--[Louis Fauche-Borel (1762-1829), a Swiss who devoted himself to

the cause of the Royalists. As Louis stepped on the shore of France

in 1814, Fauche-Borel was ready to assist him from the boat, and was

met with the gracious remark that he was always at hand when a

service was required. His services were however left unrewarded]--

CHAPTER VIII.

1806.

Alarm of the city of Hamburg--The French at Bergdorf--Favourable

orders issued by Bernadotte--Extortions in Prussia--False

endorsements--Exactions of the Dutch--Napoleon's concern for his

wounded troops--Duroc's mission to the King of Prussia--Rejection of

the Emperor's demands--My negotiations at Hamburg--Displeasure of

the King of Sweden--M. Netzel and M. Wetteratedt.

At this critical moment Hamburg was menaced on all sides; the French even

occupied a portion of its territory. The French troops, fortunately for

the country, were attached to the corps commanded by the Prince de

Ponte-Corvo. This military occupation alarmed the town of Hamburg, to

which, indeed, it proved very injurious. I wrote to Marshal Bernadotte

on the subject. The grounds on which the Senate appealed for the

evacuation of their territory were such that hernadotte could not but

acknowledge their justice. The prolonged stay of the French troops in

the bailiwick of Bergdorf, which had all the appearance of an

occupation, might have led to the confiscation of all Hamburg property

in England, to the laying an embargo on the vessels of the Republic, and

consequently to the ruin of a great part of the trade of France and

Holland, which was carried on under the flag of Hamburg. There was no

longer any motive for occupying the bailiwick of Bergdorf when there

were no Prussians in that quarter. It would have been an absurd

misfortune that eighty men stationed in that bailiwick should, for the

sake of a few louis and a few ells of English cloth, have occasioned the

confiscation of Hamburg, French, and Dutch property to the amount of

80,000,000 francs.

Marshal Bernadotte replied to me on the 16th of November, and said,

"I hasten to inform you that I have given orders for the evacuation of

the bailiwick of Bergdorf and all the Hamburg territory. If you could

obtain from the Senate of Hamburg, by the 19th of this month, two or

three thousand pairs of shoes, you would oblige me greatly. They shall

be paid for in goods or in money."

I obtained what Bernadotte required from the Senate, who knew his

integrity, while they were aware that that quality was not the

characteristic of all who commanded the French armies! What extortions

took place during the occupation of Prussia! I will mention one of the

means which, amongst others, was employed at Berlin to procure money.

Bills of exchange were drawn, on which endorsements were forged, and

these bills were presented to the bankers on whom they were purported to

be drawn. One day some of these forged bills to a large amount were

presented to Messrs. Mathiesen and Silleine of Hamburg, who, knowing the

endorsement to be forged, refused to cash them. The persons who

presented the bills carried their impudence so far as to send for the

gendarmes, but the bankers persisted in their refusal. I was informed of

this almost incredible scene, which had drawn together a great number of

people. Indignant at such audacious robbery, I instantly proceeded to

the spot and sent away the gendarmes, telling them it was not their duty

to protect robbers, and that it was my business to listen to any just

claims which might be advanced. Under Clarke's government at Berlin the

inhabitants were subjected to all kinds of oppression and exaction.

Amidst these exactions and infamous proceedings, which are not the

indispensable consequences of war, the Dutch generals distinguished

themselves by a degree of rapacity which brought to mind the period of

the French Republican peculations in Italy. It certainly was not their

new King who set the example of this conduct. His moderation was well

known, and it was as much the result of his disposition as of his honest

principles. Louis Bonaparte, who was a King in spite of himself,

afforded an example of all that a good man could suffer upon a usurped

throne.

When the King of Prussia found himself defeated at every point he

bitterly repented having undertaken a war which had delivered his States

into Napoleon's power in less time than that in which Austria had fallen

the preceding year. He wrote to the Emperor, soliciting a suspension of

hostilities. Rapp was present when Napoleon received the King of

Prussia's letter. "It is too late," said he; "but, no matter, I wish to

stop the effusion of blood; I am ready to agree to anything which is not

prejudicial to the honour or interests of the nation." Then calling

Duroc, he gave him orders to visit the wounded, and see that they wanted

for nothing. He added, "Visit every man on my behalf; give them all the

consolation of which they stand in need; afterwards find the King of

Prussia, and if he offers reasonable proposals let me know them."

Negotiations were commenced, but Napoleon's conditions were of a nature

which was considered inadmissible. Prussia still hoped for assistance

from the Russian forces. Besides, the Emperor's demands extended to

England, who at that moment had no reason to accede to the pretensions of

France. The Emperor wished England to restore to France the colonies

which she bad captured since the commencement of the war, that Russia

should restore to(o) the Porte Moldavia and Wallachia, which she then

occupied; in short, he acted upon the advice which some tragedy-king

gives to his ambassador: "Demand everything, that you may obtain

nothing." The Emperor's demands were, in fact, so extravagant that it

was scarcely possible he himself could entertain the hope of their being

accepted. Negotiations, alternately resumed and abandoned, were carried

on with coldness on both sides until the moment when England prevailed on

Russia to join Prussia against France; they then altogether ceased: and

it was for the sake of appearing to wish for their renewal, on bases

still more favourable to France, that Napoleon sent Duroc to the King of

Prussia. Duroc found the King at Osterode, on the other side of the

Vistula. The only answer he received from His Majesty was, "The time is

passed;" which was very much like Napoleon's observation; "It is too

late."

Whilst Duroc was on his mission to the King of Prussia I was myself

negotiating at Hamburg. Bonaparte was very anxious to detach Sweden from

the coalition, and to terminate the war with her by a separate treaty.

Sweden, indeed, was likely to be very useful to him if Prussia, Russia,

and England should collect a considerable mass of troops in the north.

Denmark was already with us, and by gaining over Sweden also the union of

those two powers might create a diversion, and give serious alarm to the

coalition, which would be obliged to concentrate its principal force to

oppose the attack of the grand army in Poland. The opinions of M.

Peyron, the Swedish Minister at Hamburg, were decidedly opposed to the

war in which his sovereign was engaged with France. I was sorry that

this gentleman left Hamburg upon leave of absence for a year just at the

moment I received my instructions from the Emperor upon this subject.

M. Peyron was succeeded by M. Netzel, and I soon had the pleasure of

perceiving that his opinions corresponded in every respect with those

of his predecessor.

As soon as he arrived M. Netzel sought an interview to speak to me on the

subject of the Swedes, who had been taken prisoners on the Drave. He

entreated me to allow the officers to return to Sweden on their parole.

I was anxious to get Netzel's demand acceded to, and availed myself of

that opportunity to lead him gradually to the subject of my instructions.

I had good reason to be satisfied with the manner in which he received my

first overtures. I said nothing to him of the justice of which he was

not previously convinced. I saw he understood that his sovereign would

have everything to gain by a reconciliation with France, and he told me

that all Sweden demanded peace. Thus encouraged, I told him frankly that

I was instructed to treat with him. M. Netzel assured me that M. de

Wetterstedt, the King of Sweden's private secretary, with whom he was

intimate, and from whom he showed me several letters, was of the same

opinion on the subject as himself. He added, that he had permission to

correspond with the King, and that he would; write the same evening to

his sovereign and M.. de Wetterstedt to acquaint them with our

conversation.

It will be perceived, from what I have stated, that no negotiation was

ever commenced under more favourable auspices; but who could foresee what

turn the King of Sweden would take? That unlucky Prince took M. Netzel's

letter in very ill part, and M. de Wetterstedt himself received

peremptory orders to acquaint M. Netzel with his sovereign's displeasure

at his having presumed to visit a French Minster, and, above all, to

enter into a political conversation with him, although it was nothing

more than conversation. The King did not confine himself to reproaches;

M. Netzel came in great distress to inform me he had received orders to

quit Hamburg immediately, without even awaiting the arrival of his

successor. He regarded his disgrace as complete. I had the pleasure of

seeing M. Netzel again in 1809 at Hamburg, where he was on a mission from

King Charles XIII.

CHAPTER IX.

1806

The Continental system--General indignation excited by it--Sale of

licences by the French Government--Custom-house system at Hamburg--

My letter to the Emperor--Cause of the rupture with Russia--

Bernadotte's visit to me--Trial by court-martial for the purchase of

a sugar-loaf--Davoust and the captain "rapporteur"--Influence of the

Continental system on Napoleon's fall.

I have a few remarks to make on the famous Continental system, which was

a subject of such engrossing interest. I had, perhaps, better

opportunities than any other person of observing the fraud and estimating

the fatal consequences of this system. It took its rise during the war

in 1806, and was brought into existence by a decree; dated from Berlin.

The project was conceived by weak counsellors, who; perceiving the

Emperor's just indignation at the duplicity of England, her repugnance to

enter, into negotiations with him, and her constant endeavours to raise

enemies against France, prevailed upon him to issue the decree, which I

could only regard as an act of madness and tyranny. It was not a decree,

but fleets, that were wanting. Without a navy it was ridiculous to

declare the British Isles in a state of blockade, whilst the English

fleets were in fact blockading all the French ports. This declaration

was, however, made in the Berlin Decree. This is what was called the

Continental system! which, in plain terms, was nothing but a system of

fraud and pillage.

One can now scarcely conceive how Europe could for a single day endure

that fiscal tyranny which extorted exorbitant prices for articles which

the habits of three centuries had rendered indispensable to the poor as

well as to the rich. So little of truth is there in the pretence that

this system had for its sole and exclusive object to prevent the sale of

English goods, that licences for their disposal were procured at a high

price by whoever was rich enough to pay for them. The number and quality

of the articles exported from France were extravagantly exaggerated. It

was, indeed, necessary to take out some of the articles is compliance

with the Emperor's wishes, but they were only thrown into the sea. And

yet no one had the honesty to tell the Emperor that England sold on the

continent but bought scarcely anything. The speculation in licences was

carried to a scandalous extent only to enrich a few, and to satisfy the

short-sighted views of the contrivers of the system.

This system proves what is written in the annals of the human heart and

mind, that the cupidity of the one is insatiable, and the errors of the

other incorrigible. Of this I will cite an example, though it refers to

a period posterior to the origin of the Continental system. In Hamburg,

in 1811, under Davoust's government, a poor man had well-nigh been shot

for having introduced into the department of the Elbe a small loaf of

sugar for the use of his family, while at the same moment Napoleon was

perhaps signing a licence for the importation of a million of

sugar-loaves.

--[In this same year (1811) Murat, as King of Naples, not only

winked at the infringement of the Continental system, but almost

openly broke the law himself. His troops in Calabria and all round

his immense line sea coast, carried on an active trade with Sicilian

and English smugglers. This was so much the case that an officer

never set out from Naples to join, without, being, requested by his

wife, his relations or friends, to bring them some English muslins,

some sugar and coffee, together with a few needles, pen-knives, and

razors. Some of the Neapolitan officers embarked in really large

commercial operations, going shares with the custom house people who

were there to enforce the law, and making their soldiers load and

unload the contraband vessels. The Comte de -----, a French officer

on Murat's staff, was very noble, but very poor, and excessively

extravagant. After making several vain efforts to set him up in the

world, the King told him one day he would give him the command of

the troops round the Gulf of Salerno; adding that the devil was in

it if he could not make a fortune in such a capital smuggling

district, in a couple of years.--The Count took the hint, and did

make a fortune.--Editor 1836 edition.]--

Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, whilst the Government

themselves carried it on extensively. The same cause filled the Treasury

with money, and the prisons with victims:

The custom-house laws of this period, which waged open war against

rhubarb, and armed the coasts of the Continent against the introduction

of senna, did not save the Continental system from destruction. Ridicule

attended the installation of the odious prevotal courts. The president

of the Prevotal Court at Hamburg, who was a Frenchman, delivered an

address, in which he endeavoured to prove that in the time of the

Ptolemies there had existed extraordinary fiscal tribunals, and that it

was to those Egypt owed her prosperity. Terror was thus introduced by

the most absurd folly. The ordinary customhouse officers, formerly so

much abhorred in Hamburg, declared with reason that they would soon be

regretted, and than the difference between them and the prevotal courts

would soon be felt. Bonaparte's counsellors led him to commit the folly

of requiring that a ship which had obtained a licence should export

merchandise equivalent to that of the colonial produce to be imported

under the authority of the licence. What was the consequence? The

speculators bought at a low price old stores of silk-which change of

fashion had made completely unsaleable, and as those articles were

prohibited in England they were thrown into the sea without their loss

being felt. The profits of the speculation made ample amends for the

sacrifice. The Continental system was worthy only of the ages of

ignorance and barbarism, and had it been admissible in theory, was

impracticable in application.

--[Sydney Smith was struck with the, ridiculous side of the war of

tariffs: "We are told that the Continent is to be reconquered by the

want of rhubarb and plums." (Essays of Sydney Smith, p. 533, edition

of 1861).]--

It cannot be sufficiently stigmatised. They were not the friends of the

Emperor who recommended a system calculated to rouse the indignation of

Europe, and which could not fail to create reaction. To tyrannize over

the human species, and to exact uniform admiration and submission, is to

require an impossibility. It would seem that fate, which had still some

splendid triumphs in store for Bonaparte, intended to prepare beforehand

the causes which were to deprive him of all his triumphs at once, and

plunge him into reverses even greater than the good fortune which had

favoured his elevation.

The prohibition of trade, the habitual severity in the execution of this

odious system, made it operate like a Continental impost. I will give a

proof of this, and I state nothing but what came under my own

observation. The fiscal regulations were very rigidly enforced at

Hamburg, and along the two lines of Cuxhaven and Travemunde. M. Eudel,

the director of that department, performed his duty with zeal and

disinterestedness. I feel gratified in rendering him this tribute.

Enormous quantities of English merchandise and colonial produce were

accumulated at Holstein, where they almost all arrived by way of Kiel and

Hudsum, and were smuggled over the line at the expense of a premium of 33

and 40 per cent. Convinced of this fact by a thousand proofs, and weary

of the vexations of the preventive system, I took upon myself to lay my

opinions on the subject before the Emperor. He had given me permission

to write to him personally, without any intermediate agency, upon

everything that I might consider essential to his service. I sent an

extraordinary courier to Fontainebleau, where he then was, and in my

despatch I informed him that, notwithstanding his preventive guard, every

prohibited article was smuggled in because the profits on the sale in

Germany, Poland, Italy, and even France, into which the contrabrand goods

found their way, were too considerable not to induce persons to incur all

risks to obtain them. I advised him, at the very time he was about to

unite the Hanse Towns to the French Empire, to permit merchandise to be

imported subject to a duty of 33 per cent., which was about equal to the

amount of the premium for insurance. The Emperor adopted my advice

without hesitation, and in 1811 the regulation produced a revenue of

upwards of 60,000,000 francs in Hamburg alone.

This system, however, embroiled us with Sweden and Russia, who could not

endure that Napoleon should enact a strict blockade from them, whilst he

was himself distributing licences in abundance. Bernadotte, on his way

to Sweden, passed through Hamburg in October 1810. He stayed with me

three days, during which time he scarcely saw any person but myself. He

asked my opinion as to what he should do in regard to the Continental

system. I did not hesitate to declare to him, not as a French Minister,

but as a private individual to his friend, that in his place, at the head

of a poor nation, which could only subsist by the exchange of its

territorial productions with England, I would open my ports, and give the

Swedes gratuitously that general licence which Bonaparte sold in detail

to intrigue and cupidity.

The Berlin decree could not fail to cause a reaction against the

Emperor's fortune by raising up whole nations against him. The hurling

of twenty kings from their thrones would have excited less hatred than

this contempt for the wants of nations. This profound ignorance of the

maxims of political economy caused general privation and misery, which in

their turn occasioned general hostility. The system could only succeed

in the impossible event of all the powers of Europe honestly endeavouring

to carry it into effect. A single free port would have destroyed it.

In order to ensure its complete success it was necessary to conquer and

occupy all countries, and never to evacuate them. As a means of ruining

England it was contemptible. It was necessary that all Europe should be

compelled by force of arms to join this absurd coalition, and that the

same force should be constantly employed to maintain it. Was this

possible? The captain "rapporteur" of a court-martial allowed a poor

peasant to escape the punishment due to the offence of having bought a

loaf of sugar beyond the custom-house barrier. This officer was some

time afterwards at a dinner given by Marshal Davoust; the latter said to

him, "You have a very scrupulous conscience, sir; go to headquarters and

you will find an order there for you." This order sent him eighty

leagues from Hamburg. It is necessary to have witnessed, as I have, the

numberless vexations and miseries occasioned by the unfortunate

Continental system to understand the mischief its authors did in Europe,

and how much that mischief contributed to Napoleon's fall.

--[The so-called Continental system was framed by Napoleon in

revenge for the English very extended system of blockades, after

Trafalgar had put it out of his power to attempt to keep the seas.

By these decrees all ports occupied by the French were closed to the

English, and all English goods were to be destroyed wherever found

in any country occupied by the French. All States under French

influence had to adopt this system. It must be remembered that

Napoleon eventually held or enforced his system on all the

coastlines of Europe, except that of Spain and Turkey; but as

Bourrienne shows the plan of giving licences to break his own system

was too lucrative to be resisted by him, or, still more, by his

officers. For the working of the system in the occupied lands,

Laffite the banker told Savary it was a grand idea, but

impracticable (Savary, tome v. p. 110). The Emperor Alexander is

reported to have said, after visiting England in 1814, that he

believed the system would have reduced England if it had lasted

another year. The English, who claimed the right of blockading any

coast with but little regard to the effectiveness of the blockade,

retaliated by orders in Council, the chief of which are dated 7th

January 1807, and 11th November 1807, by which no ships of any power

were allowed to trade between any French ports, or the ports of any

country closed to England. Whatever the real merits of the system,

and although it was the cause of war between the United States and

England, its execution did most to damage France and Napoleon, and

to band all Europe against it. It is curious that even in 1831 a

treaty had to be made to settle the claims of the United States on

France for unjust seizures under these decrees.]--

CHAPTER X.

1806-1807.

New system of war--Winter quarters--The Emperor's Proclamation--

Necessity of marching to meet the Russians--Distress in the Hanse

Towns--Order for 50,000 cloaks--Seizure of Russian corn and timber--

Murat's entrance into Warsaw--Re-establishment of Poland--Duroc's

accident--M. de Talleyrand's carriage stopped by the mud--Napoleon's

power of rousing the spirit of his troops--His mode of dictating--

The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin--His visits to Hamburg--The Duke of

Weimar--His letter and present--Journey of the Hereditary Prince of

Denmark to Paris--Batter, the English spy--Traveling clerks--Louis

Bonaparte and the Berlin decree--Creation of the Kingdom of Saxony--

Veneration of Germany for the King of Saxony--The Emperor's

uncertainty respecting Poland--Fetes and reviews at Warsaw--The

French Government at the Emperor's head quarters--Ministerial

portfolios sent to Warsaw.--Military preparations during the month

of January--Difference of our situation daring the campaigns of

Vienna and Prussia--News received and sent--Conduct of the Cabinet

of Austria similar to that of the Cabinet of Berlin--Battle of

Eylau--Unjust accusation against Bernadotte--Death of General

d'Hautpoult--Te Deum chanted by the Russians--Gardanne's mission to

Persia

Bonaparte was not only beyond all comparison the greatest captain of

modern times, but he may be said to have wrought a complete change in the

art of war. Before his time the most able generals regulated the

fighting season by the almanac. It was customary in Europe to brave the

cannon's mouth only from the first fine days of spring to the last fine

days of autumn; and the months of rain, snow, and frost were passed in

what were called winter quarters. Pichegru, in Holland, had set the

example of indifference to temperature. At Austerlitz, too, Bonaparte

had braved the severity of winter; this answered his purpose well, and he

adopted the same course in 1806. His military genius and activity seemed

to increase, and, proud of his troops, he determined to commence a winter

campaign in a climate more rigorous than any in which he had yet fought.

The men, chained to his destiny, were now required to brave the northern

blast, as they had formerly braved the vertical sun of Egypt. Napoleon,

who, above all generals, was remarkable for the choice of his fields of

battle, did not wish to wait tranquilly until the Russian army, which was

advancing towards Germany, should come to measure its strength with him

in the plains of conquered Prussia; he resolved to march to meet it, and

to reach it before it should arose the Vistula; but before he left Berlin

to explore and conqueror, Poland and the confines of Russia; he addressed

a proclamation to his troops, in which he stated all that had hitherto

been achieved by the French army, and at the same time announced his

future intentions. It was especially advisable that he should march

forward, for, had he waited until the Russians had passed the Vistula,

there could probably have been no winter campaign, and he would have been

obliged either to take up miserable winter quarters between the Vistula

and the Oder, or to recross the Oder to combat the enemy in Prussia.

Napoleon's military genius and indefatigable activity served him

admirably on this occasion, and the proclamation just alluded to, which

was dated from Berlin before his departure from Charlottenburg; proves

that he did not act fortuitously, as he frequently did, but that his

calculations were well-made.

--[Before leaving the capital of Prussia Bonaparte stole from the

monument, of Frederick the Great his sword and military orders. He

also plundered the galleries of Berlin and Potsdam of their best

pictures and statues, thus continuing the system he had began is

Italy. All those things he sent to Paris as trophies of victory and

glory.--Editor of as 1836 edition.]

A rapid and immense impulse given to great masses of men by the, will of

a single individual may produce transient lustre and dazzle the eyes of

the multitude; but when, at a distance from the theatre of glory, we flee

only the melancholy results which have been produced. The genius of

conquest can only be regarded as the genius of destruction. What a sad

picture was often presented to my eyes! I was continually doomed to hear

complaints of the general distress, and to execute orders which augmented

the immense sacrifices already made by the city of Hamburg. Thus, for

example, the Emperor desired me to furnish him with 50,000 cloaks which I

immediately did. I felt the importance of such an order with the

approach of winter, and in a climate--the rigour of which our troops had

not yet encountered. I also received orders to seize at Lubeck (Which

town, as I have already stated, had been alternately taken and retaken

try Blucher and Bernadotte) 400,000 lasts of corn,--[A last weighs 2000

kilogrammes]--and to send them to Magdeburg. This corn belonged to

Russia. Marshal Mortier, too, had seized some timber for building, which

also belonged to Russia; and which was estimated at 1,400,000 francs.

Meanwhile our troops continued to advance with such rapidity that hefore

the end of November Murat arrived at Warsaw, at the head of the advanced

guard of the Grand Army, of which, he had the command. The Emperor's

headquarters, were then at Posen, and, he received deputations from all

parts soliciting the re-establishment and independence of the Kingdom of

Poland.

Rapp informed me that after receiving the deputation from Warsaw the

Emperor said to him, "I love the Poles; their enthusiastic character

pleases me; I should like to make them independent, but that is a

difficult matter. Austria, Russia, and Prussia have all had a slice of

the cake; when the match is once kindled who knows where, the

conflagration may stop? My first duty, is towards France, which I must

not sacrifice to Poland; we must refer this matter to the sovereign of

all things--Time, he will presently show us what we must do." Had

Sulkowsky lived Napoleon might have recollected what he had said to him

in Egypt, and, in all probability he would have raised up a power, the

dismemberment of which; towards the close of the last century, began to

overturn the political equilibrium which had subsisted in Europe since

the peace of Westphalia in 1648.

It was at the headquarters at Posen that Duroc rejoined the Emperor after

his mission to the King of Prussia. His carriage overturned on the way,

and he had the misfortune to break his collar-bone. All the letters I

received were nothing but a succession of complaints on the bad state of

the roads. Our troops were absolutely fighting in mud, and it was with

extreme difficulty that the artillery and caissons of the army could be

moved along. M. de Talleyrand had been summoned to headquarters by the

Emperor, in the expectation of treating for peace, and I was informed

that his carriage stuck in the mud and he was detained on his journey for

twelve hours. A soldier having asked one of the persons in M. de

Talleyrand's suite who the traveller was, was informed that he was the

Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Ah! bah!" said the soldier, "why does he

come with his diplomacy to such a devil of a country as this?"

The Emperor entered Warsaw on the 1st of January 1807. Most of the

reports which he had received previous to his entrance had concurred in

describing the dissatisfaction of the troops, who for some time had had

to contend with bad roads, bad weather, and all aorta of privations.'

Bonaparte said to the generals who informed him that the enthusiasm of

his troops had been succeeded by dejection and discontent, "Does their

spirit fail them when they come in sight of the enemy?"--"No, Sire."--

"I knew it; my troops are always the same." Then turning to Rapp he

said, "I must rouse them;" and he dictated the following proclamation:

SOLDIERS--It is a year this very hour since you were on the field of

Austerlitz, where the Russian battalions fled in disorder, or

surrendered up their arms to their conquerors. Next day proposals,

of peace were talked of; but they were deceptive. No sooner had the

Russians escaped, by perhaps, blamable generosity from the disasters

of the third coalition than they contrived a fourth. But the ally

on whose tactics they founded their principal hope was no more. His

capital, his fortresses; his magazines; his arsenals, 280 flags, and

700 field-pieces have fallen into our power. The Oder, the Wartha,

the deserts of Poland, and the inclemency of the season have not for

a moment retarded your progress. You have braved all; surmounted

all; every obstacle has fled at your approach. The Russians have in

vain endeavoured to defend the capital of ancient and illustrious

Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula. The brave and

unfortunate Poles, on beholding you, fancied they saw the legions of

Sobieski, returning from their memorable expedition.

Soldiers, we will not lay down our arms until a general peace has

secured the power of our allies and restored to us our colonies and

our freedom of trade. We have gained on the Elbe and the Oder,

Pondicherry, our Indian establishments, the Cape of Good Hope, and

the Spanish colonies. Why should the Russians have the right of

opposing destiny and thwarting our just designs? They and we are

still the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz.

Rapp thus describes the entrance of the French into Warsaw, and adds a

few anecdotes connected with that event:

"At length we entered the Polish capital. The King of Naples had

preceded us, and had driven the Russians from the city. Napoleon

was received with enthusiasm. The Poles thought that the moment of

their regeneration had arrived, and that their wishes were

fulfilled. It would be difficult to describe the joy thus evinced,

and the respect with which they treated us. The French troops,

however, were not quite so well pleased; they manifested the

greatest repugnance to crossing the Vistula. The idea of want and

bad weather had inspired them with the greatest aversion to Poland,

and they were inexhaustible, in their jokes on the country."

When Bonaparte dictated his proclamations--and how many have I not

written from his dictation!--he was for the moment inspired, and he

evinced all the excitement which distinguishes the Italian improvisatori.

To follow him it was necessary to write with inconceivable rapidity. When

I have read over to him what he has dictated I have often known him to

smile triumphantly at the effect which he expected any particular phrase

would produce. In general his proclamations turned on three distinct

points--(1) Praising his soldiers for what they had done; (2) pointing

out to them what they had yet to do; and (3) abusing his enemies. The

proclamation to which I have just now alluded was circulated profusely

through Germany, and it is impossible to conceive the effect it produced.

on the whole army. The corps stationed in the rear burned too pass, by

forced marches, the space which still separated them from headquarters;

and those who were nearer the Emperor forgot their fatigues and

privations and were only anxious to encounter the enemy. They frequently

could not understand what Napoleon said in these proclamations; but no

matter for that, they would have followed him cheerfully barefooted and

without provisions. Such was the enthusiasm, or rather the fanaticism,

which Napoleon could inspire among his troops when he thought proper to

rouse them, as he termed it.

When, on a former occasion, I spoke of the Duke of, Mecklenburg-Schwerin

and his family, I forgot a circumstance respecting my intercourse with

him which now occurs to my memory. When, on his expulsion from his

States, after the battle of Jena, he took refuge in Altona, he requested,

through the medium of his Minister at Hamburg, Count von Plessen, that I

would give him permission occasionally to visit that city. This

permission I granted without hesitation; but the Duke observed no

precaution in his visits, and I made some friendly observations to him on

the subject. I knew the object of his visits. It was a secret

connection in Hamburg; but in consequence of my observations he removed

the lady to Altona, and assured me that he adopted that determination to

avoid committing me. He afterwards came very seldom to Hamburg; but as

we were on the best understanding with Denmark I frequently saw his

daughter, and son-in-law, who used to visit me at a house I had in

Holstein, near Altona.

There I likewise saw, almost every day, the Duke of Weimar, an excellent

old man. I had the advantage of being on such terms of intimacy with him

that my house was in some measure his. He also had lost his States. I

was so happy as to contribute to their restitution, for my situation

enabled me to exercise some influence on the political indulgences or

severities of the Government. I entertained a sincere regard for the

Duke of Weimar, and I greatly regretted his departure. No sooner had he

arrived in Berlin than he wrote me a letter of, thanks, to which he added

the present of a diamond, in token of his grateful remembrance of me.

The Duke of Mecklenburg was not so fortunate as the Duke of Weimar, in

spite of his alliance with the reigning family of Denmark. He was

obliged to remain at Altona until the July following, for his States were

restored only by the Treaty of Tilsit. As soon as it was known that the

Emperor had returns to Paris the Duke's son, the Hereditary Prince,

visited me in Hamburg, and asked me whether I thought he could present

himself to the Emperor, for the purpose of expressing his own and his

father's gratitude. He was a very well-educated young man. He set out,

accompanied by M. Oertzen and Baron von Brandstaten. Some time

afterwards I saw his name in the Moniteur, in one of the lists of

presentations to Napoleon, the collection of which, during the Empire,

might be regarded as a general register of the nobility of Europe.

It is commonly said that we may accustom ourselves to anything, but to me

this remark is subject to an exception; for, in spite of the necessity to

which I was reduced of employing spies, I never could surmount the

disgust I felt at them, especially when I saw men destined to fill a

respectable rank in society degrade themselves to that infamous

profession. It is impossible to conceive the artifices to which these

men resort to gain the confidence of those whom they wish to betray. Of

this the following example just now occurs to my mind.

One of those wretches who are employed in certain circumstances, and by

all parties, came to offer his services to me. His name was Butler, and

he had been sent from England to the Continent as a spy upon the French

Government. He immediately came to me, complaining of pretended enemies

and unjust treatment. He told me he had the greatest wish to serve the

Emperor, and that he would make any sacrifice to prove his fidelity.

The real motive of his change of party was, as it is with all such men,

merely the hope of a higher reward. Most extraordinary were the schemes

he adopted to prevent his old employers from suspecting that he was

serving new ones. To me he continually repeated how happy he was to be

revenged on his enemies in London. He asked me to allow him to go to

Paris to be examined by the Minister of Police. The better to keep up

the deception he requested that on his arrival in Paris he might be

confined in the Temple, and that there might be inserted in the French

journals an announcement in the following terms:

"John Butler, commonly called Count Butler, has just been arrested

and sent to Paris under a good escort by the French Minister at

Hamburg."

At the expiration of a few weeks Butler, having received his

instruction's, set out for London, but by way of precaution he said it

would be well to publish in the journals another announcement; which was

as follows:

"John Butler, who has been arrested in Hamburg as an English agent,

and conveyed to Paris, is ordered to quit France and the territories

occupied by the French armies and their allies, and not to appear

there again until the general peace."

In England Butler enjoyed the honours of French prosecution. He was

regarded as a victim who deserved all the confidence of the enemies of

France. He furnished Fouche with a considerable amount of information,

and he was fortunate enough to escape being hanged.

Notwithstanding the pretended necessity of employing secret agents,

Bonaparte was unwilling that, even under that pretext, too many

communications should be established between France and England: Fouche,

nevertheless, actively directed the evolutions of his secret army. Ever

ready to seize on anything that could give importance to the police and

encourage the suspicions of the Emperor, Fouche wrote to me that the

government had received certain--information that many Frenchmen

traveling for commercial houses in France were at Manchester purchasing

articles of English manufacture. This was true; but how was it to be

prevented? These traveling clerks passed through Holland, where they

easily procured a passage to England.

Louis Bonaparte, conceiving that the King of Holland ought to sacrifice

the interests of his new subjects to the wishes of his brother, was at

first very lenient as to the disastrous Continental system. But at this

Napoleon soon manifested his displeasure, and about the end of the year

1806 Louis was reduced to the necessity of ordering the strict observance

of the blockade. The facility with which the travelers of French

commercial houses passed from Holland to England gave rise to other

alarms on the part of the French Government. It was said that since

Frenchmen could so easily pass from the Continent to Great Britain, the

agents of the English Cabinet might, by the same means, find their way to

the Continent. Accordingly the consuls were directed to keep a watchful

eye, not only upon individuals who evidently came from England, but upon

those who might by any possibility come from that country. This plan was

all very well, but how was it to be put into execution ? . . . The

Continent was, nevertheless, inundated with articles of English

manufacture, for this simple reason, that, however powerful may be the

will of a sovereign, it is still less powerful and less lasting than the

wants of a people. The Continental system reminded me of the law created

by an ancient legislator, who, for a crime which he conceived could not

possibly be committed, condemned the person who should be guilty of it to

throw a bull over Mount Taurus.

It is not my present design to trace a picture of the state of Europe at

the close of 1806. I will merely throw together a few facts which came to

my knowledge at the time, and which I find in my correspondence. I have

already mentioned that the Emperor arrived at Warsaw on the 1st of

January. During his stay at Posen he had, by virtue of a treaty

concluded with the Elector of Saxony, founded a new kingdom, and

consequently extended his power in Germany, by the annexation of the new

Kingdom of Saxony to the Confederation of the Rhine. By the terms of

this treaty Saxony, so justly famed for her cavalry, was to furnish the

Emperor with a contingent of 20,000 men and horses.

It was quite a new spectacle to the Princes of Germany, all accustomed to

old habits of etiquette, to see an upstart sovereign treat them as

subjects, and even oblige them to consider themselves as such. Those

famous Saxons, who had made Charlemagne tremble, threw themselves on the

protection of the Emperor; and the alliance of the head of the House of

Saxony was not a matter of indifference to Napoleon, for the new King

was, on account of his age, his tastes, and his character, more revered

than any other German Prince.

From the moment of Napoleon's arrival at Warsaw until the commencement of

hostilities against the Russians he was continually solicited to

reestablish the throne of Poland, and to restore its chivalrous

independence to the ancient empire of the Jagellons. A person who was at

that time in Warsaw told me that the Emperor was in the greatest

uncertainty as to what he should do respecting Poland. He was entreated

to reestablish that ancient and heroic kingdom; but he came to no

decision, preferring, according to custom, to submit to events, that he

might appear to command them. At Warsaw, indeed, the Emperor passed a

great part of his time in fetes and reviews, which, however, did not

prevent him from watching, with his eagle eye, every department of the

public service, both interior and exterior. He himself was in the capital

of Poland, but his vast influence was present everywhere. I heard Duroc

say, when we were conversing together about the campaign of Tilsit, that

Napoleon's activity and intelligence were never more conspicuously

developed.

One very remarkable feature of the imperial wars was, that, with the

exception of the interior police, of which Fouche was the soul, the whole

government of France was at the headquarters of the Emperor. At Warsaw

Napoleon's attention was not only occupied with the affairs of his army,

but he directed the whole machinery of the French Government just the

same as if he had been in Paris. Daily estafettes, and frequently the

useless auditors of the Council of State, brought him reports more or

less correct, and curious disclosures which were frequently the invention

of the police. The portfolios of the Ministers arrived every week, with

the exception of those of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the

Minister of the War Department; the former had first stopped at Mayence

with the Empress, but had been called on to Warsaw; and the latter,

Clarke, was, for the misfortune of Berlin, governor of that city. This

state of things lasted during the ten months of the Emperor's absence

from Paris. Louis XIV. said, "I am myself the State." Napoleon did not

say this; but, in fact, under his reign the Government of France was

always at his headquarters. This circumstance had well-nigh proved fatal

to him, on the occasion of the extraordinary conspiracy of Malet, with

some points of which I alone, perhaps, am thoroughly acquainted. The

Emperor employed the month of January in military preparations for the

approaching attack of the Russians, but at the same time he did not

neglect the business of the cabinet: with him nothing was suffered to

linger in arrear.

While Napoleon was at Warsaw a battle was not the only thing to be

thought about; affairs were much more complicated than during the

campaign of Vienna. It was necessary, on the one hand, to observe

Prussia, which was occupied; and on the other to anticipate the Russians,

whose movements indicated that they were inclined to strike the first

blow. In the preceding campaign Austria, before the taking of Vienna,

was engaged alone. The case was different now: Austria had had only

soldiers; and Prussia, as Blucher declared to me, was beginning to have

citizens. There was no difficulty in returning from Vienna, but a great

deal in returning from Warsaw, in case of failure, notwithstanding the

creation of the Kingdom of Saxony, and the provisional government given

to Prussia, and to the other States of Germany which we had conquered.

None of these considerations escaped the penetration of Napoleon: nothing

was omitted in the notes, letters, and official correspondence which came

to me from all quarters. Receiving, as I did, accurate information from

my own correspondents of all that was passing in Germany, it often

happened that I transmitted to the Government the same news which it

transmitted to me, not supposing that I previously knew it. Thus, for

example, I thought I was apprising the Government of the arming of

Austria, of which I received information from headquarters a few days

after.

During the Prussian campaign Austria played precisely the same waiting

game which Prussia had played clueing the campaign of Austria. As

Prussia had, before the battle of Austerlitz, awaited the success or

defeat of the French to decide whether she should remain neutral or

declare herself against France, so Austria, doubtless supposing that

Russia would be more fortunate as the ally of Prussia than she had been

as her ally, assembled a corps of 40,000 men in Bohemia. That corps was

called an army of observation; but the nature of these armies of

observation is well known; they belong to the class of armed

neutralities, like the ingenious invention of sanitary cordons. The fact

is, that the 40,000 men assembled in Bohemia were destined to aid and

assist the Russians in case they should be successful (and who can blame

the Austrian Government for wishing to wash away the shame of the Treaty

of Presburg?). Napoleon had not a moment to lose, but this activity

required no spur; he had hastened the battle of Austerlitz to anticipate

Prussia, and he now found it necessary to anticipate Russia in order to

keep Austria in a state of indecision.

The Emperor, therefore, left Warsaw about the end of January, and

immediately gave orders for engaging the Russian army in the beginning of

February; but, in spite of his desire of commencing the attack, he was

anticipated. On the 8th of February, at seven in the morning, he was

attacked by the Russians, who advanced during a terrible storm of snow,

which fell in large flakes. They approached Preussich-Eylau, where the

Emperor was, and the Imperial Guard stopped the Russian column. Nearly

the whole French army was engaged in that battle-one of the most

sanguinary ever fought in Europe. The corps commanded by Bernadotte was

not engaged, in the contest; it had been stationed on the left at

Mohrungen, whence it menaced Dantzic. The issue of the battle would have

been very different had the four, divisions of infantry and the two of

cavalry composing Bernadotte's corps arrived in time; but unfortunately

the officer instructed to convey orders to Bernadotte to march without

delay on Preussich-Eylau was taken by a body of Cossacks; Bernadotte,

therefore, did not arrive. Bonaparte, who always liked to throw blame on

some one if things did not turn out exactly as he wished, attributed the

doubtful success of the day to the absence of Bernadotte; in this he was

right; but to make his absence a reproach to that Marshal was a gross

injustice. Bernadotte was accused of not having been willing to march on

Preussich-Eylau, though, as it was alleged, General d'Hautpoult had

informed him of the necessity of his presence. But how can that fact be

ascertained, since General d'Hautpoult was killed on that same day? Who

can assure us that that General had been able to communicate with the

Marshal?

Those who knew Bonaparte, his cunning, and the artful advantage he would

sometimes take of words which he attributed to the dead, will easily

solve the enigma. The battle of Eylau was terrible. Night came

on--Bernadotte's corps was instantly, but in vain, expected; and after a

great loss the French army had the melancholy honour of passing the night

on the field of battle. Bernadotte at length arrived, but too late. He

met the enemy, who were retreating without the fear of being molested

towards Konigsberg, the only capital remaining to Prussia. The King of

Prussia was then at Memel, a small port on the Baltic, thirty leagues

from Konigsberg.

After the battle of Eylau both sides remained stationary, and several

days elapsed without anything remarkable taking place. The offers of

peace made by the Emperor, with very little earnestness it is true, were

disdainfully rejected, as if a victory disputed with Napoleon was to be

regarded as a triumph. The battle of Eylau seemed to turn the heads of

the Russians, who chanted Te Deum on the occasion. But while the Emperor

was making preparations to advance, his diplomacy was taking effect in a

distant quarter, and raising up against Russia an old and formidable

enemy. Turkey declared war against her. This was a powerful diversion,

and obliged Russia to strip her western frontiers to secure a line of

defence on the south.

Some time after General Gardanne set out on the famous embassy to Persia;

for which the way had been paved by the success of the mission of my

friend, Amedee Jaubert. This embassy was not merely one of those pompous

legations such as Charlemagne, Louis XIV., and Louis XVI. received from

the Empress Irene, the King of Siam, and Tippoo Saib. It was connected

with ideas which Bonaparte had conceived at the very dawn of his power.

It was, indeed, the light from the East which fast enabled him to see his

greatness in perspective; and that light never ceased to fix his

attention and dazzle his imagination. I know well that Gardanne's

embassy was at first conceived on a much grander scale than that on which

it was executed. Napoleon had resolved to send to the Shah of Persia

4000 infantry, commanded by chosen and experienced officers, 10,000

muskets, and 50 pieces, of cannon; and I also know that orders were given

for the execution of this design. The avowed object of the Emperor was

to enable the Shah of Persia to make an important diversion, with 80,000

men, in, the eastern provinces of Russia. But there was likewise

another, an old and constant object, which was always, uppermost in

Napoleon's mind, namely the wish to strike at England in the very heart

of her Asiatic possessions. Such was the principal motive of Gardanne's

mission, but circumstances did not permit the Emperor, to, give, it, all

the importance he desired. He contented himself with sending a few

officers of engineers and artillery, to Persia, who, on their arrival,

were astonished at the number of English they found there.

CHAPTER XI.

1807

Abuse of military power--Defence of diplomatic rights--Marshal Brune

--Army supplies--English cloth and leather--Arrest on a charge of

libel--Dispatch from M. Talleyrand--A page of Napoleon's glory--

Interview between the two Emperors at Tilsit,--Silesia restored to

the Queen of Prussia--Unfortunate situation in Prussia--

Impossibility of reestablishing Poland in 1807--Foundation of the

Kingdom of Westphalia--The Duchy of Warsaw and the King of Saxony.

Meanwhile the internal affairs of the towns over which my diplomatic

jurisdiction extended soon gave me more employment than ever. The

greatest misfortune of the Empire was, perhaps, the abuse of the right

arrogated by the wearers of epaulettes. My situation gave me an

opportunity of observing all the odious character of a military

government. Another in my place could not have done all that I did. I

say this confidently, for my, situation was a distinct and independent

one, as Bonaparte had told me: Being authorised to correspond directly

with the Emperor; the military chiefs feared, if they did not yield to my

just representations, that I would made private reports; this

apprehension was wonderfully useful in enabling me to maintain the rights

of the towns, which had adopted me as their first citizen.

A circumstance occurred in which I had to defend the rights of the

diplomatic and commercial agents against the pretensions of military

power. Marshal Brune during his government at Hamburg, went to Bremman.

to watch the strict execution of the illusive blockade against England.

The Marshal acting no doubt, in conformity with the instructions of

Clarke, then Minister of War and Governor of Berlin, wished to arrogate

the right of deciding on the captures made by our cruisers.

He attempted to prevent the Consul Lagau from selling the confiscated

ships in order to sell them himself. Of this M. Lagau complained to me.

The more I observed a disposition to encroach on the part of the military

authorities, the more I conceived it necessary to maintain the rights of

the consuls, and to favour their influence, without which they would have

lost their consideration. To the complaints of M. Lagau I replied,

"That to him alone belonged the right of deciding, in the first instance,

on the fate of the ships; that he could not be deprived of that right

without changing the law; that he was free to sell the confiscated

Prussian ships; that Marshall Brune was at Bremen only for the execution

of the decree respecting the blockade of England, and that he ought not

to interfere in business unconnected with that decree." Lagau showed

this letter to Brune, who then allowed him to do as he wished; but it was

an affair of profit, and the Marshal for a long time owed me a grudge.

Bernadotte was exceedingly disinterested, but he loved to be talked

about. The more the Emperor endeavoured to throw accusations upon him,

the more he was anxious to give publicity to all his actions. He sent to

me an account of the brilliant affair of Braunsburg, in which a division

of the first corps had been particularly distinguished. Along with this

narrative he sent me a note in the following terms:--"I send you, my

dear. Minister, an account of the affair of Braunsburg. You will,

perhaps, think proper to publish it. In that case I shall be obliged by

your getting it inserted in the Hamburg journals," I did so. The

injustice of the Emperor, and the bad way in which he spoke of

Bernadotte, obliged the latter,--for the sake of his own credit, to make

the truth known to the world.

I have already mentioned that I received an order from the Emperor to

supply 50,000 cloaks for the army. With this order, which was not the

only one I received of the same kind, some circumstances were connected

which I may take the present opportunity of explaining.

The Emperor gave me so many orders for army clothing that all that could

be supplied by the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck would have been

insufficient for executing the commissions. I entered into a treaty with

a house in Hamburg, which I authorised, in spite of the Berlin decree,

to bring cloth and leather from England. Thus I procured these articles

in a sure and cheap way. Our troops might have perished of cold had the

Continental system and the absurd mass of inexecutable decrees relative

to English merchandise been observed.

The Director of the Customs at Hamburg got angry, but I held firm: my

cloths and my leather arrived; cloaks, coats; boots, all were promptly

made, and our soldiers thus were sheltered from the severity of the

season. To preserve peace with the Imperial Custom-house I wrote to M.

Collie, then Director-General, that M. Eudel having wished to put in

execution the law of the 10th Brumaire and complaints had been made on

every side. Marshal Brune asked for my opinion on this matter, and I

gave it to him. I declared to M. Collie that the full execution of the

decree of 31st October 1796 was impracticable, injurious to France, and

to the Hanseatic Towns, without doing harm to England. Indeed, what said

article 5 of this law? "All goods imported from foreign countries,

whatever may be their origin, are to be considered as coming from English

manufacturers." According to this article France was a foreign country

for the Hanseatic Towns, and none of the objects enumerated in this

article ought to enter Hamburg! But the town received from England a

large quantity of fine cloths, buttons; ironmongery, toys, china; and

from France only clocks, bronzes, jewellery, ribbons, bonnets, gauzes and

gloves. "Let," said I to M. Eudel, "the Paris Duane be asked what that

town alone exports in matters of this sort and it will be seen how

important it is not to stop a trade all the more profitable to France,

as the workmanship forms the greatest part of the price of the goods

which make up this trade. What would happen if the importation of these

goods were absolutely prohibited in Hamburg? The consignments would

cease, and one of the most productive sources of trade for France, and

especially for Paris would be cut off."

At this time neither Hamburg nor its territory had any manufacture of

cloth. All woollen stuffs were prohibited, according to M. Eudel, and

still my duty was to furnish, and I had furnished, 50,000 cloaks for the

Grand Army. In compliance with a recent Imperial decree I had to have

made without delay 16,000 coats, 37,000 waistcoats, and the Emperor

required of me 200,000 pairs of boots, besides the 40,000 pairs I had

sent in. Yet M. Eudel said that tanned and worked leather ought not to

enter Hamburg! If such a ridiculous application of the law of 1796 had

been made it would have turned the decree of 21st November 1796 against

France, without fulfilling its object.

These reflections, to which I added other details, made the Government

conclude that I was right, and I traded with England to the great

advantage of the armies, which were well clothed and shod. What in the

world can be more ridiculous than commercial laws carried out to one's

own detriment?

At the beginning of 1807 my occupations at Hamburg were divided between

the furnishing of supplies for the army and the inspection of the

emigrants, whom Fouche pretended to dread in order to give greater

importance to his office.

I never let slip an opportunity of mitigating the rigour of Fouche's

orders, which, indeed, were sometimes so absurd that I did not attempt to

execute them. Of this an instance occurs to my recollection. A printer

at Hamburg had been arrested on the charge of having printed a libel in

the German language. The man was detained in prison because, very much

to his honour, he would not disclose the name of the writer of the

pamphlet. I sent for him and questioned him. He told me, with every

appearance of sincerity, that he had never but once seen the man who had

brought him the manuscript. I was convinced of the truth of what he

said, and I gave an order for his liberation. To avoid irritating the

susceptibility of the Minister of Police I wrote to him the following few

lines:--"The libel is the most miserable rhapsody imaginable. The author,

probably with the view of selling his pamphlet in Holstein, predicts that

Denmark will conquer every other nation and become the greatest kingdom

in the world. This alone will suffice to prove to you how little clanger

there is in rubbish written in the style of the Apocalypse."

After the battle of Eylau I received a despatch from M. de Talleyrand, to

which was added an account in French of that memorable battle, which was

more fatal to the conqueror than to the other party,--I cannot say the

conquered in speaking of the Russians, the more especially when I

recollect the precautions which were then taken throughout Germany to

make known the French before the Russian version. The Emperor was

exceedingly anxious that every one should view that event as he himself

viewed it. Other accounts than his might have produced an unfavourable

impression in the north. I therefore had orders to publish that account.

I caused 2000 copies of it to be issued, which were more than sufficient

for circulation in the Hanse Towns and their territories.

The reader will perhaps complain that I have been almost silent with

respect to the grand manoeuvres of the French army from the battle of

Eylau to that of Friedland, where, at all events, our success was

indisputable. There was no necessity for printing favourable versions of

that event, and, besides, its immense results were soon felt throughout

Europe. The interview at Tilsit is one of the culminating points of

modern history, and the waters of the Niemen reflected the image of

Napoleon at the height of his glory. The interview between the two

Emperors at Tilsit, and the melancholy situation of the King of Prussia,

are generally known. I was made acquainted with but few secret details

relative to those events, for Rapp had gone to Dantzic, and it was he who

most readily communicated to me all that the Emperor said and did, and

all that was passing around him.--

--[Savory gives the following account of the interview between

Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit.

"The Emperor Napoleon, whose courtesy was manifest in all his

actions, ordered a large raft to be floated in the middle of the

river, upon which was constructed a room well covered in and

elegantly decorated having two doors on opposite aides, each of

which opened into an antechamber. The work could not have been

better executed in Paris. The roof was surmounted by two

weathercocks: one displaying the eagle of Russia, and the other the

eagle of France. The two outer doors were also surmounted by the

eagles of the two countries.

"The raft was precisely in the middle of the river, with the two

doors of the salon facing the two opposite banks.

"The two sovereigns appeared on the banks of the river, and embarked

at the same moment But the Emperor Napoleon having a good boat,

manned by marines of the Guard, arrived first on the raft, entered

the room, and went to the opposite door, which he opened, and then

stationed himself on the edge of the raft to receive the Emperor

Alexander, who had not yet arrived, not having each good rowers as

the Emperor Napoleon.

"The two Emperors met in the most amicable way, et least to all

appearance. They remained together for a considerable time, and

then took leave of each other with as friendly an air as that with

which they had met.

"Next day the Emperor of Russia established himself at Tilsit with a

battalion of his Guard. Orders were given for evacuating that part

of the town where he and his battalion were to be quartered; and,

though we were very much pressed for room, no encroachment on the

space allotted to the Russians was thought of.

"On the day the Emperor Alexander, entered Tilsit the whole army was

under arms. The Imperial Guard was drawn out in two lines of three

deep from the landing-place to the Emperor Napoleon's quarters, and

from thence to the quarters of the Emperor of Russia. A salute of

100 guns was fired the moment Alexander stepped ashore on the spot

where the Emperor Napoleon was waiting to receive him. The latter

carried his attention to his visitor so far as to send from his

quarters the furniture for Alexander's bedchamber. Among the

articles sent was a camp-bed belonging to the Emperor, which he

presented to Alexander, who appeared much pleased with the gift.

"This meeting; the first which history records of the same kind and

of equal importance, attracted visitors to Tilsit from 100 leagues

round. M. de Talleyrand arrived, and after the observance of the

usual ceremonies business began to be discussed." (Memoirs of the

Due de Rovigo, tome iii. p. 117).

"When," said Napoleon, "I was at Tilsit with the Emperor Alexander

and the King of Prussia, I was the most ignorant of the three in

military affairs. These two sovereigns, especially the King of

Prussia, were completely 'au fait' as to the number of buttons there

ought to be in front of a jacket, how many behind, and the manner in

which the skirts ought to be cut. Not a tailor in the army knew

better than King Frederick how many measures of cloth it took to

make a jacket. In fact," continued he laughing, "I was nobody in

comparison with them. They continually tormented me about matters

belonging to tailors, of which I was entirely ignorant, although, in

order not to affront them, I answered just as gravely as if the fate

of an army depended upon the cut of a jacket. When I went to see

the King of Prussia, instead of a library, I found that he had a

large room, like an arsenal, furnished with shelves and pegs; on

which were hung fifty or sixty jackets of different patterns. Every

day he changed his fashion and put on a different one. He attached

more importance to this than was necessary for the salvation of a

kingdom." (O'Meara's Napoleon in Exile.)]--

I, however, learned one circumstance peculiarly worthy of remark which

occurred in the Emperor's apartments at Tilsit the first time he received

a visit from the King of Prussia. That unfortunate monarch, who was

accompanied by Queen Louisa, had taken refuge in a mill beyond the town.

This was his sole habitation, whilst the Emperors occupied the two

portions of the town, which is divided by the Niemen. The fact I am

about to relate reached me indirectly through the medium of an offices of

the Imperial Guard, who was on duty in Napoleon's apartments and was an

eye-witness of it. When the Emperor Alexander visited Napoleon they

continued for a long time in conversation on a balcony below, where as

immense crowd hailed their meeting with enthusiastic shouts. Napoleon

commenced the conversation, as he did the year preceding with the Emperor

of Austria, by speaking of the uncertain fate of war. Whilst they were

conversing the King of Prussia was announced. The King's emotion was

visible, and may easily be imagined; for as hostilities were suspended,

and his territory in possession of the French, his only hope was in the

generosity of the conqueror. Napoleon himself, it is said, appeared

moved by his situation, and invited him, together with the Queen, to

dinner. On sitting down to table Napoleon with great gallantry told the

beautiful Queen that he would restore to her Silesia, a province which

she earnestly wished should be retained in the new arrangements which

were necessarily about to take place.

--[Las Cases mentions that at the time of the treaty of Tilsit

Napoleon wrote to the Empress Josephine as follows:

"'The Queen of Prussia is really a charming woman. She is fond of

coquetting with me; but do not be jealous: I am like oilcloth, along

which everything of this sort elides without penetrating. It would

cost me too dear to play the gallant'

"On this subject an anecdote was related in the salon of Josephine.

It was said that the Queen of Prussia one day had a beautiful rose

in her hand, which the Emperor asked her to give him. The Queen

hesitated for a few moments, and then presented it to him, saying,

'Why should I so readily grant what you request, while you remain

deaf to all my entreaties?' (She alluded to the fortress of

Magdeburg, which she had earnestly solicited)." (Memorial de St.

Helene).]--

The treaty of peace concluded at Tilsit between France and Russia, on the

7th of July, and ratified two days after, produced no less striking a

change in the geographical division of Europe than had been effected the

year preceding by the Treaty of Presburg. The treaty contained no

stipulation dishonourable to Russia, whose territory was preserved

inviolate; but how was Prussia treated? Some historians, for the vain

pleasure of flattering by posthumous praises the pretended moderation of

Napoleon, have almost reproached him for having suffered some remnants of

the monarchy of the great Frederick to survive. There is, nevertheless,

a point on which Napoleon has been wrongfully condemned, at least with

reference to the campaign of 1807. It has been said that he should at

that period have re-established the kingdom of Poland; and certainly

there is every reason to regret, for the interests of France and Europe,

that it was not re-established. But when a desire, even founded on

reason, is not carried into effect, should we conclude that the

wished-for object ought to be achieved in defiance of all obstacles? At

that time, that is to say, during the campaign of Tilsit, insurmountable

obstacles existed.

If, however, by the Treaty of Tilsit, the throne of Poland was not

restored to serve as a barrier between old Europe and the Empire of the

Czars, Napoleon founded a Kingdom of Westphalia, which he gave to the

young 'ensigne de vaisseau' whom he had scolded as a schoolboy, and whom

he now made a King, that he might have another crowned prefect under his

control. The Kingdom of Westphalia was composed of the States of

Hesse-Cassel, of a part of the provinces taken from Prussia by the

moderation of the Emperor, and of the States of Paderborn, Fulda,

Brunswick, and a part of the Electorate of Hanover. Napoleon, at the

same time, though he did not like to do things by halves, to avoid

touching the Russian and Austrian provinces of old Poland, planted on

the banks of the Vistula the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he gave to the

King of Saxony, with the intention of increasing or destroying it

afterwards as he might find convenient. Thus he allowed the Poles to

hope better things for the future, and ensured to himself partisans in

the north should the chances of fortune call him thither. Alexander,

who was cajoled even more than his father had been by what I may call

the political coquetry of Napoleon, consented to all these arrangements,

acknowledged 'in globo' all the kings crowned by the Emperor, and

accepted some provinces which had belonged to his despoiled ally, the

King of Prussia, doubtless by way of consolation for not having been

able to get more restored to Prussia. The two Emperors parted the best

friends in the world; but the Continental system was still in existence.

CHAPTER XII.

1807.

Effect produced at Altona by the Treaty of Tilsit--The Duke of

Mecklenburg-Schwerin's departure from Hamburg--English squadron in

the Sound--Bombardment of Copenhagen--Perfidy of England--Remark of

Bonaparte to M. Lemercier--Prussia erased from the map--Napoleon's

return to Paris--Suppression of the Tribunate--Confiscation of

English merchandise--Nine millions gained to France--M. Caulaincourt

Ambassador to Russia--Repugnance of England to the intervention of

Russia--Affairs of Portugal--Junot appointed to command the army--

The Prince Regent's departure for the Brazils--The Code Napoleon--

Introduction of the French laws into Germany--Leniency of Hamburg

Juries--The stolen cloak and the Syndic Doormann.

The Treaty of Tilsit, as soon as it was known at Altona, spread

consternation amongst the emigrants. As to the German Princes, who were

awaiting the issue of events either at Altolna or Hamburg, when they

learned that a definitive treaty of peace had been signed between France

and Russia, and that two days after the Treaty of Tilsit the Prussian

monarchy was placed at the mercy of Napoleon, every courier that arrived

threw them into indescribable agitation. It depended on the Emperor's

will whether they were to be or not to be. The Duke of Mecklenburg-

Schwerin had not succeeded in getting himself re-established in his

states, by an exceptional decision, like the Duke of Weimar; but at

length he obtained the restitution of his territory at the request of the

Emperor Alexander, and on the 28th of July he quitted Hamburg to return

to his Duchy.

The Danish charge d'affaires communicated to me about the same time an

official report from his Government. This report announced that on

Monday, the 3d of August, a squadron consisting of twelve ships of the

line and twelve frigates, commanded by Admiral Gambier, had passed the

Sound. The rest of the squadron was seen in the Categat. At the same

time the English troops which were in the island of Rugen had reembarked.

We could not then conceive what enterprise this considerable force had

been sent upon. But our uncertainty was soon at an end. M. Didelot, the

French Ambassador at Copenhagen, arrived at Hamburg, at nine o'clock in

the evening of the 12th of August. He had been fortunate enough to pass

through the Great Belt, though in sight of the English, without being

stopped. I forwarded his report to Paris by an extraordinary courier.

The English had sent 20,000 men and twenty-seven vessels into the Baltic;

Lord Cathcart commanded the troops. The coast of Zealand was blockaded

by ninety vessels. Mr. Jackson, who had been sent by England to

negotiate with Denmark, which she feared would be invaded by the French

troops, supported the propositions he was charged to offer to Denmark by

a reference to this powerful British force. Mr. Jackson's proposals had

for their object nothing less than to induce the King of Denmark to place

in the custody of England the whole of his ships and naval stores. They

were, it is true, to be kept in deposit, but the condition contained the

words, "until the conclusion of a general peace," which rendered the

period of their restoration uncertain. They were to be detained until

such precautions should be no longer necessary. A menace and its

execution followed close upon this demand. After a noble but useless

resistance, and a terrific bombardment, Copenhagen surrendered, and the

Danish fleet was destroyed. It would be difficult to find in history a

more infamous and revolting instance of the abuse of power against

weakness.

Sometime after this event a pamphlet entitled "Germania" appeared, which

I translated and sent to the Emperor. It was eloquently written, and

expressed the indignation which the conduct of England had excited in the

author as in every one else.

--["That expedition," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "showed great

energy on the part of your Ministers: but setting aside the

violation of the laws of, nations which you committed--for in fact

it was nothing but a robbery--I think that it was; injurious to your

interests, as it made the Danish nation irreconcilable enemies to

you, and in fact shut you out of the north for three years. When I

heard of it I said, I am glad of it, as it will embroil England

irrecoverably with the Northern Powers. The Danes being able to

join me with sixteen sail of the line was of but little consequence.

I had plenty of ships, and only wanted seamen, whom you did not

take, and whom I obtained afterwards, while by the expedition your

Ministers established their characters as faithless, and as persons

with whom no engagements, no laws were binding." (Voice from St.

Helena.)]--

I have stated what were the principal consequences of the Treaty of

Tilsit; it is more than probable that if the bombardment of Copenhagen

had preceded the treaty the Emperor would have used Prussia even worse

than he did. He might have erased her from the list of nations; but he

did not do so, out of regard to the Emperor Alexander. The destruction

of Prussia was no new project with Bonaparte. I remember an observation

of his to M. Lemercier upon that subject when we first went to reside at

Malmaison. M. Lemercier had been reading to the First Consul some poem

in which Frederick the Great was spoken of. "You seem to admire him

greatly," said Bonaparte to M. Lemercier; "what do you find in him so

astonishing? He is not equal to Turenne."--"General," replied M.

Lemercier, "it is not merely the warrior that I esteem in Frederick; it

is impossible to refrain from admiring a man who was a philosopher even

on the throne." To this the First Consul replied, in a half ill-humoured

tone, "Certainly, Lemercier; but Frederick's philosophy shall not prevent

me from erasing his kingdom from the map of Europe." The kingdom of

Frederick the Great was not, however, obliterated from the map, because

the Emperor of Russia would not basely abandon a faithful ally who had

incurred with him the chances of fortune. Prussia then bitterly had to

lament the tergiversations which had prevented her from declaring herself

against France during the campaign of Austerlitz.

Napoleon returned to Paris about the end of July after an absence of ten

months, the longest he had yet made since he had been at the head of the

French Government, whether as Consul or Emperor. The interview at

Tilsit, the Emperor Alexander's friendship, which was spoken of

everywhere in terms of exaggeration, and the peace established on the

Continent, conferred on Napoleon a moral influence in public opinion

which he had not possessed since his coronation. Constant in his hatred

of deliberative assemblies, which he had often termed collections of

babblers, ideologists, and phrasemongers, Napoleon, on his return to

Paris, suppressed the Tribunate, which had been an annoyance to him ever

since the first day of his elevation. The Emperor, who was 'skillful

above all men in speculating on the favourable disposition of opinion,

availed himself at this conjuncture of the enthusiasm produced by his

interview on the Niemen. He therefore discarded from the fundamental

institutions of the government that which still retained the shadow of a

popular character. But it was necessary that he should possess a Senate

merely to vote men; a mute Legislative Body to vote money; that there

should be no opposition in the one and no criticism in the other; no

control over him of any description; the power of arbitrarily doing

whatever he pleased; an enslaved press;--this was what Napoleon wished,

and this he obtained. But the month of March 1814 resolved the question

of absolute power!

In the midst of these great affairs, and while Napoleon was dreaming of

universal monarchy, I beheld in a less extensive sphere the inevitable

consequences of the ambition of a single man. Pillage and robbery were

carried on in all parts over which my diplomatic jurisdiction extended.

Rapine seemed to be legally authorised, and was perpetrated with such

fury, and at the same time with such ignorance, that the agents were

frequently unacquainted with the value of the articles which they seized.

Thus, for example, the Emperor ordered the seizure at Hamburg, Bremen,

and Lubeck of all English merchandise, whatever might be its nature or

origin. The Prince of Neufchatel (Berthier) wrote to me from the Emperor

that I must procure 10,000,000 francs from the Hanse Towns. M. Daru, the

Intendant-General, whose business it was to collect this sort of levy,

which Napoleon had learned to make in Egypt, wrote to urge me to obtain a

prompt and favourable decision. The unfortunate towns which I was thus

enjoined to oppress had already suffered sufficiently. I had obtained,

by means of negotiation, more than was demanded for the ransom of the

English merchandise, which had been seized according to order. Before I

received the letters of M. Darn and the Prince of Neufchatel I had

obtained from Hamburg 16,000,000 instead of 10,000,000, besides nearly

3,000,000 from Bremen and Lubeck. Thus I furnished the Government with

9,000,000 more than had been required, and yet I had so managed that

those enormous sacrifices were not overoppressive to those who made them.

I fixed the value of the English merchandise because I knew that the high

price at which it sold on the Continent would not only cover the proposed

ransom but also leave a considerable profit. Such was the singular

effect of the Continental system that when merchandise was confiscated,

and when afterwards the permission to sell it freely was given, the price

fetched at the sale was so large that the loss was covered, and even

great advantage gained.

Peace being concluded with Russia it was necessary to make choice of an

Ambassador, not only to maintain the new relations of amity between

Napoleon and Alexander, but likewise to urge on the promised intervention

of Russia with England,--to bring about reconciliation and peace between

the Cabinets of Paris and London. The Emperor confided this mission to

Caulaincourt, with respect to whom there existed an unfounded prejudice

relating to some circumstances which preceded the death of the Duc

d'Enghien. This unfortunate and unjust impression had preceded

Caulaincourt to St. Petersburg, and it was feared that he would not

experience the reception due to the French Ambassador and to his own

personal qualities. I knew at the time, from positive information, that

after a short explanation with Alexander that monarch retained no

suspicion unfavourable to our Ambassador, for whom he conceived and

maintained great esteem and friendship.

Caulaincourt's mission was not, in all respects, easy of fulfilment, for

the invincible repugnance and reiterated refusal of England to enter into

negotiations with France through the medium of Russia was one of the

remarkable circumstances of the period of which I am speaking. I knew

positively that England was determined never to allow Napoleon to possess

himself of the whole of the Continent,--a project which he indicated too

undisguisedly to admit of any doubt respecting it. For two years he had

indeed advanced with rapid strides; but England was not discouraged. She

was too well aware of the irritation of the sovereigns and the discontent

of the people not be certain that when she desired it, her lever of gold

would again raise up and arm the Continent against the encroaching power

of Napoleon. He, on his part, perceiving that all his attempts were

fruitless, and that England would listen to no proposals, devised fresh

plans for raising up new enemies against England.

It probably is not forgotten that in 1801 France compelled Portugal to

make common cause with her against England. In 1807 the Emperor did

again what the First Consul had done. By an inexplicable fatality Junot

obtained the command of the troops which were marching against Portugal.

I say against Portugal, for that was the fact, though France represented

herself as a protector to deliver Portugal from the influence of England.

Be that as it may, the choice which the Emperor made of a commander

astonished everybody. Was Junot, a compound of vanity and mediocrity,

the fit man to be entrusted with the command of an army in a distant

country, and under circumstances in which great political and military

talents were requisite? For my own part, knowing Junot's incapacity, I

must acknowledge that his appointment astonished me. I remember one day,

when I was speaking on the subject to Bernadotte, he showed me a letter

he had received from Paris, in which it was said that the Emperor had

sent Junot to Portugal only for the sake of depriving him of the

government of Paris. Junot annoyed Napoleon by his bad conduct, his

folly, and his incredible extravagance. He was alike devoid of

dignity--either in feeling or conduct. Thus Portugal was twice the

place of exile selected by Consular and Imperial caprice: first, when

the First Consul wished to get rid of the familiarity of Lannes; and

next, when the Emperor grew weary of the misconduct of a favourite.

The invasion of Portugal presented no difficulty. It was an armed

promenade and not a war; but how many events were connected with the

occupation of that country! The Prince Regent of Portugal, unwilling to

act dishonourably to England, to which he was allied by treaties; and

unable to oppose the whole power of Napoleon, embarked for Brazil,

declaring that all defence was useless. At the same time he recommended

his subjects to receive the French troops in a friendly manner, and said

that he consigned to Providence the consequences of an invasion which was

without a motive. He was answered in the Emperor's name that, Portugal

being the ally of England, we were only carrying on hostilities against,

the latter country by invading his dominions.

It was in the month of November that the code of French jurisprudence,

upon which the most learned legislators had indefatigably laboured, was

established as the law of the State, under the title of the Code

Napoleon. Doubtless this legislative monument will redound to Napoleon's

honour in history; but was it to be supposed that the same laws would be

equally applicable throughout so vast an extent as that comprised within

the French Empire? Impossible as this was, as soon as the Code Napoleon

way promulgated I received orders to establish it in the Hanse Towns.

--[This great code of Civil Law was drawn up under Napoleon's orders

and personal superintendence. Much had been prepared under the

Convention, and the chief merits of it were due to the labours of

such men as Tronchet; Partatis, Bigot de Preameneu, Maleville,

Cambaceres, etc. But it was debated under and by Napoleon, who took

a lively interest in it. It was first called the "Code Civil," but

is 1807 was named "Code Napoleon," or eventually "Les Cinq Codes de

Napoleon." When completed in 1810 it included five Codes--the Code

Civil, decreed March 1803; Code de Procedure Civile, decreed April

1806; Code de Commerce, decreed September 1807; Code d'Instruction

Criminelle, decreed November 1808; and the Code Penal, decreed

February 1810. It had to be retained by the Bourbons, and its

principles have worked and are slowly working their way into the law

of every nation. Napoleon was justly proud of this work. The

Introduction of the Code into the conquered countries was, as

Bourrienne says, made too quickly. Puymaigre, who was employed in

the administration of Hamburg after Bourrienne left, says, "I shall

always remember the astonishment of the Hamburgers when they were

invaded by this cloud of French officials, who, under every form,

made researches is their houses, and who came to apply the

multiplied demands of the fiscal system. Like Proteus, the

administration could take any shape. To only speak of my

department, which certainly was not the least odious one, for it was

opposed to the habits of the Hamburgers and annoyed all the

industries, no idea can be formed of the despair of the inhabitants,

subjected to perpetual visits, and exposed to be charged with

contraventions of the law, of which they knew nothing.

"Remembering their former laws, they used to offer to meet a charge

of fraud by the proof of their oath, and could not imagine that such

a guarantee could be repulsed. When they were independent they paid

almost nothing, and such was the national spirit, that in urgent

cases when money was wanted the senate taxed every citizen a certain

proportion of his income, the tenth or twentieth. A donator

presided over the recovery of this tax, which was done in a very

strange manner. A box, covered with a carpet, received the offering

of every citizen, without any person verifying the sum, and only on

the simple moral guarantee of the honesty of the debtor, who himself

judged the sum he ought to pay. When the receipt was finished the

senate always obtained more than it had calculated on." (Puymaigre,

pp, 181.)]--

The long and frequent conversations I had on this subject with the

Senators and the most able lawyers of the country soon convinced me of

the immense difficulty I should have to encounter, and the danger of

suddenly altering habits and customs which had been firmly established by

time.

The jury system gave tolerable satisfaction; but the severe punishments

assigned to certain offences by the Code were disapproved of. Hence

resulted the frequent and serious abuse of men being acquitted whose

guilt was evident to the jury, who pronounced them not guilty rather than

condemn them to a punishment which was thought too severe. Besides,

their leniency had another ground, which was, that the people being

ignorant of the new law were not aware of the penalties attached to

particular offences. I remember that a man who was accused of stealing a

cloak at Hamburg justified himself on the ground that he committed the

offence in a fit of intoxication. M. Von Einingen, one of the jury,

insisted that the prisoner was not guilty, because, as he said, the

Syndic Doormann, when dining with him one day, having drunk more wine

than usual, took away his cloak. This defence per Baccho was completely

successful. An argument founded on the similarity between the conduct of

the Syndic and the accused, could not but triumph, otherwise the little

debauch of the former would have been condemned in the person of the

latter. This trial, which terminated so whimsically, nevertheless proves

that the best and the gravest institutions may become objects of ridicule

when suddenly introduced into a country whose habits are not prepared to

receive them.

The Romans very wisely reserved in the Capitol a place for the gods of

the nations they conquered. They wished to annex provinces and kingdoms

to their empire. Napoleon, on the contrary, wished to make his empire

encroach upon other states, and to realise the impossible Utopia of ten

different nations, all having different customs and languages, united

into a single State. Could justice, that safeguard of human rights, be

duly administered in the Hanse Towns when those towns were converted into

French departments? In these new departments many judges had been

appointed who did not understand a word of German, and who had no

knowledge of law. The presidents of the tribunals of Lilbeck, Stade,

Bremerlehe, and Minden were so utterly ignorant of the German language

that it was necessary to explain to them all the pleadings in the

council-chamber. Was it not absurd to establish such a judicial system,

and above all, to appoint such men in a country so important to France as

Hamburg and the Hanse Towns? Add to this the impertinence of some

favourites who were sent from Paris to serve official and legal

apprenticeships in the conquered provinces, and it may be easily

conceived what was the attachment of the people to Napoleon the Great.

CHAPTER XIII.

1807-1808.

Disturbed state of Spain--Godoy, Prince of the Peace--Reciprocal

accusations between the King of Spain and his son--False promise of

Napoleon--Dissatisfaction occasioned by the presence of the French

troops--Abdication of Charles IV.--The Prince of the Peace made

prisoner--Murat at Madrid--Important news transmitted by a

commercial letter--Murat's ambition--His protection of Godoy--

Charles IV, denies his voluntary abdication--The crown of Spain

destined for Joseph--General disapprobation of Napoleon's conduct--

The Bourbon cause apparently lost--Louis XVIII. after his departure

from France--As Comte de Provence at Coblentz--He seeks refuge in

Turin and Verona--Death of Louis XVII--Louis XVIII. refused an

asylum in Austria, Saxony, and Prussia--His residence at Mittan and

Warsaw--Alexander and Louis XVIII--The King's departure from Milan

and arrival at Yarmouth--Determination of the King of England--M.

Lemercier's prophecy to Bonaparte--Fouche's inquiries respecting

Comte de Rechteren--Note from Josephine--New demands on the Hanse

Towns--Order to raise 3000 sailors in Hamburg.

The disorders of Spain, which commenced about the close of the year 1807,

in a short time assumed a most complicated aspect. Though far from the

theatre of events I obtained an intimate knowledge of all the important

facts connected with the extraordinary transactions in the Peninsula.

However, as this point of history is one of the most generally, though I

cannot say the best, known, I shall omit in my notes and memoranda many

things which would be but repetitions to the reading portion of the

public. It is a remarkable fact that Bonaparte, who by turns cast his

eyes on all the States of Europe, never directed his attention to Spain

as long as his greatness was confined to mere projects. Whenever he

spoke of his future destiny he alluded to Italy, Germany, the East, and

the destruction of the English power; but never to Spain. Consequently,

when he heard of the first symptoms of disorder in the Peninsula he paid

but little attention to the business, and some time elapsed before he

took any part in events which subsequently had so great an influence on

his fate.

Godoy reigned in Spain under the name of the imbecile Charles IV. He was

an object of execration to all who were not his creatures; and even those

whose fate depended upon him viewed him with the most profound contempt.

The hatred of a people is almost always the just reward of favourites.

What sentiments, therefore, must have been inspired by a man who, to the

knowledge of all Spain, owed the favour of the king only to the favours

of the queen!

--[Manuel Godoy, originally a private in the guards, became the

paramour of Charles IV.'s Queen; then a grandee; and then the

supreme ruler of the State.--Editor of 1836 edition.]--

Godoy's ascendancy over the royal family was boundless; his power was

absolute: the treasures, of America were at his command, and he made the

most infamous use of them. In short, he had made the Court of Madrid one

of those places to which the indignant muse of Juvenal conducts the

mother of Britanicus. There is no doubt that Godoy was one of the

principal causes of all the misfortunes which have overwhelmed Spain

under so many various forms.

The hatred of the Spaniards against the Prince of the Peace was general.

This hatred was shared by the Prince the Asturias,--[Afterwards Ferdinand

VII.]--who openly declared himself the enemy of Godoy. The latter

allied himself with France, from which he hoped to obtain powerful

protection against his enemies. This alliance gave rise to great

dissatisfaction in Spain, and caused France to be regarded with an

unfavourable eye. The Prince of the Asturias was encouraged and

supported by the complaints of the Spaniards, who wished to see the

overthrow of Godoy's power. Charles IV., on his part, regarded all

opposition to the Prince of the Peace as directed against himself, and in

November 1807 he accused his son of wishing to dethrone him.

The King of Spain did not confine himself to verbal complaints. He, or

rather the Prince of the Peace, acting in his name, arrested the warmest

partisans of the Prince of the Asturias. The latter, understanding the

sentiments of his father, wrote to Napoleon, soliciting his support.

Thus the father and son, at open war, were appealing one against another

for the support of him who wished only to get rid of them both, and to

put one of his brothers in their place, that he might have one junior

more in the college of European kings: but, as I have already mentioned,

this new ambition was not premeditated; and if he gave the throne of

Spain to his brother Joseph it was only on the refusal of his brother

Louis (King of Holland) to accept it.

The Emperor had promised to support Charles IV against his son; and, not

wishing to take part in these family quarrels, he had not answered the

first letters of the Prince of the Asturias. But finding that the

intrigues of Madrid were taking a serious turn, he commenced

provisionally by sending troops to Spain. This gave offence to the

people, who were averse to the interference of France. In the provinces

through which the French troops passed it was asked what was the object:

of the invasion. Some attributed it to the Prince of the Peace, others

to the Prince of the Asturias; but it excited general indignation, and

troubles broke out at Madrid accompanied by all the violence peculiar to

the Spanish character.

In these fearful circumstances Godoy proposed that Charles IV. should

remove to Seville, where he would be the better enabled to visit the

factious with punishment. A proposition from Godoy to his master was, in

fact, a command, and Charles IV. accordingly resolved to depart. The

people now looked upon Godoy as a traitor. An insurrection broke out,

the palace was, surrounded, and the, Prince of the Peace was on the point

of being massacred in an upper apartment, where he had taken refuge.

--[French troops had appeared in again some months before, on their

way to Portugal, the conquest of which country by Junot was to be

aided by Godoy and a Spanish force of 27,000 men, according to a

treaty (more disgraceful to the Court of Spain than to Bonaparte)

which had been ratified at Fontainebleau on the 27th of October

1807. Charles IV. was little better than an idiot, and Godoy and

the French made him believe that Bonaparte world give part, or the

whole of Portugal, to Spain. At the time of Junot's march on Lisbon

a reserve of 40,000 French troops were assembled at Bayonne--

a pretty clear indication, though the factious infatuated Court of

Madrid would not see it, that Bonaparte intended to seize the whole

of the Peninsula.--Editor of 1838 edition.]--

One of the mob had the presence of mind to invoke in his favour the name

of the Prince of the Asturias: this saved his life.

Charles IV. did not preserve his crown; he was easily intimidated, and

advantage was taken of a moment of alarm to demand that abdication which

he had not spirit to refuse. He surrendered up his rights to his son,

and thus was overthrown the insolent power of the Prince of the Peace;

the favourite was made prisoner, and the Spaniards, who, like all

ignorant people, are easily excited, manifested their joy on the occasion

with barbarous enthusiasm. Meanwhile the unfortunate King, who had

escaped from imaginary rather than real dangers, and who was at first

content with having exchanged the right of reigning for the right of

living, no sooner found himself in safety than he changed, his mind.

He wrote to the Emperor protesting against his abdication, and appealed.

to him as the arbiter of his future fate.

During these internal dissensions the French army was continuing its

march towards the Pyrenees. Those barriers were speedily crossed, and

Murat entered Madrid in the beginning of April 1808. Before I received

any despatch from our Government I learned that Murat's presence in

Madrid, far from producing a good effect, had only increased the

disorder. I obtained this information from a merchant of Lubeck who came

to Hamburg on purpose to show me a letter he had received from his

correspondent in Madrid. In this letter Spain was said to be a prey

which Murat wished to appropriate to himself; and all that afterwards

came to my knowledge served only to prove the accuracy of the writer's

information. It was perfectly true that Murat wished to conquer Spain

for himself, and it is not astonishing that the inhabitants of Madrid

should have understood his designs, for he carried his indiscretion so

far as openly to express his wish to become King of Spain. The Emperor

was informed of this, and gave him to understand, in very significant

terms, that the throne of Spain was not destined for him, but that he

should not be forgotten in the disposal of other crowns.

However, Napoleon's remonstrances were not sufficient to restrain the

imprudence of Murat; and if he did not gain the crown of Spain for

himself he powerfully contributed to make Charles IV. lose it. That

monarch, whom old habits attached to the Prince of the Peace, solicited

the Emperor to liberate his favourite, alleging that he and his family

would be content to live in any place of security provided Godoy were

with them. The unfortunate Charles seemed to be thoroughly disgusted

with greatness.

Both the King and Queen so earnestly implored Godoy's liberation that

Murat, whose vanity was flattered by these royal solicitations, took the

Prince of the Peace under his protection; but he at the same time

declared that, in spite of the abdication of Charles IV., he would

acknowledge none but that Prince as King of Spain until he should receive

contrary orders from the Emperor. This declaration placed Murat in

formal opposition to the Spanish people, who, through their hatred of

Godoy, embraced the cause of the heir of the throne; in whose favour

Charles IV. had abdicated.

It has been remarked that Napoleon stood in a perplexing situation in

this conflict between the King and his son. This is not correct. King

Charles, though he afterwards said that his abdication had been forced

from him by violence and threats, had nevertheless tendered it. By this

act Ferdinand was King, but Charles declared it was done against his

will, and he retracted. The Emperor's recognition was wanting, and he,

could give or withhold it as he pleased.

In this state of things Napoleon arrived at Bayonne. Thither Ferdinand

was also invited to go, under pretence of arranging with the Emperor the

differences between his father and himself. It was some time before he

could form his determination, but at length his ill-advised friends

prevailed on him to set off, and he was caught in the snare. What

happened to him, as well as to his father, who repaired to Bayonne with

his inseparable friend the Prince of the Peace is well known. Napoleon,

who had undertaken to be arbiter between the father and son, thought the

best way of settling the difference was to give the disputed throne to

his brother Joseph, thus verifying the fable of the "Two Lawyers and the

Oyster." The insurrection in Madrid on the 2d of May accelerated the

fate of Ferdinand, who was accused of being the author of it; at least

this suspicion fell on his friends and adherents.

Charles IV., it was said, would not return to Spain, and solicited an

asylum in France. He signed a renunciation of his rights to the crown of

Spain, which renunciation was also signed by the Infantas.

Napoleon now issued a decree, appointing "his dearly beloved brother

Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples and Sicily, to the crowns of Spain and

the Indies." By a subsequent decree, 15th of July, he appointed "his

dearly-beloved cousin, Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, to the throne

of Naples and Sicily, which remained vacant by the accession of Joseph

Napoleon to the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies." Both these documents

are signed Napoleon, and countersigned by the Minister Secretary of

State, Maret.

The Prince Royal of Sweden, who was at Hamburg at this time, and the

Ministers of all the European power, loudly condemned the conduct of

Napoleon with respect to Spain. I cannot say whether or not M. de

Talleyrand advised the Emperor not to attempt the overthrow of a branch

of the house of Bourbon; his good sense and elevated views might

certainly have suggested that advice. But the general opinion was that,

had he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs, the Spanish revolution

would have terminated with more decorum and good faith than was exhibited

in the tragi-comedy acted at Madrid and Bayonne.

After the Treaty of Tilsit and the bonds of friendship which seemed

likely to produce a permanent union between the Emperors of France and

Russia, the cause of the Bourbons must have been considered irretrievably

lost. Indeed, their only hope consisted in the imprudence and folly of

him who had usurped their throne, and that hope they cherished. I will

here relate what I had the opportunity of learning respecting the conduct

of Louis XVIII. after his departure from France; this will naturally

bring me to the end of November 1807, at which time I read in the Abeille

du Nord published on the 9th of the same month, that the Comte de Lille

and the Due d'Angouleme had set off for England.

The Comte de Provence, as Louis' title then went, left Paris on the 21st

of June 1791. He constantly expressed his wish of keeping as near as

possible to the frontiers of France. He at first took up his abode at

Coblentz, and I knew from good authority that all the emigrants did not

regard him with a favourable eye. They could not pardon the wise.

principles he had professed at a period when there was yet time to

prevent, by reasonable concession, the misfortunes which imprudent

irritation brought upon France. When the emigrants, after the campaign

of 1792, passed the Rhine, the Comte de Provence resided in the little

town of Ham on the Lippe, where he remained until he was persuaded that

the people of Toulon had called him to Provence. As he could not, of

course, pass through France, Monsieur repaired to the Court of his

father-in-law, the King of Sardinia, hoping to embark at Genoa, and from

thence to reach the coast of Provence. But the evacuation of Toulon,

where the name of Bonaparte was for the first time sounded by the breath

of fame, having taken place before he was able to leave Turin, Monsieur

remained there four months, at the expiration of which time his

father-in-law intimated to him the impossibility of his remaining longer

in the Sardinian States. He was afterwards permitted to reside at

Verona, where he heard of Louis XVI.'s death. After remaining two years

in that city the Senate of Venice forbade his presence in the Venetian

States. Thus forced to quit Italy the Comte repaired to the army of

Conde.

The cold and timid policy of the Austrian Cabinet afforded no asylum to

the Comte de Provence, and he was obliged to pass through Germany; yet,

as Louis XVIII. repeated over and over again, ever since the Restoration,

"He never intended to shed French blood in Germany for the sake of

serving foreign interests." Monsieur had, indeed, too much penetration

not to see that his cause was a mere pretext for the powers at war with

France. They felt but little for the misfortunes of the Prince, and

merely wished to veil their ambition and their hatred of France under the

false pretence of zeal for the House of Bourbon.

When the Dauphin died, Louis XVIII. took the title of King of France, and

went to Prussia, where he obtained an asylum.

--[His brother, Charles X., the youngest of the three grandsons of

Louis XV. (Louis XVI., Louis XVIII. Charles X.), the Comte

d'Artois, afterwards Charles X. emigrated in 1789, and went to

Turin and Mantas for 1789 and 1790. In 1791 and 1792 he lived at

Coblenta, Worms, Brussels, Vienna, and at Turin. From 1792 to 1812

he lived at Ham on the Lippe at Westphalia at London, and for most

of the time at Holyrood, Edinburgh. During this time he visited

Russia and Germany, and showed himself on the coast of France. In

1818 he went to Germany, and in 1814 entered France in rear of the

allies. In risking his person in the daring schemes of the

followers who were giving their lives for the cause of his family he

displayed a circumspection which was characterised by them with

natural warmth.

"Sire, the cowardice of your brother has ruined all;" so Charette is

said to have written to Louis XVIII.]--

But the pretender to the crown of France had not yet drained his cup of

misfortune. After the 18th Fructidor the Directory required the King of

Prussia to send away Louis XVIII., and the Cabinet of Berlin, it must be

granted, was not in a situation to oppose the desire of the French

Government, whose wishes were commands. In vain Louis XVIII. sought an

asylum in the King of Saxony's States. There only remained Russia that

durst offer a last refuge to the descendant of Louis XIV. Paul I., who

was always in extremes, and who at that time entertained a violent

feeling of hatred towards France, earnestly offered Louis XVIII., a

residence at Mittau. He treated him with the honours of a sovereign,

and loaded him with marks of attention and respect. Three years had

scarcely passed when Paul was seized with mad enthusiasm for the man who

twelve years later, ravaged his ancient capital, and Louis XVIII. found

himself expelled from that Prince's territory with a harshness equal to

the kindness with which he had at first been received.

It was during, his three, years' residence at Mittau that Louis XVIII.,

who was then known by the title of Comte de Lille, wrote to the First

Consul those letters which have been referred to in these Memoirs.

Prussia, being again solicited, at length consented that Louis XVIII.

should reside at Warsaw; but on the accession of Napoleon to the Empire

the Prince quitted that residence in order to consult respecting his new

situation with the only sovereign who had not deserted him in his

misfortune, viz. the King of Sweden. They met at Colmar, and from that

city was dated the protest which I have already noticed. Louis XVIII.

did not stay long in the States of the King of Sweden. Russia was now on

the point of joining her eagles with those of Austria to oppose the new

eagles of imperial France. Alexander offered to the Comte de Lille the

asylum which Paul had granted to him and afterwards withdrawn. Louis

XVIII. accepted the offer, but after the peace of Tilsit, fearing lest

Alexander might imitate the second act of his father as well as the

first, he plainly saw that he must give up all intention of residing on

the Continent; and it was then that I read in the 'Abeille du Nord' the

article before alluded to. There is, however, one fact upon which I must

insist, because I know it to be true, viz. that it was of his own free

will that Louis XVIII. quitted Mittau; and if he was afraid that

Alexander would imitate his father's conduct that fear was without

foundation. The truth is, that Alexander was ignorant even of the King's

intention to go away until he heard from Baron von Driesen, Governor of

Mittau, that he had actually departed. Having now stated the truth on

this point I have to correct another error, if indeed it be only an

error, into which some writers have fallen. It has been falsely alleged

that the King left Mittau for the purpose of fomenting fresh troubles in

France. The friends of Louis XVIII., who advised him to leave Mittau,

had great hopes from the last war. They cherished still greater hopes

from the new wars which Bonaparte's ambition could not fail to excite,

but they were not so ill-informed respecting the internal condition of

France as to expect that disturbances would arise there, or even to

believe in the possibility of fomenting them. The pear was not yet ripe

for Louis XVIII.

On the 29th of November the contents of a letter which had arrived from

London by way of Sweden were communicated to me. This letter was dated

the 3d of November, and contained some particulars respecting the Comte

de Lille's arrival in England. That Prince had arrived at Yarmouth on

the 31st of October 1807, and it was stated that the King was obliged to

wait some time in the port until certain difficulties respecting his

landing and the continuance of his journey should be removed. It

moreover appeared from this letter that the King of England thought

proper to refuse the Comte de Lille permission to go to London or its

neighbourhood. The palace of Holyrood in Edinburgh was assigned as his

place of residence; and Mr. Ross, secretary to Mr. Canning, conveyed the

determination of the King of England to Louis XVIII., at Yarmouth.

The precaution of the English Ministry in not permitting the refugee King

to go near London appeared to me remarkable, considering the relative

position of the Governments of France and England, and I regarded it as a

corroboration of what the Prince Wittgenstein had told me respecting Mr.

Canning's inclination for an amicable arrangement. But the moment was

approaching when the affairs of Spain were to raise an invincible

obstacle to peace, to complicate more than ever the interests of the

powers of Europe, and open to Napoleon that vast career of ambition which

proved his ruin. He did not allow the hopes of the emigrants to remain

chimerical, and the year 1814 witnessed the realization of the prophetic

remark made by M. Lemereier, in a conversation with Bonaparte a few days

before the foundation of the Empire: "If you get into the bed of the

Bourbons, General, you will not lie in it ten year." Napoleon occupied

it for nine years and nine months.

Fouche, the grand investigator of the secrets of Europe, did not fail, on

the first report of the agitations in Spain, to address to me question on

question respecting the Comte de Rechteren, the Spanish Minister at

Hamburg, who, however, had left that city, with the permission of his

Court, four months after I had entered on my functions. This was going

back very far to seek information respecting the affairs of the day. At

the very moment when I transmitted a reply to Fouche which was not

calculated to please him, because it afforded no ground for suspicion as

to the personal conduct of M. de Rechteren, I received from the amiable

Josephine a new mark of her remembrance. She sent me the following note:

"M. Milon, who is now in Hamburg, wishes me, my dear Bourrienne, to

request that you will use your interest in his favour. I feel the more

pleasure in making this request as it affords me an opportunity of

renewing the assurance of my regard for you."

Josephine's letter was dated from Fontainebleau, whither the Emperor used

to make journeys in imitation of the old Court of France. During these

excursions he sometimes partook of the pleasures of the chase, but merely

for the sake of reviving an old custom, for in that exercise he found as

little amusement as Montaigne did in the game of chess,

At Fontainebleau, as everywhere else, his mind was engaged with the means

of augmenting his greatness, but, unfortunately, the exactions he imposed

on distant countries were calculated to alienate the affections of the

people. Thus, for example, I received an order emanating from him, and

transmitted to me by M. Daru, the Intendant-General of the army, that the

pay of all the French troops stationed in the Hanse Towns should be

defrayed by these towns. I lamented the necessity of making such a

communication to the Senates of Bremen, Lubeck, and Hamburg; but my duty

compelled me to do so, and I had long been accustomed to fulfil duties

even more painful than this. I tried every possible means with the three

States, not collectively but separately, to induce them to comply with

the measure, in the hope that the assent of one would help me to obtain

that of the two others. But, as if they, had been all agreed, I only

received evasive expressions of regret.

Knowing as I did, and I may say better than any one else, the hopes and

designs of Bonaparte respecting the north of Germany, it was not without

pain, nor even without alarm, that I saw him doing everything calculated

to convert into enemies the inhabitants of a country which would always

have remained quiet had it only been permitted to preserve its

neutrality. Among the orders I received were often many which could only

have been the result of the profoundest ignorance. For example, I was

one day directed to press 3000 seamen in the Hanse Towns. Three thousand

seamen out of a population of 200,000! It was as absurd as to think of

raising 500,000 sailors in France. This project being impossible, it was

of course not executed; but I had some difficulty in persuading the

Emperor that a sixth of the number demanded was the utmost the Hanse

Towns could supply. Five hundred seamen were accordingly furnished, but

to make up that number it was necessary to include many men who were

totally unfit for war service.

CHAPTER--XIV.

1808.

Departure of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo--Prediction and superstition

--Stoppage of letters addressed to the Spanish troops--La Romana and

Romanillos--Illegible notifications--Eagerness of the German Princes

to join the Confederation of the Rhine--Attack upon me on account of

M. Hue--Bernadotte's successor in Hamburg--Exactions and tyrannical

conduct of General Dupas--Disturbance in Hamburg--Plates broken in a

fit of rage--My letter to Bernadotte--His reply--Bernadotte's return

to Hamburg, and departure of Dupas for Lubeck--Noble conduct of the

'aide de camp' Barrel.

In the spring of 1808 a circumstance occurred which gave, me much

uneasiness; it was the departure of Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo,

who received orders to repair to Copenhagen. He left Hamburg on the 8th

of March, as he was to reach his destination on the 14th of the same

month. The Danish charge d'affaires also received orders to join the

Prince, and discharge the functions of King's commissary. It was during

his government at Hamburg and his stay in Jutland that hernadotte

unconsciously paved his way to the throne of Sweden. I recollect that he

had also his presages and his predestinations. In short, he believed in

astrology, and I shall never forget the serious tone in which he one day

said to me, "Would you believe, my dear friend, that it was predicted at

Paris that I should be a King, but that I must cross the sea to reach my

throne?" I could not help smiling with him at this weakness of mind,

from which Bonaparte was not far removed. It certainly was not any

supernatural influence which elevated Bernadotte to sovereign rank.

That elevation was solely due to his excellent character. He had no

other talisman than the wisdom of his government, and the promptitude

which he always, showed to oppose unjust measures. This it was that

united all opinions in his favour.

The bad state of the roads in the north prolonged Bernadotte's journey

one day. He set out on the 8th of March; he was expected to arrive at

Copenhagen on the 14th, but did not reach there till the 15th. He

arrived precisely two hours before the death of Christian, King of

Denmark, an event with which he made me acquainted by letter written two

days after his arrival.