_More about the German intrigue against the United States.
German aims in Latin America. Japan and Germany in Mexico. What
happened in Cuba?_
“American intervention in Mexico would mean another Ireland, another
Poland—another sore spot in the world. Well, why not?”
Those were almost the last words spoken to me when I left Germany in
1914, upon my ill-fated mission to England. I had in my pocket at the
moment detailed memoranda of instructions which, if they could be carried
out, would insure such disturbances in Mexico that the United States
would be compelled to intervene. I had been given authority to spend
almost unlimited sums of money for the purchase of arms, for the bribery
of officials—for anything in fact that would cause trouble in Mexico.
And the words I have quoted were not spoken by an uninformed person with
a taste for cynical comment; they were uttered by Major Köhnemann,
of Abteilung III B of the German General Staff. They form a lucid and
concrete explanation of German activities in Mexico during the past eight
years.
Long before this war began German agents were at work in Mexico, stirring
up trouble in the hope of causing the United States to intervene. I
have already told how, in 1910 and 1911, Germany had encouraged Japan
and Mexico in negotiating a treaty that was to give Japan an important
foothold in Mexico. I have told how, after this treaty was well on the
way to completion, Germany saw to it that knowledge of the projected
terms was brought to the attention of the United States—thereby
indirectly causing Diaz’s abdication. That instance is not an isolated
case of Germany meddling in Mexican affairs. Rather is it symptomatic of
the traditional policy of Wilhelmstrasse in regard to America.
It may be well to examine this policy more closely than I have done. Long
ago Germany saw in South America a fertile field for exploitation, not
only in a commercial way, in which it presented excellent opportunities
to German manufacturers, but also as a possible opportunity for expansion
which had been denied her elsewhere. All of the German colonies were
in torrid climates, in which life for the white man was attended with
tremendous hardships and exploitation and colonization were consequently
impeded. Only in the Far East and in South America could she find
territories either unprotected through their own weakness, or so thinly
settled that they offered at once a temptation and an opportunity to
the nation with imperialistic ambitions. In the former quarter she was
blocked by a concert of the Powers, many of them actuated by similar
aims, but all working at such cross purposes that aggression by any one
of them was impossible. I have already alluded to the result of such
a situation in my discussion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. In South
America there was only one formidable obstacle to German expansion—the
Monroe Doctrine.
I am stating the case with far less than its true complexity. There
were, it is true, many facts in the form of conflicting rivalries of
the Powers as well as internal conditions in South America, that would
have had a deterrent effect upon the German program. Nevertheless, it is
certain that the prime factor in keeping Germany out of South America was
the traditional policy of the United States; and, so far as the German
Government’s attitude in the matter is concerned, it is the only phase of
the problem worth considering.
Germany had no intention of securing territory by a war of conquest. Her
method was far simpler and much less assailable. She promptly instituted
a peaceful invasion of various parts of the continent; first in the
persons of merchants who captured trade but did not settle permanently in
the country; second, by means of a vast army of immigrants, who, unlike
those who a generation before had come to the United States, settled,
_but retained their German citizenship_. With this unnaturalized element
she hoped to form a nucleus in many of the important South American
countries, which, wielding a tremendous commercial power and possessing a
political influence that was considerable, although indirect, would aid
her in determining the course of South American politics so that by a
form of peaceful expansion she could eventually achieve her aims.
Was this a dream? At any rate it received the support of many of the
ablest statesmen of Germany, who duly set about the task of discrediting
the Monroe Doctrine in the eyes of the very people it was designed to
protect, so that the United States, if it ever came forcibly to defend
the Doctrine, would find itself opposed not only by Germany but by South
America as well.
Now, the easiest way to cast suspicion upon a policy is to discredit the
sponsor of it. In the case of the United States and South America this
was not at all difficult; for the southern nations already possessed a
well defined fear and a dislike of their northern neighbor that were not
by any means confined to the more ignorant portions of the population.
Fear of American aggression has been somewhat of a bugaboo in many
quarters. Recognizing this, Germany, which has always adopted the policy
of aggravating ready-made troubles for her own ends, steadily fomented
that fear by means of a quiet but well-conducted propaganda, _and also by
seeking to force the United States into taking action that would justify
that fear_.
As a means toward securing this latter end, Mexico presented itself as a
heaven-sent opportunity. Even in the days when it was, to outward eyes,
a well-ordered community, there had been men in the United States who
had expressed themselves in favor of an expansion southward which would
result in the ultimate absorption of Mexico; and although such talk had
never attracted much attention in the quarter from which it emanated,
there were those who saw to it that proposals of this sort received
an effective publicity south of the Isthmus. Given, then, a Mexico in
which discontent had become so acute that it was being regarded with
alarm by American and foreign investors, the possibility of intervention
became more immediate and the opportunity of the trouble-maker increased
proportionately.
[Illustration: The order for the deportation of von der Goltz which for
some reason was not put into effect.]
Germany’s first step in this direction, was, as you know, the
encouragement of a Japanese-Mexican alliance, the failure of which was
a vital part of her program. It was a risky undertaking, for if, by any
chance, the alliance were successfully concluded, the United States might
well hesitate to attack the combined forces of the two countries; and
Mexico, fortified by Japan, would present a bulwark against the real or
fancied danger of American expansion, that, for a time at least, would
effectually allay the fears of South America. That risk Germany took,
and insofar as she had planned to prevent the alliance scored a success.
That she failed in her principal aim was due to the anti-imperialistic
tendencies of the United States and the statesmanship of Señor
Limantour, rather than to any other cause.
Then came the Madero Administration with its mystical program of
reform—and an opposition headed by almost all of the able men in the
republic, both Mexican and foreign. Bitterly fought by the ring of
Cientificoes, who saw the easy spoils of the past slipping from their
hands; distrusted by many honest men, who sincerely believed that Mexico
was better ruled by an able despot than by an upright visionary; hampered
by the aloofness of foreign business and governments, waiting for a
success which they alone could insure, before they should approve and
support; and constantly beset with uneasiness by the incomprehensible
attitude of the Taft Administration and of its Ambassador—the fate of the
Madero Government was easily foreseen.
Before Madero had been in power for three months this opposition had
taken form as a campaign of obstruction in the Mexican Chamber of
Deputies, supported by the press, controlled almost exclusively by
the Cientificoes and by foreign capitalists; by the clergy, who had
reason to suspect the Government of anti-clerical tendencies; and by
isolated groups of opportunity seekers who saw in the Administration an
obstacle to their own political and economic aims. The Madero family
were represented as incompetent and self-seeking; and in a short time the
populace, which a month before had hailed the new government as a savior
of the country, had been persuaded that its program of economic reform
had been merely a political pretense, and accordingly added its strength
to the party of the Opposition.
Here was tinder aplenty for a conflagration of sorts. Germany applied the
torch at its most inflammable spot.
That inflammable spot happened to be a man—Pazcual Orozco. Orozco had
been one of Madero’s original supporters, and in the days of the Madero
revolution had rendered valuable services to his chief. An ex-muleteer,
uncouth and without education, he possessed considerable ability;
but his vanity and reputation were far in excess of his attainments.
Unquestionably he had expected that Madero’s success would mean a
brilliant future for himself, although it is difficult to tell in just
what direction his ambitions pointed. Madero had placed him in command
of the most important division of the Federal army, but this presumably
did not content him. At any rate, early in February, 1912, he made a
demand upon the Government for two hundred and fifty thousand pesos,
threatening that he would withdraw from the services of the Government
unless this “honorarium”—honesty would call it a bribe—were paid to him.
Madero refused his demand, but with mistaken leniency retained Orozco in
office—and on February 27, Orozco repaid this trust by turning traitor at
Chihuahua, and involving in his defection six thousand of Mexico’s best
troops as well as a quantity of supplies.
Now mark the trail of German intrigue. In Mexico City, warmly supporting
the Madero Government, but of little real power in the country, was the
German Minister, Admiral von Hintze. Under normal circumstances, his
influence would have been of great value in helping to render secure
the position of Madero; but with means of communication disrupted as
they were to a large extent, his power was inconceivably less than
that of the German consuls, all of whom were well liked and respected
by the Mexicans with whom they were in close touch. Apart from their
political office, these men represented German business interests in
Mexico, particularly in the fields of hardware and banking. In the three
northern cities of Parral, Chihuahua and Zacatecas, the German consuls
were hardware merchants. In Torreon the consul was director of the
German bank. As such it would seem that it was to their interests to work
for the preservation of a stable government in Mexico. And yet the fact
remains that when Orozco first began to show signs of discontent, these
men encouraged him with a support that was both moral and financial; and
when the general finally turned traitor, it was my old friend, Consul
Kueck, who, as President of the Chamber of Commerce of Chihuahua, voted
to support him and to recognize Orozco’s supremacy in that State!
I leave it to the reader to decide whether it was the Minister or the
consuls who really represented the German Government.
It would be idle to attempt to trace more than in the briefest way
Germany’s part in the events of the next few years. Always she followed
a policy of obstruction and deceit. During the months immediately
succeeding the Orozco outbreak, at the very moment that von Hintze was
lending his every effort to the preservation of the Madero regime,
sending to Berlin reports which over and over again reiterated his belief
that Madero could, if given a free hand, restore order in the republic,
the German consuls were openly fomenting disorder in the North.
They were particularly well equipped to make trouble, by their position
in the community and by the character and reputation of the rest of the
German population. It may be said with safety that however careless
Germany has been about the quality of the men whom she has allowed to
emigrate to other countries, her representatives throughout all of
Latin-America have been conspicuous for their commercial attainments and
for their social adaptability. This, in a large way has been responsible
for the German commercial success in Central and South America. As
bankers they have been honest and obliging in the matter of credit. As
merchants they have adapted themselves to the local conditions and to
the habits of their customers with notable success. In consequence they
have been well-liked as individuals and have been of immense value in
increasing the prestige of the German Empire. In Mexico they were the
only foreigners who were not disliked by either peon or aristocrat; and
it is significant to note that during seven years of unrest in that
country, Germans alone among peoples of European stock have remained
practically unmolested by any party.
Consider of what service this condition was in their campaign. Respected,
influential, they were in an excellent position to stimulate whatever
anti-American feeling existed in the Latin American countries. At the
same time, they were equally well situated to encourage the unrest in
Mexico that would be the surest guarantee of American intervention—and
the coalition against the United States which intervention would be
certain to provoke. They made the utmost use of their advantage, and they
did it without arousing suspicion or rebuke.
After the failure of the short-lived Orozco outbreak, events in
Mexico seemed to promise a peaceful solution of all difficulties.
Many of Madero’s opponents declared a truce, and the irreconcileables
were forced to bide their time in apparent harmlessness. In November
came the rebellion of Felix Diaz, fathered by a miscellaneous group
of conspirators who hoped to find in the nephew sufficient of the
characteristics of the great Porfirio to serve their purposes. This
venture failed also. Again Madero showed a mistaken leniency in
preserving the life of Diaz. He paid for it with his life. Out of this
uprising came the _coup d’etat_ of General Huerta—made possible by a dual
treachery—and the murder of the only man who at the time gave promise of
eventually solving the Mexican problem.
What share German agents had in that tragic affair I do not know. You may
be sure that they took advantage of any opportunity that presented itself
to encourage the conspirators in a project that gave such rich promise
of aiding them in their purposes. I pass on to the next positive step in
their campaign. That was a repetition of their old plan of inserting the
Japanese question into the general muddle.
The Japanese question in Mexico is a very real one. I know—and the
United States Government presumably knows, also—that Japan is the only
nation which has succeeded in gaining a permanent foothold in Mexico. I
know that spies and secret agents in the guise of peddlars, engineers,
fishermen, farmers, charcoal burners, merchants and even officers in
the armies of every Mexican leader have been scattered throughout the
country. The number of these latter I have heard estimated at about
eight hundred; at any rate it is considerable. There are also about ten
thousand Japanese who have no direct connection with Tokio but who are
practically all men of military age, either unmarried or without wives in
Mexico—most of them belonging to the army or navy reserve. And, like the
Germans, the Japanese never lose their connection with the Government in
their capacity as private individuals.
Through the great government-owned steamship line, the Toyo Kisen
Kaisha, the Japanese Government controls the land for a Japanese coaling
station at Manzanilla. At Acapulco a Japanese company holds a land
concession on a high hill three miles from the sea. It is difficult to
see what legitimate use a fishing company could make of this location.
It is, however, an ideal site for a wireless station. In Mexico City an
intimate friend of the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires owns a fortress-like
building in the very heart of the capital. Another Japanese holds, under
a ninety-nine year lease, an L-shaped strip of land partly surrounding
and completely commanding the water works of the capital of Oxichimilco.
The land is undeveloped. Both of these Japanese are well supplied with
money and have been living in Mexico City for several years. Neither one
has any visible means of support. And in all of the years of revolution
in Mexico no Japanese have been killed—except by Villa. He has caused
many of them to be executed, but always those that were masquerading as
Chinese. Naturally a government cannot protest under such circumstances.
These facts may or may not be significant. They serve to lend color to
the convictions of anti-Japanese agitators in the United States, and as
such they have been of value to Germany. Accordingly it was suggested to
Señor Huerta that an alliance with Japan would be an excellent protective
measure for him to take.
Huerta had two reasons for looking with favor upon this proposal. He was
very decidedly in the bad graces of Washington, and he was constantly
menaced by the presence in Mexico of Felix Diaz, to whom he had agreed
to resign the Presidency. Diaz was too popular to be shot, too strong
politically to be exiled and yet—he must be removed. Here, thought
Huerta, was an opportunity of killing two birds with one stone. He
therefore sent Diaz to Japan, ostensibly to thank the Japanese Government
for its participation in the Mexican Centennial celebration, three years
before, but in reality to begin negotiations for a treaty which should
follow the lines of the one unsuccessfully promulgated in 1911.
Señor Diaz started for Japan—but he never arrived there. Somehow the
State Department at Washington got news of the proposed treaty—how, only
the German agents know—and Señor Diaz’s course was diverted.
Meanwhile, in spite of the strained relations between Huerta and
Washington, Germany was aiding the Mexican president with money and
supplies. In the north, Consuls Kueck of Chihuahua, Sommer of Durango,
Muller of Hermosillo, and Weber of Juarez were exhibiting the same
interest in the Huertista troops that they had formerly displayed toward
Orozco. Kueck, as I happened to learn later, had financed Salvator
Mercado, the general who had so obligingly tried to have me shot; and at
the same time he was assiduously spreading reports of unrest in Mexico,
and even attempted to bribe some Germans to leave the country, upon the
plea that their lives were in danger.
When I raided the German Consulate at Chihuahua, I found striking
documentary proof of his activities in this direction. There were letters
there proving that he had paid to various Germans sums ranging as high
as fifty dollars a month, upon condition that they should remain outside
of Mexico. These letters, in many cases, showed plainly that this was
done in order to make it seem that the unrest was endangering the lives
of foreign inhabitants; in spite of which several of the recipients
complained that their absence from Mexico was causing them considerable
financial loss, and showed an evident desire to brave whatever dangers
there might be—if they could secure the permission of Consul Kueck.
During the year and more that Huerta held power, Germany followed the
same tactics. I need not remind you of the attempt to supply Huerta with
munitions after the United States had declared an embargo upon them; or
that it has been generally admitted that the real purpose of the seizure
of Vera Cruz by United States marines was to prevent the German steamer
_Ypiranga_ from delivering her cargo of arms to the Mexicans. That is but
one instance of the way in which German policy worked—a policy which, as
I have indicated, was opposed to the true interests of Mexico, and has
been solely directed against the United States. Up to the very outbreak
of the war it continued. After Villa’s breach with Carranza, emissaries
of Consul Kueck approached the former with offers of assistance.
Strangely enough he rejected them, principally because he hates the
Germans for the assistance they gave his old enemy, Orozco. Villa had,
moreover, a personal grudge against Kueck. When General Mercado was
defeated at Ojinaga, papers were found in his effects that implicated
the Consul in a conspiracy against the Constitutionalists, although at
the time Kueck professed friendship for Villa and was secretly doing all
he could to increase the friction that existed between the general and
Mercado. Villa had sworn vengeance against the double-dealer; and Kueck,
in alarm, fled into the United States.
With the outbreak of the Great War the situation changed in one important
particular. Heretofore, German activities had been part of a plan of
attack upon the prestige of the United States. Now they became necessary
as a measure of defense. Before two months had passed it became evident
to the German Government that the United States _must_ be forced into a
war with Mexico in order to prevent the shipment of munitions to Europe.
So began the last stage of the German intrigue in Mexico—an intrigue
which still continues. As a preliminary step, Germany had organized her
own citizens in that country into a well-drilled military unit—a little
matter which Captain von Papen had attended to during the spring of 1914.
One can read much between the lines of the report sent to the Imperial
Chancellor by Admiral von Hintze, commenting upon the work of Captain von
Papen in this direction. The Admiral says in part: “He showed especial
industry in organizing the Germany colony for purposes of self-defense,
and out of this shy and factious material, unwilling to undertake any
military activity, he obtained what there was to be got.”
Von Hintze significantly recommends that the captain should be decorated
with the fourth class of the Order of the Red Eagle.
As I have stated elsewhere, I left Germany in October of 1914, with a
detailed plan of campaign for the “American front,” as Dr. Albert once
put it. My final instructions were simple and explicit.
“There must be constant uprisings in Mexico,” I was told, in effect.
“Villa, Carranza, must be reached. Zapata must continue his maraudings.
It does not matter in the least how you produce these results. Merely
produce them. All consuls have been instructed to furnish you with
whatever sums you need—_and they will not ask you any questions_.”
Rather complete, was it not? I left with every intention of carrying the
instructions out—and in a little over a week was made _hors de combat_.
It was then that von Rintelen, who had already planned to come over to
the United States in order to inaugurate a vast blockade running system,
undertook to add my undertaking to his own responsibilities.
What von Rintelen did is well known, so I shall only summarize it here.
His first act was an attempted restitution of General Huerta, which he
knew was the most certain method of causing intervention. Into this
enterprise both Boy-Ed and von Papen were impressed, and the three men
set about the task of making arrangements with former Huertistas for
a new uprising to be financed by German money. They sent agents to
Barcelona to persuade the former dictator to enter into the scheme; and
finally, when the general was on his way to America, they attempted to
arrange it so that he should arrive safely in New York and ultimately in
Mexico. It was a plan remarkably well conceived and well executed. It
would have succeeded but for one thing. General Huerta was captured by
the United States authorities at the very moment that he tried to cross
from Texas into Mexico!
But the indomitable von Rintelen was not discouraged. He had but one
purpose—to make trouble—and he made it with a will. He sent money to
Villa, and then, like the philanthropist in Chesterton’s play, supported
the other side by aiding Carranza, financing Zapata and starting two
other revolutions in Mexico. Meanwhile anti-American feeling continued
to be stirred up. German papers in Mexico presented the Fatherland’s
case as eloquently as they did elsewhere, and to a far more appreciative
audience. Carranza was encouraged in his rather unfriendly attitude
toward Washington. In a word, no step was neglected which would embarrass
the Wilson Administration and make peace between the two countries more
certain or more difficult to maintain.
Need I complete the story? Is it necessary to tell how, after the recall
of von Papen and Boy-Ed and the escape of von Rintelen, Mexico continued
to be used as the catspaw of the German plotters? Every one knows the
events of the last few months; of the concentration of German reservists
in various parts of Mexico; of the bitter attacks made upon the United
States by pro-German newspapers; and of the reports, greatly exaggerating
German activities in Mexico, which have been circulated with the direct
intention of provoking still more ill-feeling between the two countries
by leading Americans to believe that Mexico is honey-combed with German
conspiracies.
[Illustration: Cover of the British White Paper, containing von der
Goltz’s confession, and referring to him as “Bridgeman Taylor.”]
These activities have not applied to Mexico alone. It is significant that
twice in February of this year the Venezuelan Government has declined to
approve of the request of President Wilson that other neutral nations
join him in breaking diplomatic relations with Germany as a protest
against submarine warfare, and that many Venezuelan papers have stated
that this refusal is due to the representations of resident Germans, who
are many and influential. These are, of course, legitimate activities,
but they are in every case attended by a threat. Revolutions are easily
begun in Latin America, and the obstinate government can always be
brought to a reasonable viewpoint by the example of recent uprisings or
revolutions, financed by Germany, in Costa Rica, Peru and Cuba. Within
a very recent time, rumors were afloat in Venezuela that Germany was
assisting General Cipriano Castro in the revolutionary movement that he
had been organizing in Porto Rico. It was reported that there were on the
Colombian frontier many disaffected persons who would gladly join Castro
if he landed in Colombia and marched on Caracas, as he did successfully
in 1890.
For several years the Telefunken Co., a German corporation, has tried to
obtain from the Venezuelan Government a concession to operate a wireless
plant, which should be of greater power than any other in South America.
When this proposal was last made, certain ministers were for accepting
it, but the majority of the Government realized the uses to which the
plant could be put and refused to grant the concession. An alternative
proposal, made by the Government, to establish a station of less
strength, was rejected by the company.
Germany has steadily sought such wireless sites throughout this region.
Several have been established in Mexico, and in 1914 it was through
a wireless station in Colombia, that the German Admiral von Spee was
enabled to keep informed of the movements of the squadron of Admiral Sir
Christopher Cradock—information which resulted in the naval battle in
Chilean waters with a loss of three British battleships. It was after
this battle that Colombia ordered the closing of all wireless stations on
its coasts.
In Cuba, too, the hand of Germany has been evident, in spite of the
disclaimers which have been made by both parties in the recent
rebellion. That rebellion grew out of the contested election in November,
in which both President Menocal and the Liberal candidate, Alfredo
Zayas, claimed a victory. It is strange if this is the real cause of the
uprising, that hostilities did not begin until February 9, when General
Gomez, himself an ex-president, began a revolt in the eastern portion
of the island. The date is important; it was barely a week before new
elections were to be held in two disputed provinces and _only six days
after the United States had severed diplomatic relations with the German
Government, and but four days after President Menocal’s Government had
declared its intention of following the action of the United States_.
A little study of the personnel and developments of the rebellion form
convincing evidence as to its true backing. The Liberal Party is strongly
supported by the Spanish element of the population, who are almost
unanimously pro-German in their sympathies. All over the island, both
Germans and Spaniards have been arrested for complicity in the uprising.
Nor have the clergy escaped. Literally, dozens of bishops have been
jailed in Havana, upon the same charges.
It is also a notorious fact that the Mexicans have supported the
Liberals, and that the staffs of the Liberal newspapers are almost
exclusively composed of Mexican journalists. These newspapers were
suppressed at the beginning of the revolution.
But far more significant are the developments in the actual fighting.
Most of the action has taken place in the eastern provinces of Camaguey,
Oriente and Santa Clara—in which the most fertile fields of sugar cane
are situated. The damage to the cane fields has been estimated at
5,000,000 tons and is, _from a military standpoint, unnecessary_.
Col. Rigoberto Fernandez one of the revolutionary leaders, stated
that the rebels were plentifully supplied with hand-grenades and
artillery—although the reports prove that they had none. Was this an
empty boast—or may there be a connection between Fernandez’s statement
and the capture by the British of three German ships, which were found
off the Azores, laden with mines and arms?
I was in Havana in the latter part of March—upon a private errand,
although the Cuban papers persisted in imputing sinister designs to me.
Naturally, the Germans were not inclined to tell all their secrets, but
my Mexican acquaintances, all of whom were well informed regarding Cuban
affairs, gave me considerable information. Among other Mexicans I met
General Joaquin Maas, the former general of the Federal forces under
Huerta. The general has since made peace with Carranza and was at this
time acting as the latter’s go-between in negotiations with Germany. When
I last saw Maas, it was after the battle of El Paredo. He was about to
blow out his brains, but one of his lieutenants elegantly informed him
that he was a fool and dissuaded him from suicide. Maas received me with
the courtesy due a former opponent and was not averse to telling me much
about the situation. I also had ample occasion to speak with Spaniards,
whose sympathies were decidedly pro-German. Little by little I was
enabled to acquire a rather complete idea—not of the issues underlying
the Cuban revolution—but who had brought matters to a head. The answer
may be found in one word—Germany. German agents—notably one Dr. Hawe ben
Hawas, who recently took a mysterious botanizing expedition throughout
that part of Cuba, which later became the scene of revolutionary
activities, and who has thrice been arrested as a German spy—saw in
the political unrest of the country another opportunity to create a
diversion in favor of Germany. Cuba at peace was a valuable economic ally
of the United States. Cuba in rebellion was a source of annoyance to this
country, since it meant intervention, the political value of which was
unfavorable to the United States, and a serious loss in sugar, which is
one of the most important ingredients in the manufacture of several high
explosives.
Hence the burning of millions of tons of sugar cane. Hence the rebel
seizure of Santiago de Cuba. Hence the large number of negroes who joined
the rebel army, and whose labor is indispensable in the production of
sugar.
The ironic part of it all is that Germany had nothing to gain by a change
of government in Cuba. Any Cuban government must have a sympathetic
attitude toward the United States. What Germany wanted was a disruption
of the orderly life of the country—and she wanted it to continue for as
long a time as possible.
At the present writing the Cuban rebellion is ended. General Gomez and
his army have been captured, President Menocal is firmly seated in power
again, and the rebels hold only a few unimportant points. But much damage
has been done in the lessening of the sugar supply—and the rebellion has
also served its purpose as an illustration of Germany’s ability to make
trouble.
Germany has played a consistent game throughout. She has sought to use
all the existing weaknesses of the world for her own purposes—all the
rivalries, all the fears, all the antipathies, she has utilized as fuel
for her own fire. And yet, although she has played the game with the
utmost foresight, with a skill that is admirable in spite of its perverse
uses, and with an unfailing assurance of success—she has come to the
fourth year of the Great War with the fact of failure staring her in the
face.
But she has not given up. You may be sure that she has not given up.