the morning we saw column after column of smoke rise in the direction of
the fort, each smoke being nearer than the last. We knew to a certainty
that the Indians were approaching in force, burning every building and
grain or hay stack they passed. The settlers had either all been killed,
or had taken refuge at the fort or New Ulm, so we had no anxiety about
them. About 9:30 a. m. the enemy appeared in great force, on both sides
of the river. Those on the east side, when they reached the neighborhood
of the ferry, burned some stacks as a signal of their arrival, which was
responded to by a similar fire in the edge of the timber, about two
miles and a half from the town on the west side. Between this timber
and the town, was a beautiful open prairie, with considerable descent
towards the town. Immediately on seeing the smoke from the ferry the
enemy advanced rapidly, some six hundred strong, many mounted and the
rest on foot. I had determined to meet them on the open prairie, and had
formed my men by companies in a long line of battle, with intervals
between them, on the first level plateau on the west side of the town,
thus covering its whole west front. There were not over twenty or thirty
rifles in the whole command, and a man with a shotgun, knowing his
antagonist carries a rifle, has very little confidence in his fighting
ability. Down came the Indians in the bright sunlight, galloping,
running, yelling, and gesticulating in the most fiendish manner. If we
had had good rifles they never would have got near enough to do much
harm, but as it was we could not check them before their fire began to
tell on our line. They deployed to the right and left until they covered
our entire front, and then charged. My men, appreciating the inferiority
of their armament, after seeing several of their comrades fall, and
having fired a few ineffectual volleys, fell back on the town, passing
some buildings without taking possession of them, which mistake was
instantly taken advantage of by the Indians, who at once occupied them,
but they did not follow us into the town proper, no doubt thinking our
retreat was a feint to draw them among the buildings, and thus gain an
advantage. I think if they had boldly charged into the town and set it
on fire, they would have won the fight; but, instead, they surrounded it
on all sides, the main body taking possession of the lower end of the
main street below the barricades, from which direction a strong wind was
blowing towards the center of the town. From this point they began
firing the houses on both sides of the street. We soon rallied the men,
and kept the enemy well in the outskirts of the town, and the fighting
became general on all sides. Just about this time, my first lieutenant,
William B. Dodd, galloped down the main street, and as he passed a cross
street the Indians put three or four bullets through him. He died during
the afternoon, after having been removed several times from house to
house as the enemy crowded in upon us.
On the second plateau, there was an old Don Quixote windmill, with an
immense tower and sail-arms about seventy-five feet long, which occupied
a commanding position, and had been taken possession of by a company of
about thirty men, who called themselves the Le Sueur Tigers, most of
whom had rifles. They barricaded themselves with sacks of flour and
wheat, loopholed the building and kept the savages at a respectful
distance from the west side of the town. A rifle ball will bury itself
in a sack of flour or wheat, but will not penetrate it. During the
battle the men dug out several of them, and brought them to me because
they were the regulation Minie bullet, and there had been rumors that
the Confederates from Missouri had stirred up the revolt and supplied
the Indians with guns and ammunition. I confess I was astonished when I
saw the bullets, as I knew the Indians had no such arms, but I soon
decided that they were using against us the guns and ammunition they had
taken from the dead soldiers of Captain Marsh's company. I do not
believe the Confederates had any hand in the revolt of these Indians.
We held several other outposts, being brick buildings outside the
barricades, which we loopholed, and found very effective in holding the
Indians aloof. The battle raged generally all around the town, every
man doing his best in his own way. It was a very interesting fight on
account of the stake we were contending for. We had in the place about
twelve or fifteen hundred women and children, the lives of all of whom,
and of ourselves, depended upon victory perching on our banners; for in
a fight like this, no quarter is ever asked or given. The desperation
with which the conflict was conducted can be judged from the fact that I
lost sixty men in the first hour and a half, ten killed and fifty
wounded, out of less than 250, as my force had been depleted by the
number of about seventy-five by Lieutenant Huey taking that number to
guard the approach to the ferry. Crossing to the other side of the river
he was cut off, and forced to retreat toward St. Peter. It was simply a
mistake of judgment to put the river between himself and the main force,
but in his retreat he met Capt. E. St. Julian Cox, with reinforcements
for New Ulm, joined them, and returned the next day. He was a brave and
willing officer. The company I mentioned as having arrived from South
Bend, having heard that the Winnebagoes had joined in the outbreak, left
us before the final attack on Saturday, the 23d of August, claiming that
their presence at home was necessary to protect their families, and on
the morning of the 23d, when the enemy was in sight, a wagon load of
others left us and went down the river. I doubt if we could have
mustered over two hundred guns at any time during the fight.
The enemy, seeing his advantage in firing the buildings in the lower
part of the main street, and thus gradually nearing our barricades with
the intention of burning us out, kept up his work as continuously as he
could with the interruptions we made for him by occasionally driving him
out; but his approach was constant, and about 2 o'clock a roaring
conflagration was raging on both sides of the street, and the prospect
looked discouraging. At this juncture Asa White, an old frontiersman,
connected with the Winnebagoes, whom I had known for a long time, and
whose judgment and experience I appreciated and valued, came to me and
said: "Judge, if this goes on, the Indians will bag us in about two
hours." I said: "It looks that way; what remedy have you to suggest."
His answer was, "We must make for the cottonwood timber." Two miles and
a half lay between us and the timber referred to, which, of course,
rendered his suggestion utterly impracticable with two thousand
noncombatants to move, and I said: "White, they would slaughter us like
sheep should we undertake such a movement. Our strongest hold is in this
town, and if you will get together fifty volunteers, I will drive the
Indians out of the lower town and the greatest danger will be passed."
He saw at once the propriety of my proposition, and in a short time we
had a squad ready, and sallied out, cheering and yelling in a manner
that would have done credit to the wildest Comanches. We knew the
Indians were congregated in force down the street, and expected to find
them in a sunken road, about three blocks from where we started, but
they had worked their way up much nearer to us, and were in a deep swale
about a block and a half from our barricades. There was a large number
of them, estimated at about seventy-five to one hundred, some on ponies
and some on foot. When the conformation of the ground disclosed their
whereabouts, we were within one hundred feet of them. They opened a
rapid fire on us, which we returned, while keeping up our rushing
advance. When we were within fifty feet of them, they turned and fled
down the street. We followed them for at least half a mile, firing as
well as we could. This took us beyond the burning houses, and finding a
large collection of saw logs, I called a halt and we took cover among
them, lying flat on the ground. The Indians stopped when we ceased to
chase them, and took cover behind anything that afforded protection, and
kept up an incessant fire upon us whenever a head or hand showed itself
above the logs. We held them, however, in this position, and prevented
their return toward the town by way of the street. I at once sent a
party back with instructions to burn every building, fence, stack or
other object that would afford cover between us and the barricades. This
order was strictly carried out, and by six or seven o'clock there was
not a structure standing outside of the barricades in that part of the
town. We then abandoned our saw logs and returned to the town, and the
day was won, the Indians not daring to charge us over an open country. I
lost four men killed in this exploit, one of whom was especially to be
regretted. I speak of Newell Houghton. In ordinary warfare, all men
stand for the same value as a general thing; but in an Indian fight, a
man of cool head, an exceptionally fine shot, and armed with a reliable
rifle, is a loss doubly to be regretted. Houghton was famous as being
the best shot and deer hunter in all the Northwest, and had with him his
choice rifle. He had built a small steamboat with the proceeds of his
gun, and we all held him in high respect as a fine type of frontiersman.
We had hardly got back to the town before a man brought me a rifle which
he had found on the ground near a clump of brush, and handing it to me
said, "Some Indian lost a good gun in that run." It happened that White
was with me, and saw the gun. He recognized it in an instant, and said:
"Newell Houghton is dead. He never let that gun out of his hands while
he could hold it." We looked where the gun was picked up, and found
Houghton dead in the brush. He had been scalped by some Indian who had
seen him fall, and had sneaked back and scalped him.
That night we dug a system of rifle pits all along the barricades on the
outside, and manned them with three or four men each, but the firing was
desultory through the night, and nothing much was accomplished on either
side.
The next morning (Sunday) opened bright and beautiful, but scarcely an
Indian was to be seen. They had given up the contest, and were rapidly
retreating northward up the river. We got an occasional shot at one, but
without effect except to hasten the retreat. And so ended the second and
decisive battle of New Ulm.
In this fight between ourselves and the enemy we burned one hundred and
ninety buildings, many of them substantial and valuable structures. The
whites lost some fourteen killed and fifty or sixty wounded. The loss of
the enemy is uncertain, but after the fight we found ten dead Indians in
burned houses, and in chaparral where they escaped the notice of their
friends. As to their wounded we knew nothing, but judging from the
length and character of the engagement, and the number of their dead
found, their casualties must have equalled, if not exceeded ours.
About noon of Sunday, the 24th, Capt. E. St. Julien Cox arrived with a
company from St. Peter, which had been sent by Colonel Sibley to
reinforce us. Lieutenant Huey, who had been cut off at the ferry on the
previous day, accompanied him with a portion of his command. They were
welcome visitors.
There were in the town at the time of the attack on the 23d, as near as
can be learned, from 1,200 to 1,500 noncombatants, consisting of women
and children, refugees and unarmed citizens, all of whose lives
depended upon our success. It is difficult to conceive a much more
exciting stake to play for, and the men seemed fully to appreciate it,
and made no mistakes.
On the 25th we found that provisions and ammunition were becoming
scarce, and pestilence being feared from stench and exposure, we decided
to evacuate the town and try to reach Mankato. This destination was
chosen to avoid the Minnesota river, the crossing of which we deemed
impracticable. The only obstacle between us and Mankato was the Big
Cottonwood river, which was fordable. We made up a train of 153 wagons,
which had largely composed our barricades, loaded them with women and
children, and about eighty wounded men, and started. A more
heart-rending procession was never witnessed in America. Here was the
population of one of the most flourishing towns in the state abandoning
their homes and property, starting on a journey of thirty odd miles,
through a hostile country, with a possibility of being massacred on the
way, and no hope or prospect but the hospitality of strangers and
ultimate beggary. The disposition of the guard was confided to Captain
Cox. The march was successful; no Indians were encountered. We reached
Crisp's farm, which was about half way between New Ulm and Mankato,
about evening. I pushed the main column on, fearing danger from various
sources, but camped at this point with about 150 men, intending to
return to New Ulm, or hold this point as a defensive measure for the
exposed settlements further down the river. On the morning of the 26th
we broke camp, and I endeavored to make the command return to New Ulm or
remain where they were--my object, of course, being to keep an armed
force between the enemy and the settlements. The men had not heard a
word from their families for more than a week, and declined to return or
remain. I did not blame them. They had demonstrated their willingness to
fight when necessary, but held the protection of their families as
paramount to mere military possibilities. I would not do justice to
history did I not record, that, when I called for volunteers to return,
Captain Cox and his whole squad stepped to the front, ready to go where
I commanded. Although I had not then heard of Captain Marsh's disaster,
I declined to allow so small a command as that of Captain Cox to attempt
the reoccupation of New Ulm. My staff stood by me in this effort, and a
gentleman from Le Sueur county, Mr. Freeman Talbott, made an impressive
speech to the men, to induce them to return. The train arrived safely at
Mankato on the 25th, and the balance of the command on the following
day, whence the men generally sought their homes.
I immediately, on arriving at Mankato, went to St. Peter, to inform
Colonel Sibley of the condition of things in the Indian country. I found
him, on the night of August 26th, in camp about six miles out of St.
Peter, and put him in possession of everything that had happened to the
westward. His mounted men arrived at Fort Ridgely on the 27th of August,
and were the first relief that reached that fort after its long siege.
Sibley reached the fort on the 28th of August. Intrenchments were thrown
up about the fort, cannon properly placed, and a strong guard
maintained. All but ninety men of the Cullen Guard, under Captain
Anderson, returned home as soon as they found the fort was safe. The
garrison was soon increased by the arrival of forty-seven men under
Captain Sterritt, and on the 1st of September, Lieut. Col. William R.
Marshall of the Seventh Regiment arrived, with a portion of his
command. This force could not make a forward movement on account of a
lack of ammunition and provisions, which were long delayed.
BATTLE OF BIRCH COULIE.
On the 31st of August a detail of Captain Grant's company of infantry,
seventy men of the Cullen Guard, under Captain Anderson, and some
citizens and other soldiers, in all about 150 men, under command of
Major Joseph R. Brown, with seventeen teams and teamsters, were sent
from Fort Ridgely to the Lower Agency, to feel the enemy, bury the dead,
and perform any other service that might arise. They went as far as
Little Crow's village, but not finding any signs of Indians, they
returned; and on the 1st of September they reached Birch Coulie, and
encamped at the head of it. Birch Coulie is a ravine extending from the
upper plateau to the river bottom, nearly opposite the ferry where
Captain Marsh's company was ambushed.
The Indians, after their defeat at Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, had
concentrated at the Yellow Medicine river, and decided to make one more
desperate effort to carry their point of driving the whites out of the
country. Their plan of operation was, to come down the Minnesota valley
in force, stealthily, passing Sibley's command at Ridgely, and attacking
St. Peter and Mankato simultaneously. They congregated all their forces
for this attempt, and started down the river. When they reached the foot
of Birch Coulie they saw the last of Major Brown's command going up the
coulie. They decided to wait and see where they encamped, and attack
them early in the morning. The whites went to the upper end of the
Coulie, and camped on the open prairie, about 250 feet from the brush
in the coulie. On the other side of their camp there was a roll in the
prairie, about four or five feet high, which they probably did not
notice. This gave the enemy cover on both sides of the camp, and they
did not fail to see it and take advantage of it. The moment daylight
came sufficiently to disclose the camp, the Indians opened fire from
both sides. The whites had ninety horses hitched to a picket rope and
their wagons formed in a circular corral, with their camp in the center.
The Indians soon killed all the horses but one, and the men used their
carcasses as breastworks, behind which to fight. The battle raged from
the morning of September 2d to September 3d, when they were relieved by
Colonel Sibley's whole command, and the Indians fled to the west.
Major Joseph R. Brown was one of the most experienced Indian men in the
country, and would never have made the mistake of locating his camp in a
place that gave the enemy such an advantage. He did not arrive until the
camp was selected, and should have removed it at once. I have always
supposed that he was lulled into a sense of security by not having seen
any signs of Indians in his march; but the result proved that, when in a
hostile Indian country, no one is ever justified in omitting any
precautions. The firing at Birch Coulie was heard at Fort Ridgely, and a
relief was sent, under Colonel McPhail, which was checked by the Indians
a few miles before it reached its destination. The colonel sent a
courier to the fort for reinforcements, and it fell to Lieutenant
Sheehan to carry the message. With his usual energy he succeeded in
getting through, his horse dying under him on his arrival. Colonel
Sibley at once started with his whole command, and when he reached the
battle ground the Indians left the field.
This was one of the most disastrous battles of the war. Twenty-three
were killed outright or mortally wounded, and forty-five were severely
wounded, while many others received slight injuries. The tents were, by
the shower of bullets, made to resemble lace work, so completely were
they perforated. One hundred and four bullet holes were counted in one
tent. Besides the continual shower of bullets that was kept up by the
Indians, the men suffered terribly from thirst, as it was impossible to
get water into the camp. This fight forms a very important feature in
the Indian war, as, notwithstanding its horrors, it probably prevented
awful massacres at St. Peter and Mankato, the former being absolutely
defenseless, and the latter only protected by a small squad of about
eighty men, which formed my headquarters guard at South Bend, about four
miles distant.
OCCURRENCES IN MEEKER COUNTY AND VICINITY.
While these events were passing, other portions of the state were being
prepared for defense. In the region of Forest City in Meeker county, and
also at Hutchinson and Glencoe, the excitement was intense. Capt. George
C. Whitcomb obtained in St. Paul seventy-five stand of arms and some
ammunition. He left a part of the arms at Hutchinson, and with the rest
armed a company at Forest City, of fifty-three men, twenty-five of-whom
were mounted. Capt. Richard Strout, of Company "B," Ninth Regiment, was
ordered to Forest City, and went there with his company. Gen. John H.
Stevens of Glencoe was commander of the state militia for the counties
of McLeod, Carver, Sibley and Renville. As soon as he learned of the
outbreak he erected a very substantial fortification of saw-logs at
Glencoe, and that place was not disturbed by the savages. A company of
volunteers was formed at Glencoe, under Capt. A. H. Rouse. Company "F"
of the Ninth Regiment, under Lieut. O. P. Stearns, and Company "H" of
the same regiment (Capt. W. R. Baxter), an independent company from
Excelsior, and the Goodhue County Rangers (Capt. David L. Davis), all
did duty at and about Glencoe during the continuance of the trouble.
Captains Whitcomb and Strout, with their companies, made extensive
reconnoisances into the surrounding counties, rescuing many refugees,
and having several brisk and sharp encounters with the Indians, in which
they lost several in killed and wounded. The presence of these troops in
this region of country, and their active operations, prevented its
depopulation, and saved the towns and much valuable property from
destruction.
PROTECTION OF THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER.
On the 29th of August I received a commission from the governor of the
state, instructing and directing me to take command of the Blue Earth
country, extending from New Ulm to the north line of Iowa, embracing the
then western and southwestern frontier of the state. My powers were
general--to raise troops, commission officers, subsist upon the country,
and generally to do what in my judgment was best for the protection of
this frontier. Under these powers I located my headquarters at South
Bend, being the extreme southern point of the Minnesota river, thirty
miles below New Ulm, four from Mankato, and about fifty from the Iowa
line. Here I maintained a guard of about eighty men. We threw up some
small intrenchments, but nothing worthy of mention. Enough citizens of
New Ulm had returned home to form two companies at that point. Company
"E," of the Ninth Regiment, under Capt. Jerome E. Dane, was stationed
at Crisp's farm, about half way between New Ulm and South Bend. Col.
John R. Jones of Chatfield collected about three hundred men, and
reported to me at Garden City. They were organized into companies under
Captains N. P. Colburn and Post, and many of them were stationed at
Garden City, where they erected a serviceable fort of saw-logs. Others
of this command were stationed at points along the Blue Earth river.
Capt. Cornelius F. Buck of Winona raised a company of fifty-three men,
all mounted, and started west. They reached Winnebago City, in the
county of Faribault, on the 7th of September, where they reported to me,
and were stationed at Chain Lakes, about twenty miles west of Winnebago
City, and twenty of this company were afterwards sent to Madelia. A
stockade was erected by this company at Martin Lake. In the latter part
of August Capt. A. J. Edgerton of Company "B," Tenth Regiment, arrived
at South Bend, and having made his report, was stationed at the
Winnebago agency, to keep watch on those Indians and cover Mankato from
that direction. About the same time Company "F," of the Eighth Regiment,
under Capt. L. Aldrich, reported, and was stationed at New Ulm. E. St.
Julien Cox, who had previously reinforced me at New Ulm, was
commissioned a captain, and put in command of a force which was
stationed at Madelia, in Watonwan county, where they erected quite an
artistic fortification of logs, with bastions. While there an attack was
made upon some citizens who had ventured beyond the safe limits, and
several whites were killed.