In order to comply with the rule of faith, and for this reason alone,

for his speculation did not require a Spirit in addition to the Logos,

Origen also placed the Spirit alongside of Father and Son. All that is

predicated about him by the Church is that he is equal to the other

persons in honour and dignity, and it was he that inspired both Prophets

and Apostles; but that it is still undecided whether he be created or

uncreated, and whether he too is to be considered the Son of God or

not.[750] As the third hypostasis, Origen reckoned him part of the

constant divine essence and so treated him after the analogy of the Son,

without producing an impressive proof of the necessity of this

hypostasis. He, however, became the Holy Spirit through the Son, and is

related to the latter as the latter is related to the Father; in other

words he is subordinate to the Son; he is the first creation of the

Father through the Son.[751] Here Origen was following an old tradition.

Considered quantitatively therefore, and this according to Origen is the

most important consideration, the Spirit's sphere of action is the

smallest. All being has its principle in the Father, the Son has his

sphere in the rational, the Holy Spirit in the sanctified, that is in

the Church; this he has to rule over and perfect. Father, Son, and

Spirit form a [Greek: trias] ("triad")[752] to which nothing may be

compared; they are equal in dignity and honour, and the substance they

possess is one. If the following is not one of Rufinus' corrections,

Origen said[753]: "Nihil in trinitate maius minusve dicendum est cum

unius divinitatis fons verbo ac ratione sua teneat universa"[754]

("nothing in the Trinity is to be called greater or less, since the

fountain of one divinity holds all his parts by word and reason"). But,

as in Origen's sense the union of these only exists because the Father

alone is the "source of deity" ([Greek: pêgê tês theotêtos]) and

principle of the other two hypostases, the Trinity is in truth no

homogeneous one, but one which, in accordance with a "subtle emanation

idea", has degrees within it. This Trinity, which in the strict sense

remains a Trinity of revelation, except that revelation belongs to the

essence of God, is with Origen the real secret of the faith, the mystery

beyond all mysteries. To deny it shows a Jewish, carnal feeling or at

least the greatest narrowness of conception.

The idea of createdness was already more closely associated with the

Holy Ghost than with the Logos. He is in a still clearer fashion than

the Son himself the transition to the series of ideas and spirits that

having been created by the Son, are in truth the unfolding of his

fulness. They form the next stage after the Holy Spirit. In assuming the

existence of such beings as were required by his philosophical system,

Origen appealed to the Biblical doctrine of angels, which he says is

expressly acknowledged in the Church.[755] With Clement even the

association of the Son and Holy Ghost with the great angelic spirits is

as yet not altogether avoided, at least in his expressions.[756] Origen

was more cautious in this respect.[757] The world of spirits appears to

him as a series of well-arranged, graded energies, as the representative

of created reason. Its characteristic is growth, that is, progress

([Greek: prokopê]).[758] Growth is conditioned by freedom: "_omnis

creatura rationabilis laudis et culpæ capax: laudis, si secundum

rationem, quam in se habet, ad meliora proficiat, culpæ, si rationem

recti declinet_"[759] ("every rational creature is capable of meriting

praise or blame--praise, if it advance to better things according to the

reason it possesses in itself, blame, if it avoid the right course"). As

unchangeableness and permanence are characteristic of the Deity, so

freedom is the mark of the created spirit.[760] In this thesis Origen

goes beyond the assumption of the heretical Gnostics just as much as he

does in his other proposition that the creaturely spirit is in no sense

a portion of the divine (because it is changeable[761]); but in reality

freedom, as he understands it, is only the capacity of created spirits

to determine their own destiny _for a time_. In the end, however, they

must turn to that which is good, because everything spiritual is

indestructible. _Sub specie æternitatis_, then, the mere communication

of the divine element to the created spirit[762] is _not_ a mere

communication, and freedom is no freedom; but the absolute necessity of

the created spirit's developing itself merely appears as freedom. Yet

Origen himself did not draw this conclusion, but rather based everything

on his conception that the freedom of _naturæ rationabiles_ consisted in

the _possibilitas utriusque_, and sought to understand the cosmos, as it

is, from this freedom. To the _naturæ rationabiles_, which have

different _species_ and _ordines_, human souls also belong. The whole of

them were created from all eternity; for God would not be almighty

unless he had always produced everything[763]; in virtue of their origin

they are equal, for their original community with the Logos permits of

no diversity[764]; but, on the other hand, they have received different

tasks and their development is consequently different. In so far as they

are spirits subject to change, they are burdened with a kind of bodily

nature,[765] for it is only the Deity that is without a body. The

element of materiality is a necessary result of their finite nature,

that is, of their being created; and this applies both to angels and

human souls.[766] Now Origen did not speculate at all as to how the

spirit world might have developed in ideal fashion, a fact which it is

exceedingly important to recognise; he knows nothing at all about an

ideal development for all, and does not even view it as a possibility.

The truth rather is that as soon as he mentions the _naturæ

rationabiles_, he immediately proceeds to speak of their fall, their

growth, and their diversities. He merely contemplates them in the given

circumstances in which they are placed (see the exposition in [Greek:

peri archôn] II. 9. 2).

THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. All created spirits must

develop. When they have done so, they attain perfection and make way for

new dispensations and worlds.[767] In the exercise of their freedom,

however, disobedience, laxity, laziness, and failure make their

appearance among them in an endless multiplicity of ways.[768] The

disciplining and purifying of these spirits was the purpose for which

the material world was created by God.[769] It is therefore a place of

purification, ruled and harmoniously arranged by God's wisdom.[770] Each

member of the world of spirits has received a different kind of material

nature in proportion to his degree of removal from the Creator. The

highest spirits, who have virtually held fast by that which is good,

though they too stand in need of restitution, guide the world, are

servants of God ([Greek: angeloi]), and have bodies of an exceedingly

subtle kind in the form of a globe (stars). The spirits that have fallen

very deeply (the spirits of men) are banished into material bodies.

Those that have altogether turned against God have received very dark

bodies, indescribably ugly, though not visible. Men therefore are placed

between the angels and demons, both of whom try to influence them. The

moral struggle that man has to undergo within himself is made harder by

the demons, but lightened by the angels,[771] for these spiritual powers

are at all times and places acting both upon the physical and the

spiritual world. But everything is subject to the permission of the

divine goodness and finally also to the guidance of divine providence,

though the latter has created for itself a limit in freedom.[772] Evil,

however, and it is in this idea that Origen's great optimism consists,

cannot conquer in the end. As it is nothing eternal, so also it is at

bottom nothing real; it is "nonexistent" ([Greek: ouch on]) and "unreal"

([Greek: anupostaton]).[773] For this very reason the estrangement of

the spirits from God must finally cease; even the devil, who, as far as

his _being_ is concerned, resulted from God's will, cannot always remain

a devil. The spirits must return to God, and this moment is also the end

of the material world, which is merely an intermediate phase.[774]

According to this conception the doctrine of man, who in Origen's view

is no longer the sole aim of creation to the same extent as he is with

the other Fathers,[775] assumes the following form: The essence of man

is formed by the reasonable soul, which has fallen from the world above.

This is united with the body by means of the animal soul. Origen thus

believes in a threefold nature of man. He does so in the first place,

because Plato holds this theory, and Origen always embraced the most

complicated view in matters of tradition, and secondly, because the

rational soul can never in itself be the principle of action opposed to

God, and yet something relatively spiritual must be cited as the cause

of this action. It is true that we also find in Origen the view that the

spirit in man has itself been cooled down into a soul, has been, as it

were, transformed into a soul; but there is necessarily an ambiguity

here, because on the one hand the spirit of man is said to have chosen a

course opposed to God, and, on the other, that which is rational and

free in man must be shown to be something remaining intact.[776] Man's

struggle consists in the endeavour of the two factors forming his

constitution to gain control of his sphere of action. If man conquers in

this struggle he attains _likeness_ to God; the image of God he bears

beyond danger of loss in his indestructible, rational, and therefore

immortal spirit.[777] Victory, however, denotes nothing else than the

subjugation of the instincts and passions.[778] No doubt God affords

help in the struggle, for nothing good is without God,[779] but in such

a way as not to interfere with freedom. According to this conception sin

is a matter of necessity in the case of fallen spirits; all men are met

with as sinners and are so, for they were already sinners.[780] Sin is

rooted in the whole earthly condition of men; it is the weakness and

error of the spirit parted from its origin.[781] The idea of freedom,

indeed, is supposed to be a feature which always preserves the guilty

character of sin; but in truth it becomes a mere appearance,[782] it

does not avail against the constitution of man and the sinful habit

propagated in human society.[783] All must be sinners at first,[784] for

that is as much their destiny as is the doom of death which is a

necessary consequence of man's material nature.[785]

_The Doctrine of Redemption and Restoration._

In the view of Clement and Origen the proposition: "God wishes us to be

saved by means of ourselves" ([Greek: o Theos hêmas ex hêmôn autôn

bouletai sôzesthai]) is quite as true as the other statement that no

spirit can be saved without entering into fellowship with the Logos and

submitting to his instruction.[786] They moreover hold that the Logos,

after passing through his various stages of revealing activity (law of

nature, Mosaic law), disclosed himself in the Gospel in a manner

complete and accessible to all, so that this revelation imparts

redemption and eternal happiness to all men, however different their

capacities may be. Finally, it is assumed that not only men but all

spiritual creatures, from the radiant spirits of heaven down to the

dusky demons, have the capacity and need of redemption; while for the

highest stage, the "spiritual Church", there is an _eternal Gospel_

which is related to the written one as the latter is to the law. This

eternal Gospel is the first complete revelation of God's highest

intentions, and lies hidden in the Holy Scriptures.[787] These elements

compose Origen's doctrine of revelation in general and of Christ in

particular.[788] They presuppose the sighing of the creature and the

great struggle which is more especially carried on upon earth, within

the human breast, by the angels and demons, virtues and vices, knowledge

and passion, that dispute the possession of man. Man must conquer and

yet he cannot do so without help. But help has never been wanting. The

Logos has been revealing himself from the beginning. Origen's teaching

concerning the preparatory history of redemption is founded on the

doctrines of the Apologists; but with him everything takes a more vivid

form, and influences on the part of the heretical Gnosis are also not

lacking. Pure spirits, whom no fault of their own had caused to be

invested with bodies, namely, the prophets, were sent to men by the

Logos in order to support the struggling and to increase knowledge. To

prepare the way of salvation the Logos chose for himself a whole people,

and he revealed himself among all men. But all these undertakings did

not yet lead to the goal. The Logos himself was obliged to appear and

lead men back. But by reason of the diverse nature of the spirits, and

especially of men, the redeeming work of the Logos that appeared could

not fail to be a complicated one. In the case of some he had really to

show them the victory over the demons and sin, a view which beyond

dispute is derived from that of Valentinus. He had, as the "Godman," to

make a sacrifice which represented the expiation of sin, he had to pay a

ransom which put an end to the devil's sovereignty over men's souls, and

in short he had to bring a redemption visible and intelligible to

all.[789] To the rest, however, as divine teacher and hierophant he had

to reveal the depths of knowledge, and to impart in this very process a

new principle of life, so that they might now partake of his life and

themselves become divine through being interwoven with the divine

essence. Here, as in the former case, restoration to fellowship with God

is the goal; but, as in the lower stage, this restoration is effected

through faith and sure conviction of the reality of a historical

fact--namely, the redeeming death of Christ,--so, in the higher stage,

it is accomplished through knowledge and love, which, soaring upward

beyond the Crucified One, grasp the eternal essence of the Logos,

revealed to us through his teaching in the eternal Gospel.[790] What the

Gnostics merely represented as a more or less valuable appearance--

namely, the historical work of Christ--was to Origen no appearance but

truth. But he did not view it as _the_ truth, and in this he agrees with

the Gnostics, but as _a_ truth, beyond which lies a higher. That

historical work of Christ was a reality; it is also indispensable for

men of more limited endowments, and not a matter of indifference to the

perfect; but the latter no longer require it for their personal life.

Here also Origen again contrived to reconcile contradictions and thus

acknowledged, outdid, reconciled, and united both the theses of the

Gnostics and those of orthodox Christians. The object and goal of

redemption are the same for all, namely, the restoration of the created

spirit to God and participation in the divine life. In so far as history

is a struggle between spirits and demons, the death of Christ on the

cross is the turning-point of history, and its effects extend even into

heaven and hell.[791]

On the basis of this conception of redemption Origen developed his idea

of Christ. Inasmuch as he recognised Christ as the Redeemer, this

Christ, the God-man, could not but be as many-sided as redemption is.

Only through that masterly art of reconciling contradictions, and by the

aid of that fantastic idea which conceives one real being as dwelling in

another, could there be any apparent success in the attempt to depict a

homogeneous person who in truth is no longer a person, but the symbol of

the various redemptions. That such an acute thinker, however, did not

shrink from the monstrosity his speculation produced is ultimately to be

accounted for by the fact that this very speculation afforded him the

means of nullifying all the utterances about Christ and falling back on

the idea of the divine teacher as being the highest one. The whole

"humanity" of the Redeemer together with its history finally disappears

from the eyes of the perfect one. What remains is the principle, the

divine Reason, which became known and recognisable through Christ. The

perfect one, and this remark also applies to Clement's perfect Gnostic,

thus knows no "Christology", but only an indwelling of the Logos in

Jesus Christ, with which the indwellings of this same Logos in men

began. To the Gnostic the question of the divinity of Christ is of as

little importance as that of the humanity. The former is no question,

because speculation, starting above and proceeding downwards, is already

acquainted with the Logos and knows that he has become completely

comprehensible in Christ; the latter is no question, because the

humanity is a matter of indifference, being the form in which the Logos

made himself recognisable. But to the Christian who is not yet perfect

the divinity as well as the humanity of Christ is a problem, and it is

the duty of the perfect one to solve and explain it, and to guard this

solution against errors on all sides. To Origen, however, the errors are

already Gnostic Docetism on the one hand, and the "Ebionite" view on the

other.[792] His doctrine was accordingly as follows: As a pure

unchangeable spirit, the Logos could not unite with matter, because this

as [Greek: mê on] would have depotentiated him. A medium was required.

The Logos did not unite with the body, but with a soul, and only through

the soul with the body. This soul was a pure one; it was a created

spirit that had never fallen from God, but always remained in faithful

obedience to him, and that had chosen to become a soul in order to serve

the purposes of redemption. This soul then was always devoted to the

Logos from the first and had never renounced fellowship with him. It was

selected by the Logos for the purpose of incarnation and that because of

its moral dignity. The Logos became united with it in the closest way;

but this connection, though it is to be viewed as a mysteriously real

union, continues to remain perfect only because of the unceasing effort

of will by which the soul clings to the Logos. Thus, then, no

intermixture has taken place. On the contrary the Logos preserves his

impassibility, and it is only the soul that hungers and thirsts,

struggles and suffers. In this, too, it appears as a real human soul,

and in the same way the body is sinless and unpolluted, as being derived

from a virgin; but yet it is a human one. This humanity of the body,

however, does not exclude its capacity of assuming all possible

qualities the Logos wishes to give it; for matter of itself possesses no

qualities. The Logos was able at any moment to give his body the form it

required, in order to make the proper impression on the various sorts of

men. Moreover, he was not enclosed in the soul and body of Christ; on

the contrary he acted everywhere as before and united himself, as

formerly, with all the souls that opened themselves to him. But with

none did the union become so close as with the soul, and consequently

also with the body of Jesus. During his earthly life the Logos glorified

and deified his soul by degrees and the latter acted in the same way on

his body. Origen contrived to arrange the different functions and

predicates of the incarnate Logos in such a way that they formed a

series of stages which the believer becomes successively acquainted with

as he advances in knowledge. But everything is most closely united

together in Christ. This union ([Greek: koinônia enôsis, anakrasis]) was

so intimate that Holy Writ has named the created man, Jesus, the Son of

God; and on the other hand has called the Son of God the Son of Man.

After the resurrection and ascension the whole man Jesus appears

transformed into a spirit, is completely received into the Godhead, and

is thus identical with the Logos.[793] In this conception one may be

tempted to point out all possible "heresies":--the conception of Jesus

as a heavenly man--but all men are heavenly;--the Adoptianist

("Ebionite") Christology--but the Logos as a person stands behind

it;--the conception of two Logoi, a personal and an impersonal; the

Gnostic separation of Jesus and Christ; and Docetism. As a matter of

fact Origen united all these ideas, but modified the whole of them in

such a way that they no longer seem, and to some extent are not, what

they turn out to be when subjected to the slightest logical analysis.

This structure is so constituted that not a stone of it admits of being

a hair's-breadth broader or narrower. There is only one conception that

has been absolutely unemployed by Origen, that is, the modalistic view.

Origen is the great opponent of Sabellianism, a theory which in its

simplicity frequently elicited from him words of pity; otherwise he made

use of all the ideas about Christ that had been formed in the course of

two hundred years. This becomes more and more manifest the more we

penetrate into the details of this Christology. We cannot, however,

attribute to Origen a doctrine of two natures, but rather the notion of

two subjects that become gradually amalgamated with each other, although

the expression "two natures" is not quite foreign to Origen.[794] The

Logos retains his human nature eternally,[795] but only in the same

sense in which we preserve our nature after the resurrection.

The significance which this Christological attempt possessed for its

time consists first in its complexity, secondly in the energetic

endeavour to give an adequate conception of Christ's _humanity_, that

is, of the moral freedom pertaining to him as a creature. This effort

was indeed obliged to content itself with a meagre result: but we are

only justified in measuring Origen's Christology by that of the

Valentinians and Basilidians, that is, by the scientific one that had

preceded it. The most important advance lies in the fact that Origen set

forth a scientific Christology in which he was able to find so much

scope for the humanity of Christ. Whilst within the framework of the

scientific Christologies this humanity had hitherto been conceived as

something indifferent or merely apparent, Origen made the first attempt

to incorporate it with the various speculations without prejudice to the

Logos, God in nature and person. No Greek philosopher probably heeded

what Irenæus set forth respecting Christ as the second Adam, the

_recapitulatur generis humani_; whereas Origen's speculation could not

be overlooked. In this case the Gnosis really adopted the idea of the

incarnation, and at the same time tried to demonstrate the conception of

the God-man from the notions of unity of will and love. In the treatise

against Celsus, moreover, Origen went the reverse way to work and

undertook to show, and this not merely by help of the proof from

prophecy, that the predicate deity applied to the historical

Christ.[796] But Origen's conception of Christ's person as a model (for

the Gnostic) and his repudiation of all magical theories of redemption

ultimately explain why he did not, like Tertullian, set forth a doctrine

of two natures, but sought to show that in Christ's case a human subject

with his will and feelings became completely merged in the Deity. No

doubt he can say that the union of the divine and human natures had its

beginning in Christ, but here he virtually means that this beginning is

continued in the sense of souls imitating the example of Christ. What is

called the real redemption supposed to be given in him is certainly

mediated in the Psychic through his _work_, but the _person_ of Christ

which cannot be known to any but the perfect man is by no means

identified with that real redemption, but appears as a free moral

personality, inwardly blended with the Deity, a personality which cannot

mechanically transfer the content of its essence, though it can indeed

exercise the strongest impression on mind and heart. To Origen the

highest value of Christ's person lies in the fact that the Deity has

here condescended to reveal to us the whole fulness of his essence, in

the person of a man, as well as in the fact that a man is given to us

who shows that the human spirit is capable of becoming entirely God's.

At bottom there is nothing obscure and mystical here; the whole process

takes place in the will and in the feelings through knowledge.[797]

This is sufficient to settle the nature of what is called personal

attainment of salvation. Freedom precedes and supporting grace follows.

As in Christ's case his human soul gradually united itself with the

Logos in proportion as it voluntarily subjected its will to God, so also

every man receives grace according to his progress. Though Clement and

Origen did not yet recommend actual exercises according to definite

rules, their description of the gradations by which the soul rises to

God already resembles that of the Neoplatonists, except that they

decidedly begin with faith as the first stage. Faith is the first step

and is our own work.[798] Then follows the religious contemplation of

visible things, and from this the soul advances, as on the steps of a

ladder, to the contemplation of the _substantiæ rationabiles_, the

Logos, the knowable essence of God, and the whole fulness of the

Deity.[799] She retraces her steps upwards along the path she formerly

passed over as a fallen spirit. But, when left to her own resources, she

herself is everywhere weak and powerless; she requires at every stage

the divine grace, that is, enlightenment.[800] Thus a union of grace and

freedom takes place within the sphere of the latter, till the

"contemplative life" is reached, that joyous ascetic contemplativeness,

in which the Logos is the friend, associate, and bridegroom of the soul,

which now, having become a pure spirit, and being herself deified,

clings in love to the Deity.[801] In this view the thought of

regeneration in the sense of a fundamental renewal of the Ego has no

place;[802] still baptism is designated the bath of regeneration.

Moreover, in connection with the consideration of main Biblical thoughts

(God as love, God as the Father, Regeneration, Adoption, etc.) we find

in both Clement and Origen passages which, free from the trammels of the

system, reproduce and set forth the preaching of the Gospel in a

surprisingly appropriate way.[803] It is evident that in Origen's view

there can be no visible means of grace; but it likewise follows from his

whole way of thinking that the symbols attending the enlightening

operation of grace are not a matter of indifference to the Christian

Gnostic, whilst to the common man they are indispensable.[804] In the

same way he brought into play the system of numerous mediators and

intercessors with God, viz., angels and dead and living saints, and

counselled an appeal to them. In this respect he preserved a heathen

custom. Moreover, Origen regards Christ as playing an important part in

prayer, particularly as mediator and high priest. On prayer to Christ he

expressed himself with great reserve.

Origen's eschatology occupies a middle position between that of Irenæus

and the theory of the Valentinian Gnostics, but is more akin to the

latter view. Whilst, according to Irenæus, Christ reunites and glorifies

all that had been severed, though in such a way that there is still a

remnant eternally damned; and, according to Valentinus, Christ separates

what is illegitimately united and saves the spirits alone, Origen

believes that all spirits will be finally rescued and glorified, each in

the form of its individual life, in order to serve a new epoch of the

world when sensuous matter disappears of itself. Here he rejects all

sensuous eschatological expectations.[805] He accepted the formula,

"resurrection of the flesh", only because it was contained in the

doctrine of the Church; but, on the strength of 1 Cor. XV. 44, he

interpreted it as the rising of a "corpus spiritale", which will lack

all material attributes and even all the members that have sensuous

functions, and which will beam with radiant light like the angels and

stars.[806] Rejecting the doctrine that souls sleep,[807] Origen assumed

that the souls of the departed immediately enter Paradise,[808] and that

souls not yet purified pass into a state of punishment, a penal fire,

which, however, like the whole world, is to be conceived as a place of

purification.[809] In this way also Origen contrived to reconcile his

position with the Church doctrines of the judgment and the punishments

in hell; but, like Clement, he viewed the purifying fire as a temporary

and figurative one; it consists in the torments of conscience.[810] In

the end all the spirits in heaven and earth, nay, even the demons, are

purified and brought back to God by the Logos-Christ,[811] after they

have ascended from stage to stage through seven heavens.[812] Hence

Origen treated this doctrine as an esoteric one: "for the common man it

is sufficient to know that the sinner is punished."[813]

This system overthrew those of the Gnostics, attracted Greek

philosophers, and justified ecclesiastical Christianity. If one

undertook to subject it to a new process of sublimation from the

standpoint given in the "contemplative life", little else would be left

than the unchangeable spirit, the created spirit, and the ethic. But no

one is justified in subjecting it to this process.[814] The method

according to which Origen preserved whatever appeared valuable in the

content of tradition is no less significant than his system of ethics

and the great principle of viewing everything created in a relative

sense. Supposing minds of a radical cast, to have existed at the close

of the history of ancient civilisation, what would have been left to us?

The fact of a strong and undivided religious interest attaching itself

to the traditions of the philosophers and of the two Testaments was the

condition--to use Origen's own language--that enabled a new world of

spirits to arise after the old one had finished its course.

During the following century Origen's theology at first acted in its

entirety. But it likewise attained this position of influence, because

some important propositions could be detached from their original

connection and fitted into a new one. It is one of the peculiarities of

this ecclesiastical philosophy of religion that the most of its formulæ

could be interpreted and employed _in utramque partem_. The several

propositions could be made to serve very different purposes not only by

being halved, but also by being grouped. With this the relative unity

that distinguishes the system no doubt vanished; but how many are there

who strive after unity and completeness in their theory of the world?

Above all, however, there was something else that necessarily vanished,

as soon as people meddled with the individual propositions, and enlarged

or abridged them. We mean the frame of mind which produced them, that

wonderful unity between the relative view of things and the absolute

estimate of the highest good attainable by the free spirit that is

certain of its God. But a time came, nay, had already come, when a sense

of proportion and relation was no longer to be found.

In the East the history of dogma and of the Church during the succeeding

centuries is the history of Origen's philosophy. Arians and orthodox,

critics and mystics, priests who overcame the world and monks who

shunned it but were eager for knowledge[815] could appeal to this system

and did not fail to do so. But, in the main problem that Origen set for

the Church in this religious philosophy of his, we find a recurrence of

that propounded by the so-called Gnosticism two generations earlier. He

solved it by producing a system which reconciled the faith of the Church

with Greek philosophy; and he dealt Gnosticism its death-blow. This

solution, however, was by no means intended as the doctrine of the

Church, since indeed it was rather based on the distinction between

Church belief and theology, and consequently on the distinction between

the common man and the theologian. But such a distinction was not

permanently tenable in a Church that had to preserve its strength by the

unity and finality of a revealed faith, and no longer tolerated fresh

changes in the interpretation of its possession. Hence a further

compromise was necessary. The Greek philosophy, or speculation, did not

attain real and permanent recognition within the Church till a new

accommodation, capable of being accounted both Pistis and Gnosis, was

found between what Origen looked on as Church belief and what he

regarded as Gnosis. In the endeavours of Irenæus, Tertullian, and

Hippolytus were already found hesitating, nay, we may almost say naïve,

attempts at such an accommodation; but ecclesiastical traditionalism was

unable to attain complete clearness as to its own position till it was

confronted with a philosophy of religion that was no longer heathen or

Gnostic, but had an ecclesiastical colouring.

But, with this prospect, we have already crossed the border of the third

century. At its beginning there were but few theologians in Christendom

who were acquainted with speculation, even in its fragmentary form. In

the course of the century it became a recognised part of the orthodox

faith, in so far as the Logos doctrine triumphed in the Church. This

development is the most important that took place in the third century;

for it denoted the definite transformation of the rule of faith into the

compendium of a Greek philosophical system, and it is the parallel of a

contemporaneous transformation of the Church into a holy commonwealth

(see above, chapter 3).

Footnotes:

[Footnote 656: Guericke, De schola, quæ Alex. floruit catechetica 1824,

1825. Vacherot, Hist. crit. de l'école d'Alex., 1846-51. Reinkens, De

Clemente Alex., 1850. Redepenning, Origenes Thl. I. p. 57 ff. Læmmer,

Clem. Al. de Logo doctrina, 1855. Reuter, Clem. theolog. moralis, 1853.

Cognat, Clement d'Alex. Paris, 1859. Westcott, Origen and the beginnings

of Christian Philosophy (Contemporary Review, May 1879). Winter, Die

Ethik des Clemens von Alex., 1882. Merk, Cl. Alex, in seiner

Abhängigkeit von der griech. Philosophie, Leipzig, 1879 (see besides

Overbeck, Theol. Lit. Ztg., 1879. No. 20 and cf. above all his

disquisitions in the treatise "Ueber. die Anfänge der patristischen

Litteratur,") Hist. Ztschr. N.F., Vol. XII., pp. 455-472 Zahn,

Forschungen, Vol. III. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria,

Oxford, 1886. Kremmer, De catal. heurematum, Lips. 1890. Wendland,

Quæst. Musonianæ, Berol. 1886. Bratke, Die Stellung des Clem. Alex. z.

antiken Mysterienwesen (Stud. u. Krit. 1888, p. 647 ff). On Alexander of

Jerusalem see Routh, Reliq. Sacr. T. II. p. 161 sq.; on Julius Africanus

see Gelzer, Sextus Jul. Afr. I. Thl., 1880, p. 1 ff., Spitta, Der Brief

des Jul. Afr. an Aristides, Halle 1877, and my article in the

Real-Encykl. On Bardesanes see Hilgenfeld, B., der letzte Gnostiker,

1864, and Hort's article in the Dictionary of Christian Biography. On

the labours in scientific theology on the part of the so-called Alogi in

Asia Minor and of the Roman Theodotianists see Epiph. hær. 51, Euseb.,

H. E. V. 28 and my article "Monarchianismus" in the R.-Encykl. f.

protest. Theol. 2nd. ed., Vol. X., pp. 183 ff., 188 ff. On the

tendencies even of orthodox Christians to scientific theology see

Tertull., de præscr. hær. 8 ff. (cf. the first words of c. 8: "Venio

itaque ad illum articulum, quem et nostri prætendunt ad ineundam

curiositatem. Scriptum est, inquiunt, Quærite et invenietis" etc.).]

[Footnote 657: This manner of expression is indeed liable to be

misunderstood, because it suggests the idea that something new was

taking place. As a matter of fact the scientific labours in the Church

were merely a continuation of the Gnostic schools under altered

circumstances, that is, under the sway of a tradition which was now more

clearly defined and more firmly fenced round as a _noli me tangere_.]

[Footnote 658: This was begun in the Church by Irenæus and Tertullian

and continued by the Alexandrians. They, however, not only adopted

theologoumena from Paulinism, but also acquired from Paul a more ardent

feeling of religious freedom as well as a deeper reverence for love and

knowledge as contrasted with lower morality.]

[Footnote 659: We are not able to form a clear idea of the school of

Justin. In the year 180 the schools of the Valentinians, Carpocratians,

Tatian etc. were all outside the Church.]

[Footnote 660: On the school of Edessa see Assemani, Bibl. orient., T.

III., P. II., p. 924; Von Lengerke, De Ephraemi arte hermen., p. 86 sq.;

Kihn, Die Bedeutung der antiochenischen Schule etc., pp. 32 f. 79 f.,

Zahn, Tatian's Diatessaron, p. 54. About the middle of the 3rd century

Macarius, of whom Lucian the Martyr was a disciple, taught at this

school. Special attention was given to the exegesis of the Holy

Scriptures.]

[Footnote 661: Overbeck, l.c., p. 455, has very rightly remarked: "The

origin of the Alexandrian school of catechists is not a portion of the

Church history of the 2nd century, that has somehow been left in the

dark by a mere accident; but a part of the well-defined dark region on

the map of the ecclesiastical historian of this period, which contains

the beginnings of all the fundamental institutions of the Church as well

as those of the Alexandrian school of catechists, a school which was the

first attempt to formulate the relationship of Christianity to secular

science." We are, moreover, still in a state of complete uncertainty as

to the personality and teaching of Pantænus (with regard to him see

Zahn, "Forschungen" Vol. III., pp. 64 ff. 77 ff). We can form an idea of

the school of catechists from the 6th Book of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical

History and from the works of Clement and Origen.]

[Footnote 662: On the connection of Julius Africanus with this school

see Eusebius, VI. 31. As to his relations with Origen see the

correspondence. Julius Africanus had, moreover, relations with Edessa.

He mentions Clement in his chronicles. On the connection of Alexander

and the Cappadocian circle with Pantænus, Clement, and Origen, see the

6th Book of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History. Alexander and Origen were

disciples of Pantænus.]

[Footnote 663: See my article "Heraklas" in the Real-Encyklopadie.]

[Footnote 664: We have the most complete materials in Zahn,

"Forschungen" Vol. III. pp. 17-176. The best estimate of the great

tripartite work (Protrepticus, Pædagogus, Stromateis) is found in

Overbeck, l.c. The titles of Clement's remaining works, which are lost

to us or only preserved in fragments, show how comprehensive his

scientific labours were.]

[Footnote 665: This applies quite as much to the old principles of

Christian morality as to the traditional faith. With respect to the

first we may refer to the treatise: "Quis dives salvetur", and to the

2nd and 3rd Books of the Pædagogus.]

[Footnote 666: Clement was also conscious of the novelty of his

undertaking; see Overbeck, l.c., p. 464 f. The respect enjoyed by

Clement as a master is shown by the letters of Alexander of Jerusalem.

See Euseb., H. E. VI. 11 and specially VI. 14. Here both Pantænus and

Clement are called "Father", but whilst the former receives the title,

[Greek: ho makarios hôs alêthôs kai kurios ], the latter is called:

[Greek: ho hieros Klêmês, kurios mou genomenos kai ôphelêsas me].]

[Footnote 667: Strom. VI. 14, 109: [Greek: pleon estin tou pisteusai to

gnônai], Pistis is [Greek: gnôsis suntomos tôn katepeigontôn] (VII. 10.

57, see the whole chapter), Gnosis is [Greek: apodeixis tôn dia pisteôs

pareilêmmenôn tê pistei epoikodomoumenê] (l.c.), [Greek: teleiôsis

anthrôpou] (l.c.), [Greek: pistis epistêmonikê] (II. II. 48).]

[Footnote 668: We have here more particularly to consider those

paragraphs of the Stromateis where Clement describes the perfect

Gnostic: the latter elevates himself by dispassionate love to God, is

raised above everything earthly, has rid himself of ignorance, the root

of all evil, and already lives a life like that of the angels. See

Strom. VI. 9. 71, 72: [Greek: Oude gar endei ti autô pros exomôiosin tô

kalô kai agathô einai oude ara philei tina tên koinên tautên philian,

all' agapa ton ktistên dia tôn ktismatôn. Out' oun epithumia kai orexei

tini peripiptei oute endeês esti kata ge tên psuchên tôn allôn tinos

sunôn êdê di' agapês tô erastô, ô dê ôkeiôtai kata tên hairesin kai tê

ex askêseos hexei, toutô prosechesteron sunengizôn, makarios ôn dia tên

tôn agathôn periousian, ôste heneka ge toutôn exomoiousthai biazetai tô

didaskalô eis apatheian.] Strom. VII. 69-83: VI. 14, 113: [Greek: houtôs

dunamin labousa kuriakên hê psuchê meleta einai Theos, kakon men ouden

allo plên agnoias einai nomizousa.] The whole 7th Book should be read.]

[Footnote 669: Philo is quoted by Clement several times and still more

frequently made use of without acknowledgment. See the copious citations

in Siegfried, Philo von Alexandrien, pp. 343-351. In addition to this

Clement made use of many Greek philosophers or quoted them without

acknowledgment, e.g., Musonius.]

[Footnote 670: Like Philo and Justin, Clement also no doubt at times

asserts that the Greek philosophers pilfered from the Old Testament; but

see Strom. I. 5. 28 sq.: [Greek: pantôn men aitios tôn kalôn ho Theos,

alla tôn men kata proêgoumenon hôs tês te diathêkês tês palaias kai tês

neas, tôn de kat' epakolouthêma hôs tês philosophias. tacha de kai

proêgoumenôs tois Hellêsin edothê tote prin ê ton kyrion kalesai kai

tous Hellênas. epaidagôgei gar kai autê to Hellênikon hôs ho nomos tous

Hebraious eis Christon.]]

[Footnote 671: See Bratke's instructive treatise cited above.]

[Footnote 672: The fact that Clement appeals in support of the Gnosis to

an esoteric tradition (Strom. VI. 7. 61: VI. 8. 68: VII. 10. 55) proves

how much this writer, belonging as he did to a sceptical age,

underestimated the efficacy of all human thought in determining the

ultimate truth of things. The existence of sacred writings containing

all truth was not even enough for him; the content of these writings had

also to be guaranteed by divine communication. But no doubt the ultimate

cause of this, as of all similar cases of scepticism, was the dim

perception that ethics and religion do not at all come within the sphere

of the intellectual, and that the intellect can produce nothing of

religious value. As, however, in consequence of philosophical tradition,

neither Philo, nor the Gnostics, nor Clement, nor the Neoplatonists were

able to shake themselves free from the intellectual _scheme_, those

things which--as they instinctively felt, but did not recognise--could

really not be ascertained by knowledge at all received from them the

name of _suprarational_ and were traced to divine revelation. We may say

that the extinction or pernicious extravagancies to which Greek

philosophy was subjected in Neoplatonism, and the absurdities into which

the Christian dogmatic was led, arose from the fact that the tradition

of placing the ethical and religious feelings and the development of

character within the sphere of knowledge, as had been the case for

nearly a thousand years, could not be got rid of, though the incongruity

was no doubt felt. Contempt for empiricism, scepticism, the

extravagancies of religious metaphysics which finally become mythology,

have their origin here. Knowledge still continues to be viewed as the

highest possession; it is, however, no longer knowledge, but character

and feeling; and it must be nourished by the fancy in order to be able

to assert itself as knowledge.]

[Footnote 673: Clement was not a Neoplatonic mystic in the strict sense

of the word. When he describes the highest ethical ideal, ecstasy is

wanting; and the freshness with which he describes Quietism shows that

he himself was no Quietist. See on this point Bigg's third lecture,

l.c., particularly p. 98 f. "... The silent prayer of the Quietist is in

fact ecstasy, of which there is not a trace in Clement. For Clement

shrank from his own conclusions. Though the father of all the Mystics he

is no Mystic himself. He did not enter the 'enchanted garden,' which he

opened for others. If he talks of 'flaying the sacrifice,' of leaving

sense behind, of Epopteia, this is but the parlance of his school. The

instrument to which he looks for growth in knowledge is not trance, but

disciplined reason. Hence Gnosis, when once obtained, is indefectible,

not like the rapture which Plotinus enjoyed but four times during his

acquaintance with Porphyry, which in the experience of Theresa never

lasted more than half an hour. The Gnostic is no Visionary, no

Theurgist, no Antinomian."]

[Footnote 674: What a bold and joyous thinker Clement was is shown by

the almost audacious remark in Strom. IV. 22. 136: [Greek: ei goun tis

kath' hypothesin protheiê tô gnôstikô poteron helesthai bouloito tên

gnôsin tou Theou ê tên sôtêrian tên aiônian, ein de tauta kechôrismena

pantos mallon en tautotête onta, oude kath' otioun distasas heloit an

tên gnôsin tou Theou.]]

[Footnote 675: Strom. VII. 1. 1. In several passages of his main work

Clement refers to those churchmen who viewed the practical and

speculative concentration of Church tradition as dangerous and

questioned the use of philosophy at all. See Strom. VI. 10. 80: [Greek:

polloi kathaper hoi paides ta mormolukeia, houtôs dediasi tên hellênikên

philosophian, phoboumenoi mê apagagê autous]. VI. 11. 93.]

[Footnote 676: Eusebius, H. E. VI. 14. 8, tells us that Origen was a

disciple of Clement.]

[Footnote 677: Clement's authority in the Church continued much longer

than that of Origen. See Zahn, "Forschungen" III. p. 140 f. The

heterodox opinions advanced by Clement in the Hypotyposes are for the

most part only known to us in an exaggerated form from the report of

Photius.]

[Footnote 678: In ecclesiastical antiquity all systematising was merely

relative and limited, because the complex of sacred writings enjoyed a

different authority from that which it possessed in the following

period. Here the reference of a theologoumenon to a passage of Scripture

was of itself sufficient, and the manifold and incongruous doctrines

were felt as a unity in so far as they could all be verified from Holy

Scriptures. Thus the fact that the Holy Scriptures were regarded as a

series of divine oracles guaranteed, as it were, a transcendental unity

of the doctrines, and, in certain circumstances, relieved the framer of

the system of a great part of his task. Hitherto little justice has been

done to this view of the history of dogma, though it is the only

solution of a series of otherwise insoluble problems. We cannot for

example understand the theology of Augustine, and necessarily create for

ourselves the most difficult problems by our own fault, if we make no

use of that theory. In Origen's dogmatic and that of subsequent Church

Fathers--so far as we can speak of a dogmatic in their case--the unity

lies partly in the canon of Holy Scripture and partly in the ultimate

aim; but these two principles interfere with each other. As far as the

Stromateis of Clement is concerned, Overbeek (l.c.) has furnished the

explanation of its striking plan. Moreover, how would it have been

conceivable that the riches of Holy Scripture, as presented to the

philosophers who allegorised the books, could have been mastered,

problems and all, at the first attempt.]

[Footnote 679: See the treatises of Huetius (1668) reprinted by

Lommatzsch. Thomasius, Origenes 1837. Redepenning, Origenes, 2 Vols.

1841-46. Denis, de la philosophie d'Origène, Paris 1884. Lang, Die

Leiblichkeit der Vernunftwesen bei Origenes, Leipzig, 1892. Mehlhorn,

Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift für

Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.). Westcott, Origenes, in the

Dictionary of Christian Biography Vol. IV. Moller in Herzog's

Real-Encyklopädie, 2nd ed., Vol. XI., pp. 92-109. The special literature

is to be found there as well as in Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte I., p. 151,

and Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 5th ed, p. 62

f.]

[Footnote 680: See his letter in Eusebius, H. E. VI. 19. 11 ff.]

[Footnote 681: In the polemic against Celsus it seems to us in not a few

passages as if the feeling for truth had forsaken him. If we consider,

however, that in Origen's idea the premises of his speculation were

unassailable, and if we further consider into what straits he was driven

by Celsus, we will conclude that no proof has been advanced of Origen's

having sinned against the current rules of truth. These, however, did

not include the commandment to use in disputation only such arguments as

could be employed in a positive doctrinal presentation. Basilius (Ep.

210 ad prim. Neocæs) was quite ready to excuse an utterance of Gregory

Thaumaturgus, that sounded suspiciously like Sabellianism, by saying

that the latter was not speaking [Greek: dogmatikôs], but [Greek:

agônistikôs]. Jerome also (ad Pammach. ep 48, c. 13), after defending

the right of writing [Greek: gymnastikôs], expressly said that all Greek

philosophers "have used many words to conceal their thoughts, threaten

in one place, and deal the blow in another." In the same way, according

to him, Origen, Methodius, Eusebius, and Apollinaris had acted in the

dispute with Celsus and Porphyry. "Because they are sometimes compelled

to say, not what they themselves think, but what is necessary for their

purpose; they do this only in the struggle with the heathen."]

[Footnote 682: See, above all, the systematic main work "[Greek: peri

archôn]".]

[Footnote 683: Many writings of Origen are pervaded by arguments,

evincing equal discretion and patience, against the Christians who

contest the right of science in the Church. In the work against Celsus,

however, he was not unfrequently obliged to abandon the simple

Christians. C. Celsus III. 78: V. 14-24 are particularly instructive.]

[Footnote 684: In this point Origen is already narrower than Clement.

Free judgments, such as were passed by Clement on Greek philosophy, were

not, so far as I know, repeated by Origen. (See especially Clement,

Strom. I. 5. 28-32: 13. 57, 58 etc.); yet he also acknowledges

revelations of God in Greek philosophy (see, _e.g._, c. Cels. VI. 3),

and the Christian doctrine is to him the completion of Greek philosophy

(see the remains of Origen's lost Stromateis and Hom. XIV. in Genes. §

3; other passages in Redepenning II., p. 324 ff.).]

[Footnote 685: We must here content ourselves with merely pointing out

that the method of scientific Scriptural exegesis also led to

historico-critical investigations, that accordingly Origen and his

disciples were also critics of the tradition, and that scientific

theology, in addition to the task of remodelling Christianity, thus

began at its very origin the solution of another problem, namely, the

critical restoration of Christianity from the Scriptures and tradition

and the removal of its excrescences: for these efforts, strictly

speaking, do not come up for consideration in the history of dogma.]

[Footnote 686: The theory that justified a twofold morality in the

Church is now completely legitimised, but the higher form no longer

appears as Encratite and eschatological, but as Encratite and

philosophical. See, for example, Clement, Strom. III. 12. 82: VI. 13.

106 etc. Gnosis is the principle of perfection. See Strom. IV. 7. 54:

[Greek: prokeitai de tois eis teleiôsin speudousin hê gnôsis hê logikê

hês themelios hê agia trias pistis, agapê, elpis].]

[Footnote 687: See the preface to the work [Greek: peri archôn].]

[Footnote 688: From the conclusion of Hippolytus' Philosophoumena it is

also evident how the Socratic [Greek: Gnôthi seauton] was in that age

based on a philosophy of religion and was regarded as a watchword in

wide circles. See Clem. Pædag. III. 11. 1.]

[Footnote 689: See Gregory Thaumaturgus' panegyric on Origen, one of the

most instructive writings of the 3rd century, especially cc. 11-18.]

[Footnote 690: Yet all excesses are repudiated. See Clem. Strom. IV. 22.

138: [Greek: Ouk egkratês outos eti, all' en hexei gegonen apatheias

schêma theion ependusasthai anamenôn]. Similar remarks are found in

Origen.]

[Footnote 691: In many passages of Clement the satisfaction in knowledge

appears in a still more pronounced form than in Origen. The boldest

expression of it is Strom. IV. 22. 136. This passage is quoted above on

p. 328.]

[Footnote 692: See the beautiful prayer of the Christian Gnostic in

Strom. IV. 23. 148.]

[Footnote 693: See Strom. IV. 26. 172: Origen's commentaries are

continually interrupted by similar outbursts of feeling.]

[Footnote 694: On deification as the ultimate aim see Clem., Strom. IV.

23. 149-155: VII. 10. 56, 13. 82, 16. 95: [Greek: houtôs ho tô kuriô

peithomenos kai tê dotheisê di' autou katakolouthêsas prophêteia teleôs

ekteleitai kat' eikona tou didaskalou en sarki peripolôn Theos]. But

note what a distinction Clement makes between [Greek: ho Theos] and the

perfect man in VII. 15. 88 (in contradistinction to the Stoic

identification); Origen does this also.]

[Footnote 695: Gregory (l.c., c. 13) relates that all the works of the

poets and philosophers were read in Origen's school, and that every part

of these works that would stand the test was admitted. Only the works of

atheists were excluded, "because these overpass the limits of human

thought." However, Origen did not judge philosophers in such an

unprejudiced manner as Clement, or, to speak more correctly, he no

longer valued them so highly. See Bigg, l.c., p. 133, Denis l.c.

Introd.]

[Footnote 696: See, for example, c. Cels. V. 43: VII. 47, 59 sq. He

compared Plato and other wise men to those doctors who give their

attention only to cultured patients.]

[Footnote 697: See, for example, c. Cels. VI. 2.]

[Footnote 698: C. Cels. V. 43.]

[Footnote 699: One of Origen's main ideas, which we everywhere meet

with, particularly in the work against Celsus (see, for example, VI. 2)

is the thought that Christ has come to improve all men according to

their several capacities, and to lead some to the highest knowledge.

This conception appears to fall short of the Christian ideal and perhaps

really does so; but as soon as we measure it not by the Gospel but by

the aims of Greek philosophy, we see very clearly the progress that has

been attained through this same Gospel. What Origen has in his eye is

mankind, and he is anxious for the amendment not merely of a few, but of

all. The actual state of things in the Church no longer allowed him to

repeat the exclamations of the Apologists that all Christians were

philosophers and that all were filled with the same wisdom and virtue.

These exclamations were naïve and inappropriate even for that time. But

he could already estimate the relative progress made by mankind within

the Church as compared with those outside her pale, saw no gulf between

the growing and the perfect, and traced the whole advance to Christ. He

expressly declared, c. Cels. III. 78, that the Christianity which is

fitted for the comprehension of the multitude is not the best doctrine

in an absolute, but only in a relative, sense; that the "common man", as

he expresses himself, must be reformed by the prospect of rewards and

punishments; and that the truth can only be communicated to him in

veiled forms and images, as to a child. The very fact, however, that the

Logos in Jesus Christ has condescended so to act is to Origen a proof of

the universality of Christianity. Moreover, many of the wonderful

phenomena reported in the Holy Scriptures belong in his opinion to the

veiled forms and images. He is very far from doing violence to his

reason here; he rather appeals to mysterious powers of the soul, to

powers of divination, visionary states etc. His standpoint in this case

is wholly that of Celsus (see particularly the instructive disquisition

in I. 48), in so far as he is convinced that many unusual things take

place between heaven and earth, and that individual names, symbols etc.

possess a mysterious power (see, for example, c. Cels. V. 45). The views

as to the relationship between knowledge and holy initiation or

_sacramentum_ are those of the philosophers of the age. He thinks,

however, that each individual case requires to be examined, that there

can be no miracles not in accordance with nature, but that on the

contrary everything must fit into a higher order. As the letter of the

precepts in both Testaments frequently contains things contrary to

reason (see [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 2. 8-27) in order to lead men to

the spiritual interpretation, and as many passages contain no literal

sense at all (l.c. § 12), so also, in the historical narratives, we

frequently discover a mythical element from which consequently nothing

but the idea is to be evolved (l.c. § 16 sq.: "Non solum de his, quæ

usque ad adventum Christi scripta sunt, hæc Spiritus sanctus procuravit,

sed ... eadem similiter etiam in evangelistis et apostolis fecit. Nam ne

illas quidem narrationes, quas per eos inspiravit, absque huiuscemodi,

quam supra exposuimus, sapientiæ suæ arte contexuit. Unde etiam in ipsis

non parva promiscuit, quibus historialis narrandi ordo interpolates, vel

intercisus per impossibilitatem sui reflecteret atque revocaret

intentionem legentis ad intelligentiæ interioris examen.") In all such

cases Origen makes uniform use of the two points of view, that God

wished to present something even to the simple and to incite the more

advanced to spiritual investigations. In some passages, however, the

former point of view fails, because the content of the text is

offensive; in that case it is only the second that applies. Origen

therefore was very far from finding the literal content of Scripture

edifying in every instance, indeed, in the highest sense, the letter is

not edifying at all. He rather adopted, to its widest extent, the

critical method employed by the Gnostics particularly when dealing with

the Old Testament; but the distinction he made between the different

senses of Scripture and between the various legitimate human needs

enabled him to preserve both the unity of God and the harmony of

revelation. Herein, both in this case and everywhere else, lies the

superiority of his theology. Read especially c. Celsum I. 9-12. After

appealing to the twofold religion among the Egyptians, Persians,

Syrians, and Indians--the mythical religion of the multitude and the

mystery-religion of the initiated--he lays down exactly the same

distinction within Christianity, and thus repels the reproach of Celsus

that the Christians were obliged to accept everything without

examination. With regard to the mythical form of Christianity he merely

claims that it is the most suitable among religions of this type. Since,

as a matter of fact, the great majority of men have neither time nor

talent for philosophy, [Greek: poia an allê beltiôn methodos pros to

tois pollois boêthêsai heuretheiê, tês apo tou Iêsou tois ethnesi

paradotheisês] (l.c., 9). This thought is quite in the spirit of

antiquity, and neither Celsus nor Porphyry could have any fault to find

with these arguments in point of form: all positive religions have a

mythical element; the true religion therefore lies behind the religions.

But the novelty which neither Celsus nor Porphyry could recognise lies

in the acknowledgment that the one religion, even in its mythical form,

is unique and divine, and in the demand that all men, so far as they

cannot attain the highest knowledge, must subject themselves to this

mythical religion and no other. In this claim Origen rejected the

ancient contrast between the multitude and the initiated just as he

repudiated polytheism; and in this, if I see rightly, his historical

greatness consists. He everywhere recognised gradations tending in the

same direction and rejected polytheism.]

[Footnote 700: Bigg (l.c., p. 154) has rightly remarked: "Origen in

point of method differs most from Clement, who not unfrequently leaves

us in doubt as to the precise Scriptural basis of his ideas."]

[Footnote 701: Note, for example, § 8, where it is said that Origen

adopted the allegorical method from the Stoic philosophers and applied

it to the Jewish writings. On Origen's hermeneutic principles in their

relation to those of Philo see Siegfried, l.c., pp. 351-62. Origen has

developed them fully and clearly in the 4th Book of [Greek: peri

archôn].]

[Footnote 702: See Overbeck, Theologische Literatur-Zeitung, 1878, Col.

535.]

[Footnote 703: A full presentation of Origen's theology would require

many hundreds of pages, because he introduced everything worth knowing

into the sphere of theology, and associated with the Holy Scriptures,

verse by verse, philosophical maxims, ethical reflexions, and results of

physical science, which would require to be drawn on the widest canvas,

because the standpoint selected by Origen allowed the most extensive

view and the most varied judgments. The case was similar with Clement

before him, and also with Tertullian. This is a necessary result of

"Scripture theology" when one takes it up in earnest. Tertullian

assumes, for example, that there must be a Christian doctrine of dreams.

Why? Because we read of dreams in the Holy Scriptures.]

[Footnote 704: In c. Cels. III. 61 it is said (Lommatzsch XVIII., p.

337): [Greek: epemphthê oun Theos logos katho men iatros tois

hamartôlois, katho de didaskalos theiôn mustêrion tois êdê katharois kai

mêketi hamartanousin.] See also what follows. In Comment. in John I. 20

sq. the crucified Christ, as the Christ of faith, is distinguished from

the Christ who takes up his abode in us, as the Christ of the perfect.

See 22 (Lomm. I. p. 43): [Greek: kai makarioi ge hosoi deomenoi tou

huiou tou Theou toioutoi gegonasin, hôs mêketi autou chrazein iatrou

tous kakôs hechontas therapeuontos, mêde poimenos, mêde apolutrôseôs,

alla sophias kai logou kai dikaiosunês, hê ei ti allo tois dia

teleiotêta chôrein autou ta kallista dunamenois.] Read also c. Cels. II.

66, 69: IV. 15, 18: VI. 68. These passages show that the crucified

Christ is no longer of any account to the Gnostic, and that he therefore

allegorises all the incidents described in the Gospels. Clement, too,

really regards Christ as of no importance to Gnostics except as a

teacher.]

[Footnote 705: Comment, in Joh. I. 9, Lomm. I. p, 20. The "mysteries" of

Christ is the technical term for this theology and, at bottom, for all

theology. For, in respect of the form given to it, revelation always

appears as a problem that theology has to solve. What is revealed is

therefore either to be taken as immediate authority (by the believer) or

as a soluble problem. One thing, accordingly, it is not, namely,

something in itself evident and intelligible.]

[Footnote 706: See Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte, p. 136.]

[Footnote 707: To Origen the problem of evil was one of the most

important; see Book III. of [Greek: peri archôn] and c. Cels. VI. 53-59.

He is convinced (1) that the world is not the work of a second, hostile

God; (2) that virtues and the works arising from them are alone good in

the proper sense of the word, and that nothing but the opposite of these

is bad; (3) that evil in the proper sense of the word is only evil will

(see c. Cels. IV. 66: VI. 54). Accordingly he makes a very decided

distinction between that which is bad and evils. As for the latter he

admits that they partly originate from God, in which case they are

designed as means of training and punishment. But he saw that this

conception is insufficient, both in view of individual passages of Holy

Scripture and of natural experience. There are evils in the world that

can be understood neither as the result of sin nor as means of training.

Here then his relative, rational view of things comes in, even with

respect to the power of God. There are evils which are a necessary

consequence of carrying out even the best intentions (c. Cels. VI. 53:

[Greek: ta kaka ek parakolouthêseôs gegenêtai tês pros ta proêgoumena]):

"Evils, in the strict sense, are not created by God; yet some, though

but few in comparison with the great, well-ordered whole of the world,

have of necessity adhered to the objects realised; as the carpenter who

executes the plan of a building does not manage without chips and

similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the

dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of

buildings;" (l.c., c. 55). Celsus also might have written in this

strain. The religious, absolute view is here replaced by a rational, and

the world is therefore not the best absolutely, but the best possible.

See the Theodicy in [Greek: peri archôn] III. 17-22. (Here, and also in

other parts, Origen's Theodicy reminds us of that of Leibnitz; see

Denis, l.c., p. 626 sq. The two great thinkers have a very great deal in

common, because their philosophy was not of a radical kind, but an

attempt to give a rational interpretation to tradition.) But "for the

great mass it is sufficient when they are told that evil has not its

origin in God" (IV. 66). The case is similar with that which is really

bad. It is sufficient for the multitude to know that that which is bad

springs from the freedom of the creature, and that matter which is

inseparable from things mortal is not the source and cause of sin (IV.

66, see also III, 42: [Greek: to kuriôs miaron apo kakias toiouton esti.

Phusis de sômatos ou miara ou gar hê phusis sômatos esti, to gennêtikon

tês miarotêtos echei tên kakian]); but a closer examination shows that

there can be no man without sin (III. 6l) because error is inseparable

from growth and because the constitution of man in the flesh makes evil

unavoidable (VII. 50). Sinfulness is therefore natural and it is the

necessary _prius_. This thought, which is also not foreign to Irenæus,

is developed by Origen with the utmost clearness. He was not content

with proving it, however, but in order to justify God's ways proceeded

to the assumption of a Fall before time began (see below).]

[Footnote 708: See Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit

nach Origenes (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.)]

[Footnote 709: The distinction between Valentinus and Origen consists in

the fact that the former makes an æon or, in other words, a part of the

divine _pleroma_, itself fall, and that he does not utilise the idea of

freedom. The outline of Origen's system cannot be made out with complete

clearness from the work [Greek: peri archôn], because he endeavoured to

treat each of the first three parts as a whole. Origen's four principles

are God, the World, Freedom, Revelation (Holy Scripture). Each

principle, however, is brought into relation with Christ. The first part

treats of God and the spirits, and follows the history of the latter

down to their restoration. The second part treats of the world and

humanity, and likewise closes with the prospect of the resurrection,

punishment in hell, and eternal life. Here Origen makes a magnificent

attempt to give a conception of bliss and yet to exclude all sensuous

joys. The third book treats of sin and redemption, that is, of freedom

of will, temptation, the struggle with the powers of evil, internal

struggles, the moral aim of the world, and the restoration of all

things. A special book on Christ is wanting, for Christ is no

"principle"; but the incarnation is treated of in II. 6. The teachers of

Valentinus' school accordingly appear more Christian when contrasted

with Origen. If we read the great work [Greek: peri archôn], or the

treatise against Celsus, or the commentaries connectedly, we never cease

to wonder how a mind so clear, so sure of the ultimate aim of all

knowledge, and occupying such a high standpoint, has admitted in details

all possible views down to the most naive myths, and how he on the one

hand believes in holy magic, sacramental vehicles and the like, and on

the other, in spite of all his rational and even empirical views,

betrays no doubt of his abstract creations. But the problem that

confronts us in Origen is that presented by his age. This we realise on

reading Celsus or Porphyry (see Denis l.c., p. 613: "Toutes les théories

d'Origène, même les plus imaginaires, représent l'état intellectuel et

moral du siècle où il a paru"). Moreover, Origen is not a teacher who,

like Augustine, was in advance of his time, though he no doubt

anticipated the course of ecclesiastical development. This age, as

represented by its greatest men, sought to gain a substructure for

something new, not by a critical examination of the old ideas, but by

incorporating them all into one whole. People were anxious to have

assurance, and, in the endeavour to find this, they were nervous about

giving up any article of tradition. The boldness of Origen, judged as a

Greek philosopher, lies in his rejection of all polytheistic religions.

This made him all the more conservative in his endeavours to protect and

incorporate everything else. This conservatism welded together

ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek culture into a system of theology

which was indeed completely heterodox.]

[Footnote 710: The proof from prophecy was reckoned by Origen among the

articles belonging to faith, but not to Gnosis (see for ex. c. Cels. II.

37); but, like the Apologists, he found it of great value. As far as the

philosophers are concerned, Origen always bore in mind the principle

expressed in c. Cels. VII. 46: [Greek: pros tauta d'êmeis phêsomen hoi

meletêsantes mêdeni apechthanesthai tôn kalôs legomenôn; kan hoi hexô

tês pisteôs legôusi kalôs.] In that same place it is asserted that God

in his love has not only revealed himself to such as entirely consecrate

themselves to his service, but also to such as do not know the true

adoration and reverence which he requires. But as remarked above, p.

338, Origen's attitude to the Greek philosophers is much more reserved

than that of Clement.]

[Footnote 711: See, for ex., c. Cels. VI. 6, Comment in Johann. XIII.

59, Lomm. II., p. 9 sq.]

[Footnote 712: [Greek: Peri archôn] preface.]

[Footnote 713: On Origen's exegetical method see Kihn, Theodor v. Mopsu.

p. 20 ff., Bigg, l.c. p. 131 ff. On the distinction between his

application of the allegorical method and that of Clement see specially

p. 134 f. of the latter work.]

[Footnote 714: Origen noted several such passages in the very first

chapter of Genesis. Examples are given in Bigg, p. 137 f.]

[Footnote 715: Bigg, l.c., has very appropriately named Origen's

allegorism "Biblical alchemy".]

[Footnote 716: To ascertain the pneumatic sense, Origen frequently drew

analogies between the domain of the cosmic and that of the spiritual. He

is thus a forerunner of modern idealistic philosophers, for example,

Drummond: "To Origen allegorism is only one manifestation of the

sacramental mystery of nature" (Bigg, p. 134).]

[Footnote 717: See Hom in Luc. XXIX., Lomm. V., p. 193 sq.]

[Footnote 718: Since Origen does not, as a rule, dispute the literal

meaning of the Scriptures, he has also a much more favourable opinion of

the Jewish people and of the observance of the law than the earlier

Christian authors (but see Iren. and Tertull.). At bottom he places the

observance of the law quite on the same level as the faith of the simple

Christians. The Apostles also kept the law for a time, and it was only

by degrees that they came to understand its spiritual meaning. They were

also right to continue its observance during their mission among the

Jews. On the other hand, he considers the New Testament a higher stage

than the Old both in its literal and its spiritual sense. See c. Cels.

II. 1-4, 7, 75: IV. 31 sq: V. 10, 30, 31, 42 sq., 66: VII. 26.]

[Footnote 719: In opposition to the method for obtaining a knowledge of

God, recommended by Alcinous (c. 12), Maximus Tyr. (XVII. 8), and Celsus

(by analysis [apophat.], synthesis [kataphat.], and analogy), Origen, c.

Cels. VII. 42, 44, appeals to the fact that the Christian knows God

better, namely, in his incarnate Son. But he himself, nevertheless, also

follows the synthetic method.]

[Footnote 720: In defining the superessential nature of the One, Origen

did not go so far as the Basilidians (Philosoph. VII. 20, 21) or as

Plotinus. No doubt he also regards the Deity as [Greek: epekeina tês

ousias] (c. Cels. VII. 42-51; [Greek: peri archôn] I. 1; Clement made a

closer approach to the heretical abstractions of the Gnostics inasmuch

as he still more expressly renounced any designation of God; see Strom.

V. 12, 13), but he is not [Greek: buthos] and [Greek: sigê], being

rather a self-comprehending Spirit, and therefore does not require a

hypostasis (the [Greek: nous]) before he can come to himself.

Accordingly the human intellect is not incapable of soaring up to God as

the later Neoplatonists assert; at least vision is by no means so

decidedly opposed to thought, that is, elevated above it as something

new, as is held by the Neoplatonists and Philo before them. Origen is no

mystic. In accordance with this conception Origen and Clement say that

the perfect knowledge of God can indeed be derived from the Logos alone

(c. Cels VII. 48, 49: VI. 65-73; Strom. V. 12. 85: VI. 15. 122), but

that a relative knowledge may be deduced from creation (c. Cels. VII.

46). Hence they also spoke of an innate knowledge of God (Protrept. VI.

68; Strom. V. 13. 78), and extended the teleological proof of God

furnished by Philo ([Greek: peri archôn] I. 1. 6; c. Cels I. 23). The

relatively correct predicates of God to be determined from revelation

are his unity (c. Cels I. 23), his absolute spirituality ([Greek: pneuma

asômatos, aulos, aschêmatistos])--this is maintained both in opposition

to Stoicism and anthropomorphism; see Orig. [Greek: peri archôn] I. 1,

Origen's polemic against Melito's conception of God, and Clem., Strom.

V. 11. 68: V. 12. 82,--his unbegottenness, his immortality (this is

eternity conceived as enjoyment; the eternity of God itself, however, is

to be conceived, according to Clement, as that which is above time; see

Strom. II. 2. 6), and his absolute causality. All these concepts

together constitute the conception of perfection. See Fischer, De Orig.

theologia et cosmologia, 1840.]

[Footnote 721: Orig. [Greek: peri archôn] II. 1. 3.]

[Footnote 722: C. Cels V. 23.]

[Footnote 723: L.c.]

[Footnote 724: [Greek: Peri archôn] II. 9. 1: "Certum est, quippe quod

præfinito aliquo apud se numero creaturas fecit: non enim, ut quidam

volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est,

nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit

utique nee contineri vel dispensari a deo, quæ facta sunt, poterunt.

Naturaliter nempe quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit."

In Matth., t. 13., c. 1 fin., Lomm. III., p. 209 sq.]

[Footnote 725: See above, p. 343, note 2.]

[Footnote 726: See c. Cels. II. 20.]

[Footnote 727: Clement also did so; see with respect to Origen [Greek:

peri archôn] II. 5, especially § 3 sq.]

[Footnote 728: See Comment. in Johann. I. 40, Lomm. I. p. 77 sq. I

cannot agree that this view is a _rapprochement_ to the Marcionites

(contrary to Nitzsch's opinion, l.c., p. 285). The confused accounts in

Epiph., H. 43. 13 are at any rate not to be taken into account.]

[Footnote 729: Clement's doctrine of the Logos, to judge from the

Hypotyposes, was perhaps different from that of Origen. According to

Photius (Biblioth. 109) Clement assumed two Logoi (Origen indeed was

also reproached with the same; see Pamphili Apol., Routh, Reliq. S.,

IV., p. 367), and did not even allow the second and weaker one to make a

real appearance on earth; but this is a misunderstanding (see Zahn,

Forschungen III., p. 144). [Greek: Legetai men]--these are said to have

been the words of a passage in the Hypotyposes--[Greek: kai ho huios

logos homônumôs tô patrikô logô, all' ouch outos estin ho sarx

genomenos, oude men ho patrôos logos, alla dynamis tis tou Theou, oion

apporoia tou logou autou nous genomenos tas tôn anthrôpôn kardias

diapephoitêke]. The distinction between an impersonal Logos-God and the

Logos-Christ necessarily appeared as soon as the Logos was definitely

hypostatised. In the so-called Monarchian struggles of the 3rd century

the disputants made use of these two Logoi, who formed excellent

material for sophistical discussions. In the Strom. Clement did not

reject the distinction between a [Greek: logos endiathetos] and [Greek:

prophorikos] (on Strom. V. 1. 6. see Zahn, l.c., p. 145 against

Nitzsch), and in many passages expresses himself in such a way that one

can scarcely fail to notice a distinction between the Logos of the

Father and that of the Son. "The Son-Logos is an emanation of the Reason

of God, which unalterably remains in God and is the Logos proper." If

the Adumbrationes are to be regarded as parts of the Hypotyposes,

Clement used the expression [Greek: homoousios] for the Logos, or at

least an identical one (See Zahn, Forschungen III., pp. 87-138 f.). This

is the more probable because Clement, Strom. 16. 74, expressly remarked

that men are not [Greek: meros theou kai tô Theô homoousioi], and

because he says in Strom. IV. 13. 91: [Greek: ei epi to katalusai

thanaton aphikneitai to diapheron genos, ouch ho Christos ton thanaton

katêrgêsen, ei mê kai autos autois homoousios lechtheiê]. One must

assume from this that the word was really familiar to Clement as a

designation of the community of nature, possessed by the Logos, both

with God and with men. See Protrept. 10. 110: [Greek: ho theios logos,

ho phanerôtatos ontôs Theos, ho tô despotê tôn holôn exisôtheis]). In

Strom. V. I. 1 Clement emphatically declared that the Son was equally

eternal with the Father: [Greek: ou mên oude ho patêr aneu huiou hama

gar tô patêr huiou patêr] (see also Strom. IV. 7. 58: [Greek: hen mên to

agennêton ho pantokratôr, en de kai to progennêthen di' ou ta panta

egeneto], and Adumbrat. in Zahn, l.c., p. 87, where 1 John I. 1 is

explained: "principium generationis separatum ab opificis principio non

est. Cum enim dicit 'quod erat ab initio' generationem tangit sine

principio filii cum patre simul exstantis." See besides the remarkable

passage, Quis dives salv. 37: [Greek: Theô ta tês agapês mystêria, kai

tote epopteuseis ton kolpon tou patros, hon ho monogenês huios Theos

monos exêgêsato esti de kai autos ho Theos agapê kai di' agapên hêmin

anekrathê kai to men arrêton autou patêr, to de hêmin sympathes gegone

mêtêr agapêsas ho patêr ethêlunthê, kai toutou mega sêmeion, hon autos

egennêsen ex autou kai ho techtheis ex agapês karpos agapê]. But that

does not exclude the fact that he, like Origen, named the Son [Greek:

ktisma] (Phot., l.c.). In the Adumbrat. (p. 88) Son and Spirit are called

"primitivæ virtutes ac primo creatæ, immobiles exsistentes secundum

substantiam". That is exactly Origen's doctrine, and Zahn (l.c., p. 99)

has rightly compared Strom. V. 14. 89: VI. 7. 58; and Epit. ex Theod.

20. The Son stands at the head of the series of created beings (Strom.

VII. 2. 5; see also below), but he is nevertheless specifically

different from them by reason of his origin. It may be said in general

that the fine distinctions of the Logos doctrine in Clement and Origen

are to be traced to the still more abstract conception of God found in

the former. A sentence like Strom. IV. 25. 156 ([Greek: ho men oun Theos

anapodeiktos ôn ouk estin epistêmonikos, ho de huios sophia te esti kai

epistêmê]) will hardly be found in Origen I think. Cf. Schultz, Gottheit

Christi, p. 45 ff.]

[Footnote 730: See Schultz, l.c., p. 51 ff. and Jahrbuch fur

protestantische Theologie I. pp. 193 ff. 369 ff.]

[Footnote 731: It is very remarkable that Origen [Greek: peri archôn] I.

2. 1 in his presentation of the Logos doctrine, started with the person

of Christ, though he immediately abandoned this starting-point "Primo

illud nos oportere scire", so this chapter begins, "Quod aliud est in

Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia

humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit.

Propter quod videndum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei."]

[Footnote 732: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 2, 6.]

[Footnote 733: The expression was familiar to Origen as to Justin (see

Dial. c. Tryph). See c. Cels. V. 39: [Greek: Kai deuteron oun legômen

Theon istôsan, hoti ton deuteron Theon ouk allo ti legomen, hê tên

periektikên pasôn aretôn aretên kai ton periektikon pantos houtinosoun

logou tôn kata physin kai proêgoumenôs gegenêmenôn.]]

[Footnote 734: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 13 has been much corrupted by

Rufinus. The passage must have been to the effect that the Son is indeed

[Greek: agathos], but not, like the Father, [Greek: aparallaktôs

agathos].]

[Footnote 735: Selecta in Psalm., Lomm. XIII., p. 134; see also Fragm.

comm. in ep. ad Hebr., Lomm. V., p. 299 sq.]

[Footnote 736: L.c.: "Sic et sapientia ex deo procedens, ex ipsa

substantia dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem

corporalis aporrhoeæ esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriæ omnipotentis pura

quædam et sincera. Quæ utræque similitudines (see the beginning of the

passage) manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiæ esse filio cum

patre. Aporrhoea enim [Greek: homoousios] videtur, id est, unius

substantiæ cum illo corpore, ex quo est vel aporrhoea vel vapor." In

opposition to Heracleon Origen argues (in Joh. XIII. 25., Lomm. II., p.

43 sq.) that _we_ are not homousios with God: [Greek: epistêsômen de, ei

me sphodra estin asebes homoousios tê agennêtô physei kai pammakaria

einai legein tous proskunountas en pneumati tô Theô.] On the meaning of

[Greek: homoousios] see Zahn, Marcell., pp. 11-32. The conception

decidedly excludes the possibility of the two subjects connected by it

having a different essence; but it says nothing about how they came to

have one essence and in what measure they possess it. On the other hand

it abolishes the distinction of persons the moment the essence itself is

identified with the one person. Here then is found the Unitarian danger,

which could only be averted by assertions. In some of Origen's teachings

a modalistic aspect is also not quite wanting. See Hom. VIII. in Jerem.

no. 2: [Greek: To men hupokeimenon hen esti, tais de epinoiais ta polla

onomata epi diaphorôn]. Conversely, it is also nothing but an appearance

when Origen (for ex. in c. Cels. VIII. 12) merely traces the unity of

Father and Son to unity in feeling and in will. The charge of Ebionitism

made against him is quite unfounded (see Pamphili Apol., Routh IV. p.

367).]

[Footnote 737: [Greek: Ouk estin ote ouk ên], de princip. I. 2. 9; in

Rom. I. 5.]

[Footnote 738: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 2-9. Comm. in ep. ad. Hebr.

Lomm. V., p. 296: "Nunquam est, quando filius non fuit. Erat autem non,

sicut de æterna luce diximus, innatus, ne duo principia lucis videamur

inducere, sed sicut ingenitæ lucis splendor, ipsam illam lucem initium

habens ac fontem, natus quidem ex ipsa; sed non erat quando noa erat."

See the comprehensive disquisition in [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 28, where

we find the sentence: "hoc autem ipsum, quod dicimus, quia nunquam fuit,

quando non fuit, cum venia audiendum est" etc. See further in Jerem. IX.

4, Lomm. XV., p. 212: [Greek: to apaugasma tês doxês ouchi hapax

gegennêtai, kai ouchi gennatai ... kai aei gennatai ho sôtêr hupo tou

patros]; see also other passages.]

[Footnote 739: See Caspari, Quellen, Vol. IV., p. 10.]

[Footnote 740: In [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 28 the _prolatio_ is

expressly rejected (see also I. 2, 4) as well as the "conversio partis

alicuius substantiæ dei in filium" and the "procreatio ex nullis

substantibus."]

[Footnote 741: L.c. I. 2. 2].

[Footnote 742: L.c. I. 2. 3].

[Footnote 743: De orat. 15: [Greek: Eteros kat' ousian kai hupokeimenon

ho huios esti tou patros]. This, however, is not meant to designate a

deity of a hybrid nature, but to mark the parsonal distinction.]

[Footnote 744: C. Cels. VIII. 12.: [Greek: duo tê hypostasei pragmata].

This was frequently urged against the Monarchians in Origen's

commentaries; see in Joh. X. 21: II. 6 etc. The Son exists [Greek: kat'

idian tês ousias perigraphên]. Not that Origen has not yet the later

terminology [Greek: ousia, hypostasis, hypokeimenon, prosôpon]. We find

three hypostases in Joh. II. 6. Lomm. I., p. 109, and this is repeatedly

the case in c. Cels.]

[Footnote 745: In Joh. I. 22, Lomm. I., p. 41 sq.: [Greek: ho Theos men

oun pantê hen esti kai aploun ho de sôtêr hêmôn dia ta polla]. The Son

is [Greek: idea ideôn, systêma theôrêmatôn en autô](Lomm. I., p. 127).]

[Footnote 746: See the remarks on the saying: "The Father is greater

than I," in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II., p. 45 sq. and other passages. Here

Origen shows that he considers the homoousia of the Son and the Father

just as relative as the unchangeability of the Son.]

[Footnote 747: [Greek: Peri archôn] II. 2. 6 has been corrupted by

Rufinus; see Jerome ep. ad Avitum.]

[Footnote 748: See [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 13 (see above, p. 354,

note 3).]

[Footnote 749: Athanasius supplemented this by determining the essence

of the Logos from the redeeming work of Christ.]

[Footnote 750: See [Greek: peri archôn] præf. and in addition to this

Hermas' view of the Spirit.]

[Footnote 751: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 3. The Holy Spirit is eternal, is

ever being breathed out, but is to be termed a creature. See also in

Job. II. 6, Lomm. I., p. 109 sq.: [Greek: to hagion pneuma dia tou logou

egeneto, presbuterou] (logically) [Greek: par' auto tou logou

tugchanontos]. Yet Origen is not so confident here as in his Logos

doctrine.]

[Footnote 752: See [Greek: peri archôn] I. 3, 5-8. Hence Origen says the

heathen had known the Father and Son, but not the Holy Spirit (de

princip. I. 3: II. 7).]

[Footnote 753: L.c. § 7.]

[Footnote 754: See Hom. in Num. XII. I, Lomm. X, p. 127: "Est hæc trium

distinctio personarum in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, quæ ad

pluralem puteorum numerum revocatur. Sed horum puteorum unum est fons.

Una enim substantia est et natura trinitatis."]

[Footnote 755: [Greek: Peri archôn] præf.]

[Footnote 756: From Hermas, Justin, and Athenagoras we learn how, in the

2nd century, both in the belief of uneducated lay-Christians and of the

Apologists, Son, Spirit, Logos, and angels under certain circumstances

shaded off into one another. To Clement, no doubt, Logos and Spirit are

the only unchangeable beings besides God. But, inasmuch as there is a

series which descends from God to men living in the flesh, there cannot

fail to be elements of affinity between Logos and Spirit on the one hand

and the highest angels on the other, all of whom indeed have the

capacity and need of development. Hence they have certain names and

predicates in common, and it frequently remains uncertain, especially as

regards the theophanies in the Old Testament, whether it was a high

angel that spoke, or the Son through the angel. See the full discussion

in Zahn, Forschungen, III., p. 98 f.]

[Footnote 757: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5.]

[Footnote 758: So also Clement, see Zahn, l.c.]

[Footnote 759: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5. 2.]

[Footnote 760: It was of course created before the world, as it

determines the course of the world. See Comm. in Matth. XV. 27, Lomm.

III., p. 384 sq.]

[Footnote 761: See Comm. in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II, p. 45: we must not

look on the human spirit as [Greek: homoousios] with the divine one. The

same had already been expressly taught by Clement. See Strom., II. 16.

74: [Greek: ho Theos oudemian echei pros hêmas physikên schesin hôs hoi

tôn haireseôn ktistai thelousin]. Adumbr., p. 91 (ed. Zahn). This does

not exclude God and souls having _quodammodo_ one substance.]

[Footnote 762: Such is the teaching of Clement and Origen. They

repudiated the possession of any natural, essential goodness in the case

of created spirits. If such lay in their essence, these spirits would be

unchangeable.]

[Footnote 763: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 10: "Quemadmodum pater non

potest esse quis, si filius non sit, neque dominus quis esse potest sine

possessione, sine servo, ita ne omnipotens quidem deus dici potest, si

non sint, in quos exerceat potentatum, et deo ut omnipotens ostendatur

deus, omnia subsistere necesse est." (So the Hermogenes against whom

Tertullian wrote had already argued). "Nam si quis est, qui velit vel

sæcula aliqua vel spatia transisse, vel quodcunque aliud nominare vult,

cum nondum facta essent, quæ facta sunt, sine dubio hoc ostendet, quod

in illis sæculis vel spatiis omnipotens non erat deus et postmodum

omnipotens factus est." God would therefore, it is said in what follows,

be subjected to a [Greek: prokopê], and thus be proved to be a finite

being. III. 5. 3.]

[Footnote 764: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 8.]

[Footnote 765: Here, however, Origen is already thinking of the

temporary wrong development that is of growth. See [Greek: peri archôn]

I. 7. Created spirits are also of themselves immaterial, though indeed

not in the sense that this can be said of God who can never attach

anything material to himself.]

[Footnote 766: Angels, ideas (see Phot. Biblioth. 109), and human souls

are most closely connected together, both according to the theory of

Clement and Origen and also to that of Pantænus before them (see Clem.

eclog. 56, 57); and so it was taught that men become angels (Clem.

Strom. VI. 13. 107). But the stars also, which are treated in great

detail in [Greek: peri archôn] I. 7, belong to the number of the angels.

This is a genuinely Greek idea. The doctrine of the preëxistence of

human souls was probably set forth by Clement in the Hypotyposes. The

theory of the transmigration of souls was probably found there also

(Phot. Biblioth. 109). In the Adumbrat., which has been preserved to us,

the former doctrine is, however, contested and is not found in the

Stromateis VI. 16. I. sq.]

[Footnote 767: Phot. Biblioth. 109: [Greek: Klêmês pollous pro tou Adam

kosmous terateuetai]. This cannot be verified from the Strom. Orig.,

[Greek: peri archôn] II. 3.]

[Footnote 768: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5 and the whole 3rd Book. The

Fall is something that happened before time began.]

[Footnote 769: The assumption of uncreated matter was decidedly rejected

by Origen ([Greek: peri archôn] II. 1, 2). On the other hand Clement is

said to have taught it in the Hypotyposes (Phot., l.c.: [Greek: hulên

archronon doxazei]); this cannot be noticed in the Strom.; in fact in

VI. 16. 147 he vigorously contested the view of the uncreatedness of the

world. He emphasised the agreement between Plato and Moses in the

doctrine of creation (Strom. II. 16. 74 has nothing to do with this).

According to Origen, matter has no qualities and may assume the most

diverse peculiarities (see, e.g., c. Cels. III. 41).]

[Footnote 770: This conception has given occasion to compare Origen's

system with Buddhism. Bigg. (p. 193) has very beautifully said:

"Creation, as the word is commonly understood, was in Origen's views not

the beginning, but an intermediate phase in human history. Æons rolled

away before this world was made; æons upon æons, days, weeks, months and

years, sabbatical years, jubilee years of æons will run their course,

before the end is attained. The one fixed point in this gigantic drama

is the end, for this alone has been clearly revealed," "God shall be all

in all." Bigg also rightly points out that Rom. VIII. and 1 Cor. XV.

were for Origen the key to the solution of the problems presented by

creation.]

[Footnote 771: The popular idea of demons and angels was employed by

Origen in the most comprehensive way, and dominates his whole view of

the present course of the world. See [Greek: peri archôn] III. 2. and

numerous passages in the Commentaries and Homilies, in which he approves

the kindred views of the Greeks as well as of Hermas and Barnabas. The

spirits ascend and descend; each man has his guardian spirit, and the

superior spirits support the inferior ([Greek: peri archôn] I. 6).

Accordingly they are also to be reverenced ([Greek: therapeuesthai]);

yet such reverence as belongs to a Gabriel, a Michael, etc., is far

different from the adoration of God (c. Cels. VIII. 13).]

[Footnote 772: Clement wrote a special work [Greek: peri pronoias] (see

Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 39 ff.), and treated at length of [Greek:

pronoia] in the Strom.; see Orig. [Greek: peri archôn] III. 1; de orat.

6 etc. Evil is also subject to divine guidance; see Clem., Strom. I. 17.

81-87: IV. 12. 86 sq. Orig. Hom. in Num. XIV., Lomm. X., p. 163: "Nihil

otiosum, nihil inane est apud deum, quia sive bono proposito hominis

utitur ad bona sive malo ad necessaria." Here and there, however, Origen

has qualified the belief in Providence, after the genuine fashion of

antiquity (see c. Gels. IV. 74).]

[Footnote 773: [Greek: Peri archôn] II. 9. 2: "Recedere a bono, non

aliud est quam effici in malo. Ceterum namque est, malum esse bono

canere. Ex quo accidit, ut in quanta mensura quis devolveretur a bono,

in tantam mensuram malitiæ deveniret." In the passage in Johann. II. 7,

Lomm. I., p. 115, we find a closely reasoned exposition of evil as

[Greek: anupostaton] and an argument to the effect that [Greek: ta

ponêra] are--[Greek: mê onta].]

[Footnote 774: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5. 3: III. 6. The devil is the

chief of the apostate angels (c. Cels. IV. 65). As a reasonable being he

is a creature of God (l.c., and in Joh. II. 7, Lomm., l.c.).]

[Footnote 775: Origen defended the teleology culminating in man against

Celsus' attacks on it; but his assumption that the spirits of men are

only a part of the universal spirit world is, as a matter of fact, quite

akin to Celsus' view. If we consider the plan of the work [Greek: peri

archôn] we easily see that to Origen humanity was merely an element in

the cosmos.]

[Footnote 776: The doctrine of man's threefold constitution is also

found in Clement. See Pædag. III. 1. 1; Strom V. 14. 94: VI. 16. 134.

(quite in the manner of Plato). Origen, who has given evidence of it in

all his main writings, sometimes calls the rational part spirit,

sometimes [Greek: psychê logikê], and at other times distinguishes two

parts in the one soul. Of course he also professes to derive his

psychology from the Holy Scriptures. The chief peculiarity of his

speculation consists in his assumption that the human spirit, as a

fallen one, became as it were a soul, and can develop from that

condition partly into a spirit as before and partly into the flesh (see

[Greek: peri archôn] III. 4. 1 sq.: II. 8. 1-5). By his doctrine of the

preëxistence of souls Origen excluded both the creation and traducian

hypotheses of the origin of the soul.]

[Footnote 777: Clement (see Strom. II. 22. 131) gives the following as

the opinion of some Christian teachers: [Greek: to men kat' eikona

eutheôs kata tên genesin eilêphenai ton anthrôpon, to kath' homoiôsin de

usteron kata tên peleiôsin mellein apolambanein]. Orig. c. Cels. IV. 30:

[Greek: epoiête d'o Theos ton anthrôpon kat' eikona Theos, all' ouchi

kath' homoiôsin êdê].]

[Footnote 778: This follows from the fundamental psychological view and

is frequently emphasised. One must attain the [Greek: sôphorsynê].]

[Footnote 779: This is emphasised throughout. The goodness of God is

shown first in his having given the creature reason and freedom, and

secondly in acts of assistance, which, however, do not endanger freedom.

Clem.; Strom. VI. 12, 96: [Greek: hêmas ex hêmôn autôn bouletai

sôzesthai].]

[Footnote 780: See above, p. 344, and p. 361, note 5. Origen continually

emphasised the universality of sin in the strongest expressions: c.

Cels. III. 61-66: VII. 50; Clem., Pæd. III. 12. 93: [Greek: to

examartanein pasin emphyton].]

[Footnote 781: See Clem., Strom. VII. 16. 101: [Greek: myriôn goun ontôn

kat' arithmon ha prassousin anthrôpoi schedon duo eisin archai pasês

hamartias, agnoia kai astheneia, amphô de eph' hêmin, tôn mête

ethelontôn manthanein mête au tês epithymias kratein]. Two remedies

correspond to this (102): [Greek: hê gnôsis te kai hê tês ek tôn graphôn

martyrias enargês apodeixis] and [Greek: hê kata logon askêsis ek

pisteôs te kai phobou paidagôgoumenê], or otherwise expressed: [Greek:

hê theôria hê epistêmonikê] and [Greek: hê praxis] which lead to perfect

love.]

[Footnote 782: Freedom is not prejudiced by the idea of election that is

found here and there, for this idea is not worked out. In Clem., Strom.

VI. 9. 76, it is said of the friend of God, the true Gnostic, that God

has destined ([Greek: proôrisen]) him to sonship before the foundation

of the world. See VII. 17. 107.]

[Footnote 783: C. Cels. III. 69.]

[Footnote 784: It is both true that men have the same freedom as Adam

and that they have the same evil instincts. Moreover, Origen conceived

the story of Adam symbolically. See c. Cels. IV. 40; [Greek: peri

archôn] IV. 16; in Levit. hom. VI. 2. In his later writings, after he

had met with the practice of child baptism in Cæsarea and prevailed on

himself to regard it as apostolic, he also assumed the existence of a

sort of hereditary sin originating with Adam, and added it to his idea

of the preëxisting Fall. Like Augustine after him, he also supposed that

there was an inherent pollution in sexual union; see in Rom. V. 9: VII.

4; in Lev. hom. VIII. 3; in Num. hom. 2 (Bigg, p. 202 f.).]

[Footnote 785: Nevertheless Origen assumes that some souls are invested

with flesh, not for their own sins, but in order to be of use to others.

See in Joh. XIII. 43 ad fin; II. 24, 25; in Matth. XII. 30.]

[Footnote 786: Origen again and again strongly urged the necessity of

divine grace.]

[Footnote 787: See on this point Bigg, pp. 207 ff., 223 f. Origen is the

father of Joachim and all spiritualists.]

[Footnote 788: See Knittel, Orig. Lehre von der Menschwerdung (Tübinger

Theologische Quartalschrift, 1872). Ramers, Orig. Lehre von der

Auferstehung des Fleisches, 1851. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, pp. 51-62.]

[Footnote 789: With regard to this point we find the same explanation in

Origen as in Irenæus and Tertullian, and also among the Valentinians, in

so far as the latter describe the redemption necessary for the Psychici.

Only, in this instance also, everything is more copious in his case,

because he availed himself of the Holy Scriptures still more than these

did, and because he left out no popular conception that seemed to have

any moral value. Accordingly he propounded views as to the value of

salvation and as to the significance of Christ's death on the cross,

with a variety and detail rivalled by no theologian before him. He was,

as Bigg (p. 209 ff.) has rightly noticed, the first Church theologian

after Paul's time that gave a detailed theology of sacrifices. We may

mention here the most important of his views. (1) The death on the cross

along with the resurrection is to be considered as a real, recognisable

victory over the demons, inasmuch as Christ (Col. II. 14) exposed the

weakness of his enemies (a very frequent aspect of the matter). (2) The

death on the cross is to be considered as an expiation offered to God.

Here Origen argued that all sins require expiation, and, conversely,

that all innocent blood has a greater or less importance according to

the value of him who gives up his life. (3) In accordance with this the

death of Christ has also a vicarious signification (see with regard to

both these conceptions the treatise Exhort, ad martyr., as well as c.

Cels. VII. 17: I. 31; in Rom. t. III. 7, 8, Lomm. VI., pp. 196-216

etc.). (4) The death of Christ is to be considered as a ransom paid to

the devil. This view must have been widely diffused in Origen's time; it

readily suggested itself to the popular idea and was further supported

by Marcionite theses. It was also accepted by Origen who united it with

the notion of a deception practised on the devil, a conception first

found among the Basilidians. By his successful temptation the devil

acquired a right over men. This right cannot be destroyed, but only

bought off. God offers the devil Christ's soul in exchange for the souls

of men. This proposal of exchange was, however, insincere, as God knew

that the devil could not keep hold of Christ's soul, because a sinless

soul could not but cause him torture. The devil agreed to the bargain

and was duped. Christ did not fall into the power of death and the

devil, but overcame both. This theory, which Origen propounded in

somewhat different fashion in different places (see Exhort ad martyr.

12; in Matth. t. XVI. 8, Lomm. IV., p. 27; t. XII. 28, Lomm. III., p.

175; t. XIII. 8, 9, Lomm. III., pp. 224-229; in Rom. II. 13, Lomm. VI.,

p. 139 sq. etc.), shows in a specially clear way the conservative method

of this theologian, who would not positively abandon any idea. No doubt

it shows at the same time how uncertain Origen was as to the

applicability of popular conceptions when he was dealing with the sphere

of the Psychici. We must here remember the ancient idea that we are not

bound to sincerity towards our enemies. (5) Christ, the God who became

flesh, is to be considered as high priest and mediator between God and

man (see de Orat. 10, 15). All the above-mentioned conceptions of

Christ's work were, moreover, worked out by Origen in such a way that

his humanity and divinity are necessary inferences from them. In this

case also he is characterised by the same mode of thought as Irenæus.

Finally, let us remember that Origen adhered as strongly as ever to the

proof from prophecy, and that he also, in not a few instances, regarded

the phrase, "it is written", as a sufficient court of appeal (see, for

example, c. Cels. II. 37). Yet, on the other hand, behind all this he

has a method of viewing things which considerably weakens the

significance of miracles and prophecies. In general it must be said that

Origen helped to drag into the Church a great many ancient (heathen)

ideas about expiation and redemption, inasmuch as he everywhere found

some Bible passage or other with which he associated them. While he

rejected polytheism and gave little countenance to people who declared:

[Greek: eusebesteroi esmen kai Theon kai ta agalmata sebontes] (Clemens

Rom., Hom. XI. 12), he had for all that a principal share in introducing

the apparatus of polytheism into the Church (see also the way in which

he strengthened angel and hero worship).]

[Footnote 790: See above, p. 342. note 1, on the idea that Christ, the

Crucified One, is of no importance to the perfect. Only the teacher is

of account in this case. To Clement and Origen, however, teacher and

mystagogue are as closely connected as they are to most Gnostics.

Christianity is [Greek: mathêsis] and [Greek: mystagôgia] and it is the

one because it is the other. But in all stages Christianity has

ultimately the same object, namely, to effect a reconciliation with God,

and deify man. See c. Cels. III. 28: [Greek: Alla gar kai tên katabasan

eis anthrôpinên physin kai eis anthrôpinas peristaseis dynamin, kai

analabousan psychên kai sôma anthrôpinon, heôrôn ek tou pisteuesthai

meta tôn theioterôn symballomenên eis sôtêrian tois pisteuousin orôsin,

ap' ekeinou êrxato theia kai anthrôpinê sunuphainesthai physis en ê

anthrôpinê tê pros to theioteron koinônia genêtai theia ouk en monô tô

Iêsou, alla kai pasi tois meta too pisteuein analambanousi bion, hon

Iêsous edidaxena].]

[Footnote 791: From this also we can very clearly understand Origen's

aversion to the early Christian eschatology. In his view the demons are

already overcome by the work of Christ. We need only point out that this

conception must have exercised a most important influence on his frame

of mind and on politics.]

[Footnote 792: Clement still advocated docetic views without

reservation. Photius (Biblioth. 109) reproached him with these ([Greek:

mê sarkôthênai ton logon alla doxai]), and they may be proved from the

Adumbrat, p. 87 (ed Zahn): "fertur in traditionibus--namely, in the Acta

of Lucius--quoniam Iohannes ipsum corpus (Christi), quod erat

extrinsecus, tangens manum suam in profunda misisse et duritiam carnis

nullo modo reluctatam esse, sed locum manui præbuisse discipuli," and

likewise from Strom. VI. 9. 71 and III. 7. 59. Clement's repudiation of

the Docetists in VII. 17. 108 does not affect the case, and the fact

that he here and there plainly called Jesus a man, and spoke of his

flesh (Pæd. II. 2. 32: Protrept. X. 110) matters just as little. This

teacher simply continued to follow the old undisguised Docetism which

only admitted the apparent reality of Christ's body. Clement expressly

declared that Jesus knew neither pain, nor sorrow, nor emotions, and

only took food in order to refute the Docetists (Strom. VI. 9. 71). As

compared with this, Docetism in Origen's case appears throughout in a

weakened form; see Bigg, p. 191.]

[Footnote 793: See the full exposition in Thomasius, Origenes, p. 203

ff. The principal passages referring to the soul of Jesus are de

princip. II. 6: IV. 31; c. Cels. II. 9. 20-25. Socrates (H. E. III. 7)

says that the conviction as to Jesus having a human soul was founded on

a [Greek: mysticê paradosis] of the Church, and was not first broached

by Origen. The special problem of conceiving Christ as a real [Greek:

theanthrôpos] in contradistinction to all the men who only possess the

presence of the Logos within them in proportion to their merits, was

precisely formulated by Origen on many occasions. See [Greek: peri

archôn] IV. 29 sq. The full divine nature existed in Christ and yet, as

before, the Logos operated wherever he wished (l.c., 30): "non ita

sentiendum est, quod omnis divinitatis eius maiestas intra brevissimi

corporis claustra conclusa est, ita ut omne verbum dei et sapientia eius

ac substantialis veritas ac vita vel a patre divulsa sit vel intra

corporis eius coercita et conscripta brevitatem nec usquam præterea

putetur operata; sed inter utrumque cauta pietatis debet esse confessio,

ut neque aliquid divinitatis in Christo defuisse credatur et nulla

penitus a paterna substantia, quæ ubique est, facta putetur esse

divisio." On the perfect ethical union of Jesus' soul with the Logos see

[Greek: peri archôn] II. 6. 3: "anima Iesu ab initio creaturæ et

deinceps inseparabiliter ei atque indissociabiliter inhærens et tota

totum recipiens atque in eius lucem splendoremque ipsa cedens facta est

cum ipso principaliter unus spiritus;" II. 6. 5: "anima Christi ita

elegit diligere iustitiam, ut pro immensitate dilectionis

inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhæreret, ita ut propositi

firmitas et affectus immensitas et dilectionis inexstinguibilis calor

omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscinderet, et quod in

arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu iam versum sit in naturam."

The sinlessness of this soul thus became transformed from a fact into a

necessity, and the real God-man arose, in whom divinity and humanity are

no longer separated. The latter lies in the former as iron in the fire

II. 6. 6. As the metal _capax est frigoris et caloris_ so the soul is

capable of deification. "Omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit,

deus est," "nec convertibilis aut mutabilis dici potest" (l.c.).

"Dilectionis merito anima Christi cum verbo dei Christus efficitur."

(II. 6. 4). [Greek: Tis mallon tês Iêsou psychês ê kan paraplêsiôs

kekollêtai tô kyriô; hoper ei houtôs echei ouk eisi duo hê psychê tou

Iêsou pros ton pasês ktiseôs prôtotokon Theon logon] (c. Cels. VI. 47).

The metaphysical foundation of the union is set forth in [Greek: peri

archôn] II. 6. 2: "Substantia animæ inter deum carnemque mediante--non

enim possibile erat dei naturam corpori sine mediatore miscere--nascitur

deus homo, illa substantia media exsistente, cui utique contra naturam

non erat corpus assumere. Sed neque rursus anima illa, utpote substantia

rationabilis, contra naturam habuit, capere deum." Even during his

historical life the body of Christ was ever more and more glorified,

acquired therefore wonderful powers, and appeared differently to men

according to their several capacities (that is a Valentinian idea, see

Exc. ex Theod. 7); cf. c. Cels. I. 32-38: II. 23, 64: IV. 15 sq.: V. 8,

9, 23. All this is summarised in III. 41: "[Greek: On men nomizomen kai

pepeismetha archêthen einai Theon kai huion Theou, outos ho autologos

esti kai hê autosophia kai hê autoalêtheia to de thnêton autou sôma kai

tên anthrôpinên en autô psychên tê pros ekeinon ou monon koinônia, alla

kai henôsei kai anakrasei, ta megista phamen proseilêphenai kai tês

ekeinou thetêtos kekoinônêkota eis Theon metabebêkenai]." Origen then

continues and appeals to the philosophical doctrine that matter has no

qualities and can assume all the qualities which the Creator wishes to

give it. Then follows the conclusion: [Greek: ei hugiê ta toiauta, ti

thaumaston, tên poiotêta tou thnêtou kata ton Iêsoun sômatos pronoia

Theou boulêthentos metabalein eis aitherion kai theian poiotêta]; The

man is now the same as the Logos. See in Joh. XXXII. 17, Lomm. II., p.

461 sq.; Hom. in Jerem. XV. 6, Lomm. XV., p. 288: [Greek: ei kai ên

anthrôpos, alla nun oudamôs estin anthrôpos].]

[Footnote 794: In c. Cels. III. 28, Origen spoke of an intermingling of

the divine and human natures, commencing in Christ (see page 368, note

1). See I. 66 fin.; IV. 15, where any [Greek: allattesthai kai

metaplattesthai] of the Logos is decidedly rejected; for the Logos does

not suffer at all. In Origen's case we may speak of a _communicatio

idiomatum_ (see Bigg, p. 190 f.).]

[Footnote 795: In opposition to Redepenning.]

[Footnote 796: This idea is found in many passages, especial in Book

III, c. 22-43, where Origen, in opposition to the fables about

deification, sought to prove that Christ is divine because he realised

the aim of founding a holy community in humanity. See, besides, the

remarkable statement in III. 38 init.]

[Footnote 797: A very remarkable distinction between the divine and

human element in Christ is found in Clement Pæd. I. 3. 7: [Greek: panta

oninêsin ho kurios kai panta ôphelei kai hôs anthrôpos kai hôs Theos, ta

men hamartêmata hôs Theos aphieis, eis de to mê examartanein paidagôgôn

hôs anthrôpos].]

[Footnote 798: "Fides in nobis; mensura fidei causa accipiendarum

gratiarum" is the fundamental idea of Clement and Origen (as of Justin);

"voluntas humana præcedit". In Ezech. hom. I. c. II: "In tua potestate

positum est, ut sis palea vel frumentum". But all growth in faith must

depend on divine help. See Orig. in Matth. series 69, Lomm. IV., p. 372:

"Fidem habenti, quæ est ex nobis, dabitur gratia fidei quæ est per

spiritum fidei, et abundabit; et quidquid habuerit quis ex naturali

creatione, cum exercuerit illud, accipit id ipsum et ex gratia dei, ut

abundet et firmior sit in eo ipso quod habet"; in Rom. IV. 5, Lomm. VI.,

p. 258 sq.; in Rom. IX. 3, Lomm VII., p. 300 sq. The fundamental idea

remains: [Greek: ho Theos hêmas ex hêmôn autôn bouletai sôzesthai.]]

[Footnote 799: This is frequent in Clement; see Orig. c. Cels. VII. 46.]

[Footnote 800: See Clem, Strom. V. I. 7: [Greek: chariti sôzometha, ouk

aneu mentoi tôn kalôn ergôn.]. VII. 7. 48: V. 12. 82, 13. 83: [Greek:

eite to en hêmin autexousiou eis gnôsin aphikomenon tagathou skirta te

kai pêda huper ta eskammena, plên ou charitos aneu tês exairetou

pteroutai te kai anistatai kai anô tôn huperkeimenôn airetai hê psychê];

The amalgamation of freedom and grace. Quis cliv. salv. 21. Orig.

[Greek: peri archôn.] III. 2. 2: In bonis rebus humanum propositum solum

per se ipsum imperfectum est ad consummationem boni, adiutorio namque

divino ad perfecta quæque peracitur. III. 2. 5, I. 18; Selecta in Ps. 4,

Lomm. XI., p. 450: [Greek: to tou logikou agathon mikton estin ek te tês

proaireseôs autou kai tês sumpneousês theias dunameôs tô ta allista

proelomenô]. The support of grace is invariably conceived as

enlightenment; but this enlightenment enables it to act on the whole

life. For a more detailed account see Landerer in the Jahrbucher fur

deutsche Theologie, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 500 ff., and Worter, _Die

christliche Lehre von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustin_, 1860.]

[Footnote 801: This goal was much more clearly described by Clement than

by Origen; but it was the latter who, in his commentary on the Song of

Solomon, gave currency to the image of the soul as the bride of the

Logos. Bigg (p. 188 f.): "Origen, the first pioneer in so many fields of

Christian thought, the father in one of his many aspects of the English

Latitudinarians, became also the spiritual ancestor of Bernard, the

Victorines, and the author of the 'De imitatione,' of Tauler and Molinos

and Madame de Guyon."]

[Footnote 802: See Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte I., p. 467.]

[Footnote 803: See e.g., Clem. Quis dives salv. 37 and especially Pædag.

I. 6. 25-32; Orig. de orat. 22 sq.--the interpretation of the Lord's

Prayer. This exegesis begins with the words: "It would be worth while to

examine more carefully whether the so-called Old Testament anywhere

contains a prayer in which God is called Father by anyone; for till now

we have found none in spite of all our seeking ... Constant and

unchangeable sonship is first given in the new covenant."]

[Footnote 804: See above, p. 339 f.]

[Footnote 805: See [Greek: peri archôn] II. 11.]

[Footnote 806: See [Greek: peri archôn] II. 10. 1-3. Origen wrote a

treatise on the resurrection, which, however, has not come down to us,

because it was very soon accounted heretical. We see from c. Cels V.

14-24 the difficulties he felt about the Church doctrine of the

resurrection of the flesh.]

[Footnote 807: See Eusebius, H. E. VI. 37.]

[Footnote 808: Orig., Hom. II. in Reg. I., Lomm. XI., p. 317 sq.]

[Footnote 809: C. Cels. V. 15: VI. 26; in Lc. Hom. XIV., Lomm. V., p.

136: "Ego puto, quod et post resurrectionem ex mortuis indigeamus

sacramento eluente nos atque purgante". Clem., Strom. VII. 6. 34:

[Greek: phamen d' êmeis agiazein to pur, ou ta krea, alla tas amartôlous

psychas, pur ou to pamphagon kai banauson, alla to phronimon legontes]

(cf. Heraclitus and the Stoa), [Greek: to duknoumenon dia psychêa tês

dierchomenês to pur]. For Origen cf. Bigg, p. 229 ff. There is another

and intermediate stage between the punishments in hell and _regnum

dei_.]

[Footnote 810: See [Greek: peri archôn] II. 10. 4-7; c. Cels. l.c.]

[Footnote 811: See [Greek: peri archôn] I. 6. 1-4: III. 6. 1-8; c. Cels.

VI. 26.]

[Footnote 812: On the seven heavens in Clem. see Strom. V. II. 77 and

other passages. Origen does not mention them, so far as I know.]

[Footnote 813: c. Cels. l.c.]

[Footnote 814: We would be more justified in trying this with Clement.]

[Footnote 815: See Bornemann, In investiganda monachatus origine quibus

de causis ratio habenda sit Origenis. Gottingæ 1885.]