_The last stand of German intrigue. Germany’s spy system in
America. What is coming?_
As I write these last few pages three clippings from recent newspapers
lie before me on my desk. One of them tells of the new era of good
feeling that exists between the governments of Mexico and the United
States, and speaks of the alliance of Latin-American republics against
German autocracy.
Another tells how the first contingent of American troops have landed in
France, after a successful battle with a submarine fleet. And a third
speaks of the victorious advance of the troops of Democratic Russia,
after the world had begun to believe that Russia had forgotten the war in
her new freedom.
I read them over again and I think that each one of these clippings, if
true, writes “failure” once again upon the book of German diplomacy.
I remember a day not so very many months ago, when a man with whom I had
some business in—for me—less quiet days, came to see me.
“B. E. is in town,” he said quietly. “He says he must see you. Can you
meet him at the —— Restaurant to-night?”
Boy-Ed! I was not surprised that he should be in this country, for I knew
the man’s audacity. But what could he want of me? Well, it would do no
harm to meet him, I thought, and, anyway, my curiosity was aroused.
I nodded.
“I’ll be there,” I said. “At what hour?”
“Six-thirty,” my friend replied. “It’s only for a minute. He is leaving
to-night.”
That evening for the first time in two years I saw the man who had done
his share in the undermining of America. I did not ask him what his
presence in this country meant, and needless to say, he did not inform me.
Our business was of a different character. I had just arranged to write
a series of newspaper articles exposing the operations of the Kaiser’s
secret service and Boy-Ed tried to induce me to suppress them.
“I cannot do it,” I told him.
But the captain showed a remarkable knowledge of my private affairs.
“Under your contract,” he said, “the articles cannot be published until
you have endorsed them. As you have not yet affixed your signature to
them, you can suppress them by merely withholding your endorsement.”
This I declined to do and our conversation ended.
Shortly afterward, Boy-Ed returned to Germany on the U-53. He did not
attempt to see me again, but three times within the following weeks,
attempts were made upon my life. Later, pressure was brought to bear
from sources close to the German Embassy, but they failed to secure the
suppression of the articles.
But my curiosity was aroused as to the meaning of Boy-Ed’s presence here
and I set to work to discover the purpose of it. This was not difficult,
for although I have ceased to be a secret agent, I am still in touch with
many who formerly gave me information, and I know ways of discovering
many things I wish to learn.
Soon I had the full story of Boy-Ed’s latest activities in this country.
He had, I learned, gone first to Mexico in an attempt to pave the way for
that last essay at a Mexican-Japanese alliance, which the discovery of
the famous Zimmermann note later made public. Whether he had succeeded
or no, I did not discover at the time. But what was more important, I did
learn that while he was in Mexico, Boy-Ed had selected and established
several submarine bases for Germany! His plans had also carried him to
San Francisco, to which he had gone disguised only by a mustache. There
he had identified several men who were needed by the counsel of the
defense of the German Consul Bopp, who had been arrested on a charge of
conspiracy and for fomenting sedition within the United States.
From the Pacific Coast Boy-Ed had gone to Kansas City and had bought off
a witness who had intended to testify for the United States in the trial
of certain German agents. Thence, after a private errand of his own, he
had made his way to New York, _en route_ to Newport and Germany.
It may be well here to comment upon one feature of the Zimmermann note
which has generally escaped attention. It was through no blunder of
the German Government that that document came into possession of the
United States, as I happen to know. I have pointed out before that
diplomatic negotiations are carried through in the following manner. The
preliminary negotiations are conducted by men of unofficial standing
and it is not until the attitude of the various governments involved is
thoroughly understood by each of them that final negotiations are drawn
up. Now, although no negotiations had taken place between Germany, Japan
and Mexico, the form of the Zimmermann note would seem to indicate that
there was a thorough understanding between these countries. They were
drawn up in this form with a purpose. Germany wished the United States to
conclude that Mexico and Japan were hostile to her; Germany hoped that
this country would be outwardly silent about the Zimmermann note but
would take some diplomatic action against Mexico and Japan which would
inevitably draw these two countries into an anti-American alliance.
Did President Wilson perceive this thoroughly Teutonic plot? I cannot
say; but at any rate upon February 28, he astounded America by revealing
once again Germany’s evil intentions toward the United States, and by
so doing not only defeated the German Government’s particular plan but
effectively cemented public opinion in this country, bringing it to
a unanimous support of the government in the crisis which was slowly
driving it toward war.
That marked the last stand of German intrigue, as it was conducted before
the war. Now there is a new danger—a danger whose concrete illustration
lies before me in the account of that first engagement between United
States warships and German submarines.
The people of the United States, just entered into active participation
in the war, are faced with a new peril—the betrayal of military and naval
secrets to representatives of the German Government working in this
country. Not only was it known to Germany that American troops had been
sent to France, but the very course that the transports were to take had
been communicated to Berlin. It is probable that other news of equal
value has been or is being sent to Germany at the present time; and the
United States is confronted with the possibility of submarine attacks
upon its troop ships, as well as other dangers which, if not properly
combated, may result in serious losses and greatly hamper it in its
conduct of the war.
What exactly is this spy peril which this country now faces and which
constitutes a far greater, because less easily combated danger than
actual warfare?
How can it be got rid of?
These are the questions which the American people and the American
Government are asking themselves and must ask themselves if they are to
bear an effective share in the war in which they are now engaged.
Because of my former connection with the German Government and my work as
a secret agent both in Europe and America, in the former of which I was
brought into intimate contact with the workings of the secret service in
other countries, I am prepared to give a reliable account of the general
structure and workings of the German spy system in the United States as
it is to-day.
It is important to remember that the secret diplomatic service, as it was
conducted in this country before the war, and with which I was connected,
is entirely different both in its personnel and methods with the spy
system which is in operation to-day. A little further on I shall point
out why this is so and why it must be so.
Before the entry of the United States into the war, the principal
activities of the German Government’s agents were confined to the
fomenting of strikes in munitions plants and other war activities, the
organizing of plots to blow up ships, canals, or bridges—anything
which would hamper the transportation of supplies to the Allies—and the
inciting of sedition by stirring up trouble between German-Americans and
Americans of other descent. All of these acts were committed in order to
prevent you from aiding in any way the enemies of Germany; and also, by
creating disorder in this country in peace times to furnish you with an
object lesson of what could be done in war times.
These things were planned, overseen and executed by Germans and by other
enemies of the Allies, under the leadership of men like von Papen, who
were accredited agents of the German Government and who were protected by
diplomatic immunity.
Now that war has come an entirely new task is before the German
Government and an entirely new set of people are needed to do it. Wartime
spying is absolutely different from the work which was done before the
war, and the two have no connection with each other—except as the work
done before the war has prepared the way for the work which is being done
now.
And whereas the work done before the war was conducted by Germans, the
present work, for very obvious reasons, cannot be done by any one who is
a German or who is likely to be suspected of German affiliations.
I venture to say that not one per cent. of the persons who are engaged in
spying for the German Government at the present time are either of German
birth or descent.
I say this, not because I know how the German secret service is being
conducted in this country, but because I know how it has been conducted
in other countries.
Let me explain. It is obvious that such activities as the inciting to
strikes, and the conspiring which were done in the last three years
could be safely conducted by Germans, because the two countries were at
peace. The moment that war was declared, every German became an object
of suspicion, and his usefulness in spying—that is, the obtaining of
military, naval, political and diplomatic secrets—was ended immediately.
For that reason Germany and every other government which has spies in
the enemy country make a practice during war of employing practically no
known citizens of its own country.
At the present time more than ninety per cent. of the German spies in
England are Englishmen. The rest are Russians, Dutchmen, Roumanians—what
you will—anything but Germans.
One of the former heads of the French secret service in this country was
a man who called himself Guillaume. His real name is Wilhelm and he was
born in Berlin!
For that reason to arrest such men as Carl Heynen or Professor Hanneck is
merely a precautionary measure. Whatever connection these men may have
had with the German Government formerly, their work is now done, and
their detention does not hinder the workings of the real spy system one
iota.
HOW THE SPY SYSTEM WORKS.
It is difficult to distinguish between the work done in neutral countries
by the secret diplomatic agent—the man who is engaged in fomenting
disorders, such as I have described—and the spy, who is seeking military
information which may be of future use. The two work together in that the
secret agent reports to Berlin the names of inhabitants of the country
concerned, who may be of use in securing information of military or naval
value. It is well to remember, however, that the real spy always works
alone. His connection with the government is known only to a very few
officials, and is rarely or never suspected by the people who assist him
in securing information. Here permit me to make a distinction between
two classes of spies: the agents or directors of espionage, who know
what they are doing; and the others, the small fry, who secure bits of
information here and there and pass it on to their employers, the agents,
often without realizing the real purpose of their actions.
In the building of the spy system in America, Germans and
German-Americans have been used. Business houses, such as banks and
insurance companies, which have unusual opportunities of obtaining
information about their clients—most of whom, in the case of German
institutions in this country, are of German birth or descent—have been of
service in bringing the directors of spy work into touch with people who
will do the actual spying.
The German secret service makes a point of having in its possession lists
of people who are in a position to find out facts of greater or less
importance about government officials. Housemaids, small tradesmen, and
the like, can be of use in the compiling of data about men of importance,
so that their personal habits, their financial status, their business
and social relationships become a matter of record for future use. These
facts are secured, usually by a little “jollying” rather than the payment
of money, by the local agent—a person sometimes planted in garrison
towns, state capitals, etc.—who is paid a comparatively small monthly sum
for such work. This information is passed to a director of spies, who
thereby discovers men who are in a position to supply him with valuable
data and who determine whether or not they can be reached.
Now, just how is this “reaching” done? Mainly, I think it safe to say,
by blackmail and intimidation. If from this accumulated gossip about
his intended victim—who may be an army or naval officer, a manufacturer
of military supplies, or a government clerk—the spy learns of some
indiscretion committed by the man or his wife, he uses it as a club in
obtaining information that he desires. Or he may hear that a man is in
financial straits. He will make a point of seeing that his victim is
helped, and then will make use of the latter’s friendship to worm facts
out of him. In this way, sometimes without the suspicion of the victim
being aroused, little bits of information are secured, which may be of
no importance in themselves, but are of immense value when considered in
conjunction with facts acquired elsewhere.
Ultimately the victim will balk or become suspicious. Then he is offered
the alternative of continuing to supply information or of being exposed
for his previous activities. Generally he accepts the lesser evil.
In this manner the spy system is built up even in peace times. The
tremendous sums of money that are spent in this manner amount to
millions. The quantity of information secured is on the other hand,
inconceivably small for the most part. But in the mass of useless and
superfluous facts that are supplied to the spies and through them to the
government, are to be found a few that are worth the cost of the system.
By the time war breaks out, if it does, the German Government has in its
possession innumerable facts about the equipment of the army and navy of
its enemy—and more important still, it has in its power men, sometimes
high in the confidence of the enemy government, who can be forced into
giving additional information when needed.
Now, the moment that war breaks out, what happens? The German Government
has distributed throughout the country thousands of men and women
who have legitimate business there; it has its hands on men who are
not spies, but who will betray secrets for a price either in money or
security; it is acquainted with the strength and weakness of fortresses,
various units of the service, the exact armament of every ship in the
navy, the resources of munition factories—in a word almost all of the
essential details about that country’s fighting and economic strength. It
also knows what portion of the populace are inclined to be disaffected.
And it is thoroughly familiar with the strategical points of that
country, so that in case of invasion it may strike hard and effectively.
What is must learn now is:
First, what are the present military and naval activities of the enemy.
Second, what are they planning to do.
Finally, the German Government must learn the how, why, when and where of
each of these things.
That, with the machinery at its command, is not so difficult as it would
seem.
Here is where the value of the minor bits of information comes in. A
trainman tells, for instance, that he has seen a trainload of soldiers
that day, upon such and such a line. A similar report comes in from
elsewhere. Meantime another agent has reported that a certain packing
house has shipped to the government so many tons of beef; while still
another announces the delivery at a particular point of a totally
different kind of supplies. Do you not see how all these facts, taken
together, and coupled with an accurate knowledge of transportation
conditions and of the geographical structure of the country would
constitute an important indication of an enemy’s plans, even failing the
possession of any absolute secrets? Do you not suppose that weeks before
you were aware that any United States soldiers had sailed for France, the
Germans might have known of all the preparations that were being made
and could deduce accurately the number of troops that were sailing, and
many facts of importance about their equipment. There is no need for the
betrayal of secrets for this kind of information to become known. It is a
mere matter of detective work.
But mark one feature of it. These facts are communicated by different
spies—not to a central clearing house of information in this country,
as has been surmised, but to various points outside the country for
transmission to the Great General Staff. They are duplicated endlessly
by different agents. They are sent to many different people for
transmission. _And even if half of the reports were lost, or half of the
spies were discovered, there would still be a sufficient number left to
carry on their work successfully._
Germany does not depend upon one spy alone for even the smallest item.
Always the work is duplicated. Always the same information is being
secured by several men, not one of whom knows any of the others; and
always that information is transmitted to Berlin through so many diverse
channels that it is impossible for the most vigilant secret service in
the world to prevent a goodly part of it from reaching its destination.
How that information is transmitted I shall tell in a moment. First, I
wish to explain how more important facts are secured—the secret plans of
the government, such, for instance, as the course which had been decided
upon for the squadron which carried the first American troops to France.
It is obvious that such facts as these could not have been deduced from
a mass of miscellaneous reports. That secret must have been learned in
its entirety. Exactly how it was discovered I do not pretend to know
nor shall I offer any theories. But here, in a situation of this sort,
unquestionably, is where the real spy—the “master spy,” if you wish to
call him so—steps in.
Now, it is impossible, in spite of the utmost vigilance, to keep an
important document from the knowledge of all but one or two people.
No matter how secret, it is almost certain to pass through the hands
of a number of officials and possibly several clerks. And with every
additional person who knows of it, the risk of discovery or betrayal is
correspondingly increased. If in code, it may be copied or memorized by a
spy who is in a position to get hold of it, or by a person who is in the
power of that spy! Once in Berlin, it can be deciphered. For the General
Staff and the Admiralty have their experts in these matters who are very
rarely defeated.
You may be sure that Germany has made her utmost efforts to put her spies
into high places in this country, just as she has tried to do elsewhere.
You may be sure, also, that she has neglected no opportunity to gain
control over any official or any naval or army officer—however important
or unimportant—whom the agents could influence. That has always been her
method; nor is it difficult to see why it frequently succeeds.
Imagine the situation of a man who in time of peace had supplied, either
innocently or otherwise, a foreign agent with information which possessed
a considerable value. It is probable that he would revolt at a suggestion
that he do it in time of war—but with his neck once in the German noose,
with the alternative of additional compliance or exposure facing him,
it is not hard to see how some men would become conscious traitors and
others would be driven to suicide.
By a system of blackmail and intimidation the Germans have attempted to
force into their ranks many people from whom they extort information that
would now be regarded as traitorous, although formerly it might have been
given out in all innocence.
Undoubtedly it was for purposes of intimidation that von Papen carried
with him to England papers incriminating Germans and German-Americans
who had been associated with him in one way or another. And why did von
Rintelen return to this country and aid this government in exposing
the German affiliations of people who had no German blood in them? The
obvious answer is that those people had balked at aiding him in some
scheme he had proposed. Therefore he made examples of them, with the
double purpose of demonstrating to the United States the extent of German
intrigue and of filling other implicated people with fear of the exposure
that would come to them if they were not more compliant.
Once in possession of secret information, the spy is faced with the
necessity of transmitting it to Berlin. Here again, the spy who is a
German would meet with considerable difficulty. He may mail letters if
no mail censorship has been instituted; but these are liable to seizure
and are not so useful in the transmission of war secrets as they were in
informing his government before the war of more or less standard facts
about the strength of fortifications and the like. He may use private
messengers—as do all spies—but the delay in this method is a severe
handicap.
In sending news of the movements of troops, speed is the prime essential.
Consequently he must communicate either by wireless or by cable. How does
he do it?
There are innumerable ways. There may be in the confidential employ
of many business houses which do a large cable business with neutral
countries men who are either agents or dupes of the German Government.
These men may send cables which seem absolutely innocent business
messages, but which if properly read impart facts of military value to
the recipient in Holland, say, or in Spain or South America. It is not a
difficult matter to use business codes, giving to the terms an entirely
different meaning from the one assigned in the code-book. Personal
messages are also used in this way, as is well known. As to the wireless,
although all stations are under rigid supervision, what is to prevent the
Germans from establishing a wireless station in the Kentucky Mountains,
for instance, and for a time operating it successfully?
But in spite of all cable censorship, the spy can smuggle information
into Mexico, where it can be cabled or wirelessed on to Berlin, either
directly or indirectly by way of one of the neutral countries. Even in
spite of the most rigid censorship of mails and telegrams this sort of
smuggling can be accomplished.
When I was in the Constitutional Army in Mexico, I used to receive
revolver ammunition from an old German who carried it over the border _in
his wooden leg_. Could not this method be applied to dispatches?
There are numerous authenticated cases of spies who have sent messages
concealed in sausages or other articles of food. Moreover, the current
of the Rio Grande at certain places runs in such a manner that a log or
a bucket dropped in on the American side will drift to the Mexican shore
and arrive at a point which can be determined with almost mathematical
certainty.
I mention those instances merely to show how little of real value the
censorship of cables and mails can accomplish. The question arises: What
can be done? I shall try to indicate the answer.
HOW TO GET RID OF THE SPY SYSTEM.
I say frankly that I think it absolutely impossible to eradicate spies
from any country. Certainly it cannot be done in a week or a year, or
even in many years. It is more than probable that the German spy systems
in France and England are more complete to-day than they were at the
beginning of the war. Three years ago the spies in those countries were
made up of both experienced and inexperienced men. Now the bunglers have
been weeded out, and only those who are expert in defying detection
remain. But these are the only men who were ever of real use to Germany;
and fortified as they are by three years of unsuspected work in these
countries, they are enabled to secure information of infinitely more
worth than they formerly were. What is the situation in America?
I have shown you the structure of that system. Let me repeat again that
Germany has installed in this country thousands of men, whose nationality
and habits are such as to protect them from suspicion, who work silently
and alone, because they know that their very lives depend upon their
silence, and who are in communication with no central spy organization,
for the very simple reason that no such organization exists. There is no
clearing house for spy information in this country. There are no “master
spies.”
Do you think that the German Government would risk the success of a work
so important as this, by organizing a system which the arrest of any one
man or group of men would betray? The idea of centralization in this
work is popular at present. In theory it is a good one. In practise it
is impossible. By the very nature of the spy’s trade, he must run alone,
and not only be unsuspected of any connection with Germany now, but be
believed never to have had such a connection. If the secret service
were a chain, the loss of one link would break it. With a system of
independent units, endlessly overlapping, eternally duplicating each
other’s work, they continue their practices even though half of their
number are caught.
Now with these men, protected as they are by the fact that not even their
fellows know them, with their wits sharpened by three years of silent
warfare against the agents of other governments and your own neutrality
squad, the task of ferreting them out is an utterly impossible one. You
cannot prevent spies from securing information.
You cannot prevent the transmission of that information to Berlin,
without instituting, not a censorship, but a complete suppression of all
communications of any sort.
But you can do much to counteract their methods by doing two things:
I. Delaying all mails and cables, other than actual government messages.
II. Instituting a system of counter espionage, which shall have for
its object the detection _but not the arrest_ of enemy spies; and the
dissemination of misleading information.
The war work of the spy depends for success upon the speed with which he
can communicate new facts to Berlin. If all his messages are delayed, his
effectiveness is severely crippled.
If in addition to that, all persons sending suspicious messages anywhere
are carefully shadowed; if their associations are looked up, it may be
possible to determine from whom they are getting information, and by
seeing that incorrect reports are given them, render them of negligible
value to their employers.
Public arrests of suspected men are worthless. Such disclosures only
serve to put the real spies on their guard. But if the spies are allowed
to work in fancied security, it will be possible to find out just what
they know and the government can change its plans at the last moment and
so nullify their efforts.
Eternal vigilance, here as elsewhere, is the price of security. Germany
has regarded the work of her spies as of almost as much importance as
the force in the field. She has spent millions of dollars in building up
a system in this country, whose ramifications extend to all points of
your national life. And since upon this system rests all of her hopes of
rendering worthless your participation in the war, she will not lightly
let it fail.
I toss aside my clippings and sit looking out into the New York street
which shows such little sign of war as yet. Defeat! That is the end
of this silent warfare, this secret underground attack that has in it
nothing of humanity or honor. I think of Germany, a country of quiet,
peaceful folk as I once knew it, bearing no malice, going cheerfully
about their work, seeking their destiny with a will that has nothing in
it of conquest. And I think of Germany embattled, ruled by a group of
iron men who see only their own ambitions as a goal—who have brought upon
the country and the world this three-year tyranny of hate.
What will be the end? Will the war go on, eating up the lives and honor
of men with its monstrous appetite? Or will there be peace—a peace that
will bring nothing of revenge or oppression; that will carry with it
only a desire for justice to all the peoples of the earth—that will kill
forever this desire for conquest which now and in the past has borne only
sorrow and bloodshed as its fruit? Will the peace bring forgetfulness of
the past, in so far as men _can_ forget?
That would be worth fighting for.
THE END.
FOOTNOTES
[1] You will find an interesting account of the effect of this treaty
upon Persia in William Morgan Shuster’s valuable book, “The Strangling of
Persia.”
[2] Mr. Edward I. Bell, in his “The Political Shame of Mexico.”
[3] It is interesting to remember that Captain von Papen had in the
earlier part of the year, while he was still in Mexico, conducted an
investigation into the types of explosives used in Mexico for similar
enterprises. This investigation had been undertaken at the request of
the German Ministry of War. Letters regarding this matter were found in
Captain von Papen’s effects by the British authorities, and are printed
in the British White Papers, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1916).
[4] Fritzen, who was captured in Hartwood, Cal., on March 9, 1917, was
arraigned in New York City on March 16, and after pleading not guilty,
later reversed his plea. He is at present serving a term of eighteen
months in a Federal prison.