general words, has recourse to
images, more than he who investigates sensible facts: but such, at
all events, was the turn which my mind took. Laying down such general
assumption or hypothesis as I considered to be the strongest, I
accepted as truth whatever squared with it, respecting cause as well
as all other matters. In this way I came upon the investigation of
another sort of cause.[54]
[Footnote 52: Plato, Phædon, p. 99 C-D. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ tau/tês
e)sterê/thên, kai\ ou)/t' au)to\s eu(rei=n ou)/te par' a)/llou
mathei=n oi(=o/s te e)geno/mên, to\n deu/teron plou=n e)pi\ tê\n tê=s
ai)ti/as zê/têsin ê(=| pepragma/teumai, bou/lei soi\ e)pi/deixin
poiê/sômai?]]
[Footnote 53: Plato, Phædon, p. 99 E. [Greek: i)/sôs me\n ou)=n ô(=|
ei)ka/zô, tro/pon tina\ ou)k e)/oiken; ou) ga\r pa/nu xugchôrô= to\n
e)n toi=s lo/gois skopou/menon ta\ o)/nta e)n ei)ko/si ma=llon
skopei=n ê)\ to\n e)n toi=s e)/rgois.]]
[Footnote 54: Plato, Phædon, p. 100 B. [Greek: e)/rchomai ga\r dê\
e)picheirô=n soi\ e)pidei/xasthai tê=s ai)ti/as to\ ei)=dos o(\
pepragma/teumai], &c.]
[Side-note: He now assumes the separate existence of ideas.
These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain
attributes.]
"I now assumed the separate and real existence of Ideas by
themselves--The Good in itself or the Self-Good, Self-Beautiful,
Great, and all such others. Look what follows next upon this
assumption. If any thing else be beautiful, besides the
Self-Beautiful, that other thing can only be beautiful because it
partakes of the Self-Beautiful: and the same with regard to other similar
Ideas. This is the only cause that I can accept: I do not understand
those other ingenious causes which I hear mentioned.[55] When any one
tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a showy colour or
figure, I pay no attention to him, but adhere simply to my own
affirmation, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except the
presence or participation of the Self-Beautiful. In what way such
participation may take place, I cannot positively determine. But I
feel confident in affirming that it does take place: that things
which are beautiful, become so by partaking in the Self-Beautiful;
things which are great or little, by partaking in Greatness or
Littleness. If I am told that one man is taller than another by the
head, and that this other is shorter than the first by the very same
(by the head), I should not admit the proposition, but should repeat
emphatically my own creed,--That whatever is greater than another is
greater by nothing else except by Greatness and through
Greatness--whatever is less than another is less only by Littleness
and through Littleness. For I should fear to be entangled in a
contradiction, if I affirmed that the greater man was greater and the
lesser man less by the head--First, in saying that the greater was
greater and that the lesser was less, by the very same--Next, in
saying that the greater man was greater by the head, which is itself
small: it being absurd to maintain that a man is great by something
small.[56] Again, I should not say that ten is more than eight by
two, and that this was the cause of its excess;[57] my doctrine is,
that ten is more than eight by Multitude and through Multitude: so
the rod of two cubits is greater than that of one, not by half, but
by Greatness. Again, when One is placed alongside of One,--or when
one is bisected--I should take care not to affirm, that in the first
case the juxtaposition, in the last case the bisection, was the cause
why it became two.[58] I proclaim loudly that I know no other cause
for its becoming two except participation in the essence of the Dyad.
What is to become two, must partake of the Dyad: what is to become
one, of the Monad. I leave to wiser men than me these juxtapositions
and bisections and other such refinements: I remain entrenched within
the safe ground of my own assumption or hypothesis (the reality of
these intelligible** and eternal Ideas).
[Footnote 55: Plato, Phædon, p. 100 C. [Greek: ou) toi/nun e)/ti
mantha/nô, ou)de\ du/namai ta\s a)/llas ai)ti/as ta\s sopha\s tau/tas
gignô/skein.]]
[Footnote 56: Plato, Phædon, p. 101 A. [Greek: phobou/menos mê/ ti/s
soi e)nanti/os lo/gos a)pantê/sê|, e)a\n tê=| kephalê=| mei/zona/
tina phê=|s ei)=nai kai\ e)la/ttô, prô=ton me\n tô=| au)tô=| to\
mei=zon mei=zon ei)=nai kai\ to\ e)/latton e)/latton, e)/peita tê=|
kephalê=| smikra=| ou)/sê| to\n mei/zô mei/zô ei)=nai, kai\ tou=to
dê\ te/ras ei)=nai, to\ smikrô=| tini\ me/gan tina\ ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 57: Plato, Phædon, p. 101 B. [Greek: Ou)/koun ta\ de/ka
tô=n o)ktô\ duoi=n plei/ô ei)=nai, kai\ dia\ tau/tên tê\n ai)ti/an
u(perba/llein, phoboi=o a)\n le/gein, a)lla\ mê\ plê/thei kai\ dia\
to\ plê=thos? kai\ to\ di/pêchu tou= pêchuai/ou ê(mi/sei mei=zon
ei)=nai, a)ll' ou) mege/thei?]]
[Footnote 58: Plato, Phædon, p. 101 B-C. [Greek: ti/ de/? e(ni\
e(no\s prostethe/ntos, tê\n pro/sthesin ai)ti/an ei)=nai tou= du/o
gene/sthai, ê)\ diaschisthe/ntos tê\n schi/sin, ou)k eu)laboi=o a)\n
le/gein, kai\ me/ga a)\n boô/|ês o(/ti ou)k oi)=stha a)/llôs pôs
e(/kaston gigno/menon ê)\ metascho\n tê=s i)di/as ou)si/as e(kastou
ou)= a)\n meta/schê|; kai\ e)n tou/tois ou)k e)/cheis a)/llên tina\
ai)ti/an tou= du/o gene/sthai a)ll' ê)\ tê\n tê=s dua/dos
meta/schesin], &c.]
[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were
impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the
hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences.]
"Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? I
should make no reply to him until I had followed out fully the
consequences of it: in order to ascertain whether they were
consistent with, or contradictory to, each other. I should, when the
proper time came, defend the hypothesis by itself, assuming some
other hypothesis yet more universal, such as appeared to me
best, until I came to some thing fully sufficient. But I would not
permit myself to confound together the discussion of the hypothesis
itself, and the discussion of its consequences.[59] This is a method
which cannot lead to truth: though it is much practised by litigious
disputants, who care little about truth, and pride themselves upon
their ingenuity when they throw all things into confusion."--
[Footnote 59: Plato, Phædon, p. 101 E. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ e)kei/nês
au)tê=s (tê=s u(pothe/seôs) de/oi se dido/nai lo/gon, ô(sau/tôs a)\n
didoi/ês, a)/llên au)= u(po/thesin u(pothe/menos, ê(/tis tô=n
a)/nôthen belti/stê phai/noito . . . . a)/ma de\ ou)k a)\n phu/roio,
ô(/sper oi( a)ntilogikoi/, peri/ te tê=s a)rchê=s dialego/menos kai\
tô=n e)x e)kei/nês ô(rmême/nôn, ei)/per bou/loio/ ti tô=n o)/ntôn
eu(rei=n.]]
[Side-note: Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers.
Remarks upon it.]
The exposition here given by Sokrates of successive intellectual
tentatives (whether of Sokrates or Plato, or partly one, partly the
other), and the reasoning embodied therein, is represented as
welcomed with emphatic assent and approbation by all his
fellow-dialogists.[60] It deserves attention on many grounds. It
illustrates instructively some of the speculative points of view, and
speculative transitions, suggesting themselves to an inquisitive
intellect of that day.
[Footnote 60: Plato, Phædon, p. 102 A. Such approbation is peculiarly
signified by the intervention of Echekrates.]
[Side-note: The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned
upon different views as to a true cause.]
If we are to take that which precedes as a description of the
philosophical changes of Plato himself, it differs materially from
Aristotle: for no allusion is here made to the intercourse of Plato
with Kratylus and other advocates of the doctrines of Herakleitus:
which intercourse is mentioned by Aristotle[61] as having greatly
influenced the early speculations of Plato. Sokrates describes three
different phases of his (or Plato's) speculative point of view: all
turning upon different conceptions of what constituted a true Cause.
His first belief on the subject was, that which he entertained before
he entered on physical and physiological investigations. It seemed
natural to him that eating and drinking should be the cause why a
young man grew taller: new bone and new flesh was added out of the
food. So again, when a tall man appeared standing near to a short
man, the former was tall by the head, or because of the head: ten
were more than eight, because two were added on: the measure of
two cubits was greater than that of one cubit, because it stretched
beyond by one half. When one object was added on to another, the
addition was the cause why they became two: when one object was
bisected, this bisection was the cause why the one became two.
[Footnote 61: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, a. 32.]
This was his first conception of a true Cause, which for the time
thoroughly satisfied him. But when he came to investigate physiology,
he could not follow out the same conception of Cause, so as to apply
it to more novel and complicated problems; and he became dissatisfied
with it altogether, even in regard to questions on which he had
before been convinced. New difficulties suggested themselves to him.
How can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made
_two_, by the fact that they are brought together? What
alteration has happened in their nature? Then again, how can the very
same fact, the change from one to two, be produced by two causes
perfectly contrary to each other--in the first case, by
juxtaposition--in the last case, by bisection?[62]
[Footnote 62: Sextus Empiricus embodies this argument of Plato among
the difficulties which he starts against the Dogmatists, adv.
Mathematicos, x. s. 302-308.]
[Side-note: Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first
sought solution.]
That which is interesting here to note, is the sort of Cause which
first gave satisfaction to the speculative mind of Sokrates. In the
instance of the growing youth, he notes two distinct facts, the
earliest of which is (assuming certain other facts as accompanying
conditions) the cause of the latest. But in most of the other
instances, the fact is one which does not admit of explanation.
Comparisons of eight men with ten men, of a yard with half a yard, of
a tall man with a short man, are mental appreciations, beliefs,
affirmations, not capable of being farther explained or accounted
for: if any one disputes your affirmation, you prove it to him, by
placing him in a situation to make the comparison for himself, or to
go through the computation which establishes the truth of what you
affirm. It is not the juxtaposition of eight men which makes them to
be eight (they were so just as much when separated by ever so wide an
interval): though it may dispose or enable the spectator to count
them as eight. We may count the yard measure (whether actually
bisected or not), either as one yard, or as two half yards, or as
three feet, or thirty-six inches. Whether it be one, or two, or
three, depends upon the substantive which we choose to attach to the
numeral, or upon the comparison which we make (the unit which we
select) on the particular occasion.
[Side-note: Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the
treatise of Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between
causes and co-efficients.]
With this description of Cause Sokrates grew dissatisfied when he
extended his enquiries into physical and physiological problems. Is
it the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? and such like
questions. Such enquiries--into the physical conditions of mental
phenomena--did really admit of some answer, affirmative, or negative.
But Sokrates does not tell us how he proceeded in seeking for an
answer: he only says that he failed so completely, as even to be
disabused of his supposed antecedent knowledge. He was in this
perplexity when he first heard of the doctrine of Anaxagoras.
"_Nous_ or Reason is the regulator and the cause of all things."
Sokrates interpreted this to mean (what it does not appear that
Anaxagoras intended to assert)[63] that the Kosmos was an animal or
person[64] having mind or Reason analogous to his own: that this
Reason was an agent invested with full power and perpetually
operative, so as to regulate in the best manner all the phenomena of
the Kosmos; and that the general cause to be assigned for every thing
was one and the same--"It is best thus"; requiring that in each
particular case you should show _how_ it was for the best.
Sokrates took the type of Reason from his own volition and movements;
supposing that all the agencies in the Kosmos were stimulated or
checked by cosmical Reason for her purposes, as he himself put in
motion his own bodily members. This conception of Cause, borrowed
from the analogy of his own rational volition, appeared to Sokrates
very captivating, though it had not been his own first conception.
But he found that Anaxagoras, though proclaiming the doctrine as a
principium or initiatory influence, did not make applications of it
in detail; but assigned as causes, in most of the particular cases,
those agencies which Sokrates considered to be subordinate and
instrumental, as his own muscles were to his own volition.
Sokrates will not allow such agencies to be called Causes: he
says that they are only co-efficients indispensable to the efficacy
of the single and exclusive Cause--Reason. But he tells us himself
that most enquirers considered them as Causes; and that Anaxagoras
himself produced them as such. Moreover we shall see Plato himself in
the Timæus, while he repeats this same distinction between Causes
Efficient and Causes Co-efficient--yet treats these latter as Causes
also, though inferior in regularity and precision to the Demiurgic
Nous.[65]
[Footnote 63: I have given (in chap. i. p. 48 seq.) an abridgment and
explanation of what seems to have been the doctrine of Anaxagoras.]
[Footnote 64: Plato, Timæus, p. 30 D. [Greek: to/nde to\n ko/smon,
zô=on e)/mpsuchon e)/nnoun te], &c.]
[Footnote 65: Plato, Timæus, p. 46 C-D.
[Greek: ai)/tia--xunai/tia--xummetai/tia]. He says that most persons
considered the [Greek: xunai/tia] as [Greek: ai)/tia]. And he himself
registers them as such (Timæus, p. 68 E). He there distinguishes the
[Greek: ai)/tia] and [Greek: xunai/tia] as two different sorts of
[Greek: ai)/tia], the _divine_ and the _necessary_, in a remarkable
passage: where he tells us that we ought to study the divine causes, with
a view to the happiness of life, as far as our nature permits--and the
necessary causes for the sake of the divine: for that we cannot in
any way apprehend, or understand, or get sight of the divine causes
alone, without the necessary causes along with them (69 A).
In Timæus, pp. 47-48, we find again [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek:
a)na/gkê] noted as two distinct sorts of causes co-operating to
produce the four elements. It is farther remarkable that Necessity is
described as "the wandering or irregular description of
Cause"--[Greek: to\ tê=s planôme/nês ei)=dos ai)ti/as]. Eros and
[Greek: A)na/gkê] are joined as co-operating--in Symposion,
pp. 195 C, 197 B.]
[Side-note: Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of
substituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same
which Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates.]
In truth, the complaint which Sokrates here raises against
Anaxagoras--that he assigned celestial Rotation as the cause of
phenomena, in place of a quasi-human Reason--is just the same as that
which Aristophanes in the Clouds advances against Sokrates
himself.[66] The comic poet accuses Sokrates of displacing Zeus to
make room for Dinos or Rotation. According to the popular religious
belief, all or most of the agencies in Nature were personified, or
supposed to be carried on by persons--Gods, Goddesses, Dæmons,
Nymphs, &c., which army of independent agents were conceived, by
some thinkers, as more or less systematised and consolidated
under the central authority of the Kosmos itself. The causes of
natural phenomena, especially of the grand and terrible phenomena,
were supposed agents, conceived after the model of man, and assumed
to be endowed with volition, force, affections, antipathies, &c.:
some of them visible, such as Helios, Selênê, the Stars; others
generally invisible, though showing themselves whenever it specially
pleased them.[67] Sokrates, as we see by the Platonic Apology, was
believed by his countrymen to deny these animated agencies, and to
substitute instead of them inanimate forces, not put in motion by the
quasi-human attributes of reason, feeling and volition. The Sokrates
in the Platonic Phædon, taken at this second stage of his speculative
wanderings, not only disclaims such a doctrine, but protests against
it. He recognises no cause except a Nous or Reason borrowed by
analogy from that of which he was conscious within himself, choosing
what was best for himself in every special situation.[68] He tells
us however that most of the contemporary philosophers dissented
from this point of view. To them, such inanimate agencies were the
sole and real causes, in one or other of which they found what they
thought a satisfactory explanation.
[Footnote 66: Aristophan. Nubes, 379-815. [Greek: Di=nos basileu/ei,
to\n Di/' e)xelêlakô/s]. We find Proklus making this same complaint
against Aristotle, "that he deserted theological _principia_,
and indulged too much in physical reasonings"--[Greek: tô=n me\n
theologikô=n a)rchô=n a)phista/menos, toi=s de\ phusikoi=s lo/gois
pe/ra tou= de/ontos e)ndiatri/bôn] (Proklus ad Timæum, ii. 90 E, p.
212, Schneider). Pascal also expresses the like displeasure against
the Cartesian theory of the vortices. Descartes recognised God as
having originally established rotatory motion among the atoms,
together with an equal, unvarying quantity of motion: these two
points being granted, Descartes considered that all cosmical facts
and phenomena might be deduced from them.
"Sur la philosophie de Descartes, Pascal était de son sentiment sur
l'automate; et n'en était point sur la matière subtile, dont il se
moquait fort. Mais il ne pouvait souffrir sa manière d'expliquer la
formation de toutes choses; et il disait très souvent,--Je ne puis
pardonner à Descartes: il voudrait bien, dans toute sa philosophie,
pouvoir se passer de Dieu: mais il n'a pu s'empêcher de lui accorder
une chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement: après cela, il n'a
que faire de Dieu." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi. p. 237, edition de
Louandre, citation from Mademoiselle Périer, Paris, 1854.)
Again, Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics (bk. ii. ch. 19, p.
276), cites these remarks of Plato and Aristotle on the deficiencies
of Anaxagoras, and expresses the like censure himself against the
cosmical theories of Newton:--"Sir Isaac puts me in mind of an
ancient philosopher Anaxagoras, who maintained, as Sir Isaac does,
that mind was the cause of all things; but when he came to explain
the particular phænomena of nature, instead of having recourse to
mind, employed airs and æthers, subtle spirits and fluids, and I know
not what--in short, any thing rather than mind: a cause which he
admitted to exist in the universe; but rather than employ it, had
recourse to imaginary causes, of the existence of which he could give
no proof. The Tragic poets of old, when they could not otherwise
untie the knot of their fable, brought down a god in a machine, who
solved all difficulties: but such philosophers as Anaxagoras will
not, even when they cannot do better, employ _mind_ or divinity.
Our philosophers, since Sir Isaac's time, have gone on in the same
track, and still, I think, farther."
Lord Monboddo speaks with still greater asperity about the Cartesian
theory, making a remark on it similar to what has been above cited
from Pascal. (See his Dissertation on the Newtonian Philosophy,
Appendix to Ancient Metaphysics, pp. 498-499.)]
[Footnote 67: Plato, Timæus, p. 41 A. [Greek: pa/ntes o(/soi te
peripolou=si phanerô=s kai\ o(/soi phai/nontai kath' o(/son a)\n
e)the/lôsi theoi\], &c.]
[Footnote 68: What Sokrates understands by the theory of Anaxagoras,
is evident from his language--Phædon, pp. 98-99. He understands an
indwelling cosmical Reason or Intelligence, deliberating and
choosing, in each particular conjuncture, what was best for the
Kosmos; just as his own (Sokrates) Reason deliberated and chose what
was best for him ([Greek: tê=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei]), in
consequence of the previous determination of the Athenians to condemn
and punish him.
This point deserves attention, because it is altogether different
from Aristotle's conception of Nous or Reason in the Kosmos: in which
he recognises no consciousness, no deliberation, no choice, no
reference to any special situation: but a constant, instinctive,
undeliberating, movement towards Good as a determining
End--_i.e._ towards the reproduction and perpetuation of regular
Forms.
Hegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part i. pp. 355, 368-369,
2nd edit.), has given very instructive remarks, in the spirit of the
Aristotelian Realism, both upon the principle announced by
Anaxagoras, and upon the manner in which Anaxagoras is criticised by
Sokrates in the Platonic Phædon. Hegel observes:--
"Along with this principle (that of Anaxagoras) there comes in the
recognition of an Intelligence, or of a self-determining agency which
was wanting before. Herein we are not to imagine thought,
subjectively considered: when thought is spoken of, we are apt to
revert to thought as it passes in our consciousness: but here, on the
contrary, what is meant is, the Idea, considered altogether
objectively, or Intelligence as an effective agent: (N.B.
_Intellectum_, or _Cogitatum_--not _Intellectio_, or
_Cogitatio_, which would mean the conscious process--see this
distinction illustrated by Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2,
5, p. 219: also Marbach, Gesch. der Phil. s. 54, 99 not. 2): as we
say, that there is reason in the world, or as we speak of Genera in
nature, which are the Universal. The Genus Animal is the Essential of
the Dog--it is the Dog himself: the laws of nature are her immanent
Essence. Nature is not formed from without, as men construct a table:
the table is indeed constructed intelligently, but by an Intelligence
extraneous to this wooden material. It is this extraneous form which
we are apt to think of as representing Intelligence, when we hear it
talked of: but what is really meant is, the Universal--the immanent
nature of the object itself. The [Greek: Nou=s] is not a thinking
Being without, which has arranged the world: by such an
interpretation the Idea of Anaxagoras would be quite perverted and
deprived of all philosophical value. For to suppose an individual,
particular, Something without, is to descend into the region of
phantasms and its dualism: what is called, a thinking Being, is not
an Idea, but a Subject. Nevertheless, what is really and truly
Universal is not for that reason Abstract: its characteristic
property, quâ Universal, is to determine in itself, by itself, and
for itself, the particular accompaniments. While it carries on this
process of change, it maintains itself at the same time as the
Universal, always the same; this is a portion of its self-determining
efficiency."--What Hegel here adverts to seems identical with that
which Dr. Henry More calls an Emanative Cause (Immortality of the
Soul, ch. vi. p. 18), "the notion of a thing possible. An Emanative
Effect is co-existent with the very substance of that which is said
to be the Cause thereof. That which _emanes_, if I may so speak,
is the same in reality with its Emanative Cause."
Respecting the criticism of Sokrates upon Anaxagoras, Hegel has
further acute remarks which are too long to cite (p. 368 seq.)]
[Side-note: The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be
carried out, either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates
turns to general words, and adopts the theory of ideas.]