}
Sidi Soltan. „ }
}
Elzrelli. „ }
}
Arbir. „ }
} Sold to General Hamida Ben
Sciauatt. Tebourba. } Ayad for 500,000 francs.
}
Nahba. Mater. }
}
Elzriba. „ }
}
Ermil. „ }
Elmebtuh. Bizerta road. }
}
Buarada. Elfahs. }
} Sold to Signor Rivoltella
Borj Elamri. Tunis. } and a syndicate for 975,000
} francs.
Elazib. Bizerta. }
}
Ghiran. „ }
Fritisa and Asciafir. „ }
}
Beny Ata. „ }
} Sold as in the last case for
Beny Meslem. „ } 200,000 francs.
}
Sidi Hassan. „ }
Gafur. Teboursak. Not sold, but worth 600,000
francs.
Elmornaghia. Manouba. Not sold, but worth 200,000
francs.
Seltan. Hamman-el-Lif. Not sold, but worth 300,000
francs.
Village of Grambalia. Not sold, but worth 1,500,000
francs.
Mkada. Bizerta. }
}
Udai. „ } Not sold, but worth 200,000
} francs.
Elzaina. „ }
In addition to all these splendid properties:—
100,000 olive-trees at Menzel.
Two caravanserais in the city of Tunis.
Twenty shops.
Jewels of the value of 3,000,000 francs belonging to Sy Mustapha
Khaznadar, the disgraced favourite, and Sy Ismael Sunni and Sy Rescid,
the strangled ministers.
Furniture worth about 1,500,000 francs, belonging to the same persons.
_N.B._—The greater part of the real estate absorbed by Mustapha were
portions of the theoretically inalienable royal domain, belonging to the
various princes and princesses of the Hassanite family—_e.g._, the
village of Grambalia was the property of the late Muhamed Bey, of whose
son Mustapha was appointed guardian. So complete has been the nest-
feathering to which the Bey has been exposed on all sides, that the
Financial Commission has been lately compelled to reduce his annual
Civil List by £15,000 at one blow. The first reform which should occupy
the attention of the French authorities is the dilapidation of the
public or quasi-public State lands, and the bringing to justice of the
persons concerned in it. The list of Mustapha’s “tokens of affection”
from his sovereign was compiled by a person for some years in his
confidence, after consulting the purchasers of his estates. Mustapha is
now thinking of a rainy day; the proceeds of his Tunisian lands are
being prudently expended in Parisian house-property. If the French
Protectorate is to receive recognition at the hands of Europe, by all
means let the Minister Resident be Prime Minister as well _de facto_ as
_de jure_. We have had enough of absorptive Grand Viziers.
P.
_Strength and Arrangement of the First Corps Expéditionnaire on the 8th
June 1881._
Staff: 46 officers, 383 men, 171 horses, 198 mules.
Division Delebecque: Staff, 22 officers, 167 men, 143 horses, 57 mules.
Brigade Caillot: 130 officers, 3771 men, 125 horses, 415 mules.
„ Vincendon: 167 officers, 4681 men, 303 horses, 479 mules.
„ Galland: 148 officers, 4092 men, 137 horses, 386 mules.
„ Logerot: 151 officers, 3660 men, 465 horses, 689 mules.
„ Gaume: 65 officers, 868 men, 937 horses, 34 mules.
„ De Brem: 82 officers, 2130 men, 522 horses, 81 mules.
Fourth Brigade (General Bréart): 244 officers, 6669 men, 1247 horses,
and 1209 mules.
Kef: 46 officers, 1274 men, 127 horses, 130 mules.
Ghardimaou: 20 officers, 496 men.
Beja: 9 officers, 325 men, 3 horses, 4 mules.
Souk-Erras (Algeria): 2 officers, 120 men, 82 horses, 60 mules.
Tabarca: 60 officers, 1516 men, 95 horses.
Total: 1202 officers, 30,152 men, 4357 horses, and 3742 mules.
Q.
_Troops sent from France to take part in the First Tunisian Expedition._
1st Brigade 202 officers. 4987 men.
2d „ 191 „ 5245 „
3d „ 189 „ 5247 „
Brigade of Reserves 258 „ 6587 „
Detachment at Tabarca 54 „ 1550 „
-----------
Total 23,616 men.
Of these the following were left in Tunis:—
1st Brigade 44 officers. 1112 men.
2d „ 91 „ 2772 „
3d „ 89 „ 2890 „
Brigade of Reserves 80 „ 3477 „
Detachment at Tabarca 34 „ 1109 „
-----------
Total 11,360 men.
The following were sent to Algeria:—
1st Brigade (one battery) 4 officers. 177 men.
2d „ 3 „ 695 „
3d (Company Commissariat) 3 „ 695 „
Reserves (Cavalry and transport service) 27 „ 585 „
---------
Total 2152 men.
A round number of 10,000 were therefore sent back to France on the
breaking up of the Corps Expéditionnaire.
R.
_Troops sent to Algeria to take part in the First Tunisian Expedition._
6 Battalions of Zouaves.
5 „ Turcos.
1 „ Infantry.
3 Squadrons of Cavalry.
2 „ of Spahis.
5½ Batteries of Artillery.
5 Companies of Engineers.
4 „ Military Train.
Thus constituting a total force of 8200 men.
At the end of the expedition all the troops were sent back to Algeria,
where their presence was necessitated by the affairs of Saïda, with the
exception of one squadron of Spahis, one battery of Artillery, and two
companies of Engineers, and left the Regency on the following dates:—
June 13.—Embarked 2 battalions of the 1st Tirailleurs for Algiers.
„ „ „ 2 „ „ 2d „ for Oran.
„ 19. „ 1 „ „ 2d Zouaves for Oran.
„ „ „ 1 battery of Artillery for Oran.
July 1. „ ⅓ „ „ for Algiers.
„ „ „ 4 companies of Military Train for Algiers.
„ 4. „ 1 company of Engineers for Algiers.
„ 8. „ 2 battalions of Zouaves for Algiers.
„ „ „ 1 company Engineers for Algiers.
„ 13. „ 1 battery of Artillery for Algiers.
The rest, viz., 4 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 2 batteries, recrossed
the frontier into the province of Constantine, with General Forgemol, on
the 28th June.
S.
_Troops sent to Tunis to take part in the Second Campaign._
July 9.—Tunis, 4 battalions (71st, 93d, 136th, and 137th) 2000 men.
(Afterwards sent to Sfax.)
„ 13. „ 1 battalion (77th) 450 „
(Afterwards sent to Sfax.)
„ 21. „ 2 battalions (107th and 114th) 1000 „
(Afterwards sent to Gabes.)
„ „ „ 1 battalion (78th) 500 „
(Afterwards sent to Jerba.)
„ „ „ 1 battery (35th) 188 „
(Afterwards divided between Sfax and Gabes.)
„ 24 —Tunis, 2 companies of Military Train (6th brigade) 180 „
& 26.
„ 27.—Tunis, 2 battalions (25th, 55th, 6th brigade) 1030 „
„ 28. „ 1 battalion 135th (6th brigade) 500 „
„ 29. „ 1 company of Engineers 141 „
(Afterwards sent to Sfax, Jerba, and Gabez.)
„ 31.—Bizerta, 2 battalions (65th, 28th Chasseurs, 6th 1000 „
brigade)
„ „ Tunis, 2 batteries (31st, 95th, 6th brigade) 360 „
„ „ „ 1 battalion (125th, 6th brigade) 515 „
Aug. 1. „ 1 battalion (6th, 6th brigade) 500 „
„ 31.—Goletta, 3 battalions (80th, 114th, 118th) 1500 „
Sept. 6.—Susa, 3 battalions (66th, 116th, and 48th) 1500 „
„ 4. „ 1 battery (33d) 185 „
„ 1.—Tunis, 3 battalions (33d, 43d, 110th) 1500 „
„ „ „ workmen and hospital assistants 125 „
„ 11. „ 3 battalions 1500 „
„ 12. „ 2 squadrons (1st Hussars) 360 „
„ „ „ 1 battalion of the 127th 515 „
„ 14. „ 2 battalions (8th and 73d) 1200 „
„ „ „ 2 batteries (31st and 33d) 360 „
„ „ „ 1 squadron (1st Hussars) 125 „
„ „ „ others 150 „
„ 16. „ 1 company of Engineers (3d battalion) 128 „
„ „ „ Telegraphists 44 „
„ „ „ Hussars 85 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (34th) 188 „
„ „ „ ambulance of the 6th brigade 128 „
„ „ „ Topographical service 14 „
„ 20. „ 1 battery (34th) 180 „
„ „ „ convoy of the 6th brigade 234 „
„ 25.—Susa, 2 battalions (10th and 138th) 1040 „
„ „ „ 1 company of Engineers (11th battalion) 124 „
„ 27. „ 1 battalion (23d Chasseurs) 509 „
„ „ „ 1 squadron (6th Hussars) 189 „
„ „ „ ½ battery (32d) 90 „
„ „ „ staff of the 7th brigade 17 „
„ 28.—Manouba, 2 battalions (111th and 61st) 1128 „
„ „ Susa, 1 battalion (62d) 534 „
„ „ „ 2 squadrons (6th Hussars) 307 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (29th) 187 „
„ „ „ staff and other services 118 „
„ 30. „ 1 battalion (46th) 549 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (10th) 188 „
„ „ „ others 9 „
Oct. 3.—Goletta, gendarmerie 99 „
„ „ „ others 25 „
„ 5. „ train and others 127 „
„ „ Susa, ambulance and convoy 300 „
„ 7.—Tunis, Artillery 97 „
„ 9.—Susa, ½ battery of Artillery (32d) 118 „
„ „ „ others 97 „
„ 10.—Tunis, 3 battalions (1st, 84th, 101st) 1694 „
„ „ „ _section de munitions_ 179 „
„ „ „ others 28 „
„ „ Susa, military railway corps 205 „
„ 12.—Tunis, train and gendarmerie 160 „
„ „ Susa, train and telegraph 60 „
„ 17.—Tunis, 3 battalions (87th, 119th, and 128th) 1698 „
„ 19. „ train 90 „
„ 21. „ „ 89 „
„ 24. „ telegraphists 30 „
„ „ Susa, ammunition train 130 „
„ „ „ train 10 „
„ 25.—Tunis, 3 battalions (130th) 1627 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (27th) 184 „
-----------
30,421 men.
T.
_Formation of the Columns employed in the Concentric Movement on
Kairwán._
The troops forming part of the columns Forgemol and Étienne have been
enumerated in the text. The following details explain the constitution
of the column Saussier, Logerot, and Sabatier, which marched on Kairwán
from Tunis and the Manouba:—
_Infantry_— (1.) The battalions of the 65th, 125th, and 135th
Regiments attached to the _corps expéditionnaire_,
which formed the 1st _Regiment de Marche_.
(2.) The 2d _Regiment de Marche_, composed of the
battalions belonging to the 25th and 55th Regiments.
(3.) The 28th battalion of the _Chasseurs à pied_.
_Cavalry_— (1.) 7th Regiment of the _Chasseurs à cheval_.
(2.) One squadron of the 1st Regiment of _chasseurs
d’Afrique_.
(In addition to these, there were one battalion of the 33d Regiment
and one of the 46th Regiment detached from the Brigade Philibert.)
_Artillery_—10th battery of the 9th Regiment (field guns).
3d _section de munitions_ of 36th Regiment of Artillery.
_Engineers_— 3d company of the 3d battalion of the 3d Regiment.
_Transports
(Train des
équipages)_— 5th company and 5 _bis_ company of the 5th squadron.
U.
_Details of the Positions and Strength of the French Army of Occupation
in the Regency of Tunis on April 1_, 1882.
DIVISION DU NORD.
GENERAL JAPY (_now General Guyon Vernier_).
* * * * *
_Commandement des places de Tunis et la Goulette_—GÉNÉRAL LAMBERT, _à
Tunis_.
LA GOULETTE.
4e zouaves (1 bataillon et le depôt).
114 régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
11 régiment de hussards (1 péleton).
Parc d’artillerie No 3.
14e escadron du train (1 détachement).
11/4 génie (1 détachement).
_Services administratifs._
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e id. d’infirmiers.
Dépôt des convalescents.
Ambulance.
TUNIS.
4e zouaves (2 bataillons).
1er de ligne (1 bataillon).
101e id. id.
118e id. id.
11 régiment de hussards (1 péleton).
1er batterie 19me d’artillerie 90 mm.
10e id. 34me id. 80 mm.
14e escadron du train (1 détachement).
15e id. id.
18e id. id.
20e id. id. (3 compagnies).
11/4 génie, portion principale.
Gendarmerie.
21e section d’infirmiers.
* * * * *
_Subdivision de Testour_—GÉNÉRAL D’AUBIGNY, _à Tebourba._
TEBOURBA.
8e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
20e id. id.
11e régiment de hussards (1½ escadrons).
Génie (1 section).
MEDJEZ-EL-BAB.
127e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (1 section montagne).
12/2 génie.
TESTOUR.
84e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e „ d’infirmiers.
BORDJ MESSAOUDI.
128e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
LE KEF.
83e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
122e id. id.
128e id. (2 compagnies).
13e chasseurs à cheval (3 péletons).
3e batterie 26e d’artillerie 80 mm.
10e id. 13e id. (1 section montagne).
18/2 génie.
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e id. d’infirmiers.
Ambulance.
AÏN TUNGA.
73e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
11e régiment de hussards (1 péleton).
10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (section montagne).
ELLEZ.
80e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
13e chasseurs à cheval (1 péleton).
10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (section montagne).
* * * * *
_Subdivision d’Aïn Draham_—GÉNÉRAL GUYON VERNIER, _Aïn Draham._
AÏN DRAHAM.
29e bataillon de chasseurs.
18e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
22e id. id.
14e escadron du train, 5e compagnie bis.
13e batterie 16e d’artillerie (montagne).
16/3 genie, à El Aioun (1 section).
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e id. d’infirmiers.
Ambulance.
BÉJA.
57e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
142e id. id.
10me batterie 13e régiment d’artillerie.
14e escadron du train (détachement).
11/4 génie (détachement).
GHARDIMAOU.
96e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
13e régiment de chasseurs à cheval (1 escadron).
18/2 génie (détachement).
TABARKA.
143e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
13e régiment de chasseurs à cheval (1 escadron).
1er batterie 19e d’artillerie (1 section).
8e id. 12e id. id.
14e escadron du train.
15/2 génie à 16e Teboul (détachement).
SOUK-EL-ARBA.
1re compagnie de fusilliers de discipline.
18/2 génie (détachement).
* * * * *
_Subdivision de Tunis_—GÉNÉRAL MAURAND, _à Tunis._
TUNIS.
115e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
HAMMAM-LIF.
88e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
119e id. (3 compagnies).
9e batterie du 27 d’artillerie (montagne).
9e id. id. id.
11/4 génie.
Gendarmerie.
ZAGHOUÁN.
87e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
92e id. id.
11e regiment de hussards (un péleton).
16/3 génie (détachement).
HAMMANET.
1 compagnie franche.
BIZERTE.
38e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
1er batterie 19e d’artillerie (1 section, 80 mm.)
14e escadron du train (1 détachement).
11/4 génie.
21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).
MATEUR.
30e bataillon de chasseurs à pied.
14e escadron du train (détachement).
21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).
MANOUBA.
119e régiment de ligne (1 compagnie).
11e régiment de hussards (½ escadron).
14e escadron du train 5e compagnie pp.
18e id. id.
21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).
Ambulance.
Depôt de remonte.
RÉCAPITULATION.
_Infanterie._
1er régiment de ligne Tunis.
8e id. Tébourba.
18e id. Aïn Draham.
20e id. Tébourba.
22e id. Aïn Draham.
38e id. Bizerte.
57e id. Béja.
73e id. Aïn Tounga.
80e id. Ellez.
83e id. Le Kef.
84e id. Testour.
87e id. Zaghouán.
88e id. Hammam-Lif.
92e id. Zaghouán.
96e id. Ghardimaou.
101e id. Tunis.
114e id. La Goulette.
115e id. Tunis.
118e id. id.
119e id. Hammam-Lif.
122e id. Le Kef.
127e id. Medjez-el-Bab.
128e id. Le Kef.
143e id. Tabarka.
142e id. Béja.
29e bataillon de chasseurs Aïn Draham.
30e id. id. Mateur.
4e zouaves (3 bataillon et depôt) Tunis et La Goulette.
1er compagnie franche Tunis.
1re compagnie de fusilliers de discipline Souk-el-Arba.
_Cavalerie._
13e chasseurs Le Kef, Tabarka, Ghardimaou.
11e hussards Tébourba, La Goulette, Manouba.
id. Tunis, Aïn-Tounga, Zaghouán.
3e Spahis Aïn Draham.
_Artillerie._
12e régiments, 8e batteries Tabarka.
13e id. 10e id. Béja, Kef.
16e id. 13e id. Aïn Draham.
19e id. 1re id. Tunis, Bizerte, Tabarka.
26e id. 3e id. Le Kef.
27e id. 9e id. Hammam-Lif.
31e id. 9e id. id.
33e id. 10e id. Medjez, Aïn Tunga, Ellez.
34e id. 10e id. Tunis.
Parc No. 3 La Goulette.
_Train des Equipages._
14e escadrons, 5e compagnies, pp. Manouba.
14e id. 5e id. bis. Aïn Draham.
18e id. 5e id. pp. Manouba.
20e id. 3e id. Tunis.
_Génie._
11e escadrons, 4e compagnies Tunis, Bizerte.
12e id. 2e id. Medjez-el-Bab.
15e id. 2e id. Tabarka.
16e id. 3e id. Aïn Draham, Tabarka.
18e id. 2e id. Le Kef.
_Troupes d’administration._
21e section, ouvriers Tunis,
La Goulette.
id. infirmiers Manouba.
19e section de secretaires d’etat-major force publique, Tunis.
DIVISION DU SUD.
GÉNÉRAL LOGEROT.
* * * * *
_5e Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL SABATIER.
CAMP DE SOUSSE.
65e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
28e bataillon de chasseurs à pied.
125e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
135e id. id.
6e id. id.
25e id. id.
7me régiment de chasseurs.
10e batterie du 9e d’artillerie (montée).
10e id. du 35e id. (montagne).
6e section de munitions (36e d’artillerie).
Un péleton de génie (3e régt., 3e bon., 3e cie).
Train des équipages (5e cie. pp. et 5e cie. bis)
ENFIDA.
65e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
EL DJEM.
125e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
* * * * *
_6me Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL PHILIBERT.
GAFSA.
27e bataillon de chasseurs.
46e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
61e id. id.
111e id. id.
1er régiment de hussards (1 escadron).
10e batterie du 31e régiment (2 sections montagne).
Génie (1 section, 3e cie., 3e bon., 3e régt.)
Train des équipages (5e cie. pp.)
OUED GILMA.
33e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
43e id. id.
110e id. id.
1er régiment de hussards (escadron).
Détachement de la section de munitions (36e).
Génie (1 section, 3e bon., 3e cie., 3e régt.)
Train des équipages (5e cie. bis détachement).
RAZ-EL-OUED GABÈS.
1 regiment de hussards (1 escadron).
* * * * *
_7me Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL ÉTIENNE.
EL-MELAH.
23e bataillon de chasseurs.
KAIRWAN.
48e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
66e id. id.
62e id. id.
138e id. id.
6e régiment de hussards (2 escadrons).
10e batterie (29e régiment d’artillerie).
9e id. du 10e id.
Génie (2e cie. du 3e bon. du 3e regt).
Train des équipages (5e cie. et 5e cie. bis détachement).
SOUSSE.
19e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
10e batterie du 32e d’artillerie.
Parc No. 2.
3e cie. d’ouvriers mixte du chemins de fer.
Train des équipages (5e cie. détachement).
SIDI-EL-HANI.
6me hussards (½ escadron).
3e section des munitions (36e artillerie).
Train des équipages (détachement de la 5e cie.)
OUED-LAYA.
19e de ligne (2 compagnies).
6e hussards (½ escadron).
* * * * *
_Brigade de la Côte_—GÉNÉRAL JAMAIS.
RAZ-EL-OUED GABÈS.
Un bataillon de zouaves.
14e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
77e id. id.
107e id. id.
137e id. id.
6e id. id.
25e id. id.
1er hussards (un escadron).
9e batterie du 35e d’artillerie (2 sections montagne).
Génie (2 sections du 4e régt.)
SFAX.
136e regiment de ligne.
55e id.
9e batterie du 13e régiment (montagne).
MEHDIA.
71e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
ILE DE DJERBA.
_Houmt-Souk._
73e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
_Borj-Marsa._
73e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
10e batterie du 13 régiment (13e montagne).
_El-Kantera._
71e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
9e batterie 35e d’artillerie (une section montagne).
RÉCAPITULATION.
_Infanterie._
6e régiment de ligne Gabès.
14e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
19e id. Sousse et Oued-Laya.
25e id. Gabès.
46e id. Gafsa.
48e id. Kairwán.
55e id. Sfax.
61e id. Gafsa.
62e id. Kairwán.
65e id. Sousse et Enfida.
66e id. Kairwán.
71e id. (Djerba), Médra-el-Kantara.
77e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
78e id. (Djerba), Bordj Marsa.
107e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
111e id. Gafsa.
125e id. Sousse-el-Djem.
135e id. Sousse.
136e id. Sfax.
137e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
138e id. Kairwán.
4e zouaves (1 bataillon) Gabès.
23e bataillon de chasseurs El-Melah.
27e id. Gafsa.
28e id. Sousse.
_Cavalerie._
7e régiment de chasseurs Sousse.
1er hussards Gafsa, Ras-el-Oued, Gabès.
id. Oueld Gilma.
6e id. Kairwán, Ouled-Laya.
6e id. Sidi-el-Hami.
_Artillerie._
9e régiments, 10e batteries Sousse.
10e id. 9e id. Kairwán.
13e id. 9e id. Sfax.
13e id. 10e id. Bordj-Marsa.
29e id. 10e id. Kairwán.
31e id. 10e id. Gafsa.
32e id. 10e id. Sousse.
35e id. 9e id. Ras-el-Oued, Randam.
35e id. 10e id. Sousse.
Parc No. 2 id.
_Train des equipages._
Escadrons. compagnies.
... 5e 5me bis.
Sousse, Gafsa, Oued-Gilma, Kairwán, Sidi-el-Hami.
_Génie._
Sousse, Gafsa, Oued-Gilma, Kairwán, Raz-el-Oued-Gabès.
V.
_An American Prophecy about Tunis._
Mr. Amos Perry was, from July 1862 till September 1867, United States’
Consul at Tunis. On his return to America he published, in 1869, a book
entitled, “Carthage and Tunis—Past and Present.” His note as to “the
political future of the country” has been so curiously verified that it
may be reproduced with advantage. He writes:—
“Just as I was leaving Tunis, after having endured the heat of the
summer of 1867, and breathed a noxious air, that brought cholera and
death to thousands around me, I received from an eminent diplomatic
source a pointed inquiry, whose definite answer, which was then
confidential, implied on my part some insight into the future. Though
not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, I embraced my privilege as a
Yankee and guessed.
“Since then, I have seen no reason to change my views. As the great ship
canal across the isthmus of Suez progresses under French auspices,
Tunis, centrally situated on the great highway between the canal and the
ocean, acquires a new importance, which the French people and government
are not slow to appreciate, and turn to their account. They see on the
Tunisian coast better harbours, and a richer soil, than are to be found
in their Algerian possessions, and they evidently mean to bring them
under their control. Instead of being animated by a chivalrous spirit
and a desire to diffuse the blessings of civilisation, they seem
disposed to take advantage of the weakness of this government to extend
their power and increase their territorial possessions. Despite his
graceful air and comely looks, the French eagle is savagely rapacious;
and now the British lion, which seeks the gratification of his own
appetite, is powerless to restrain the soaring and plunging movements of
this keen-eyed bird. The American eagle, distrustful of both the bird
and beast that hovered and prowled around his western domains in the
season of his exposure, contents himself with simply noting passing
events. The inquiry and reply were as follows:—
“WHAT IS TO BE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF TUNIS?
“This question is often put, and gives rise to a variety of speculations
and answers. Frenchmen apparently regard Tunis as the supplement of
Algeria. Englishmen see here an important source of supplies for Malta,
and Italians claim special consideration on account of their language
and customs, which have to some extent prevailed here from the Roman
period to the present time. Italy has the largest colony here; England
has the most pressing need of supplies for Malta; but France has the
greatest force at hand to control the country.
“Politically, too, France has the most intimate relations with Tunis.
From the beginning of the war against Algiers, the French have been near
neighbours of the Bey, and much of the time have been patronised as his
special friends. On one occasion they prevented the Ottoman fleet from
an organised effort to get control of this government. They have
employed the full range of diplomatic arts to introduce and keep up
intimate relations between the two countries. The French consul at
length acquired a leading, not to say controlling, influence with the
Bey. He was consulted, and his aid was regarded as needful to the
success of all important enterprises. French subjects were invited to
fill places of emolument and trust, and to them were given the most
important contracts, such as establishing telegraphic communication
between different parts of the regency, making loans to the government
almost on their own terms, and introducing water into the city and its
environs from the mountains of Zaghuán.
“With French influence thus strongly established and recognised, in the
year 1864, a French consul, with little experience in the country,
attempted to inaugurate a new line of policy, boldly treating the Bey as
a French vassal by interrupting his vessels in his own waters, demanding
the dismissal of some of his ministers, and recommending other important
changes in the government. Not being able to execute this line of policy
without resorting to force (from which measure the consul did not
shrink), and giving serious offence to other nations, the French
government withdrew this consul, and has since sent other officers who
have pursued a more conciliatory course. Still, during their
administration, the Bey has been made to feel the arbitrary power of the
French government.
“When the Bey was relieved of the presence of the offensive consul, it
was regarded as a victory on his part, and was so proclaimed abroad. But
I believe France took this step, both because she did not wish to
encounter the displeasure of other nations and especially because she
was not disposed unnecessarily to have another religious war similar to
that waged in Algeria. But her ultimate purposes in regard to this
country are scarcely to be questioned. While she watches it with a
vigilant eye lest it escape her irritating touch, she sees that
gentleness is in general better than harshness. Feeling secure of her
plunder, she can afford to await the maturity of plans of slow
development.
“If the French were to take forcible possession of the regency, other
nations might protest, and Mussulmans might massacre and plunder. The
seizure could be made and the country held. Difficulties would, however,
naturally arise in regulating many complicated affairs while
encountering the hatred of Mussulmans and the ill-will of Europeans. In
view of all the facts in this case France decides to await the progress
of events. Her experience in Algeria and in Mexico probably serves as a
warning. Her legitimate influence as a powerful neighbour of the Bey is
great, and she has but to persist in the maintenance of apparently
friendly relations, and seize every petty occasion to assert her
presumed authority, to secure present advantages and a final triumph.
“I am, then, persuaded that this country will at length come under the
acknowledged protection and control of France, if not with the consent
and approbation of other nations, probably without violent opposition.
Such at least is the manifest tendency of affairs at the present time,
notwithstanding a species of statecraft employed to produce a counter
result. The malady is too deeply seated to be overcome by empirics in
the name of diplomacy. The Gallic eagle, already scenting the prey,
prepares to clutch it, despite the lion’s growl and all the shrieks and
howls that may be raised as he enjoys his repast.”
W.
_A Foreign Diplomatist’s Note on Tunis._
The following _mémoire_ was sent to Lord De la Warr by a foreign
diplomatist last May. It affords very valuable aid to the serious study
of the Tunisian Question, if the reader has not already made up his
mind, that political conventions and diplomatic assurances are not
altogether subservient to the doctrine of expediency:—
“The jesuitical language employed by certain portions of the Russian and
Austrian Press on the subject of the aggressive policy of France in the
Mediterranean is the more remarkable, and at the same time the more
immoral, because it was precisely the diplomatists of Austria and Russia
who, at the Congress of Vienna, extorted from the representatives of
France a declaration guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the
Regency of Tunis. It is superfluous to point out now that the present
policy of France, who seems to have entirely deserted the path of peace
and honour, menaces the great and vital interests of England,
commercially in Europe, and politically in the East. Very patent facts
oblige British statesmen now-a-days to remember the traditions of George
Canning, who by an energetic policy saved the prestige of his country
and the interests of modern civilisation; then, as now, menaced by the
struggle for supremacy carried on by a restless Power which is trying by
all possible means to subject nations and races to the despotism of a
so-called universal Republic.
“‘The régime changes,’ says George Canning, speaking of France, ‘but the
hereditary character of the French people never alters.’ The French are
Chauvinists now as they were under Henry IV., Louis XIV., Charles X.,
Louis Philippe, and the Napoleons, who, to blind the English, invented
as it suited them that now exploded fiction, ‘L’Empire c’est la paix.’
Let us glance for a moment at Protocol XIII. ‘of the Conference held at
Vienna, April 26th, 1855.’
“Prince Gortschakoff: ‘A territorial stipulation being once guaranteed,
should we not extend it to the most distant points, _as, for instance,
in the case of Tunis_, and make a _casus belli_ of all attacks on the
outlying portions of the Empire?’
“M. Drouyn de Lhuys: ‘I would point out that France not only promises to
respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but has
engaged to cause the principle to be respected by others; as far as I am
concerned, _I see no difficulty in extending to that country (Tunis) the
operation of the Treaty_ I am ready to subscribe.’
“The Baron de Bourquenet: ‘I am of entirely the same opinion as M.
Drouyn de Lhuys.’
“This Protocol was communicated by Her Majesty’s Government to the
Houses of Parliament on the 10th May 1855. It bears the signatures of
the Plenipotentiaries of France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the Baron de
Bourquenet, as well as those of M. le Comte Buol Schauenstein, Baron
Prokesch-Osten, Lord Westmorland, M. de Titoff, Prince Gortschakoff,
Aali Pasha, and Aarif Effendi.
“By this international convention it is evident that France actually
confirmed the obligations which she had already entered into by her
adhesion to the Treaty of London in 1841—obligations which, in the eyes
of every honest man in Europe, were solemnly ratified afterwards at
Paris and Berlin.
“It results, therefore, that the admission of Sir Charles Dilke, as to
the recognition by Europe of the Tunisian Firman of 1871, is actually
based on great international engagements; but it merely confirmed a
state of things existing _ab antiquo_. Is there any record of a Bey of
Tunis _not_ being invested by the Sultan? Did the Sultan obtain from his
Tunisian vassal a contingent of 15,000 men during the war of 1854?
“An examination, however, of historical facts abundantly proves that the
advance on Tunis is nothing more nor less than an incident in one long-
continued and traditional policy of Chauvinistic aggression. Before the
dawn of the present century, Citizen Devoize played very effectively at
Tunis the rôle of the Roustan of to-day, and let it be noted that M.
Devoize’s proceedings were speedily followed by the invasion of Malta,
Syria, and Egypt by the French troops. ‘La mission de civilisation’ is
no new phrase; it is as old as the time of the First Napoleon. Let us
pursue our inquiry into the traditional politics of France. In 1795, M.
Devoize, under the veil of coral-fishing, did his best to enable France
to annex the Regency, and even then the pretext was an old one, for a
quarter of a century before, her consul had endeavoured to purchase
Tabarca _and Bizerta_ for the same purpose. France has always coveted
Tunis as the political and strategic key of her vast plans for the
foundation of a French Carthage.
“Hence Bonaparte’s expedition; hence the revolt of Mehemet Ali, the
emissary of France in Egypt, Syria, and South Arabia. Did not France
encourage Abdul Jelil to excite a rising in Tripoli? The most eloquent
testimony as to the ultimate aims of France on the whole African
littoral is afforded by the reports of the British Political Agents at
Tunis and Tripoli for the past twenty years; but they appear to have
been written only to be treated as a sealed book. The famous letter of
M. Sabattier (then Consul-General for France in Egypt) addressed to the
Parisian paper _L’Union_ should just now be consulted. Lord Salisbury
should have remembered at Berlin that the day after the Treaty of Paris
Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, Lord Russell, Mr. Disraeli, and Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe all said that _now_ the possibility of a further
French advance on Tunis was removed for ever. This opinion was also
communicated by England to H.E. Nusret Pasha, Ottoman Commissioner to
Tunis, then in Paris, and appeared in all the French newspapers of that
date.
The memoirs of Captain Carette (_vide_ ‘Bulletin de la Société de la
Géographie,” 4ième série, vol. ii. No. 21, 1852), as quoted by M. de la
Roquette, affirm that ‘the possession of Tunis would give France
_political frontiers_, and enable her to annex a great Oriental empire,
at the same time guaranteeing to her supremacy both in Europe and in the
Mediterranean, and assuring her a monopoly of African trade.’ Strange to
say, the letter of the ill-fated Colonel Flatters, of the 29th January
1881 (reproduced in the St. Petersburg papers two months later),
contains the same ideas. This document speaks of positive instructions
from the Minister, M. Freycinet, ‘_to form a French party_ at Mourzouk
(Fezzan) amongst the Touaregs,’ and adding, ‘_it is absolutely necessary
to go to the Soudan_.’
“On the 20th of June 1865, Napoleon III. wrote thus to Marshal MacMahon,
Governor of Algeria:—‘When our manner of regenerating a vanquished
nation becomes an object of envy to the fifteen millions of Arabs
scattered over other parts of Africa and Asia; when our supremacy,
established at the foot of Mount Atlas, appears to them an intervention
of Providence, _that day_ the glory of France will resound from Tunis to
the Euphrates!’
“The Protectorate of France over Tunis will very shortly menace the
freedom of trade at the great Saharian Fair of Berbera Zeilah (the Roman
_Avalites Emporium_), which lasts six months, and up to the present time
affords the most important means of commerce between England and Africa.
By this Protectorate she also assures to herself not only a practical
monopoly of commerce, but the possession of the Soudan as a recruiting
ground, from which no less than four hundred thousand fighting men are
obtainable (_vide_ Report of M. Selve, afterwards Solyman Pasha,
organiser of Mehemet Ali’s army, and Lieutenant of France under Louis
Philippe Egalité).
“It is known that the Soudan furnished 300,000 men towards Louis
Philippe’s _levée de boucliers_, but he was ultimately vanquished by the
energetic policy of Lord Palmerston and the diplomacy of the Berlin
Foreign Office.
“The political manifesto of France in Africa (from which Napoleon’s
letter has been quoted) is now very studiously ignored by British
opportunist statesmen. Article IV., which is particularly instructive,
and is entitled ‘Les Turcos,’ says, ‘_the most useful products which
Africa can give to France are her soldiers_.’ The same article speaks of
bounties of 300 francs for each enlistment, &c.
“Messrs. Gladstone and Dilke should read carefully a once popular
pamphlet in France, entitled ‘La Regénération Militaire Française.’ It
was written by General Yusef, and is dedicated to Marshal Bugeaud (the
Arab roaster). At page 1 he says: ‘AFRICA BELONGS TO-DAY TO FRANCE,’
and, later on, ‘by the aid of her camels and dromedaries, France _is to
go_ into the Soudan, _and_ FROM TUNIS UP TO THE EUPHRATES.’ General
Yusef extols the expedition of General Carbuccia, and his plan of
alliances with the tribes and with the Kabyles, which is also glorified
by the apostle of _chauvinisme par excellence_, M. Thiers, in the second
volume of his ‘History of the French Revolution.’
“The fatal error of England is, that she never understood this self-
evident fact—that the political aim of France, both before and since her
usurpation of Algeria, has been to found the Empire _Carthage Gauloise_,
and so dictate the law to England in the East.
“This undoubted truth is shown in bold relief by M. Louis Blanc in his
‘Histoire de dix ans.’ Having described the annexation of Algeria, he
speaks of the interviews at Paris between M. de Polignac and the English
Ambassador, Lord Stuart. The quotation of one or two astounding passages
is sufficient. Irritated by Lord Stuart’s tone, the French diplomatist
allowed the following words to escape him: ‘If you require a diplomatic
answer, the Resident or the Council will give it to you. As for me, I
can only tell you in unofficial language, _we can do without you_.’ In
volume ii., chapter iii., p. 82, we read:—‘In consequence of the
embarrassments and complications of Europe, the prudent course to be
adopted in Paris is to risk all, and the most daring diplomacy in
appearance is in reality the wisest. Peace may be secured by either
system, only in shaking the Treaties of Europe as exemplified in the
Algerian expedition, France would be in a position to impose peace to
Europe, whereas by adhering to those treaties she would have been forced
to beg for peace. If she imposed it, she could dictate the conditions.
If she had to beg for it, she would have had to submit to them.’
“In these words we have an explanation of the secret of the motive for
France’s Protectorate over Tunis.
“The foregoing unpalatable truths are what Sir Charles Dilke must learn
before he can attempt to baffle the strategy of the Quai d’Orsay. As it
is, his more than equivocal answers in Parliament to the pertinent
questions of Mr. Montague Guest, Lord Bective, Lord Randolph Churchill,
Sir H. D. Wolff, and Mr. Otway, would to all appearances reveal a very
decided predilection for a Franco-Arabian Republic.
“The language of the French Press, and the articles in the official
Arabic journals published in Paris, remind one strangely of an almost
forgotten pamphlet, entitled ‘Les temps sont venus.’ At page 7 we find
these words:—
“‘If France had only followed _one_ line and _one_ policy since 1789,
she would be now at the head, not only of Europe, but of the whole
world, which would follow her footsteps in the glorious path of Peace
and Universal ‘Fraternity!’
“George Canning, in a memorable speech delivered in December 1802,
fearlessly denounced the French policy in Europe and the East from the
time of Louis XIV. He pointed out its characteristic
feature—_duplicity_. Duplicity as regards other nations, duplicity
towards the House of Savoy, and above all, duplicity against England. He
exhorted his countrymen to mistrust the deceitful assurances of France,
no matter from what Government they might emanate, and he implored them
to save the legitimate prestige of England and of modern civilisation by
that energetic resistance which alone could muzzle the supremacy-seeking
vagaries of France and her rulers. ‘Providence,’ he said, ‘will do
nothing for those who neglect their own interest, nor will Heaven itself
help a country (England) which does nothing in its own defence.’”
· · · · · · · · · ·
X.
_The last Episode in the History of Carthage._
On the 16th April Monseigneur Charles Martial Allemand Lavigérie
received, in one of the halls of the college he has erected over the
site of the temple of Esculapius on the Byrsa hill at Carthage, the
first insignia of the Cardinalate from the hands of Count Cechini of the
Papal guards. This imposing ceremony was performed in the presence of
the French Minister Resident M. Cambon, the chiefs of the French naval
and military services, and several of the foreign representatives. For
some time past Monseigneur Lavigérie’s influence has been undoubtedly
exercised with a view to promote a conciliation of conflicting interests
in the Regency. After the investiture the Cardinal delivered the
following short allocution:—“I am almost overwhelmed at receiving these
honours in this place. The ruins of Carthage which surround us are at
once emblems of human greatness and the vanity of earthly magnificence.
It was from the spot on which we are now standing came the conquerors of
Africa—the islands of the Mediterranean, and the shores of the distant
oceans—the great captains, who for a moment caused the fate of Rome
itself to tremble in the balance. What names are those of Mago, Hanno,
Hamilcar, Hannibal, and Hasdrubal, who upon this very hill saw his
father-land in flames and his children slaughtered in the temple, the
remains of which at this moment surround us! What names are those of
Regulus, Scipio, Marius, Cæsar, Justinian and Belisarius, and in more
modern times those of Louis IX. and Charles V.! Each of them left upon
this spot the memorials of his deeds and his glory. But what a lesson as
to the vanity of man presents itself! Not a trace of these memorials
remains, and one must excavate even to know that it was here that
Carthage existed!
“The name of Carthage is as famous in the history of the Church as it is
in that of the world at large. The very earth we now tread on has been
trodden by the feet of such eloquent divines as Tertullian, Augustine,
and Fulgencius, by such admirable saints as Eugenia, Monica, Felicita,
and Perpetua, and by such bishops as Cyprian, who in his person
represented all the glories of Christian Carthage. Once more, after the
lapse of centuries the cross crowns the summit of this famous hill, and
I see before me European colonists of all the great nations of the
South, who have come to exercise their art and industries in this
country. To them I have a mission, and it is to preach to every one of
them charity, union, and peace. I trust the day is not far distant when
all contention will cease, and when every Christian inhabitant of this
country, no matter to what nation he may belong, will work cheerfully
and earnestly for the good and progress of the country of his adoption.”
Y.
_An Intercepted Letter about Frontier Raids._
In August 1865 the Bey of Tunis managed, by some means or other, to
obtain possession of a letter addressed by his _then_ Consul at Bone to
the French Chargé d’Affaires at Tunis on leave in Paris, through the
medium of the French War Office. I am unable to ascertain how he
contrived to intercept it, but it must be remembered that for two
generations at least the Tunisian Government has been officially and
unofficially represented in the French capital. The document in question
shows sufficiently the utility of border raids in diplomacy, and runs as
follows:—
“Monsieur le Consul Général,—
“Permit me to congratulate you on your nomination to the rank of
Commander in the Legion of Honour. . . I regret I did not see you before
your departure, as I had many things to communicate to you. . . I must
admit that your mission is a most difficult one in presence of the
eternal _non possumus_ of the Khaznadar. Nevertheless, your exquisite
courtesy and the great benefits you have conferred on the Hassanite
dynasty, by asserting the independence of Tunis as far as the Porte is
concerned, should have compelled him (if he was really loyal to his
sovereigns), to express his gratitude, and brought him into a proper
line of thinking. Alas! the great achievement with which all European
journals have rung, has been misrepresented to the Tunisian population
by the Khaznadar; no paper in the country has ever mentioned it (!); and
it is not difficult to detect the influence which has prompted this
extraordinary behaviour.
“As a retired French officer I cannot but deplore the fatal conduct of
the Khaznadar; I am persuaded that the Bey, who is a very worthy and
honest Prince, would be displeased by it if he could only understand it,
because his sheet anchor is clearly France and not England.
“The fall of the Khaznadar would save the Tunisian government; I am
convinced that every one at the Tunisian Court desires it for the good
of the country. But unfortunately an interested influence sustains this
man: the influence in question is the more to be dreaded, because it
commands pounds sterling, the chief moving force of the present century.
France should arouse herself and cease to be the victim of her good
faith. It must henceforth be with her a case of diamond cut diamond. The
following project illustrates this maxim:—
“In the first place, be persuaded that this idea of mine is not
suggested by personal interest (as appearances might wrongly indicate);
it is prompted by a desire to see French influence consolidated at
Tunis, and to thus have friends for neighbours instead of enemies.
“As you are aware, I am Consul of the Bey of Tunis at Bone, but I have
not been accepted by the French government, because France has not yet
officially recognised the independence of the Tunisian government. As,
however, she has notified it to the Porte, she must, to be consistent,
recognise the agents of the government. It is besides the interest of
France, especially on the Algerian frontier, that these agents should be
devoted to her, or in plain language that they should be Tunisians in
name and Frenchmen in heart. With such materials as this, let us suppose
that the frontier Arabs (who are generally very turbulent), declare in a
moment of revolt that ‘they respect the Bey, but will no longer endure
the Khaznadar,’ and that these simple words, _said or not said_, be
embodied in the official reports of the Tunisian Consular agents, and
that by some indiscretion the French government becomes aware of the
circumstances. France will then certainly have a right to say, that to
secure the tranquillity of Algeria, she urgently demands the dismissal
of the Khaznadar, who is the sole cause of agitation in the Regency. It
would be pointed out that these troubles are all the more dangerous for
Algeria, because they occur near the frontier, and one might add that
this cannot be denied, because the Tunisian Consular agents themselves
had said so in their telegrams announcing their detailed reports on the
events.
“Yes, sir, by this means France will be fully justified, and will be
only acting in self-defence, in causing her columns to enter the
country, from which they will retire on the dismissal of the Khaznadar.
“In my humble opinion, I believe that in accordance with existing
relations between France and the other powers, the means which I propose
to-day are the only ones applicable, and the results will be
satisfactory without causing unnecessary fiction. If you think the
project feasible, count upon me. I repeat, I am a Frenchman above all:
on my breast shines the emblem of honour and devotion to France. I speak
openly to you, because I have detected in you that intelligence which
enabled you to distinguish an able man in the crowd. You fascinated me
in our first interview, and I think we understood each other: do you
need an assistant, a man of activity to accomplish your political
projects? I am your man. The influence which I exercise on the frontier
ensures a successful result.
“It may be that the Khaznadar, who has in his pay a trusty secret
police, may have learned with suspicion of our good relations, and that
I have consequently offended him, but this can be easily diverted when
once I am officially recognised as Consul. The French Consulate will
simulate a certain coolness towards me, and might even prefer some
complaint as to my partiality for the Tunisians. Then the Khaznadar,
whose confidence I shall take care to gain, will assuredly accord me
that influence which is useful to all of us in the present state of
things.
“If by chance you are called elsewhere by promotion, and in case your
successor possesses your qualities, I beg you to recommend me to him,
and to answer for me, as far as regards the plans which I have now
unfolded.”
Z.
_The Tunisian Esparto Trade._
Throughout the work I have often incidentally alluded to the trade in
_esparto_ fibre, which has of late years been almost exclusively carried
on between Great Britain and Tunis. The wild mountainous districts in
the south of the Regency produce vast quantities of this useful plant,
only a small proportion of which has, however, as yet been brought to
the European market. _Esparto_ grass enters more and more into the
manufacture of paper, and in the near future there is every probability
of its being extensively used in many other materials. Three weeks after
the signing of the treaty of Kasr-es-Said, M. Roustan induced the Bey to
grant to M. Réné Duplessis, a retired cavalry officer, exclusive rights
over five of the richest of these esparto-producing mountain ranges for
a term of ninety-nine years. This all-important concession under
ordinary circumstances would have done incalculable injury to English
trade. Fortunately enough for all parties the strong good sense and
straightforward conduct of M. Duplessis has prevented a disagreeable
international conflict. He has now ceded the larger share in his rights
to a well-known English firm, and under the joint auspices of Messrs.
Hough, Surtees, Lawes & Co. and M. Duplessis, an Anglo-French Company
will shortly commence operations amongst the grass covered hills of
Southern Tunis. _Esparto_ fibre is growing there in luxuriant abundance,
and its quality, I am told, leaves little to be desired, but workmen and
labourers are still wanting. The Arabs of Bühedma, Ben Aicha and Majura
are away on the Tripolitan frontier with Ali Ben Hlifa. On leaving this
Mr. Hough, with characteristic British energy, at once went to Tripoli
and sought out the rebel chiefs. He offered them every inducement to
return to their native mountains and pick esparto. “We are starving,”
they answered; “we have no harvest, and many of us have died while
waiting to march with our Caliph and Sultan’s troops against the French.
How can we come back?” He proposed to exchange stores of corn and oil
for gathered _halfa_. Here was at once a remedy for their troubles, and
they gratefully agreed to his terms. If once Southern Tunis is thus re-
peopled (and some of the tribes have already crossed the frontier), the
success of the enterprise is assured. Unless the Sultan speedily does
something more than promise, it seems probable that English merchants
may give once more to Southern Tunis that pacification which French
columns and French bayonets have wholly failed to achieve. French
diplomatists are apparently contented with this solution.
THE END.
* * * * *
PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO.
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.
_CORRIGENDA, VOL. II._
* * * * *
Page 36, line 8, _for_ “Giará” _read_ “Jára.”
„ 45, line 16, _for_ “Giará” _read_ “Jára.”
„ 48, line 5, _et passim, for_ “Lavigerie” _read_ “Lavigérie.”
„ 328, line 6, _for_ “alcoholise” _read_ “alcoholisé.”
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: Messrs. Perry, Bury, & Co. of Liverpool.]
[Footnote 2: Since made an officer of the Legion of Honour as a pendent
to Mustapha’s Grand Cordon and Musalli’s Knight Commandership.]
[Footnote 3: Now a Major or Colonel in the Imperial Ottoman army.]
[Footnote 4: Now a fugitive at Malta.]
[Footnote 5: This person was the confidential servant of the Prime
Minister Mustapha down to a few days after the 12th May. It was the
dinner given to the Foreign Representatives at this man’s house which
furnished Signor Pestalozza with the material for the only amusing
article in the ill-fated _Mostakel_. Although he had worked very hard in
the French interest he managed to offend M. Roustan, and was degraded,
deprived of all his possessions, and detained in a dungeon at Gabes,
till he was liberated by the French shells.]
[Footnote 6: Appendix O.]
[Footnote 7: The counting of these columns is undoubtedly a puzzle. M.
Dulhoit, the intelligent director of the department of Historical
Monuments in Algeria, has made an elaborate plan of the Mosque. He says
the following is an entirely correct computation of the pillars:—
The court 497
Two minarets 16
Doors 30
Angles 4
---
547
It is to be noted that some of the pillars are so placed as to be almost
invisible to the casual spectator.]
[Footnote 8: Knights of Malta, vol ii. p. 100.]
[Footnote 9: Bosio, iii. p. 349.]
[Footnote 10: M. Roustan’s confusion of mind and defects of memory
contributed very greatly to his ultimate discomfiture. He denied that
Musalli was appointed as Director of the Tunisian Foreign Office. I
find, however, the following entry in the Official Calendar for 1882.
QUATRIÈME SECTION.
_Affaires Etrangères._
Le Commandeur, M. Théodore Roustan, Ministre résident de France, délégué
du Gouvernement Tunisien pour les affaires Etrangères.
Le Général Elias Musalli, Directeur et 1ier Interprète de S. A. le Bey,
G.O.If., Commandeur de la Legion d’Honneur.
He also professed to know nothing of Musalli’s advancement in the Legion
of Honour, although he had twice recommended him for promotion, and only
five months before obtained him the rank of commander.]
[Footnote 11: I cannot resist translating the preamble, which is a
unique specimen of the most approved style of Oriental diplomatic
writing.]
Transcriber's note:
Changes in the CORRIGENDA have been done.
pg 47, changed: "suscept-tibilities by hastening" to:
"susceptibilities"
pg 80, changed: "an Italian, burnt to beath" to: "death"
pg 163, changed: "expedition towards Gabes and Gassa" to: "Gafsa"
pg 184, changed: "midst of the maddened Aíssaouia" to: "Aïssaouia"
Ill. facing p. 262, changed: "IL NOUS FAUDRAIT, POUR BEIN _FARRE_"
to: "BIEN"
pg 299, changed: "Tho doctor’s only recourse" to: "The"
pg 314, changed: "Mr. Levy ha induced an English gentleman" to:
"had induced"
pg 340, changed: "the orginal deed of gift" to: "original"
pg 381, changed: "Le Hef, Tabarka, Ghardimaou" to: "Le Kef"
Text with overline is surrounded by "~".