CHAPTER XVIII

1799.

Arrival at Jaffa--The siege--Beauharnais and Croisier--Four thousand

prisoners--Scarcity of provisions--Councils of war--Dreadful

necessity--The massacre--The plague--Lannes and the mountaineers--

Barbarity of Djezasi--Arrival at St Jean d'Acre, and abortive

attacks--Sir Sidney Smith--Death of Caffarelli--Duroc wounded--

Rash bathing--Insurrections in Egypt.

On arriving before Jaffa, where there were already some troops, the first

person. I met was Adjutant-General Gresieux, with whom I was well

acquainted. I wished him good-day, and offered him my hand. "Good God!

what are you about?" said he, repulsing me with a very abrupt gesture;

"you may have the plague. People do not touch each other here!"

I mentioned the circumstance to Bonaparte, who said, "If he be afraid of

the plague, he will die of it." Shortly after, at St. Jean d'Acre, he

was attacked by that malady, and soon sank under it.

On the 4th of March we commenced the siege of Jaffa. That paltry place,

which, to round a sentence, was pompously styled the ancient Joppa, held

out only to the 6th of March, when it was taken by storm, and given up to

pillage. The massacre was horrible. General Bonaparte sent his aides de

camp Beauharnais and Croisier to appease the fury of the soldiers as much

as possible, and to report to him what was passing. They learned that a

considerable part of the garrison had retired into some vast buildings,

a sort of caravanserai, which formed a large enclosed court. Beauharnais

and Croisier, who were distinguished by wearing the 'aide de camp' scarf

on their arms, proceeded to that place. The Arnauts and Albanians, of

whom these refugees were almost entirely composed, cried from the windows

that they were willing to surrender upon an assurance that they would be

exempted from the massacre to which the town was doomed; if not, they

threatened to fire on the 'aides de camp', and to defend themselves to

the last extremity. The two officers thought that they ought to accede

to the proposition, notwithstanding the decree of death which had been

pronounced against the whole garrison, in consequence of the town being

token by storm. They brought them to our camp in two divisions, one

consisting of about 2500 men, the other of about 1600.

I was walking with General Bonaparte, in front of his tent, when he

beheld this mass of men approaching, and before he even saw his 'aides de

camp' he said to me, in a tone of profound sorrow, "What do they wish me

to do with these men? Have I food for them?--ships to convey them to

Egypt or France? Why, in the devil's name, have they served me thus?"

After their arrival, and the explanations which the General-in-Chief

demanded and listened to with anger, Eugene and Croisier received the

most severe reprimand for their conduct. But the deed was done. Four

thousand men were there. It was necessary to decide upon their fate.

The two aides de camp observed that they had found themselves alone in

the midst of numerous enemies, and that he had directed them to restrain

the carnage. "Yes, doubtless," replied the General-in-Chief, with great

warmth, "as to women, children, and old men--all the peaceable

inhabitants; but not with respect to armed soldiers. It was your duty to

die rather than bring these unfortunate creatures to me. What do you want

me to do with them?" These words were pronounced in the most angry tone.

The prisoners were then ordered to sit down, and were placed, without any

order, in front of the tents, their hands tied behind their backs.

A sombre determination was depicted on their countenances. We gave them

a little biscuit and bread, squeezed out of the already scanty supply for

the army.

On the first day of their arrival a council of war was held in the tent

of the General-in-Chief, to determine what course should be pursued with

respect to them the council deliberated a long time without coming to any

decision.

On the evening of the following day the daily reports of the generals of

division came in. They spoke of nothing but the insufficiency of the

rations, the complaints of the soldiers--of their murmurs and discontent

at seeing their bread given to enemies who had been withdrawn from their

vengeance, inasmuch as a decree of death; in conformity with the laws of

war, had been passed on Jaffa. All these reports were alarming, and

especially that of General Bon, in which no reserve was made. He spoke

of nothing less than the fear of a revolt, which would be justified by

the serious nature of the case.

The council assembled again. All the generals of division were summoned

to attend, and for several hours together they discussed, under separate

questions, what measures might be adopted, with the most sincere desire

to discover and execute one which would save the lives of these

unfortunate prisoners.

(1.) Should they be sent into Egypt? Could it be done?

To do so; it would be necessary to send with them a numerous escort,

which would too much weaken our little army in the enemy's country. How,

besides, could they and the escort be supported till they reached Cairo,

having no provisions to give them on setting out, and their route being

through a hostile territory, which we had exhausted, which presented no

fresh resources, and through which we, perhaps, might have to return,

(2.) Should they be embarked?

Where were the ships?--Where could they be found? All our telescopes,

directed over the sea could not descry a single friendly sail Bonaparte,

I affirm, would have regarded such an event as a real favour of fortune.

It was, and--I am glad to have to say it, this sole idea, this sole hope,

which made him brave, for three days, the murmurs of his army. But in

vain was help looked for seaward. It did not come.

(3.) Should the prisoners be set at liberty?

They world then instantly proceed to St. Jean d'Acre to reinforce the

pasha, or else, throwing themselves into the mountains of Nablous, would

greatly annoy our rear and right-flank, and deal out death to us, as a

recompense for the life we had given them. There could be no doubt of

this. What is a Christian dog to a Turk? It would even have been a

religious and meritorious act in the eye of the Prophet.

(4.) Could they be incorporated, disarmed, with our soldiers in the

ranks?

Here again the question of food presented itself in all its force. Next

came to be considered the danger of having such comrades while marching

through an enemy's country. What might happen in the event of a battle

before St. Jean d'Acre? Could we even tell what might occur during the

march? And, finally, what must be done with them when under the ramparts

of that town, if we should be able to take them there? The same

embarrassments with respect to the questions of provisions and security

would then recur with increased force.

The third day arrived without its being possible, anxiously as it was

desired, to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of

these unfortunate men. The murmurs in the camp grew louder the evil went

on increasing--remedy appeared impossible--the danger was real and

imminent. The order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed on

the 10th of March. We did not, as has been stated, separate the Egyptians

from the other prisoners. There were no Egyptians.

Many of the unfortunate creatures composing the smaller division, which

was fired on close to the seacoast, at some distance from the other

column, succeeded in swimming to some reefs of rocks out of the reach of

musket-shot. The soldiers rested their muskets on the sand, and, to

induce the prisoners to return, employed the Egyptian signs of

reconciliation in use in the country. They, came back; but as they

advanced they were killed, and disappeared among the waves.

I confine myself to these details of this act of dreadful necessity, of

which I was an eye-witness. Others, who, like myself, saw it, have

fortunately spared me the recital of the sanguinary result. This

atrocious scene, when I think of it, still makes me shudder, as it did on

the day I beheld it; and I would wish it were possible for me to forget

it, rather than be compelled to describe it. All the horrors imagination

can conceive, relative to that day of blood, would fall short of the

reality.

I have related the truth, the whole truth. I was present at all the

discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. I had not, as

may be supposed, a deliberative voice; but I am bound to declare that.

the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical

strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy,

would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition which

was carried into effect, if I had a vote to give. It was necessary to be

on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which existed.

War, unfortunately, presents too many occasions on which a law, immutable

in all ages, and common to all nations, requires that private interests

should be sacrificed to a great general interest, and that even humanity

should be forgotten. It is for posterity to judge whether this terrible

situation was that in which Bonaparte was placed. For my own part, I

have a perfect conviction that he could not do otherwise than yield to

the dire necessity of the case. It was the advice of the council, whose

opinion was unanimous in favour of the execution, that governed him,

Indeed I ought in truth to say, that he yielded only in the last

extremity, and was one of those, perhaps, who beheld the massacre with

the deepest pain.

After the siege of Jaffe the plague began to exhibit itself with a little

more virulence. We lost between seven and eight hundred, men by the

contagion during the campaign of Syria'

--[Sir Walter Scott says, that Heaven seat this pestilence amongst

us to avenge the massacre of Jaffa]--

During our march on St. Jean d'Acre, which was commenced on the 14th of

March, the army neither obtained the brilliant triumphs nor encountered

the numerous obstacles spoken of in certain works. Nothing of importance

occurred but a rash skirmish of General Lannes who, in spite of contrary

orders, from Bonaparte, obstinately pursued a troop of mountaineers into

the passes of Nabloua. On returning, he found the mountaineers placed in

ambush in great numbers amongst rocks, the windings of which they were

well, acquainted with, whence they fired close upon our troops; whose

situation rendered them unable to defend themselves. During the time of

this foolish and useless enterprise; especially while the firing was

brisk, Bonaparte, exhibited much impatience, and it must be confessed,

his anger was but natural: The Nablousians halted at the openings of the

mountain defiles. Bonaparte reproached Lannes bitterly for having

uselessly exposed himself, and "sacrificed, without any object, a number

of brave men." Lannes excused himself by saying that the mountaineers

had defied him, and he wished to chastise the rabble. "We are not in a

condition to play the swaggerer," replied Napoleon.

In four days we arrived before St. Jean d'Acre, where we learned that

Djezzar had cut off the head of our envoy, Mailly-de-Chateau-Renaud, and

thrown his body into the sea in a sack. This cruel pasha was guilty of a

great number of similar executions. The waves frequently drove dead

bodies towards the coast, and we came upon them whilst bathing.

The details: of the siege of Acre are well known. Although surrounded by

a wall, flanked with strong towers, and having, besides, a broad-and deep

ditch defended by works this little fortress did not appear likely to

hold out against French valour and the skill of our corps of engineers

and artillery; but the ease and rapidity with which Jaffa had been taken

occasioned us to overlook in some degree the comparative strength of the

two places, and the difference of their respective situations. At Jaffa

we had sufficient artillery: at St. Jean d'Acre we had not. At Jaffa we

had to deal only with a garrison left to itself: at St. Jean d'Acre we

were opposed by a garrison strengthened by reinforcements of men and

supplies of provisions, supported by the English fleet, and assisted by

European Science. Sir Sidney Smith was, beyond doubt, the man who did us

the greatest injury.

--[Sir Sidney Smith was the only Englishman besides the Duke of

Wellington who defeated Napoleon in military operations. The third

Englishman opposed to him, Sir John Moore, was compelled to make a

precipitate retreat through the weakness of his force]--

Much has been said respecting his communications with the

General-in-Chief. The reproaches which the latter cast upon him for

endeavouring to seduce the soldiers and officers of the army by tempting

offers were the more singular, even if they were well founded, inasmuch

as these means are frequently employed by leaders in war.

--[At one time the French General was so disturbed by them as to

endeavour to put a stop to them; which object he effected by

interdicting all communication with the English, and signifying, in

an order of the day, that their Commodore was a madman. This, being

believed in the army, so enraged Sir Sidney Smith, that in his wrath

he sent a challenge to Napoleon. The latter replied, that he had

too many weighty affairs on his hands to trouble himself in so

trifling a matter. Had it, indeed, been the great Marlborough, it

might have been worthy his attention. Still, if the English sailor

was absolutely bent upon fighting, he would send him a bravo from

the army, and show them a smell portion of neutral ground, where the

mad Commodore might land, and satisfy his humour to the full.--

(Editor of 1836 edition.)]--

As to the embarking of French prisoners on board a vessel in which the

plague existed, the improbability of the circumstance alone, but

especially the notorious facts of the case, repel this odious

accusation. I observed the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith closely at the

time, and I remarked in him a chivalric spirit, which sometimes hurried

him into trifling eccentricities; but I affirm that his behaviour towards

the French was that of a gallant enemy. I have seen many letters, in

which the writers informed him that they "were very sensible of the good

treatment which the French experienced when they fell into his hands."

Let any one examine Sir Sidney's conduct before the capitulation of

El-Arish, and after its rupture, and then they can judge of his

character.

--[Napoleon, when at St. Helena, in speaking of the siege of Acre,

said,--Sidney Smith is a brave officer. He displayed considerable

ability in the treaty for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. He

took advantage of the discontent which he found to prevail amongst

the French troops at being so long away from France, and other

circumstances. He manifested great honour in sending immediately to

Kleber the refusal of Lord Keith to ratify the treaty, which saved

the French army; if he had kept it a secret seven or eight days

longer, Cairo would have been given up to the Turks, and the French

army necessarily obliged to surrender to the English. He also

showed great humanity and honour in all his proceedings towards the

French who felt into his hands. He landed at Havre, for some

'sotttice' of a bet he had made, according to some, to go to the

theatre; others said it was for espionage; however that may be, he

was arrested and confined in the Temple as a spy; and at one time it

was intended to try and execute him. Shortly after I returned from

Italy he wrote to me from his prison, to request that I would

intercede for him; but, under the circumstances in which he was

taken, I could do nothing for him. He is active, intelligent,

intriguing, and indefatigable; but I believe that he is 'mezzo

pazo'.

"The chief cause of the failure at Acre was, that he took all my

battering train, which was on board of several small vessels.

Had it not been for that, I would have taken Acre in spite of him.

He behaved very bravely, and was well seconded by Phillipeaux, a

Frenchman of talent, who had studied with me as an engineer. There

was a Major Douglas also, who behaved very gallantly. The

acquisition of five or six hundred seamen as gunners was a great

advantage to the Turks, whose spirits they revived, and whom they

showed how to defend the fortress. But he committed a great fault

in making sorties, which cost the lives of two or three hundred

brave fellows without the possibility of success. For it was

impossible he could succeed against the number of the French who

were before Acre. I would lay a wage that he lost half of his crew

in them. He dispersed Proclamations amongst my troops, which

certainly shook some of them, and I in consequence published an

order, stating that he was read, and forbidding all communication

with him. Some days after he sent, by means of a flag of truce,

a lieutenant or a midshipman with a letter containing a challenge to

me to meet him at some place he pointed out in order to fight a

duel. I laughed at this, sad sent him back an intimation that when

he brought Marlborough to fight me I would meet him. Not,

withstanding this, I like the character of the man." (Voices from

St. Helena, vol. 4, p. 208).]--

All our manoeuvres, our works, and attacks were made with that levity and

carelessness which over-confidence inspires. Kleber, whilst walking with

me one day in the lines of our camp, frequently expressed his surprise

and discontent. "The trenches," said, he, "do not come up to my knees."

Besieging artillery was, of necessity, required: we commenced with field

artillery. This encouraged the besieged, who perceived the weakness of

our resources. The besieging artillery, consisting only of three

twenty-four pounders and six, eighteen pounders, was not brought up

until the end of April, and before that period threw assaults had taken

place with very serious loss. On the 4th of May our powder began to

fail us. This cruel event obliged us to slacken our fire. We also

wanted shot; and an order of the day fixed a price to be given for all

balls, according to their calibre, which might be picked up after being

fired from the fortress or the two ships of the line, the 'Tiger' and

'Theseus', which were stationed on each side of the harbour: These two

vessels embarrassed the communication, between the camp and the

trenches; but though they made much noise, they did little harm. A ball

from one of them; killed an officer on the evening the siege was raised.

The enemy had within the walls some excellent riflemen, chiefly

Albanians. They placed stones, one over the other, on the walls, put

their firearms through the interstices, and thus, completely sheltered,

fired with destructive precision.

On the 9th of April General Caffarelli, so well known for his courage and

talents, was passing through the trench, his hand resting as he stooped

on his hip, to preserve the equilibrium which his wooden leg, impaired;

his elbow only was raised above the trench. He was warned that the

enemy's shot, fired close upon us did not miss the smallest object.

He paid no attention to any observation of this kind, and in a few

instants his elbow joint was fractured. Amputation of the arm was judged

indispensable. The General survived the operation eighteen days.

Bonaparte went regularly twice a day to his tent. By his order, added to

my friendship for Caffarelli, I scarcely ever quitted him. Shortly

before he expired he said to me, "My dear Bourrienne, be so good as to

read to me Voltaire's preface to 'Esprit des Lois'." When I returned to

the tent of the General-in-Chief he asked, "How is Caffarelli?" I

replied, "He is near his end; but he asked me to read him Voltaire's

preface to the 'Esprit de Lois', he has just fallen asleep." Bonaparte

said, "Bah! to wish to hear that preface? how singular!" He went to see

Caffarelli, but he was still asleep. I returned to him that evening and

received his last breath. He died with the utmost composure. His death.

was equally regretted by the soldiers and the men of science, who

accompanied us. It was a just regret due to that distinguished man, in

whom very extensive information was united with great courage and amiable

disposition.

On the 10th of May; when an assault took place, Bonaparte proceeded at an

early hour to the trenches.

--[Sir Sidney Smith, in his Official report of the assault of the

8th of May, says that Napoleon was distinctly seen directing the

operation.]--

Croisier, who was mentioned on our arrival at Damanhour and on the

capture of Jaffa, had in vain courted death since the commencement of the

siege. Life had become insupportable to him since the unfortunate affair

at Jaffa. He as usual accompanied his General to the trenches.

Believing that the termination of the siege, which was supposed to be

near, would postpone indefinitely the death which he sought, he mounted a

battery. In this situation his tall figure uselessly provoked all, the

enemy's shots. "Croisier, come down, I command you; you have no business

there," cried Bonaparte, in a loud and imperative tone. Croisier

remained without making any reply. A moment after a ball passed through

his right leg. Amputation was not considered, indispensable. On the day

of our departure he was placed on a litters which was borne by sixteen

men alternately, eight at a time. I received his farewell between Gaza

and El-Arish, where, he died of tetanus. His modest tomb will not be

often visited.

The siege of St. Jean d'Acre lasted sixty days. During that time

eight-assaults and-twelve sorties took place. In the assault of the 8th

of May more than 200 men penetrated into the town. Victory was already

shouted; but the breach having been taken in reverse by the Turks, it

was not approached without some degree of hesitation, and the men who

had entered were not supported. The streets were barricaded. The

cries, the howlings of the women, who ran trough the streets throwing,

according to the custom of the country, dust in the, air, excited the

male inhabitants to a desperate resistance, which rendered unavailing,

this short occupation of the town, by a handful of men, who, finding

themselves left without assistance, retreated towards the breach. Many

who could not reach it perished in the town.

During this assault Duroc, who was in the trench, was wounded in the

right thigh by the a splinter from a shell fired against the

fortifications. Fortunately this accident only carried away the flesh

from the bone, which remained untouched. He had a tent in common with

several other 'aides de camp'; but for his better accommodation I gave

him mine, and I scarcely ever quitted him. Entering his tent one day

about noon, I found him in a profound sleep. The excessive heat had

compelled him to throw off all covering, and part of his wound was

exposed. I perceived a scorpion which had crawled up the leg of the

camp-bed and approached very near to the wound. I was just in time to

hurl it to the ground. The sudden motion of my hand awoke Duroc.

We often bathed in the sea. Sometimes the English, perhaps after taking

a double allowance of grog, would fire at our heads, which appeared above

water. I am not aware that any accident was occasioned by their

cannonade; but as we were beyond reach of their guns, we paid scarcely

any attention to the firing. It was seen a subject of amusement to us.

Had our attack on St. Jean d'Acre been less precipitate, and had the

siege been undertaken according to the rules of war; the place would not

have held out three days; one assault, like that of the 8th of May, would

have been sufficient. If, in the situation in which we were on the day

when we first came in sight of the ramparts of Acre; we had made a less

inconsiderate estimate of the strength of the place; if we had likewise

taken into consideration the active co-operation of the English and the

Ottoman Porte; our absolute want of artillery of sufficient calibre; our

scarcity of gunpowder and the difficulty of procuring food; we certainly

should not have undertaken the siege; and that would have been by far the

wisest course.

Towards the end of the siege the General-in-Chief received intelligence

of some trifling insurrections in northern Egypt. An angel had excited

them, and the heavenly messenger, who had condescended to assume a name,

was called the Mahdi, or El Mohdy. This religious extravagance, however,

did not last long, and tranquillity was soon restored. All that the

fanatic Mahdi, who shrouded himself in mystery, succeeded in doing was to

attack our rear by some vagabonds, whose illusions were dissipated by a

few musket shots.

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