TUNIS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL DE LA SEINE.
The month of December was only three days old when M. Roustan set out
for Paris to do battle with M. Henri Rochefort. M. Ferry had three weeks
before fallen a victim to the growing unpopularity of the Tunisian
Expedition, and M. Léon Gambetta now reigned in his stead. Like a
mysterious Hindu divinity, the great republican leader had long lived
and prospered on the credit of his much delayed ministerial incarnation,
and nobody trusted more fondly in his apparent omnipotence than M.
Roustan and his friends. Ever since his famous vote on a side issue,
which cut the Gordian knot of official perplexities concerning Tunis, M.
Gambetta was regarded by the “no surrender” party in the Regency as the
saviour of the Protectorate. M. Roustan hoped great things from the new
Premier, and now began to adroitly use his well-known name as a sort of
moral scarecrow to frighten the almost tamed Bey. But M. Barthélémy
Saint-Hilaire had, in the simplicity of his heart, arranged a pitfall,
which was not only destined to hopelessly trip up M. Roustan, but to
materially aid the _descensus Averni_ of the Premier himself. It was
precisely this snare of M. Saint-Hilaire’s contriving which now
occasioned M. Roustan’s somewhat unexpected departure, leaving the
French Residency for the second time to the intelligent care of M.
Lequeux.
Cheap glory was popular in France just as long as it remained cheap and
no longer; when it cost something, its popularity vanished as if by
magic. Ever since the almost simultaneous outbreak of Arab “fanaticism”
and typhoid fever in July, everything savouring of Tunis seemed suddenly
to become an object of hatred and ridicule. That ficklest of fickle
goddesses, the French press, now boxed the compass in the most
remarkable manner; and while the _Télégraphe_, the _France_, the
_Clairon_, the _Radical_, the _Intransigeant_, the _Justice_, the
_Presse_, the _Napoléon_, and the _Henri IV._ were bitterly attacking
the more serious aspect of the new Punic War, and boldly denouncing it
as a _guerre d’affaires_ or a _guerre de tripotages_, such papers as the
_Comédie Politique_ were lashing its authors with the scourge of sarcasm
and lampoon. The French are pre-eminently endowed with a keen sense of
humour; when a cause becomes ridiculous in France it is lost, and this
was the fate which befell the expedition to Tunis. While poor M. Ferry
was trusting to the saving virtue of a timely triumph at Kairwán, and
pronouncing a touching panegyric on the man “who held high the banner of
France for seven years at Tunis,” the _Comédie Politique_ was sending
broadcast over the country a cartoon, in which M. Rochefort as Bluebeard
is represented in the act of killing the unfortunate _President du
Conseil_, who cries piteously to the venerable M. Saint-Hilaire, looking
anxiously through a telescope on a watch tower, “Sister Anne, sister
Anne, cannot you see the capture of Kairwán?” and receives the answer,
“All I can make out in the direction of Tunis is M. Roustan walking on
the Marina parade with Madame Elias Musalli.” After this, one can hardly
wonder that his passionate peroration “qui touche l’armée, touche la
France,” failed even to excite the most passing enthusiasm. France now
thoroughly understood the humour of the situation.
Amongst the foremost in the ranks of the anti-war politicians were
several leading members of the party generally described as the _extrême
gauche_. M. Pelletan had worked hard at Tunis for a fortnight taking
notes on his own account in October; and he afterwards published a
scathing account of his experiences in the _Justice_. Although he may
possibly have come across an occasional _canard_ in the course of his
investigations, no man ever laboured with greater honesty of purpose or
in a more patriotic spirit than Camille Pelletan. He was the first to
discover the legendary character of the so-called French colony at
Tunis, and was naturally indignant at ascertaining that not a single
Frenchman formed part of the _entourage_ of M. Roustan. “France has been
wofully deceived,” said M. Pelletan, “I will try to undeceive her;” and
so he did. Some time before M. Pelletan’s visit to Tunis, Henri
Rochefort had made the Tunisian question the subject of the most cutting
invective. On the 27th September he published an article headed “_Le
Secret de l’Affaire Tunisienne_,” which filled no less than five columns
of the _Intransigeant_. The most striking passage ran as follows:—
We compared the Tunisian Expedition to an ordinary fraud. We were
mistaken. Cheating is an offence punished by a police magistrate. Our
readers, however, will see that the Tunis business is a robbery
aggravated by murder, for which the authors are amenable to an assize
court.
MM. Gambetta and Roustan formed an association, the object of which was,
firstly, to make Tunisian bonds drop to the value of the paper they were
printed upon, and then to buy them back for a few pence. But as the Bey
would never have had the 200,000,000f. necessary for their
reimbursement, these two confederates impelled the French Government to
intervene in the Regency, and to assume the task of paying the bonds,
which would have been converted into Three per Cent. Rentes. M. Gambetta
and M. Roustan would then have exchanged their pile of paper for Rentes
to an amount of upwards of 100,000,000f., which the taxpayers would have
had to pay. That is why 50,000 of our soldiers have gone yonder to die
of sunstroke and starvation. We compared the Tunisian with the Mexican
war. They have that resemblance which makes Opportunism so like
Bonapartism. The Jecker Bonds also had been bought up at next to nothing
by the sharpers of the Imperial _entourage_, and when they had
sufficiently filled their pockets, they got Bonaparte to set up a sort
of emperor in Mexico, who pledged himself to pay them 75,000,000f.,
representing the bonds they had got for 500f. . . . . M. Roustan acted
as the Jecker of the Tunisian Expedition. He found his Morny.
This attack was followed by a second, directed against M. Challemel
Lacour, the French Ambassador in England. M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire
placed the whole matter in the hands of “_son collègue de la justice_,”
who sanctioned the commencement of criminal proceedings against both M.
Rochefort and his manager M. Delpierre. The charge as to M. Lacour was
subsequently removed to an inferior tribunal, but the trial for the
_scandalum magnatum_ on M. Roustan was set down for hearing before the
Assize Court of the Seine on the 14th December.
According to English notions the issue raised was as clear as it is
uninteresting:—“Did or did not MM. Gambetta and Roustan conspire to
lower the price of Tunisian bonds, with a view to afterwards raising it
for their profit by a military expedition against the Regency?” It
appears, however, that French procedure ignores relevancy, and gives a
premium to hearsay evidence, and that the propriety, good faith, and
expediency of the Tunisian expedition and the disinterestedness or
otherwise of its authors or reputed authors, could be with perfect
propriety inquired into along with the accusation against M. Rochefort
and his publisher. An hour after the case commenced it was clear to
everybody that the Tunisian question was on its trial, and not M.
Rochefort, and this fact alone at once invested the proceedings with all
the dignity of a _cause célèbre_. The story of how Muhamed es Sadek
unexpectedly found a Nemesis for his enemies in a Parisian jury forms
one of the most curious episodes in the judicial annals of modern times.
The battle of the _Tribunal de la Seine_ was far more keenly contested,
and had much more momentous consequences than either the _chasse aux
Khamírs_ or the occupation of Holy Kairwán. It is the conflict _par
excellence_ of the last Punic War.
When M. Roustan left Tunis ten days before, he was in blissful ignorance
of the anomalies of French jurisprudence, or he would certainly have
provided himself with all the weapons which the attesting complaisance
of the docile Bey or the accommodating adulation of the “French colony”
could furnish. As it was, he had only obtained a certificate that he was
a stranger to the exile of General Heussein, which in the confusion of
the trial does not seem to have been made use of. M. Rochefort’s story
of the “Truth about Tunis” may have been to a certain extent apocryphal
and wide of the mark, but the latitude allowed to the judicial
proceedings which it entailed, converted the trial of the case Roustan
versus Rochefort into an impeachment of the originators of the war, and
an examination of the _raison d’être_ of the expedition itself.
To witness the last phase of M. Saint-Hilaire’s simplicity, my readers
must imagine themselves to be in a dingy hall on the unfashionable side
of the Seine, at eleven o’clock on a foggy morning in December. The
carefully selected jury with difficulty find their way through the
crowded audience to their box, when the President M. Lefebre de
Viefville takes his seat on the bench. The chief _dramatis personæ_ are
if possible political rather than legal celebrities. M. Rochefort, the
observed of all observers at the bar, is the best dressed and most
aristocratic-looking man in the court. The space assigned to the legal
profession is filled to overflowing with black-robed and black-capped
advocates, and the rest of the room is occupied by an attentive audience
of ministers, diplomatists, journalists, and deputies. M. Rochefort’s
counsel are two prominent members of the French Chamber—Maître Gatineau,
who has lately declared war to the knife against M. Gambetta, and M.
Delattré, himself a leader of the _extrême gauche_. M. Roustan, nervous
and agitated, sat next his advocate, M. Cléry, who had been selected
more on account of his pronounced Opportunism than his legal acumen,
while that very indiscreet personage, M. le Procureur Général Dauphin,
in all the glories of a scarlet gown, looked the majesty of the law
itself in the chair of the public prosecutor. At mid-day precisely the
jury are sworn in. The accused say nothing, M. Roustan tries to make a
speech. He murmurs in a harsh, grating, unsympathetic voice that as an
honest Frenchman he has come there to be white-washed by honest
Frenchmen, and abruptly sits down. The President at once showed himself
to be an adept at running with the hare and the hounds, or, as the
French themselves have it, saving both “the goat and the cabbages.” He
tried throughout to please all parties, and consequently allowed both
sides to do pretty much what they liked. M. De Viefville seemed also to
feel no little satisfaction at presiding over so important a case, and
even remarked at the outset that the cause “ne s’agissait pas d’un
procès ordinaire, mais d’une affaire politique et nationale où la
conscience publique était intéressée à ce que la lumière se fit par tous
les moyens!” So impatient did he seem to get to the expected disclosures
that he began by inverting the usual order of hearing the evidence, and
at once called on the defence to produce their witnesses. The first
person to enter the box was our old friend, the Baron Sigismund Robert
de Billing. He has grown a little grey since he was the pioneer of a
Sancy-Ronalds’ policy in Tunis, and now carries a red morocco portfolio,
which he says contains his cyphered instructions, but which everybody
seemed afraid to ask him to open. After declaring he had never before
seen M. Rochefort, M. De Billing said there had been two well-known
Stock Exchange jobs in relation to Tunis. The first concerned the
guarantee on the Bone-Guelma line, which sent up the shares 200 francs
in an hour, and the second, the Tunisian bonds themselves. He _had
heard_ that the Bey had been told that no expedition would take place if
he gave in about the Enfida and the Italian opposition to the Hammám el
Lif railway, and that M. Roustan received _pots de vin_ (no polite
Frenchman could ever use such a coarse expression as bribes) through the
medium of General Elias Musalli. The witness now descended for a moment
to fact; he knew that Musalli had been dismissed from the Bey’s service
for theft, and _had heard_ that M. Roustan had procured for the broken
Volterra, formerly accused of false coining, the inappropriate post of
Master of the Tunisian Mint. M. De Billing added that he had been
charged with a secret mission to Tunis by M. Saint-Hilaire, and said
that he carried the cyphered documents which proved it about him, and
would produce them if desirable. Here the red portfolio was flourished,
but the President, in a fit of political discretion, interposed and gave
a little evidence himself. “Your mission has been disclaimed,” said M.
De Viefville, “and your papers are irrelevant to the case.”
Nevertheless, M. Saint-Hilaire was afterwards called to contradict M. De
Billing, and although a wrangle of an hour’s duration ensued about the
“mission,” nobody ever suggested the opening of the red morocco despatch
case. M. Cléry was indiscreet enough to ask leave of the Court for M.
Roustan to make a speech in reply to the deposition of M. De Billing.
“What!” exclaimed M. Roustan, “have I heard aright that a Frenchman
accuses me of _pots de vin_? Even my bitterest enemies the Italians
never went so far as that! Every one knows I have got nothing. General
Elias Musalli was the only Tunisian functionary upon whom I could count.
I have, however, made no _proposition en sa faveur_. My relations with
the family Elias are natural enough, as I want the General every
moment.” Then followed in the same harsh unsympathetic voice more
evasions about the new Master of the Mint who had not coined, but was
concerned in importing base money.
Such patent tergiversation as this was enough to hopelessly ruin a much
better case than M. Roustan’s. In the first place, “the General” had
been out of office for four years when M. Roustan’s patronage began to
retrieve his lost position. He had already sold his palace, and paid out
with difficulty an execution for a petty debt on his furniture, when, at
M. Roustan’s urgent and reiterated request, he was re-employed as a
second interpreter at the Bardo, and rose to a higher post after the
Sancy ultimatum in 1879. Since then fortune has shone in a remarkable
manner on General Elias, and if M. Roustan “made no proposal in his
favour,” it is very strange that the Bey, who notoriously hated him,
never seemed tired of forcing costly presents upon him. M. Roustan
should have passed over M. De Billing’s _on-dits_ in silence, but his
explanation carried its own condemnation. Pecuniary _pots de vin_, like
water poured on sand, leave no trace, but when they take the shape of
landed property they are difficult to be concealed, especially when they
are subsequently turned into cash. The following is a correct list of
the real estate known to have been conveyed to the Musallis by the
Tunisian Government since 1875. It affords a good illustration of the
manner the _pagoda_ tree has been shaken in this country, and shows that
M. Roustan’s “constant want of Musalli’s services” was eminently
beneficial to that much-abused individual.
_Properties granted to the Musallis as a mark of the pure and
disinterested sympathy of the Bey of Tunis._
1. Three estates known as Elreynin, Elzriga, and Harruri, in the
district of the Dehlet Elmanin, and subsequently sold to General Hamida
Ben Ayad for 200,000 piastres.
2. The domain of the Emghira at Mahemdia.
3. The _enschir_ Eldaeb at Hammam el Lif.
4. Four houses in Goletta at a nominal ground-rent of £30, and now
rented to the French military authorities at 10,000 francs per annum.
5. Eight thousand metres of land on the Marina at a rent of fourpence a
metre, and resold at prices varying from 10 to 18 francs a metre.
6. Another 3000 metres obtained from the Bey as a second donation.
7. One third of the _enschir_ Elzin, in partnership with Dr. Mascaro and
the Master of the Mint.
Before leaving the question of these remarkable proofs of generosity on
the part of the conquered Tunisians towards their conquerors, I may
mention that Dr. Mascaro, who, on the 8th May, was told curtly “to leave
politics alone and mind his physic,” has since received very substantial
proofs of the Bey’s favour. Two hundred thousand metres of land at
Hammam el Lif (worth two millions of francs, at a ground rent of £5 per
annum), 12,000 metres of land on the Marina under the same conditions as
those obtained by the Musallis, and a third of the great domain of
Elzin, will at any rate give Dr. Mascaro a considerable stake in the
future of Tunis. Of course, all this was quite spontaneous on the part
of the Bey, and M. Roustan never made any proposals in favour of Dr.
Mascaro, any more than he did in behalf of General Musalli. Be this as
it may, there can be no doubt that the Bey’s Physician Extraordinary was
wise in his generation in being on the winning side of Tunisian
politics, and very fortunate in reaping so handsome a reward for his
services. After this unavoidable digression on _pots de vin_ I must
return to the Tribunal de la Seine.
The next witness called was M. Villet, the organiser of the
International Financial Commission. After a close questioning as to a
supposed conversation with General Grévy, he was asked if he was aware
of the relations between M. Roustan and the family Musalli. He replied
in the affirmative, and added that his impression as to the _moralité du
ménage_ of Elias was unfavourable, and that “the General” had been
dismissed from the Bardo for theft. M. Villet was followed by M. Gay de
Tunis, who was allowed to open his evidence with an historical and
geographical dissertation on the port of Carthage, which lasted for
nearly an hour. This concluded, he continued, “I am unable to say
whether M. Roustan has acted from ambition or pecuniary interest. I have
no proof, but personally I have always endeavoured to protect Tunis. The
private speculations supported by M. Roustan have afforded an excuse for
our seizing her. _Moi je l’aime la Tunisie_ (shouts of laughter). I once
trusted General Musalli, but at last I found out he was a thief. _He
stole 12,000 francs from his wife_.” Here he produced the now historical
letter in which Madame Musalli complained of the unfair advantage taken
by her husband in the division of the _pot de vin_ given to M. Gay
himself as compensation for not being allowed the privilege of restoring
the city of Carthage, including the proposed cathedral in memory of the
African martyrs. After the Baron de Saint-Amand had been heard, M.
Camille Pelletan entered the witness-box. He was allowed full scope to
describe upon oath the impressions derived from his researches, in his
own peculiar and fascinating style. “We had hardly been a week at
Tunis,” said M. Camille Pelletan, “when a feeling of profound disgust
took possession of our minds. I had occasion to converse with the
officers and French civilians now in Tunis, and I recollect that the
first time I was alone with poor Le Faure he said to me, ‘Our impresions
are the same. We must make revelations when we return to Paris; I shall
not mince matters, and mean to speak out.’ You all know why he can no
longer speak to you. I am here alone to reveal the facts and explain the
details of the Tunisian Question. I am forced to throw light on M.
Roustan’s position, as it presented itself to me. This is the first
circumstance which struck me painfully: I expected to come to a place
where Frenchmen and Italians were at variance, and to find M. Roustan
surrounded by the French colony. I was surprised to observe that M.
Roustan saw very few French people, and was exclusively surrounded by
Levantines, or Orientalised Italians who had become Levantines. I can
name the whole _entourage_ of M. Roustan: General Musalli, Volterra, an
Italian Jew, and Forti, a naturalised Frenchman. There is not a true
Frenchman amongst them. We endeavoured to unravel the mystery, and this
is the solution. M. Roustan is wholly under the domination of the Elias
Musalli family, and his carriage is before their house for hours every
day. Every one at Tunis knows that persons in need of French official
support must address themselves to that house. Let me explain the
character of M. Roustan’s habitual intermediaries. The first is General
Musalli; he may be a General of interpreters, but he has nothing
military about him. A decoration he wears alone gives him this title.
Elias Musalli is a simple dragoman. He was a servant for ten years in
the house of Sidi Mustapha Khaznadar, who married him to the Signora
Traverso. General Elias did not by any means commence his career under
M. Roustan. He was in favour with many persons, and especially with
Kheir-ed-Din. He was dismissed from the Bey’s service by the Khaznadar
himself on account of some accidents of a very Tunisian character
(laughter), the most known of which was an abnormal manner of performing
a commission involving the negotiation of some Tunisian bonds at Paris.
There is also a story of a donation to a charitable fête. The Bey sent a
certain contribution, but only half of it found its way into the
_tronc_. Be this as it may, Elias Musalli was disgraced, and Kheir-ed-
Din would never reinstate him. Reduced to a pension of £150 per annum,
he was miserably poor, when he got into the good graces of M. Roustan.
Then a magnificent plot of ground was granted him to build a new palace,
but Kheir-ed-Din still declined to re-employ him, saying that he would
have nothing to do with a thief. Kheir-ed-Din compromised himself, by
giving to France the concession for the line from Bone to Tunis. All the
foreign consuls leagued themselves against him. He still refused to take
back Elias. The French representative deserted him, and he fell. The
rest we all know. This is the history of Elias Musalli, but there is a
sub-Elias (loud laughter.) This man is the friend of Elias in precisely
the same manner as Elias is the friend of M. Roustan. He is a Jew from
Leghorn, and commenced life as a broker. He became so celebrated for
bringing about the failure of his employers, that he acquired the
pseudonym of the _courtier de l’agonie_. But he did something else; he
introduced false money into Tunis. The coin was made in Switzerland, and
brought to its destination by way of Genoa and La Calle. The bags
containing it were consigned to Volterra by an employé of the Compagnie
Valéry. The affair was hushed up at the time, but one fine day the
French flag floated over the Tunisian citadel. The first result obtained
was the appointment of Elias Musalli as the Director of the Tunisian
Foreign Office, and the second the nomination of Volterra as Master of
the Mint. (M. Roustan here energetically denies this statement.[10]) The
mint at Tunis is administered by somebody. It is Mustapha who has taken
the contract in his name, and made Volterra his agent. The fact is so
notorious that the International Financial Commission has made it the
subject of a formal protest. I shall now proceed to show how business is
done by the Levantine alliance, and shall speak first of Taib Bey. Taib
has brought up his children in French fashion, and seems to be a friend
of France. As early as in 1879 M. Roustan established relations with
Taib. At first Taib declined to accept the overtures made to him, but at
last he seemed disposed to acquiesce in M. Roustan’s proposals. Taib
tells me that four days before the Treaty of Kasr-es-Said, the brother
of Madame Elias said, ‘_We_ are going to put Taib upon the throne, but
he must first sign in favour of Madame Elias a bond for 1,500,000
francs.’ Taib was intelligent enough to understand, that although he
might easily pay the sum if he succeeded his brother, it would be his
death-warrant if he did not, and therefore declined to act on the
suggestion. Since then evil days have fallen on Taib, and he has been
even obliged to borrow money to defray his household expenses.
Everything at Tunis turns on _pots de vin_: at every turn one hears that
‘So-and-so, having got into a scrape, has got out of it by timely
application to Madame Elias.’ The three great _pots de vin_ seem to be
the Enfida, the Crédit Foncier, and the Tunisian Bonds. I saw M. Roustan
at Tunis, and told him that I was surprised he had given the monopoly of
the railways in the Regency to one company; he answered that it was to
the French generally that the exclusive privileges had been given. In
the _livre jaune_, however, it clearly appears that the Compagnie Bone-
Guelma has the monopoly. He also denied that in M. Léon Renault’s
concession there was any permission to advance money to the Bedouins, or
that it had ever been contemplated to supplant Muhamed es Sadek by Taib.
These two assertions were not borne out by the evidence I obtained.”
Although M. Roustan at intervals protested that all M. Pelletan said was
untrue, he was not even cross-examined.
The interest in the debates somewhat waned after M. Pelletan’s address.
M. Veil-Picard told the story of his purchase of the _dossier_ of the
_Mostakel_ and the infamy of Bokhos, and a commission was appointed to
overhaul it. M. Desfossés was next called, and denied M. Roustan’s
knowledge of his anti-Kheir-ed-Din crusade in the _République
Française_, as well as the allegations of his having represented M.
Roustan in financial affairs. This witness has written a series of
expanding pamphlets on the Tunisian question, in which he gradually
rises from the _status quo_, through the Protectorate, to a coming
annexation. M. Leblant, M. Villet’s successor, then took the place
vacated by M. Desfossés. He was informed that M. Gambetta had absolved
him from his official obligation to secrecy. M. De Viefville then asked
him if he knew anything of M. Roustan being concerned in financial
speculations. “I have nothing to allege against M. Roustan personally,”
answered M. Leblant, “but he has done wrong to merge his existence in
that of persons of notorious bad repute, who were accustomed to trade in
the affairs of the Tunisian Government.” He _had heard_ that M. Roustan
had assisted in inducing the Bey to pay a sum of 75,000 francs due by
Madame Musalli’s brother; that patents of French protection had been
sold. This deposition closed amidst a wrangle between M. Roustan and
Rochefort about a case the former had decided against a M. Reddon. Here
again M. Roustan lost both his head and his temper; he first said he had
only detained Reddon in prison for forty-eight hours, and then added
that M. Rochefort had better get some information from Madame Reddon’s
lover (_sic_), M. Cassas, his former subordinate, who was at that moment
in Paris. In the middle of the storm M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire,
Senator of France, and ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the _Cabinet
des Naifs_ and a translator of Aristotle, calmly entered the witness-
box. Silence was at once restored, and every spectator bent eagerly
forward to hear the venerable statesman perform the somewhat novel task
of expounding his policy on oath.
The testimony of M. Saint-Hilaire was undoubtedly one of the most
extraordinary features of this extraordinary case. He began by making a
speech after the fashion of M. Pelletan: “M. Roustan,” said the witness,
“has had no personal influence in the recent events. The causes _of the
war_ are more ancient. The security of our African colony was involved.
Our frontiers were perpetually violated. The causes of this French
enterprise are of old date. Of all the subordinates under my orders
during my tenure of office, I have found few who possess as much zeal,
intelligence, probity, devotion, energy, and docility as M. Roustan.
Everything that has been said about his personal influence is false and
calumnious. The treaty of Kasr-es-Said was signed on the 12th May, but
the idea of it existed long before my accession to the portfolio of
Foreign Affairs. I have collected the traditions, and put into execution
the intention of my predecessors for a quarter of a century. . . . The
treaty was sent from Paris, drawn up and ready for General Bréart to
carry.”
If this is true, what becomes of M. Saint-Hilaire’s repeated assurances
to Lord Lyons in a very different strain? On the 6th April, for
instance, Lord Lyons thus writes to Lord Granville:—
M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire spoke to me this afternoon of the incursion
of the Kroumírs from the Tunisian frontier into Algeria, and of the
measures taken in consequence by the French Government.
The French territory had, his Excellency said, for many years past
suffered from the lawlessness of the tribes nominally under the
sovereignty of the Bey of Tunis. More than 400 incursions of more or
less gravity were on record, but this last had surpassed in atrocity
those which had preceded it. French soldiers had been killed; the state
of the frontier had become intolerable; and the French Government were
determined to put a stop, once for all, to these attacks.
They were, he went on to say, about to send a corps of from 12,000 to
15,000 men to the Tunisian frontier to inflict a signal chastisement on
the Kroumírs and other lawless tribes. This number of men would be sent
from France, and they would either go themselves to the frontier or take
the place of troops already in garrison in Algeria, who, being inured to
the climate, might perhaps be better adapted for active service in the
expedition.
The Bey of Tunis would be reminded of his responsibility as sovereign of
the country whence the incursions proceeded, and would be invited to
send troops of his own to co-operate with the French expedition. _The
French troops would be assembled on the French side of the frontier, and
they would not cross the frontier without necessity_; but they would be
empowered to do so if their military operations required it. Should the
necessity for entering the Tunisian territory arise, the French
Commander would give the Bey notice.
_M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire spoke of the operations as if they were to
be confined to the neighbourhood of the frontier, and to be directed
only to the punishment of the lawless frontier tribes_.
Two days later he reports:—
M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire’s language implied that the expedition was
undertaken solely with a view to chastise the lawless tribes, and that
it was not intended that it should enter farther into Tunisian territory
than might be necessary for this purpose.
It may be that the present intentions of the French Government do not go
much beyond this.
And also on the 12th April:—
Having finished the perusal of the despatch, M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire
read out in French the passage stating that, should there be a prospect
of further action on the part of France, it might be necessary to send
vessels of war to Tunis to protect the life and property of British
subjects against a possible outbreak of Mahommedan fanaticism.
M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire said that undoubtedly, in case there should
be a probability that life and property would be in danger, every nation
would feel bound to provide for the safety of its own people. In such a
contingency the French Government also would send ships of war to Tunis,
which it was not now their intention to do.
After contradicting everything he had ever said to the Ambassador of a
friendly Power upon the subject of Tunis, he next proceeded to demolish
M. De Billing. “The Baron said to me,” continued M. Saint-Hilaire, “that
he wanted to go to Utica, and asked if I saw any objection to his doing
so. ‘Not the least,’ I replied; ‘in an archæological point of view a
_monographie_ on Utica would be most interesting.’ M. De Billing had
somehow or other conceived the idea of a treaty with the Bey. _He
managed to secure the approbation of Italy_, but we never said anything
to him on the subject. When in Tunis, instead of addressing himself to
M. Roustan, he paid his respects to the Bey directly. M. Roustan
informed me, and I promptly ordered the traveller to return. M. De
Billing had no mission from me. I emphatically deny all insinuations of
this kind.” His version of M. De Billing’s visit to Tunis a few weeks
before the Khamír campaign, is hardly less unsatisfactory than his
statement on oath as to the causes of the expedition. At the time M. De
Billing went to Tunis his “mission” was announced in every paper in
France, Italy, and England. Why was it not repudiated then? Is it likely
that M. De Billing could personally obtain the consent of the Italian
Government to any scheme of a private character? If M. Saint-Hilaire did
not send M. De Billing to Tunis, how could he order him to return
therefrom on his not treating the Pro-Bey in embryo with sufficient
deference? And, lastly, why did he not accept M. De Billing’s challenge
to allow the inspection of the cyphered contents of the mysterious red
portfolio? The French public, who could hardly digest the Khamírs, could
not reasonably be expected to swallow submissively the beautiful idea of
an archæological _monographie_ about Utica. The third portion of M.
Saint-Hilaire’s evidence was devoted to the purchase of the _dossier_
Bokhos. Of course the ex-minister had nothing to do with “an affair of
this kind,” and supposed that M. Veil-Picard had acted from principles
of pure patriotism, or with the intention of reselling the papers at a
profit! This astounding declaration closed the first day of the trial,
and terminated a statement, which seemed to be Aristotle, _minus_ the
logic, translated by Molière.
The second day’s proceedings opened with the examination of one of M.
Saint-Hilaire’s predecessors, M. Waddington. After considerable fencing
over the old ground of the Sancy indemnity, M. Gatineau asked the
witness if he had heard of the _ménage_ Elias Musalli, and was aware of
its influence upon M. Roustan? M. Waddington’s reply was worthy of his
venerable successor:—“I have been acquainted with the relations existing
between M. Roustan and the Musalli family ever since they originated,
and I have always approved of them, as Musalli _was the only functionary
at the Bardo who could be trusted_.” He also gave M. Roustan an
excellent character. M. Ferdinand Lesseps could only say that Madame
Elias Musalli was a very beautiful woman, which nobody ever denied. M.
Herbette stated that when he was _Directeur du personnel des affaires
étrangères_ he had no sort of fault to find with M. Roustan and the
Count de Sancy of Sidi Tabet, the hero of the ultimatum of 1879, blushed
deeply at the very mention of a _pot de vin_, described the modest
probity of the Minister-Resident, and supplemented M. Oscar Gay’s
dissertation on Carthage with an essay on Tunisian _cancans_ and
_canards_.
M. De Billing was now recalled, apparently for the purpose of a personal
encounter with M. Saint-Hilaire. The red portfolio was still under his
arm. He recommenced by saying that if it had not been for M. Gambetta a
war would have occurred two years previously, whereupon the President
politely requested him “not to pose as the representative of M.
Gambetta.” M. De Billing, unabashed by the interruption, continued his
account of General Heussein’s visit to Paris in 1879. “I took the
Tunisian envoy to M. Gambetta,” said the witness, “and he told both of
us that M. Roustan never ceased to harass the Bey for the benefit of the
Musallis, husband and wife. M. Gambetta then asked Heussein to state the
details, and the latter declared that M. Roustan had asked for Elias
Musalli a large plot of ground in one of the best quarters of Tunis, and
that the Bey had replied, ‘I will not give an estate of that value to
people of this description, but I present it to you, Consul of France,
to do whatever you like with.’ On this M. Gambetta said, ‘It is
shameful: a Tunisian expedition after ten years of peace would be a
great misfortune.’” M. De Billing and M. Saint-Hilaire having publicly
given each other the lie in the most edifying manner, the former entered
on some of the details of his visit to Tunis. “I saw M. Maccio,” he
said, “who told me he had been M. Roustan’s intimate friend, and had
sought the appointment at Tunis by his suggestion. He showed me several
of M. Roustan’s letters to him, and declared that during the first week
he was in Tunis M. Roustan came five or six times to see him. M. Maccio
added that at M. Roustan’s last visit he had approached Madame Maccio,
saying, ‘Je vous demande la permission de vous amener Madame Elias
Musalli,’ but that his wife declined the honour, as, if she had received
Madame Musalli, no other lady would have frequented her house. On her
doing so, M. Roustan broke off relations with the Maccios and the
Italians.” M. Roustan rose in a passion and flatly contradicted the
witness, who retorted by saying that it was M. Roustan who had caused
French blood to flow. In answer to a question by M. Gatineau, M. De
Billing said that he had heard from Desfossés that the latter considered
himself fortunate in being a personal friend of M. Roustan, as he
thereby escaped paying blackmail on his affairs at the rate of thirty
per cent. to the Musalli family. M. Desfossés now gave M. De Billing the
lie from the body of the hall, and a most undignified wrangle ensued.
M. Léon Renault next gave his version of the Crédit Foncier business,
and denied having threatened the Bey. It is not clear to what extent he
admitted the project published by MM. Rochefort and Pelletan. Be this as
it may, it is certain that at the time he came to Tunis, he delivered a
copy of his scheme to Mustapha, who at once communicated it to several
persons interested in the matter. M. Camille Farcy, who had followed the
troops during the expedition as the correspondent of the journal _La
France_ was then called, but he proved nothing, and the President
strenuously opposed his saying if “he had ever met a Khamír,” on the
ground of irrelevancy.
M. Cléry then addressed the jury on behalf of M. Roustan. He began by
drawing a comparison between French interests in Tunis before and after
M. Roustan’s arrival, and then went on to sketch his career and attack
the defence presented by his adversaries. After reading the various
complimentary addresses presented to M. Roustan by more or less
legendary French colonies all over the Levant, M. Cléry asked the jurors
to believe that his client and the Musallis were the only righteous
persons to be found in an otherwise universal sink of corruption. “My
task is finished, gentlemen,” concluded M. Cléry, “but you must not
deceive yourselves as to the consequences of the verdict you are about
to render. If you say not guilty, as the defendants ask you to do, you
will declare that M. Roustan has brought about the fall of Tunisian
bonds; you will declare that he is a thief, you will heap mud upon him,
and with the same blow censure the Government which employed him, and
the vote of the people from which in turn that Government emanates. It
will then be evident henceforth to everybody, that the reward of every
man who does his duty and risks his life for his country, is to be
assailed and disgraced by public opinion. They will learn that men like
this might expect the fate assigned to M. Roustan by his enemies, viz.,
to be shot at the foot of a wall like a bandit or a dog!”
The Procureur-Général now asked M. Rochefort if he would redeem his
promise of divulging the name of the author of the revelations he had
published. The editor of the _Intransigeant_ promptly answered, “Muhamed
Arif Effendi, ex-Secretary of the Bey, at present commanding a troop of
insurgents at Kairwán.” Was this meant as harmless banter, or as a piece
of adroit judicial fencing? I am unable to say. Poor Muhamed Arif died
three years ago in a lunatic asylum in Stamboul, and how any one could
be “commanding a troop of insurgents at Kairwán,” two months after its
occupation by the French troops, I am unable to conceive. The answer,
however, appeared to satisfy the Tribunal de la Seine.
The last day of the trial had now arrived, and M. le Procureur Dauphin
rose in his magnificent robe of red woollen, faced with black silk and
white fur, to address the jury. His tactics were somewhat different from
those of M. Cléry; he at once dropped the _entourage_ as hopelessly
corrupt and dishonest, and held up M. Roustan as the _one_ righteous man
in Tunis. The Musallis came off second-best at the hands of M. Dauphin,
but a diversion was made in favour of Mustapha, who was described in
touching language as “donnant à son souverain le jour et la nuit le
témoignage de son attachement.” After pooh-poohing the evidence adduced
by M. Rochefort, the Procureur-Général concluded his speech with these
words:—“If M. Roustan is guilty, by all means acquit M. Rochefort! The
day when M. Roustan will be in his turn placed at the bar, I shall know
how to do my duty, and I shall fulfil it with all the more assiduity as
the charge will concern an official. But if M. Roustan has been the
victim of calumny, I conjure you to defend him by your verdict, and in
saving the honour of an individual, you will at the same time protect
the fair fame of an entire country.”
Before M. Gatineau commenced his reply, M. Desfossés was recalled, and
another incident occurred. The witness was asked if he had been M.
Roustan’s intermediary for the distribution of Tunisian decorations at
Paris? He answered evasively, “It is possible,” adding in the same
breath, “I know nothing about it.” Being pressed still further, he
accused M. Delattré, one of the counsel for the defence, of having asked
for a _nichán_ himself. M. Delattré made a crushing rejoinder, and M.
Gatineau commenced a vigorous speech on behalf of M. Rochefort. After he
had finished his reply, a letter which had arrived that morning from
Tunis was admitted as evidence. Its author was M. Pelletier, a man of
considerable ability, who has for many years acted as a legal
practitioner in that city. After giving an account of the past doings of
the Musallis, he spoke of an affair which had lately happened as an
illustration of what was going on. “A man named El Mennai came to Tunis
as a candidate for the Khalifat of Gafsa. He at once opened negotiations
with Shatruk, a broker in the employ of Madame Musalli, and was promised
the place for 30,000 francs. A portion was to be paid at once, and the
remainder on his receiving the appointment. The first dragoman of the
French Consulate was at once sent to ask for the nomination, but the
Minister insisted on referring the matter to General Mourabet, the
Governor of Kairwán. An unfavourable report having been received, the
Minister endeavoured to shelve the question. El Mennai now began to
clamour for the money he had paid, but he was quietly told to keep quiet
and bring the remainder. He did so, and the next day received his _amra_
as Khalifa of Gafsa. Who can say with truth that nobody profits by the
Protectorate?” A mysterious list of the Musalli _pots de vin_ was also
produced. One of the items consisted of a sum of 2500 francs, which was
represented as being carried on porters’ backs in silver five-franc
pieces to the Musallis’ palace—a palpable exaggeration which was much
commented on at the time. M. Roustan had hardly done protesting against
these _manœuvres de dernière heure_, when the jury retired to consider
their verdict. Judges in France are no longer required to sum up the
evidence, or do anything more than present a list of questions to guide
the jurors in their finding. In half-an-hour they returned and acquitted
M. Rochefort and Delpierre upon all the counts of the indictment, and
the court ordered the prosecutor to pay the costs of the suit. An hour
afterwards the Boulevards of Paris rung with the shrill cries of the
news-boys selling _la condamnation de Roustan_.
The news was at once telegraphed to Tunis, and I shall ever remember the
sensation it occasioned. For a moment even the 12th May was forgotten.
The excitement was the greater, because the intelligence was wholly
unexpected. The _Havas_ as usual had gently prepared us for a very
different result, and when the verdict was given, omitted to telegraph
it for a whole day. The Bey gave a handsome gratuity to the man who
brought him the tidings, and when the newspapers at length came, they
fetched fabulous prices. Translations of the trial in Arabic were at a
premium, and the satisfaction reached a culminating point when the
_Havas_ told us the Minister-Resident would be “promoted.” This,
however, was not to be. Although, according to the speech of the
Procureur-Général, the acquittal of M. Rochefort should have entailed
the criminal prosecution of M. Roustan; although M. Cléry said that an
adverse verdict would expose M. Roustan to the fate of being “shot like
a dog or a bandit at the foot of a wall;” and notwithstanding that
everybody connected with the case was perfectly well aware that the
result amounted to a distinct condemnation of the Tunisian expedition,
its causes, its authors, and its consequences, M. Gambetta resolved to
defy public opinion, and send M. Roustan back to his dominions. His will
was law; but five weeks later, the great Minister, whose incarnation
France had waited patiently for during one entire decade, sustained a
far more crushing defeat than that suffered by his predecessors. If M.
Ferry died of Tunis-on-the-brain, M. Gambetta expired from acute
Roustanophobia. The _procès_ Roustan-Rochefort had far more to do with
the Ministerial crisis than the _scrutin de liste_. French Governments
and French statesmen have often flown in the face of the _vox populi_,
but they have almost invariably had to rue the consequences.
· · · · · · · · · ·
The trial of Henri Rochefort dissipated every remaining illusion as to
the Tunisian expedition, and France realised at last the true nature of
the bitter experience she had purchased, at the cost of so much treasure
and so many priceless lives.