Sioux Indians--the M'day-wa-kon-tons, Wak-pa-koo-tas, Si-si-tons and
Wak-pay-tons. The first two bands were known as the Lower Sioux and the
last two bands as the Upper Sioux. These designations arose from the
fact that, in the sale of their lands to the United States by the
treaties of 1851, the lands of the Lower Sioux were situate in the
southern part of the state, and those of the upper bands in the more
northern part, and when a reservation was set apart for their future
occupation on the upper waters of the Minnesota river they were
similarly located thereon. Their reservation consisted of a strip of
land, ten miles wide, on each side of the Minnesota river, beginning at
a point a few miles below Fort Ridgely and extending to the headwaters
of the river. The reservation of the lower bands extended up to the
Yellow Medicine river; that of the upper bands included all above the
last named river. An agent was appointed to administer the affairs of
these Indians, whose agencies were established at Redwood for the lower
and at Yellow Medicine for the upper bands. At these agencies the
annuities were paid to the Indians, and so continued from the making of
the treaties to the year 1862. These bands were wild, very little
progress having been made in their civilization, the very nature of the
situation preventing very much advance in that line. The whole country
to the north and west of their reservation was an open, wild region,
extending to the Rocky Mountains, inhabited only by the buffalo, which
animals ranged in vast herds from British Columbia to Texas. The buffalo
was the chief subsistence of the Indians, who naturally frequented their
ranges, and only came to the agencies when expecting their payments.
When they did come, and the money and goods were not ready for them,
which was frequently the case, they suffered great inconvenience, and
were forced to incur debt with the white traders for their subsistence,
all of which tended to create bad feelings between them and the whites.
The Indian saw that he had yielded a splendid domain to the whites, and
that they were rapidly occupying it. They could not help seeing that the
whites were pushing them gradually--I may say rapidly--out of their
ancestral possessions and towards the West, which knowledge naturally
created a hostile feeling towards them. The Sioux were a brave people,
and the young fighting men were always making comparisons between
themselves and the whites, and bantering each other as to whether they
were or were not afraid of them. I made a study of these people for
several years, having had them in charge as their agent, and I think
understood their feelings and standing towards the whites as well as any
one. Much has been said and written about the immediate cause of the
outbreak of 1862, but I do not believe that anything can be assigned out
of the general course of events that will account for the trouble.
Delay, as usual, had occurred in the arrival of the money for the
payment, which was due in July, 1862. The war was in full force with the
South, and the Indians saw that Minnesota was sending thousands of men
out of the state to fight the battles of the Union. Major Thomas
Galbraith was their agent in the summer of 1862, and being desirous of
contributing to the volunteer forces of the government, he raised a
company of half-breeds on the reservation and started with them for Fort
Snelling, the general rendezvous, to have them mustered into service. It
was very natural that the Indians who were seeking for trouble should
look upon this movement as a sign of weakness on the part of the
government, and reason that, if the United States could not conquer its
enemy without their assistance, it must be in serious difficulties.
Various things of similar character contributed to create a feeling
among the Indians that it was a good time to recover their country,
redress all their grievances, and reestablish themselves as lords of the
land. They had ambitious leaders. Little Crow was the principal
instigator of war on the whites. He was a man of greater parts than any
Indian in the tribe. I had used him on many trying occasions, as the
captain of my bodyguard, and my ambassador to negotiate with other
tribes, and always found him equal to any emergency; but on this
occasion his ambition ran away with his judgment, and led him to fatal
results. With all these influences at work, it took but a spark to fire
the magazine, and that spark was struck on the seventeenth day of
August, 1862.
A small party of Indians were at Acton, on August 17th, and got into a
petty controversy about some eggs with a settler, which created a
difference of opinion among them as to what they should do, some
advocating one course and some another. The controversy led to one
Indian saying that the other was afraid of the white man, to resent
which, and to prove his bravery, he killed the settler, and the whole
family was massacred. When these Indians reached the agency, and related
their bloody work, those who wanted trouble seized upon the opportunity,
and insisted that the only way out of the difficulty was to kill all the
whites, and on the morning of the 18th of August the bloody work began.
It is proper to say here that some of the Indians who were connected
with the missionaries, conspicuously An-pay-tu-tok-a-cha, or John
Otherday, and Paul Ma-za-ku-ta-ma-ni, the president of the Hazelwood
Republic, of which I have spoken, having learned of the intention of the
Indians, informed the missionaries on the night of the 17th, who, to
the number of about sixty, fled eastward to Hutchinson, in McLeod
county, and escaped. The next morning, being the 18th of August, the
Indians commenced the massacre of the whites, and made clean work of all
at the agencies. They then separated into small squads of from five to
ten and spread over the country to the south, east and southeast,
attacking the settlers in detail at their homes and continued this work
during all of the 18th and part of the 19th of August, until they had
murdered in cold blood quite one thousand people--men, women and
children. The way the work was conducted, was as follows: The party of
Indians would call at the house, and, being well known, would cause no
alarm. They would await a good opportunity, and shoot the man of the
family; then butcher the women and children, and, after carrying off
everything that they thought valuable to them, they would burn the house
and proceed to the next homestead and repeat the performance.
Occasionally some one would escape, and spread the news of the massacre
to the neighbors, and all who could would escape to some place of
refuge.
The news of the outbreak reached Fort Ridgely (which was situated about
thirteen miles down the Minnesota river) from the agencies about eight
o'clock on the morning of the 18th, by means of the arrival of a team
from the Lower Agency, bringing a badly wounded man; but no details
could be obtained. The fort was in command of Capt. John Marsh, of
Company "B," Fifth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. He had eighty-five men
in his company, from which he selected forty-five, leaving the balance,
under Lieut. T. F. Gere, to defend the fort. This little squad, under
command of Captain Marsh, with a full supply of ammunition, provisions,
blankets, etc., accompanied by a six-mule team, left the fort at
9:00 a. m., on the 18th of August, for the Lower Sioux Agency, which
was on the west side of the Minnesota river, the fort being on the east,
which necessitated the crossing of the river by a ferry near the agency.
On the march up the command passed nine or ten dead bodies, all bearing
evidence of having been murdered by the Indians, one of which was Dr.
Humphrey, surgeon at the agency. On reaching the vicinity of the ferry
no Indians were in sight, except one on the opposite side of the river,
who tried to induce them to cross over. A dense chaparral bordered the
river on the agency side, and tall grass covered the bottom on the side
where the troops were. Suspicion of the presence of Indians was aroused
by the disturbed condition of the water of the river, which was muddy
and contained floating grass. Then a group of ponies was seen. At this
point, and without any notice whatever, Indians in great numbers sprang
up on all sides of the troops, and opened upon them a deadly fire. About
half of the men were killed instantly. Finding themselves surrounded, it
became with the survivors a question of _sauve qui peut_. Several
desperate hand-to-hand encounters occurred, with varying results, when
the remnant of the command made a point down the river, about two miles
from the ferry, Captain Marsh being of the number. Here they attempted
to cross, but the captain was drowned in the effort. Only from thirteen
to fifteen of the command reached the fort alive. Among those killed was
Peter Quinn, the United States interpreter, an Irishman, who had been in
the Indian territory for many years. He had married into the Chippewa
tribe. He was a man much esteemed by the army and all old settlers.
Much criticism has been indulged in as to whether Captain Marsh, when he
became convinced of the general outbreak, should not have retreated to
the fort. Of course, forty-five men could do nothing against five or six
hundred warriors, who were known to be at or about the agency. The Duke
of Wellington, when asked as to what was the best test of a general,
said, "To know when to retreat, and to dare to do it." Captain Marsh
cannot be justly judged by any such criterion. He was not an experienced
general. He was a young, brave, and enthusiastic soldier. He knew little
of Indians. The country knows that he thought he was doing his duty in
advancing. I am confident, whether this judgment is intelligent or not,
posterity will hold in warmer esteem the memory of Captain Marsh and his
gallant little band than if he had adopted the more prudent course of
retracing his steps. Gen. George Custer was led into an ambush of almost
the exact character, which was prepared for him by many of the same
Indians who attacked Marsh, and he lost five companies of the Seventh
United States Cavalry, one of the best fighting regiments in the
service, not a man escaping.
Immediately previous to the outbreak Lieut. Timothy J. Sheehan, of
Company "C," Fifth Minnesota, had been sent, with about fifty men of his
company, to the Yellow Medicine Agency, on account of some disorder
prevailing among the Indians; but having performed his duty, he had been
ordered to Fort Ripley, and had on the 17th left Fort Ridgley, and on
the 18th had reached a point near Glencoe, distant from Fort Ridgley
about forty miles. As soon as Captain Marsh became aware of the
outbreak, he sent the following dispatch to Lieutenant Sheehan, which
reached him on the evening of the 18th:
"_Lieutenant Sheehan:_
"It is absolutely necessary that you should return with your
command immediately to this post. The Indians are raising hell
at the Lower Agency. Return as soon as possible."
Lieutenant Sheehan was then a young Irishman, of about the age of
twenty-five years, with immense physical vigor, and corresponding
enthusiasm. He immediately broke camp and returned to the fort, arriving
there on the 19th of August, having made a forced march of forty-two
miles in nine and one-half hours. He did not arrive a moment too soon.
Being the ranking officer after the death of Captain Marsh, he took
command of the post. The garrison then consisted of the remnant of
Marsh's Company "B," fifty-one men, Sheehan's Company "C," fifty men,
and the Renville Rangers, fifty men. This latter company was the one
raised by Major Galbraith, the Sioux agent at the agencies, and was
composed principally of half-breeds. It was commanded by Capt. James
Gorman. On reaching St. Peter, on its way down to Snelling to be
mustered into the service of the United States, it learned of the
outbreak, and at once returned to Ridgley, having appropriated the arms
of a militia company at St. Peter. There was also at Ridgley, Sergeant
Jones of the regular artillery, who had been left there in charge of the
military stores. He was quite an expert gunner, and there were several
field-pieces at the fort. Besides this garrison, a large number of
people from the surrounding country had sought safety at the fort, and
there was also a party of gentlemen, who had brought up the annuity
money to pay the Indians, who, learning of the troubles, had stopped
with the money, amounting to some $70,000 in specie. I will here leave
the fort for the present, and turn to other points that became prominent
in the approaching war.
On the night of the 18th of August, the day of the outbreak, the news
reached St. Peter, and, as I have before stated, induced the Renville
Rangers to retrace their steps. Great excitement prevailed, as no one
could tell at what moment the Indians might dash into the town, and
massacre the inhabitants.
The people at New Ulm, which was situated about sixteen miles below Fort
Ridgely, on the Minnesota river, dispatched a courier to St. Peter as
soon as they became aware of the trouble. He arrived at 4 o'clock a. m.
on the 19th, and came immediately to my house, which was about one mile
below the town, and informed me that the Indians were killing people all
over the country. Having lived among the Indians for several years, and
at one time had charge of them as their agent, I thoroughly understood
the danger of the situation, and knowing that, whether the story was
true or false, the frontier was no place at such a time for women and
children, I told him to wake up the people at St. Peter, and that I
would be there quickly. I immediately placed my family in a wagon, and
told them to flee down the river, and taking all the guns, powder and
lead I could find in my house, I arrived at St. Peter about 6 a. m. The
men of the town were soon assembled at the court-house, and in a very
short time a company was formed of 116 men, of which I was chosen as
captain, William B. Dodd as first, and Wolf H. Meyer as second
lieutenant. Before noon two men, Henry A. Swift, afterwards governor of
the state, and William C. Hayden, were dispatched to the front in a
buggy to scout, and locate the enemy if he was near, and about noon
sixteen mounted men under L. M. Boardman, sheriff of the county, were
started on a similar errand. Both these squads kept moving until they
reached New Ulm, at about 5 p. m.
Great activity was displayed in equipping the main body of the company
for service. All the guns of the place were seized, and put into the
hands of the men. There not being any large game in this part of the
country, rifles were scarce, but shot-guns were abundant. All the
blacksmith shops and gun shops were set at work moulding bullets, and we
soon had a gun in every man's hand, and he was supplied with a powder
horn or a whiskey flask full of powder, a box of caps and a pocket-full
of bullets. We impressed all the wagons we needed for transportation,
and all the blankets and provisions that were necessary for subsistence
and comfort. While these preparations were going on a large squad from
Le Sueur, ten miles further down the river, under the command of Captain
Tousley, sheriff of Le Sueur county, joined us. Early in the day a squad
from Swan lake, under an old settler named Samuel Coffin, had gone to
New Ulm to see what was the matter.
Our advance guard reached New Ulm just in time to participate in its
defense against an attack of about one hundred Indians who had been
murdering the settlers on the west side of the river, between the town
and Fort Ridgely. The inhabitants of New Ulm were almost exclusively
German, there being only a few English-speaking citizens among them, and
they were not familiar with the character of the Indians, but the
instinct of self-preservation had impelled them to fortify the town with
barricades to keep the enemy out. The town was built in the usual way of
western towns, the principal settlement being along the main street, and
the largest and best houses occupying a space of about three blocks.
Some of these houses were of brick and stone, so with a strong barricade
around them, the town was quite defensible. Several of the people were
killed in this first attack, but the Indians, knowing of the coming
reinforcements, withdrew, after firing five or six buildings.
The main body of my company, together with the squad from Le Sueur,
reached the ferry about two miles below the settled part of New Ulm,
about 8 p. m., having made thirty-two miles in seven hours, in a
drenching rainstorm. The blazing houses in the distance gave a very
threatening aspect to the situation, but we crossed the ferry
successfully, and made the town without accident. The next day we were
reinforced by a full company from Mankato under Capt. William Bierbauer.
Several companies were formed from the citizens of the town. A full
company from South Bend arrived on the 20th or 21st, and various other
squads, greater or less in numbers, came in during the week, before
Saturday, the 23d, swelling our forces to about three hundred men, but
nearly all very poorly armed. We improved the barricades and sent out
daily scouting parties who succeeded in bringing in many people who were
in hiding in swamps, and who would have undoubtedly been lost without
this succor. It soon became apparent that, to maintain any discipline or
order in the town, some one man must be placed in command of the entire
force. The officers of the various companies assembled to choose a
commander-in-chief, and the selection fell to me. A provost guard was at
once established, order inaugurated, and we awaited events.
I have been thus particular in my description of the movements at this
point because it gives an idea of the defenseless condition in which the
outbreak found the people of the country, and also because it shows the
intense energy with which the settlers met the emergency, at its very
inception, from which I will deduce the conclusion at the proper time
that this prompt initial action saved the state from a calamity, the
magnitude of which is unrecorded in the history of Indian wars.
Having described the defensive condition of Fort Ridgely and New Ulm,
the two extreme frontier posts, the former being on the Indian
reservation and the latter only a few miles southeast of it, I will take
up the subject at the capital of the state. The news reached Governor
Ramsey, at St. Paul, on the 19th of August, the second day of the
outbreak. He at once hastened to Mendota, at the mouth of the Minnesota
river, and requested ex-Governor Sibley to accept the command of such
forces as could be put in the field, to check the advance of and punish
the Indians. Governor Sibley had a large experience with the Sioux,
perhaps more than any man in the state, having traded and lived with
them since 1834, and besides that, was a distinguished citizen of the
state, having been its first governor. He accepted the position, with
the rank of colonel in the state militia. The Sixth Regiment was being
recruited at Fort Snelling for the Civil War, and, on the 20th of
August, Colonel Sibley started up the valley of the Minnesota with four
companies of that regiment, and arrived at St. Peter on Friday, the 22d.
Capt. A. D. Nelson of the regular army had been appointed colonel of the
Sixth, and William Crooks had been appointed lieutenant colonel of the
Seventh. Colonel Crooks conveyed the orders of the governor to Colonel
Nelson, overtaking him at Bloomington Ferry. On receipt of his orders,
finding he was to report to Colonel Sibley, he made the point of
military etiquette, that an officer of the regular army could not report
to an officer of militia of the same rank, and turning over his command
to Colonel Crooks, he returned to St. Paul and handed in his
resignation. It was accepted, and Colonel Crooks was appointed colonel
of the Sixth. Not knowing much about military etiquette, I will not
venture an opinion on the action of Colonel Nelson in this instance, but
it always seemed to me that, in the face of the enemy, and especially
considering the high standing of Colonel Sibley, and the intimate
friendship that existed between the two men, it would have been better
to have waived this point, and unitedly fought the enemy, settling all
such matters afterwards.
On Sunday, the 24th, Colonel Sibley's force at St. Peter, was augmented
by the arrival of about two hundred mounted men, under the command of
William J. Cullen, formerly superintendent of Indian affairs, called the
Cullen Guard. On the same day six more companies of the Sixth arrived,
making up the full regiment, and also about one hundred more mounted
men, and several squads of volunteer militia. The mounted men were
placed under the command of Col. Samuel McPhail. By these acquisitions
Colonel Sibley's command numbered about 1,400 men. Although the
numerical strength was considerable, the command was practically
useless. The ammunition did not fit the guns of the Sixth Regiment, and
had to be all made over. The horses of the mounted men, were raw and
undisciplined, and the men themselves were inexperienced and practically
unarmed. It was the best the country afforded, but was probably about as
poorly equipped an army as ever entered the field--and to face what I
regard as the best warriors to be found on the North American continent;
but fortunately the officers and men were all that could be desired. The
leaders of this army were the best of men, and being seconded by
intelligent and enthusiastic subordinates, they soon overcame their
physical difficulties; but they knew nothing of the strength, position
or previous movements of the enemy, no news having reached them from
either Fort Ridgely or New Ulm. Any mistake made by this force,
resulting in defeat, would have been fatal. No such mistake was made.
Having now shown the principal forces in the field, we will turn to the
movements of the enemy. The Indians felt that it would be necessary to
carry Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, before they extended their depredations
further down the valley of the Minnesota, and concentrated their forces
for an attack on the fort. Ridgely was in no sense a fort. It was simply
a collection of buildings, principally frame structures, facing in
towards the parade ground. On one side was a long stone barrack and a
stone commissary building, which was the only defensible part of it.
THE ATTACK ON FORT RIDGELY.
On the 20th of August, at about 3 p. m., an attack was made upon the
fort by a large body of Indians. The first intimation the garrison had
of the assault was a volley poured through one of the openings between
the buildings. Considerable confusion ensued, but order was soon
restored. Sergeant Jones attempted to use his cannon, but to his utter
dismay, he found them disabled. This was the work of some of the
half-breeds belonging to the Renville Rangers, who had deserted to the
enemy. They had been spiked by ramming old rags into them. The sergeant
soon rectified this difficulty, and brought his pieces into action. The
attack lasted three hours, when it ceased, with a loss to the garrison
of three killed and eight wounded.
On Thursday, the 21st, two further attacks were made on the fort, one in
the morning and one in the afternoon, but with a reduced force, less
earnestness, and little damage. On Friday, the 22d, the savages seemed
determined to carry the fort. About eight hundred or more, under the
leadership of Little Crow, came down from the agency. Concentrating
themselves in the ravines which lay on several sides of the fort, they
made a feint, by sending about twenty warriors out on the prairie for
the purpose of drawing out the garrison from the fort, and cutting them
off. Such a movement, if successful, would have been fatal to the
defenders; but fortunately there were men among them of much experience
in Indian warfare, who saw through the scheme, and prevented the success
of the maneuver. Then followed a shower of bullets on the fort from all
directions. The attack was continued for nearly five hours. It was
bitterly fought, and courageously and intelligently resisted. Sergeant
Jones and other artillerists handled the guns with effective skill,
exploding shells in the outlying buildings, and burning them over the
heads of the Indians, while the enemy endeavored to burn the wooden
buildings composing the fort, by shooting fire arrows on their roofs.
One of the most exposed and dangerous duties to be performed was
covering the wooden roofs with earth to prevent fire. One white man was
killed and seven wounded in this engagement. Lieutenant Sheehan, who
commanded the post through all these trying occurrences, Lieutenant
Gorman, of the Renville Rangers, Lieutenant Whipple, and Sergeants Jones
and McGrew, all did their duty in a manner becoming veterans, and the
men seconded their efforts handsomely. The Indians, after this effort,
being convinced that they could not take the fort, and anticipating the
coming of reinforcements, withdrew, and, concentrating all their
available forces, descended upon New Ulm the next morning, August 23d,
for a final struggle. In the official history (written for the state)
of this battle at Fort Ridgely, I place the force of the Indians as 450,
but have learned since from reliable sources that it was as above
stated.
BATTLE OF NEW ULM.
We left New Ulm, after the arrival of the various companies which I have
named on the 21st of August, strengthening its barricades and awaiting
events. I had placed a good glass on the top of one of the stone
buildings within the barricades for the purpose of observation, and
always kept a sentinel there to report any movement he should discover
in any direction throughout the surrounding country. We had heard
distinctly the cannonading at the fort for the past two days, but knew
nothing of the result of the fight at that point. I was perfectly
familiar, as were many of my command, with the country between New Ulm
and the fort, on both sides of the river, knowing the house of every
settler on the roads.