Difficulties of the colonists much underrated—The Matabele
campaign of 1893—Military spirit scotched, not killed—Estimated
native losses—Disarmament of Matabele incomplete—Natives well
supplied with arms and ammunition—Defections amongst the native
police.
As will be seen from the last sentence of Mr. Gifford's letter to
Colonel Napier, even at this early stage of the insurrection he
predicted that it would prove a more serious business than the first
war, and that this prediction has been fully justified will never I
think be gainsaid by any man who has taken part in both campaigns.
As, however, the difficulties experienced by the colonists in coping
with the present rebellion have been very much underrated in certain
quarters, and invidious comparisons instituted between Dr. Jameson's
victorious march on Bulawayo in 1893 and the conduct of the present
campaign, I will take the liberty of giving my own opinion on the
subject; which is that the essential differences in the circumstances
under which the two campaigns were conducted render it impossible to
institute any comparison between them. In 1893 Dr. Jameson marched from
Mashunaland to Bulawayo with a compact force of 670 white men, 400 of
whom were mounted, a small number of native allies, and a strong party
of artillery consisting of 5 Maxim guns, 2 seven-pounders, 1 Gardner
gun, and 1 Hotchkiss. Choosing its own line, and under the guidance
of Nyenyezi —a Matabele of high position, whose whole family to the
number of seventy had lately been put to death by the order of Lo
Bengula, and who was himself a proscribed fugitive—this force kept in
the open country as much as possible, but were obliged to pass through
some broken wooded country in the neighbourhood of the Tchangani
river. Here, at 4 A.M. on the morning of the 25th of October, it was
attacked for the first time by the eastern division of the Matabele
army, computed at some 5000 strong, though it is improbable that all
the regiments composing this division were actually engaged, as all the
fighting seems to have been done by the Insukamini regiment, aided
by small detachments of the Inhlati and Umquicho.
The attack failed, the Matabele being beaten off from the laager with
heavy loss, whilst the column marched on towards Bulawayo, and was not
again attacked until after the Impembisi had been crossed.
At a point a few miles beyond this river the laager was again attacked
on 1st November, this time in perfectly open ground, and in the middle
of the day. The attack was made by the Imbezu and Ingubu regiments,
computed by Sir John Willoughby to number together about 1700 men; some
5000 more of other regiments who were hanging round never having come
into action at all. In this engagement these two regiments suffered
very heavily from the fire of the Maxim guns, although, as they have
both reformed and taken a prominent part in the present rebellion, they
were certainly not annihilated. On hearing of the defeat of the Imbezu
and Ingubu, one or other of which regiments he usually kept near him as
a sort of bodyguard, Lo Bengula fled from Bulawayo, after first burning
the kraal and blowing up his European house; but before doing so he
recalled his son-in-law, Gambo, from the Mangwe Pass, thus leaving it
open for the unopposed advance of the southern column under Colonel
Gould Adams, who with the 400 men under his command was thus enabled to
effect a junction with Dr. Jameson on 15th November. Gambo had been in
command of all the regiments composing the Eegapa and the Umschlopay,
the two largest military divisions of the four into which the country
was divided, numbering together at least 8000 men. Excepting, however,
a small detachment which attacked Colonel Gould Adams at the Singuesi
river, none of the men composing this force took any part in the first
Matabele war, although it numbered in its ranks some of the king's best
regiments, such as the Inyama Nghlovu and M'schlaschlanglela. Neither
were the men under Sikombo, Umlugulu, and many other influential
Indunas living to the south-east of Bulawayo, ever engaged in the first
war, as although they were all mustered and were close to Bulawayo at
the time of the defeat of their compatriots at the Impembisi, they seem
to have lost heart when they heard of the disastrous result of that
fight, immediately followed as it was by the flight of their king, and
so retired to the Matopo Hills, and subsequently surrendered without
fighting.
The death of Lo Bengula probably closed the campaign, for but for this
event his pursuit to the lower Tchangani, resulting as it did in the
death of Major Wilson and all his brave companions, would scarcely have
had any other effect than to show the Matabele that although white men
were invincible when defending a laager with Maxim guns, they were by
no means so when only armed with rifles, if they could be outnumbered
and surrounded in difficult country.
But the death of their king left them like a swarm of bees bereft of
their queen. Their councils were divided; their military arrogance
crushed out of them by the heavy defeats their best regiments had
sustained at the Tchangani, the Impembisi, and in a minor degree at
the Singuesi. Short of food, and living like wild beasts in the rocks
and forests, with all the bitter discomfort which such a life entails
even on savages during the rainy season in a sub-tropical country, they
saw their women and children sicken and die day by day, until their
only hope of life seemed to lie in a speedy return to the high and
healthy plateau from which they had fled. But there lay the laagers of
the white men strongly defended with cannon and Maxim guns. From such
positions they could not hope to drive them, nor without a leader or
any cohesion between the numberless little parties into which they were
divided did they dare to try conclusions with the mounted patrols which
scoured the open country. What wonder then that when liberal terms of
peace were offered them, first one Induna with all his people, and
then another and another, surrendered, until in a short time the whole
nation had freely and frankly submitted itself to the white man's rule?
Such is a brief account of the conquest of Matabeleland in 1893, which
was practically settled by two battles, in which the Matabele attacked
the white men in laager and were in each case driven off with heavy
loss by the fire of the Maxim guns.
The brilliancy of the exploit, resulting as it did in the overthrow
of one of the most cruel and barbarous despotisms that has ever
existed even in barbarous Africa, and in the throwing open to European
enterprise of a rich and fertile territory, blessed with a climate in
which white men can live and thrive, will ever be remembered as one
of the most brilliant episodes in the history of British colonisation
in South Africa; and no one, in this country at any rate, would wish
to detract one iota from the honour due to all those who took part
in Dr. Jameson's historic march to Bulawayo in 1893. It was admirable
both in the boldness of its conception and the steady and unflinching
resolution with which it was carried out.
All I wish to point out is that in 1893 the fighting power and the
military spirit of the Matabele nation was only scotched, not killed;
for more than half the regiments which had formed the king's army at
the time of the war did not lose a single man during the hostilities,
never having been engaged in any of the fights; whilst the only
regiments which lost really heavily were the Insukamini, the Imbezu,
and the Ingubu. It is difficult to state with any degree of exactitude
the number of men lost by the Matabele in 1893, but personally I find
it difficult to believe that their loss in men killed or who died from
wounds can have exceeded 1000—that is, 200 at the Tchangani, 500 at
the Impembisi, 100 at the Inguesi, and 200 killed during the fighting
on the lower Tchangani. Be it remembered by those who consider this
too low an estimate, that if more than 500 Matabele were killed at the
Impembisi fight, it would mean over 30 per cent of the entire force
engaged, as the strength of the Imbezu and Ingubu together did not
exceed 1700, whilst the number of the survivors who have been and still
are taking part in the present rebellion is by no means inconsiderable.
As regards the loss inflicted on the Matabele by Major Wilson and
his brave companions during their last desperate stand on the lower
Tchangani, we have nothing to go upon, except what natives who were
there can tell us, and I think there is reason to believe that their
loss there was not actually so heavy as at one time it was supposed
to be, as they were always able to fire on the whites from behind
the shelter of trees. Apart, however, from the direct loss sustained
in the various fights, the Matabele must have suffered heavily from
the ravages of sickness caused by exposure and want of food after the
fighting had ceased. The greatest sufferers were naturally the women
and children, the able-bodied men having been better able to withstand
the unaccustomed hardships. Altogether, I think that if to the 1000,
which is my estimate of those killed in battle, or who died from the
effects of their wounds, another 1000 is added for the able-bodied men
who died of sickness afterwards, the aggregate will be a very liberal
allowance for the total losses sustained by the Matabele in fighting
men during, and in consequence of, the war of 1893.
However, to avoid all cavilling let us add another 1000 to this number,
making 3000 altogether. Subtract these 3000 from the entire fighting
strength of the nation before the war, which has never been estimated
at less than 20,000, and it leaves a residue of 17,000 able-bodied
men. This total may be a thousand or two out one way or the other;
but, whatever the fighting strength of the nation may be, every man
composing it throughout the length and breadth of the land is now in
arms against the white men, with the exception of some of Gambo's
people and a few others, numbering in all under 1000 men, about whom I
shall say a few words later on.
But, it has been said, however many Matabele may have rebelled against
the Government, they cannot be very dangerous foes, since the whole
nation was disarmed after the first war. This is an error. After the
war of 1893 a considerable number of guns were certainly given up,
but that the total handed in and destroyed was but a small proportion
of what they had possessed before the war no one who knew anything
about the matter ever doubted. Besides muzzle-loading guns of every
description, the Matabele were formerly in possession of at least 2000
breech-loading rifles, principally Martini-Henrys, a certain number
of which were captured from them during the war or surrendered after
hostilities were over. As no count seems ever to have been kept of the
number of these rifles captured or handed in, no exact figure can be
given. General report says 150 to 300, whilst the highest number I have
ever heard ventured was "between 400 and 500."
Even taking the highest number to be correct, considering that a
considerable number of Martini-Henry rifles have been illicitly sold to
the Matabele during the last two years, that nearly 100 breech-loading
rifles were taken over to the enemy by the rebel police, whilst many
more were captured from murdered men during the first days of the
rebellion, it cannot be denied that they have regained more than they
lost, so that in the matter of breech-loading arms they entered upon
the present insurrection with a larger supply than they possessed in
1893, whilst, as I have said before, however many muzzle-loading guns
they may have surrendered, they kept back a great many which they
are now using. As regards ammunition, I, for one, certainly thought
when the present rebellion broke out that their supply would soon run
short, but it has not yet done so, and, moreover, it seems to be fairly
distributed through the whole nation, as every impi with which we have
yet been engaged has shown itself to be well supplied, especially with
Martini-Henry cartridges.
Thus we now see that after the first conquest of Matabeleland a very
large proportion of the former military strength of the country was
still available, and that although this large number of able-bodied
savages were apparently without arms, their weapons were only hidden
for the time being. Where the large supply of ammunition which they
have proved themselves to be possessed of came from, I cannot say.
Probably large quantities were buried with the rifles after the first
war, and this store has been constantly added to by theft and illicit
purchase ever since.
However, over two years of most submissive behaviour, unbroken by
any attempt whatever to rebel against the authority of the Chartered
Company, lulled every white man in the country into a feeling of
security which events have not justified.
A native police force was raised, which was apparently working
admirably up to the time of the rebellion; and even then, it is but
fair to say, almost all the police who had been first enrolled, and
who had done more than a year's service, held themselves aloof from
the rebels, the great majority of defections occurring amongst those
who had been but lately enrolled and amongst whom there was therefore
little or no _esprit de corps_.