Effect of removing the police force—Witch-doctors'
influence—Originators of the insurrection—Gambo detained at
Bulawayo—The Imbezu regiment—Unpreparedness of the Colonists
at the outbreak—The Rhodesia Horse—Horses in possession of
the Government—Rifles, guns, and ammunition in Government
stores—Want of community of action of the Matabele—The Umlimo's
mistake—Critical position at Bulawayo—Neglect of the Matabele to
block the roads—Force in Bulawayo at the outbreak—The Africander
Corps.
In spite of their submissive behaviour, it seems probable that all
the members of the late king's family and many of the chief Indunas
were only biding their time, and waiting for an opportunity to try the
chances of a rebellion against the white man.
This opportunity did not present itself as long as there was a strong
police force in the country, but once that police force was removed, I
think the malcontents began to act.
That the plague of locusts with which Matabeleland has been afflicted
ever since 1890, the first year of the occupation of Mashunaland by
Europeans; the partial drought of the last two years; and, finally, the
outbreak of the rinderpest, would all be ascribed to the evil influence
of the white man, and made use of by the witch-doctors to incite the
mass of the people to join the insurgents, is doubtless true; but
that the insurrection can be fairly ascribed to the bitterness caused
by these visitations alone, I very much doubt, for it is remarkable
that throughout the Umzingwani, Filibusi, and Insiza districts, where
all the first murders of white men were committed, the rainfall had
been plentiful, and the locusts had done but little damage, so that,
as I can personally bear witness, the crops throughout these portions
of the country were exceptionally good, whilst as the rinderpest had
not yet approached this part of Matabeleland, the people living in
these districts could have known little or nothing about it. In its
inception, the insurrection was, in my opinion, a rebellion against
the white man's rule by the Matabele of Zulu origin alone, and I am
convinced that, in the district where I was living at least, the other
section of the tribe were at first not in the secret; however, the
greater part of these soon joined, some unwillingly and under threats
from their former masters, but most of them readily enough, believing,
as they did, that with the assistance of the Umlimo they would be able
to completely root out the white man, and revel once more in loot and
wholesale murder. And a merry time they had of it, if it was but a
short one, to be followed by a heavy retribution.
When the first news of the rising reached Bulawayo, Gambo was in the
town on a visit to the chief native commissioner, by whom he was very
wisely detained as a prisoner. Whether, if he had been at large, he
would have joined the rebels or not, it is difficult to say. Since
the war, he has lost control over the greater part of the people who
formerly composed the Eegapa military division, and many of these have
joined the ranks of the insurgents, but all Gambo's own people, under
his head Induna, Marzwe, have remained loyal to the Government. Umjan,
once the Induna of the Imbezu regiment, and now quite an old man, has
also refrained from taking part in the present hostilities, although he
is one of the few whose cattle were shot by order of the Government
because they were infected with the rinderpest. He came in to Bulawayo
soon after the outbreak of the rebellion with his wives and immediate
attendants, and is now living quietly near the town. His sons, however,
have joined the rebels, whilst the men whom he formerly commanded—the
Imbezu—reformed themselves into a regiment, and have been fighting
since the outbreak of the insurrection.
Besides Gambo's men, a few hundreds of Matabele Maholi (men of Makalaka
and Mashuna descent) living on my Company's property of Essexvale, on
Colonel Napier's land and round the Hope Fountain mission station, have
thought it advisable to stand by the Government, and have, therefore,
come in to live near Bulawayo for protection. But putting aside these
few hundreds of natives who have not joined in the rebellion, the
fact remains that at least nine-tenths, I think I might safely say
nineteen-twentieths, of the Matabele nation are now in arms against the
whites.
And, now, let us see how the colonists were prepared to meet the onset
of these hordes of savages. When the rising first broke out, with
the exception of the native police, there was no organised force in
Matabeleland worth speaking of; and as one-half of the native police
at once went over to the enemy, and the remainder had to be disarmed,
for fear lest they should follow suit, it may be said that there was
no police force at all. Of the old Mounted Police there only remained
forty-eight officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, in the whole
of Matabeleland, under Inspector Southey. Of these, twenty-two were
stationed in Bulawayo, and the rest distributed over the country at
the police stations of Gwelo, Selukwe, Belingwe, Inyati, Mangwe, Tuli,
Matopos, Umzingwani, and Iron Mine Hill. When the rebellion broke out
only twelve of these men were available at Bulawayo for immediate
service, and these, under Inspector Southey, accompanied Mr. Gifford
to the Insiza. The Rhodesia Horse, a volunteer force which had been
raised and equipped the previous year, had also practically ceased
to exist as an effective force fit for use at a moment's notice, for
although there were some six hundred men in Matabeleland who had
enrolled themselves as members of this corps, they were scattered all
over the country at the outbreak of the rebellion. Some of these were
murdered, whilst others had to take refuge in the laagers of Belingwe
and Gwelo. However, about five hundred were soon mustered in Bulawayo,
but the services of the majority could not be utilised except to defend
the town, owing to the want of horses, since, so great had been the
ravages of the fatal horse-sickness during the rainy season then just
coming to an end, that when Colonel Napier, the senior officer of
the Rhodesia Horse, called on the Government for seventy horses for
immediate use on 23rd March, he could only be supplied with sixty-two.
The actual number of horses in the possession of the Government
throughout Matabeleland on the day when the first tidings of the
outbreak of the insurrection reached Bulawayo is as follows:—
Horses in Government stables 77
Horses in possession of members of the Rhodesia
Horse Volunteers scattered over various
parts of Matabeleland 117
In possession of cattle inspectors 28
Unfit for work 58
Of the 117 horses that had been issued to Volunteers, a good many never
returned to Bulawayo, as they either died of horse-sickness or were
taken to Gwelo or Belingwe, so that in the first days of the rebellion
the Government could not command the services of more than 100 horses;
but no expense was spared to procure more, and very soon all the
private horses in Bulawayo were bought up, whilst others were sent up
from the Transvaal, so that by the end of April there were nearly 450
horses in the Government stables, the large majority of which were fit
for active service.
The number of rifles belonging to the Government throughout the country
on 25th March was as follows:—
Lee-Metford Lee-Metford
Rifles. Carbines.
At Gwanda 20 ――
At Gwelo 40 ――
With Colonel Napier's patrol 33 52
" " Spreckley's patrol 36 2
To guard coaches 7 ――
In stores 295 70
Permanent staff 25 ――
――― ―――
Total 456 124
═══ ═══
Making a total of 580 rifles all told.
Besides these, however, there were about eighty old Martini-Henry
rifles in the Government stores, but these were nearly all
unserviceable at the outbreak of the rebellion, though the armourer has
since been able to get most of them into working order. Of ammunition
there was a good supply, viz. 1,500,000 rounds.
In the way of artillery there was in Bulawayo when the insurrection
broke out one 303 Maxim gun in good order, and a second so much out of
repair as to be useless; two 2.5 screw guns in good order, but with
only seventeen rounds of ammunition for the two; one Hotchkiss gun and
limber, one Gatling, one Gardner, one Nordenfeldt—all in good order—and
one seven-pounder, useless except at Bulawayo owing to carriage having
been destroyed by white ants. In addition to this ordnance there
arrived in Bulawayo from Macloutsie, on the very day on which Mr.
Maddocks was murdered, two old Maxims and two seven-pounders. These,
however, were unserviceable at the time, one of the seven-pounders
being without a carriage and the two Maxims being also out of repair.
The armourer here has now, however, I believe, put them all in working
order.
Taking these figures as correct—and they are absolutely beyond
question—it cannot, I think, be said that the colonists in Matabeleland
were very well prepared to cope with a sudden and unexpected rising
of at least 10,000 natives, about one-fifth of whom were armed with
breech-loading rifles and well supplied with ammunition, whilst
many more were in possession of muzzle-loading guns; and when it is
remembered that at the time of the outbreak the food supply was very
low in Bulawayo, owing to the ravages of the rinderpest, it must be
acknowledged that the position was at one time a very serious one,
which a little more intelligence on the part of the Matabele might have
rendered absolutely disastrous.
But all through they have behaved in an incomprehensible manner, their
leaders apparently never having arranged any settled plan of campaign,
the consequence being that there has never been any understanding or
community of action between the various hordes into which the nation
is now divided. All through there appears to have been a general
belief amongst them that they would receive supernatural aid from the
"Umlimo," or god, but this belief must be getting a little thin now,
and they would have done far better had they worked together under one
intelligent general.
Why, when the rebellion first broke out, they never attempted to block
the main road to Mangwe will ever remain a mystery. No one doubts
that they might have done so, nor that, if they had placed a couple
of thousand men in the Shashani Pass, we could not have raised a
sufficient force on this side to dislodge them and open the road; for
it must be remembered that as there were over six hundred women and
children in Bulawayo a large force was always necessary to protect
them. Possibly there is some truth in the report that the road to
Mangwe has been purposely left open by command of the Umlimo in order
to give the white men the opportunity of escaping from the country.
That this was an error of judgment, if it is a fact, is very clear,
as in the critical time but few men left the country, and such as did
could be well spared, as they were of no use as defenders of the women
and children, and were only consuming valuable food. On the other hand,
owing to the road having been left open, stores of arms and food and
horses were constantly being brought in.
It certainly seems very strange that no attempt has ever been made
to stop waggons and coaches on this road, when it is remembered that
at one time Government House—which is less than three miles from
the centre of Bulawayo—was practically in the hands of the rebels,
sometimes in the daytime and always at nights for a period of about ten
days, their impis during that time lying in a semicircle to the west
and north of the town, and being sometimes within two miles of it.
Yet although two Dutchmen, living in their waggon standing near the
boundary of the town commonage, about four and a half miles along the
road from Bulawayo, were murdered, no waggon or coach moving along the
road was ever interfered with, nor was the Government House burnt, the
reason for this being, it is said, because the Umlimo told the people
that when Bulawayo had been destroyed, and all the white men in the
country killed, they would find Lo Bengula sitting there, ready to rule
them once more; for, be it said, Government House has been built in the
centre of the old kraal of Bulawayo, just where the king's house once
stood.
For over a month, an impi, supposed to be at least a thousand strong,
was camped just within the Matopo Hills, not ten miles from the nearest
point on the road to Mangwe, and no one doubts that at any moment a
portion of this impi might have moved over to the road by night, and,
by shooting a mule or two, have had a coachload of white men at its
mercy; and God help the unfortunate white man who has nothing else to
trust to but the mercy of the Matabele!
Of course there were forts along the road, and patrols rode daily
between the forts, but even so I maintain that much damage might have
been done if the natives had determined at any moment to block the
road. Now, however, that the impi of which I have been speaking has
been driven from its position by the forces under Major-General Sir
Frederick Carrington, it is not likely that the safety of the road will
ever again be threatened.
And, now, let me hark back to the early days of the rebellion. I think
I have shown by figures that on the outbreak of the insurrection the
country was not over well supplied with either horses or arms, nor was
there any superfluity of men, and the smallness of the number will,
I think, astonish some critics of the present campaign in England.
Turning to the _Matabele Times_ of 6th April last, I find it stated
under the heading "The Native Rising up to Date," "A census was taken
of all those who had been in the laager on Friday night as they made
their exit on Saturday morning, or remained on the waggons. The count
was carefully made, and showed that the refugees numbered 632 women
and children, and 915 men, making a total of 1547"; and further on we
read—"A general parade was held yesterday of the men now in town who
have enrolled themselves in the Bulawayo Field Force. They fell in at
ten o'clock, the scouts, under Captain Grey, in front making a splendid
display of the class of men whom the hostile natives will not seek to
tackle twice. The men on foot looked like business, and went through
their movements with sufficient precision. The Africander Corps now
consists of three companies, numbering 76, 64, and 73, with 6 on the
staff. The total number on parade was over 500, of whom about 300 were
fully armed, and about 100 were engineers and artillerymen. To this
number have to be added the 169 out under the Hon. M. Gifford and
Captain Dawson, and the 100 men gone down to Gwanda under Captain Brand
and Captain Van Niekerk. The total efficient force now available for
the reconquest of Matabeleland may be put down at 700, nearer 800."
From these figures it will be seen that at the outbreak of the
rebellion there were under 1000 men in Bulawayo, some 200 of whom were
unfit for active service. The remainder of the male population of the
country were shut up in the laagers at Gwelo, Belingwe, and Mangwe, and
therefore unavailable for offensive operations against the Matabele;
whilst of the 800 fighting men in Bulawayo, it was necessary to have
at least 400 always in town to protect the women and children, and 130
were drafted off to man the forts on the Mangwe road, leaving less than
300 available for active operations against the enemy. This force was,
however, augmented by about 150 Cape boys, chiefly Amaxosa Kafirs and
Zulus. These boys were got together and formed into a regiment by Mr.
Johan Colenbrander, and they have done most excellent service during
the present campaign, being man for man both braver and better armed
than the Matabele.
Thus, all things considered, I do not think the colonists have done
so badly. With small patrols they first succeeded in bringing in
many scattered whites from the outlying districts, and then after a
series of engagements, always fought on ground of the enemy's own
choosing, succeeded in driving them from the immediate neighbourhood
of Bulawayo, and forcing them to take refuge in the forests and hills,
from which they will be finally driven by the forces now in the country
under the command of Major-General Sir Frederick Carrington.
It is worthy of remark that whilst in the first war the Matabele
attacked strong positions defended by artillery and Maxim guns, thereby
suffering very heavy loss themselves but killing very few white men, in
the present war all the fighting has been amongst broken ground, and in
country more or less covered with bush, and all the killing has been
done with rifles; for in the first war the natives learnt the futility
of attacking fortified positions, and now only fight in the bush in
skirmishing order, giving but little opportunity for the effective use
of machine guns; so that, although a good many rounds have been fired
from Maxims at long ranges, only a very small amount of execution has
been done by them.