without describing it. See III. 16. 6, which passage may here stand for
many. "Verbum unigenitus, qui semper humano generi adest, unitus et
consparsus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris et caro factus ipse est
Iesus Christus dominus noster, qui et passus est pro nobis et
ressurrexit propter nos.... Unus igitur deus pater, quemadmodum
ostendimus, et unus Christus Iesus domiuns noster, veniens per universam
dispositionem et omnia in semelipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est
et homo plasmatio del, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est,
invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus
comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis et verbum homo." V. 18. 1:
"Ipsum verbum dei incarnatum suspensum est super lignum."]
[Footnote 591: Here Irenæus was able to adopt the old formula "God has
suffered" and the like; so also Melito, see Otto l.c., IX. p. 416:
[Greek: ho Theos peponuen hupo dexias Israêlitidos] (p. 422): "Quidnam
est hoc novum mysterium? iudex iudicatur et quietus est; invisibilis
videtur neque erubescit: incomprehensibilis prehenditur neque
indignatur, incommensurabilis mensuratur neque repugnat; impassibilis
patitur neque ulciscitur; immortalis moritur, neque respondit verbum,
coelestis sepelitur et id fert." But let us note that these are not
"doctrines," but testimonies to the faith, as they were always worded
from the beginning and such as could, if need were, be adapted to any
Christology. Though Melito in a fragment whose genuineness is not
universally admitted (Otto, l.c., p. 415 sq.) declared in opposition to
Marcion, that Christ proved his humanity to the world in the 30 years
before his baptism; but showed the divine nature concealed in his human
nature during the 3 years of his ministry, he did not for all that mean
to imply that Jesus' divinity and humanity are in any way separated.
But, though Irenæus inveighed so violently against the "Gnostic"
separation of Jesus and Christ (see particularly III. 16. 2, where most
weight is laid on the fact that we do not find in Matth.: "Iesu
generatio sic erat" but "Christi generatio sic erat"), there is no doubt
that in some passages he himself could not help unfolding a speculation
according to which the predicates applying to the human nature of Jesus
do not also hold good of his divinity, in fact he actually betrayed a
view of Christ inconsistent with the conception of the Saviour's person
as a perfect unity. We can indeed only trace this view in his writings
in the form of an undercurrent, and what led to it will be discussed
further on. Both he and Melito, as a rule adhered to the simple "filius
dei filius hominis factus" and did not perceive any problem here,
because to them the disunion prevailing in the world and in humanity was
the difficult question that appeared to be solved through this very
divine manhood. How closely Melito agreed with Irenæus is shown not only
by the proposition (p. 419): "Propterea misit pater filium suum e coelo
sine corpore (this is said in opposition to the Valentinian view), ut,
postquam incarnatus esset in, utero virginis et natus esset homo,
vivificaret hominem et colligeret membra eius quæ mors disperserat, quum
hominem divideret," but also by the "propter hominem iudicatus est
iudex, impassibilis passus est?" (l.c.).]
[Footnote 592: The concepts employed by Irenæus are _deus_, _verbum_,
_filius dei_, _homo_, _filius hominis_, _plasma dei_. What perhaps
hindered the development of that formula in his case was the
circumstance of his viewing Christ, though he had assumed the _plasma
dei_, humanity, as a personal man who (for the sake of the
recapitulation theory) not only had a human nature but was obliged to
live through a complete human life. The fragment attributed to Irenæus
(Harvey II., p. 493) in which occur the words, [Greek: tou Theou logou
henôoei tê kath' hupostasin physikê henôthentos tê sakri], is by no
means genuine. How we are to understand the words: [Greek: hina ex
amphoterôn to periphanes tôn physeôn paradeichthê] in fragment VIII.
(Harvey II., p. 479), and whether this piece belongs to Irenæus, is
uncertain. That Melito (assuming the genuineness of the fragment) has
the formula of the two natures need excite no surprise; for (1) Melito
was also a philosopher, which Irenæus was not, and (2) it is found in
Tertullian, whose doctrines can be shown to be closely connected with
those of Melito (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 249 f.). If
that fragment is genuine Melito is the first Church teacher who has
spoken of two natures.]
[Footnote 593: See Apol. 21: "verbum caro figuratus ... homo deo
mixtus;" adv. Marc. II. 27: "filius dei miscens in semetipso hominem et
deum;" de carne 15: "homo deo mixtus;" 18: "sic homo cum deo, dum caro
hominis cum spiritu dei." On the Christology of Tertullian cf. Schulz,
Gottheit Christi, p. 74 ff.]
[Footnote 594: De carne 5: "Crucifixus est dei filius, non pudet quia
pudendum est; et mortuus est dei filius, prorsus credibile est, quia
ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossible est;"
but compare the whole book; c. 5 init.: "deus crucifixus," "nasci se
voluit deus". De pat. 3: "nasci se deus in utero patitur." The formula:
[Greek: ho gennêtheis, ho megas Theos] is also found in Sibyll. VII.
24.]
[Footnote 595: De carne I, cf. ad nat. II. 4: "ut iure consistat
collegium nominis communione substantiæ."]
[Footnote 596: De carne 18 fin.]
[Footnote 597: Adv. Prax. 27: "Sed enim invenimus illum diiecto et deum
et hominem expositum, ipso hoc psalmo suggerente (Ps. LXXXVII. 5) ...
hic erit homo et filius hominis, qui definitus est filius dei secundum
spiritum ... Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum in una
persona deum et hominem Iesum. De Christo autem differo. Et adeo salva
est utriusque proprietas substantiæ, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in
illo, id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa
sit, esuriens sub diabolo ... denique et mortua est. Quodsi tertium quid
esset, ex utroque confusum, ut electrum, non tam distincta documenta
parerent utrinsque substantiæ." In what follows the _actus utriusque
substantiæ_ are sharply demarcated: "ambæ substantiæ in statu suo quæque
distincte agebant, ideo illis et operæ et exitus sui occurrerunt ...
neque caro spiritus fit neque spiritus caro: in uno plane esse possunt."
See also c. 29: "Quamquam cum duæ substantiæ censeantur in Christo Iesu,
divina et humana, constet autem immortalem esse divinam" etc.]
[Footnote 598: Of this in a future volume. Here also two _substances_ in
Christ are always spoken of (there are virtually three, since, according
to _de anima_ 35, men have already two substances in themselves) I know
only one passage where Tertullian speaks of _natures_ in reference to
Christ, and this passage in reality proves nothing; de carne 5: "Itaque
utriusque substantiæ census hominem et deum exhibuit, hinc natum, inde
non natum (!), hinc carneum, inde spiritalem" etc. Then: "Quæ proprietas
conditionum, divinæ et humanæ, æqua utique _naturæ_ cuiusque veritate
disjuncta est."]
[Footnote 599: In the West up to the time of Leo I. the formula "deus et
homo," or, after Tertullian's time "duæ substantiæ," was always a simple
expression of the facts acknowledged in the Symbol, and not a
speculation derived from the doctrine of redemption. This is shown just
from the fact of stress being laid on the unmixedness. With this was
associated a theoretic and apologetic interest on the part of
theologians, so that they began to dwell at greater length on the
unmixedness after the appearance of that Patripassianism, which
professed to recognise the _filius dei_ in the _caro_, that is in the
_deus_ so far as he is _incarnatus_ or has _changed_ himself into flesh.
As to Tertullian's opposition to this view see what follows. In
contradistinction to this Western formula the monophysite one was
calculated to satisfy both the _salvation_ interest and the
understanding. The Chalcedonian creed, as is admitted by Schulz, l.c.,
pp. 64 ff., 71 ff., is consequently to be explained from Tertullian's
view, not from that of the Alexandrians. Our readers will excuse us for
thus anticipating.]
[Footnote 600: "Quare," says Irenæus III. 21. 10--"igitur non iterum
sumpsit limum deus sed ex Maria operatus est plasmationem fieri? Ut non
alia plasmatio fieret neque alia, esset plasmatio quæ salvaietur, sed
eadem ipsa recapitularetur, servata similitudine?"]
[Footnote 601: See de carne 18. Oehler has misunderstood the passage and
therefore mispointed it. It is as follows: "Vox ista (Joh. I. 14) quid
caro factum sit contestatur, nec tamen periclitatur, quasi statim aliud
sit (verbum), factum caro, et non verbum.... Cum scriptura non dicat
nisi quod factum sit, non et unde sit factum, ergo ex alio, non ex
semetipso suggerit factum" etc.]
[Footnote 602: Adv. Prax. 27 sq. In de carne 3 sq. and elsewhere
Tertullian indeed argues against Marcion that God in contradistinction
to all creatures can transform himself into anything and yet remain God.
Hence we are not to think of a transformation in the strict sense, but
of an _adunitio_.]
[Footnote 603: So I think I ought to express myself. It does not seem to
me proper to read a twofold conception into Irenæus' Christological
utterances under the pretext that Christ according to him was also the
perfect man, with all the modern ideas that are usually associated with
this thought (Bohringer, l.c., p. 542 ff., see Thomasius in opposition
to him).]
[Footnote 604: See, e.g., V. 1. 3. Nitzch, Dogmengeschichte I. p. 309.
Tertullian, in his own peculiar fashion, developed still more clearly
the thought transmitted to him by Irenæus. See adv. Prax. 12: "Quibus
faciebat deus hominem similem? Filio quidem, qui erat induturus
hominem.... Erat autem ad cuius imaginem faciebat, ad filii scilicet,
qui homo futurus certior et verior imaginem suam fecerat dici hominem,
qui tunc de limo formari habebat, imago veri et similitudo." Adv. Marc.
V. 8: "Creator Christum, sermonem suum, intuens hominem futurum,
Faciamus, inquit, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram"; the
same in de resurr. 6. But with Tertullian, too, this thought was a
sudden idea and did not become the basis of further speculation.]
[Footnote 605: Iren. IV. 14. 2; for further particulars on the point see
below, where Irenæus' views on the preparation of salvation are
discussed. The views of Dorner, l.c., 492 f., that the union of the Son
of God with humanity was a gradual process, are marred by some
exaggerations, but are correct in their main idea.]
[Footnote 606: "Secundum id quod verbum dei homo erat ex radice lesse et
filius Abrabæ, secunum hoc requiescebat spiritus dei super eum ...
secundum autem quod deus erat, non secundum gloriam iudicabat." All that
Irenæus said of the Spirit in reference to the person of Christ is to be
understood merely as an _exegetical_ necessity and must not be regarded
as a theoretical _principle_ (this is also the case with Tertullian).
Dorner (l.c., p. 492 f.) has failed to see this, and on the basis of
Irenæus' incidental and involuntary utterances has attempted to found a
speculation which represents the latter as meaning that the Holy Ghost
was the medium which gradually united the Logos, who was exalted above
growing and suffering, into one person with the free and growing man in
Jesus Christ. In III. 12. 5-7 Irenæus, in conformity with Acts IV. 27:
X. 38, used the following other formulæ about Christ: [Greek: ho Theos,
ho poiêsas ton ouranon k.t.l., kai ho toutou pais, on echrisen ho
Theos]--"Petrus Iesum ipsum esse filium dei testificatus est, qui et
unctus Spiritu Sancto Iesus dicitur." But Irenæus only expressed himself
thus because of these passages, whereas Hippolytus not unfrequently
calls Christ [Greek: pais Theos].]
[Footnote 607: On Hippolytus' views of the incarnation see Dorner, l.c.,
I. p. 609 ff.--an account to be used with caution--and Overbeck, Quæst.
Hippol. Specimen (1864), p. 47 sq. Unfortunately the latter has not
carried out his intention to set forth the Christology of Hippolytus in
detail. In the work quoted he has, however, shown how closely the latter
in many respects has imitated Irenæus in this case also. It is
instructive to see what Hippolytus has not adopted from Irenæus or what
has become rudimentary with him. As a professional and learned teacher
he is at bottom nearer to the Apologists as regards his Christology than
Irenæus. As an exegete and theological author he has much in common with
the Alexandrians, just as he is in more than one respect a connecting
link between Catholic controversialists like Irenæus and Catholic
scholars like Origen. With the latter he moreover came into personal
contact. See Hieron., de vir. inl. 61: Hieron., ep. ad Damas. edit.
Venet. I., ep. 36 is also instructive. These brief remarks are, however,
by no means intended to give countenance to Kimmel's untenable
hypothesis (de Hippol. vita et scriptis, 1839) that Hippolytus was an
Alexandrian. In Hippolytus' treatise c. Noët. we find positive teachings
that remind us of Tertullian. An important passage is de Christo et
Antichristo 3 f.: [Greek: eis gar kai ho tou Theou] (Iren.), [Greek: di'
ou kai hêmeis tuchontes tên dia tou hagiou pneumatos anagennesin eis ena
teleion kai epouranion anthrôpon hoi pantes katantêsai epithumoumen]
(see Iren.) [Greek: Epeidê gar ho logos tou Theou asarkos ôn] (see
Melito, Iren., Tertull.) [Greek: enedusato tên hagian sarka ek tês
hagias parthenou; hôs numphios himation exuphanas heautô ên tô staurikô
pathei] (Irenæus and Tertullian also make the death on the cross the
object of the assumption of the flesh), [Greek: hopôs sygkerasas to
thnêton hemôn sôma tê heautou dunamei kai mixas] (Iren., Tertull.)
[Greek: tô aphthartô to phtharton kai to asthenes tô ischurô sôse ton
apollumenon anthrôpon] (Iren.). The succeeding disquisition deserves
particular note, because it shows that Hippolytus has also borrowed from
Irenæus the idea that the union of the Logos with humanity had already
begun in a certain way in the prophets. Overbeck has rightly compared
the [Greek: anaplassein di' heutou ton Adam] l.c., c. 26, with the
[Greek: anakephalaioun] of Irenæus and l.c., c. 44, with Iren. II. 22,
4. For Hippolytus' Christology Philosoph. X. 33, p. 542 and c. Noet. 10
ff. are the chief passages of additional importance. In the latter
passage it is specially noteworthy that Hippolytus, in addition to many
other deviations from Irenæus and Tertullian, insists on applying the
full name of Son only to the incarnate Logos. In this we have a remnant
of the more ancient idea and at the same time a concession to his
opponents who admitted an eternal Logos in God, but not a pre-temporal
hypostasis of the Son. See c. 15: [Greek: poion oun huion heautou ho
Theos dia tês sarkos katepempsen all' hê ton logon; hon huion
prosêgoreue dia to mellein auton genesthai, kai to koinon onoma tês eis
anthrôpous philostorgias analambanei ho huios (kaitoi teleios logos ôn
monogenes). oud' hê sarx kath' heautên dicha tou logou hupostênai
êdunato dia to en logô tên sustasin echein houtôs oun eis huios teleios
Theou ephanerôthê.] Hippolytus partook to a much greater extent than his
teacher Irenæus of the tree of Greek knowledge and he accordingly speaks
much more frequently than the latter of the "divine mysteries" of the
faith. From the fragments and writings of this author that are preserved
to us the existence of very various Christologies can be shown; and this
proves that the Christology of his teacher Irenæus had not by any means
yet become predominant in the Church, as we might suppose from the
latter's confident tone. Hippolytus is an exegete and accordingly still
yielded with comparative impartiality to the impressions conveyed by the
several passages. For example he recognised the woman of Rev. XII. as
the Church and the Logos as her child, and gave the following exegesis
of the passage (de Christo et Antichristo 61): [Greek: ou pausetai hê
ekklêsia gennôsa ek kardias ton logon tou en kosmô hupo apistôn
diôkomenon. "kai eteke", phêsin, "huion arrena, hos mellei poimainein
panta ta ethnê", ton arrena kai teleios Christon, paida Theou, Theon kai
anthrôpon katangellomenon aei tiktousa hê ekklêsia didaskei panta ta
ethnê.] If we consider how Irenæus' pupil is led by the text of the Holy
Scriptures to the most diverse "doctrines," we see how the "Scripture"
theologians were the very ones who threatened the faith with the
greatest corruptions. As the exegesis of the Valentinian schools became
the mother of numerous self-contradictory Christologies, so the same
result was threatened here--"doctrinæ inolescentes in silvas iam
exoleverunt Gnosticorum." From this standpoint Origen's undertaking to
subject the whole material of Biblical exegesis to a fixed theory
appears in its historical greatness and importance.]
[Footnote 608: See other passages on p. 241, note 2. This is also
reëchoed in Cyprian. See, for example, ep. 58. 6: "filius dei passus est
ut nos filios dei faceret, et filius hominis (scil. the Christians) pati
non vult esse dei filius possit."]
[Footnote 609: See III. 10. 3.]
[Footnote 610: See the remarkable passage in IV. 36. 7: [Greek: hê
gnôsis tou huiou tou Theou, hêtis ên aphtharsia.] Another result of the
Gnostic struggle is Irenæus' raising the question as to what new thing
the Lord has brought (IV. 34. 1): "Si autem subit vos huiusmodi sensus,
ut dicatis: Quid igitur novi dominus attulit veniens? cognoscite,
quoniam omnem novitatem attulit semetipsum afferens, qui fuerat
annuntiatus." The new thing is then defined thus: "Cum perceperunt eam
quæ ab eo est libertatem et participant visionem eius et audierunt
sermones eius et fruiti sunt muneribus ab eo, non iam requiretur, quid
novius attulit rex super eos, qui annuntiaverunt advenum eius ...
Semetipsum enim attulit et ea quæ prædicta sunt bona."]
[Footnote 611: See IV. 36. 6: "Adhuc manifestavit oportere nos cum
vocatione (i.e., [Greek: meta tên klêsin]) et iustitiæ operibus
adornari, uti requiescat super nos spiritus dei"--we must provide
_ourselves_ with the wedding garment.]
[Footnote 612: The incapacity of man is referred to in III. 18. 1: III.
21. 10; III. 21-23 shows that the same man that had fallen had to be led
to communion with God; V. 21. 3: V. 24. 4 teach that man had to overcome
the devil; the intrinsic necessity of God's appearing as Redeemer is
treated of in III. 23. 1: "Si Adam iam non reverteretur ad vitam, sed in
totum proiectus esset morti, victus esset deus et superasset serpentis
nequitia voluntatem dei. Sed quoniam deus invictus et magnanimis est,
magnanimem quidem se exhibuit etc." That the accomplishment of salvation
must be effected in a righteous manner, and therefore be as much a proof
of the righteousness as of the immeasurable love and mercy of God, is
shown in V. 1. 1: V. 21.]
[Footnote 613: Irenæus demonstrated the view in V. 21 in great detail.
According to his ideas in this chapter we must include the history of
the temptation in the _regula fidei_.]
[Footnote 614: See particularly V. 1. 1: "Verbum potens et homo verus
sanguine suo rationabiliter redimens nos, redemptionem semetipsum dedit
pro his, qui in captivitatem ducti sunt ... del verbum non deficiens in
sua iustitia, iuste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam, ea
quæ sunt sua redimens ab ea, non cum vi, quemadmodum ilia initio
dominabatur nostri, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabiliter rapiens, sed
secundum suadelam, quemadmodum decebat deum suadentem et non vim
inferentem, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod est iustum confringeretur
neque antiqua plasmatio dei deperiret." We see that the idea of the
blood of Christ as ransom does not possess with Irenæus the value of a
fully developed theory, but is suggestive of one. But even in this form
it appeared suspicious and, in fact, a Marcionite idea to a Catholic
teacher of the 3rd century. Pseudo-Origen (Adamantius) opposed it by the
following argument (De recta in deum fide, edit Wetstein 1673, Sectio I.
p. 38 sq. See Rufinus' translation in Caspari's Kirchenhistorische
Anecdota Vol. I. 1883, p. 34 sq., which in many places has preserved the
right sense): [Greek: Ton priômenon ephês, einai ton Christon, ho
peprakôs tis estin; êlthen eis se ho aplous mythos; hoti ho pôlôn kai ho
agorazôn adelphoi eisin; ei kakos ôn ho diabolos tô agathô pepraken, ouk
esti kakos alla agathos; ho gar ap' archês phthonêsas tô anthrôpô, nun
ouk eti hupo phthonou agetai, tô agathô tên nomên paradous. estai oun
dikaios ho tou phthonou kai pantos kakou pausamenos. autos goun ho Theos
heurisketai pôlêsas; mallon de hoi hêmartêkotes heautous apêllotriôsan
hoi anthrôpoi dia tas hamartias autôn; palin de elutrôthêsan dia tên
eusplagchnian autou. touto gar phêsin ho prophêtês; Tais hamartiais
humôn eprathête kai tais anomiais exapesteila tên mêtera humôn. Kai
allos palin; Dôrean eprathête, kai ou meta argyriou lutrôthêsesthe. to,
oude meta argyriou; dêlonoti, tou haimatos tou Christou. touto gar
phaskei ho prophêtês] (Isaiah, LIII. 5 follows). [Greek: Eikos de hoti
kata se epriato dous heautou to haima; pôs oun kai ek nekrôn êgeireto;
ei gar ho labôn tên timên tôn anthrôpôn, to haima, apedôken, ouketi
epôlêsen. Ei de mê apedôke, pôs anestê Christos, ouketi oun to, Exousian
echô theinai kai exousian echô labein, histatai; ho goun diabolos
katechei to haima tou Christou anti tês timês tôn anthrôpôn; pollê
blasphêmios anoia! Pheu tôn kakôn! Apethanen, anestê hôs dunatos;
ethêken ho elaben; autê poia prasis; tou prophêtou legontos; Anastêtô ho
Theos kai diaskorpisthêtôsan hoi echthroi autou, Opou anastasis, ekei
thanatos!] That is an argument as acute as it is true and victorious.]
[Footnote 615: See Iren. V. 2, 3, 16. 3, 17-4. In III. 16. 9 he says:
"Christus per passionem reconciliavit nos deo." It is moreover very
instructive to compare the way in which Irenæus worked out the
recapitulation theory with the old proof from prophecy ("this happened
that the Scripture might be fulfilled"). Here we certainly have an
advance; but at bottom the recapitulation theory may also be conceived
as a modification of that proof.]
[Footnote 616: See, e.g., IV. 5. 4: [Greek: prothumôs Abraam ton idion
monogenê kai agapêton parachôrêsas thusian tô Theô, hina kai ho Theos
eudokêsê huper tou spermatos autou pantos ton idion monogenê kai
agapêton huion thusian paraschein eis lutrôsin hêmeteran].]
[Footnote 617: There are not a few passages where Irenæus said that
Christ has annihilated sin, abolished Adam's disobedience, and
introduced righteousness through his obedience (III. 18. 6, 7: III. 20.
2: V. 16-21); but he only once tried to explain how that is to be
conceived (III. 18. 7), and then merely reproduced Paul's thoughts.]
[Footnote 618: Irenæus has no hesitation in calling the Christian who
has received the Spirit of God the perfect, the spiritual one, and in
representing him, in contrast to the false Gnostic, as he who in truth
judges all men, Jews, heathen, Marcionites, and Valentinians, but is
himself judged by no one; see the great disquisition in IV. 33 and V. 9.
10. This true Gnostic, however, is only to be found where we meet with
right faith in God the Creator, sure conviction with regard to the
God-man Jesus Christ, true knowledge as regards the Holy Spirit and the
economy of salvation, the apostolic doctrine, the right Church system in
accordance with the episcopal succession, the intact Holy Scripture, and
its uncorrupted text and interpretation (IV. 33. 7, 8). To him the true
believer is the real Gnostic.]
[Footnote 619: See IV. 22. In accordance with the recapitulation theory
Christ must also have descended to the lower world. There he announced
forgiveness of sins to the righteous, the patriarchs and prophets (IV.
27. 2). For this, however, Irenæus was not able to appeal to Scripture
texts, but only to statements of a presbyter. It is nevertheless
expressly asserted, on the authority of Rom. III. 23, that these
pre-Christian just men also could only receive justification and the
light of salvation through the arrival of Christ among them.]
[Footnote 620: See III. 16. 6: "In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio
dei; et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis
visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et
impassibilis passibilis, et verbum homo, universa in semetipsum
recapitulans, uti sicut in supercaelestibus et spiritalibus et
invisibilibus princeps est verbum dei, sic et in visibilibus et
corporalibus principatum habeat, in semetipsum primatum assumens et
apponens semetipsum caput ecclesiæ, universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto
in tempore."]
[Footnote 621: There are innumerable passages where Tertullian has urged
that the whole work of Christ is comprised in the death on the cross,
and indeed that this death was the aim of Christ's mission. See, e.g.,
de pat. 3: "Taceo quod figitur; in hoc enim venerat"; de bapt. II: "Mors
nostra dissolvi non potuit, nisi domini passione, nee vita restitui sine
resurrectione ipsius"; adv. Marc. III. 8: "Si mendacium deprehenditur
Christi caro... nec passiones Christi fidem merebuntur. Eversum est
igitur totum dei opus. Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus,
mors Christi, negatur, quam iam impresse apostolus demendat, utique
veram, summum eam fundamentum evangelii constituens et salutis nostræ et
prædictionis suae," 1 Cor. XV. 3, 4; he follows Paul here. But on the
other hand he has also adopted from Irenæus the mystical conception of
redemption--the constitution of Christ is the redemption--though with a
rationalistic explanation. See adv. Marc. II. 27: "filius miscens in
semetipso hominem et deum, ut tantum homini conferat, quantum deo
detrahit. Conversabatur deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur. Ex æquo
agebat deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum deo posset." Here
therefore the meaning of the divine manhood of the Redeemer virtually
amounts to divine teaching. In de resurr. 63 Christ is called
"fidelissimus sequester dei et hominum, qui et homini deum et hominem
deo reddet." Note the future tense. It is the same with Hippolytus who
in Philos. X. 34 represents the deification of men as the aim of
redemption, but at the same time merely requires Christ as the lawgiver
and teacher: "[Greek: Kai tauta men ekpheuxê Theon ton onta didachtheis,
exeis de athanaton to sôma kai aphtharton hama psychê, basileian ouranôn
apolêpsê, ho en gê bious kai epouranion basilea epignous, esê de
homilêtês Theou kai sygklêronomos Christou, ouk epithymiais ê pathesi
kai nosois douloumenos. Gegonas gar Theos hosa gar hupemeinas pathê
anthrôpos ôn, tauta edidou, hoti anthrôpos eis, hosa de parakolouthei
Theô, tauta parechein epêngeltai Theos, hoti etheopoiêthês, athanatos
gennêtheis. Toutesti to Gnôthi seauton, epignous tou pepoiêkota Thoen.
To gar epignônai heauton epignôsthênai symbebêke tô kaloumenô hup'
autou. Mê philechthrêsête toinun heautois, anthrôpoi, mêde to
palindromein distasête. Christos gar estin ho kata pantôn Theos, os tên
hamartian ex anthrôpôn apoplunein proetaxe, neon ton palaion anthrôpon
apotelôn, eikona touton kalesas ap' archês, dia tupou tên eis se
epideiknumenos storgên, ou prostagmasin hupakousas semnois, kai agathou
agathos genomenos mimêtês, esê homoios hup' autou timêtheis. Ou gar
ptôcheuei Theos kai se Theon poiêsas eis doxan autou]." It is clear that
with a conception like this, which became prevalent in the 3rd century,
Christ's death on the cross could have no proper significance; nothing
but the Holy Scriptures preserved its importance. We may further remark
that Tertullian used the expression "satisfacere deo" about men (see,
e.g., de bapt. 20; de pud. 9), but, so far as I know, not about the work
of Christ. This expression is very frequent in Cyprian (for penances),
and he also uses it about Christ. In both writers, moreover, we find
"meritum" (_e.g._, Scorp. 6) and "promereri deum". With them and with
Novatian the idea of "culpa" is also more strongly emphasised than it is
by the Eastern theologians. Cf. Novatian de trin. 10: "quoniam cum caro
et sanguis non obtinere regnum dei scribitur, non carnis substantia
damnata est, quæ divinis manibus ne periret, exstructa est, sed sola
carnis _culpa_ merito reprehensa est." Tertullian de bapt. 5 says:
"Exempto reatu eximitur et poena." On the other hand he speaks of
fasting as "officia humiliationis", through which we can "inlicere" God.
Among these Western writers the thought that God's anger must be
appeased both by sacrifices and corresponding acts appears in a much
more pronounced form than in Irenæus. This is explained by their ideas
as practical churchmen and by their actual experiences in communities
that were already of a very secular character. We may, moreover, point
out in a general way that the views of Hippolytus are everywhere more
strictly dependent on Scripture texts than those of Irenæus. That many
of the latter's speculations are not found in Hippolytus is simply
explained by the fact that they have no clear scriptural basis; see
Overbeck, Quæst, Hippol., Specimen p. 75, note 29. On a superficial
reading Tertullian seems to have a greater variety of points of view
than Irenæus; he has in truth fewer, he contrived to work the grains of
gold transmitted to him in such a way as to make the form more valuable
than the substance. But one idea of Tertullian, which is not found in
Irenæus, and which in after times was to attain great importance in the
East (after Origen's day) and in the West (after the time of Ambrosius),
may be further referred to. We mean the notion that Christ is the
bridegroom and the human soul (and also the human body) the bride. This
theologoumenon owes its origin to a combination of two older ones, and
subsequently received its Biblical basis from the Song of Solomon. The
first of these older theologoumena is the Greek philosophical notion
that the divine Spirit is the bridegroom and husband of the human soul.
See the Gnostics (e.g., the sublime description in the Excerpta ex
Theodoto 27); Clem. ep. ad Jacob. 4. 6; as well as Tatian, Orat. 13;
Tertull., de anima 41 fin.: "Sequitur animam nubentem spiritui caro; o
beatum connubium"; and the still earlier Sap. Sal. VIII. 2 sq. An
offensively realistic form of this image is found in Clem. Horn. III.
27: [Greek: numphê gar estin ho pas anthrôpos, hopotan tou alêthous
prophêtou leukô logô alêtheias speiromenos phôtizêtai ton noun.] The
second is the apostolic notion that the Church is the bride and the body
of Christ. In the 2nd Epistle of Clement the latter theologoumenon is
already applied in a modified form. Here it is said that humanity as the
Church, that is human nature (the flesh), belongs to Christ as his Eve
(c. 14; see also Ignat. ad Polyc. V. 2; Tertull. de monog. II, and my
notes on [Greek: Didachê] XI. 11). The conclusion that could be drawn
from this, and that seemed to have a basis in certain utterances of
Jesus, viz., that the individual human soul together with the flesh is
to be designated as the bride of Christ, was, so far as I know, first
arrived at by Tertullian de resurr. 63: "Carnem et spiritum iam in
semetipso Christus foederavit, sponsam sponso et sponsum spousæ;
comparavit. Nam et si animam quis contenderit sponsam, vel dotis nomine
sequetur animam caro ... Caro est sponsa, quæ in Christo spiritum
sponsum per sanguinem pacta est"; see also de virg. vel. 16. Notice,
however, that Tertullian continually thinks of all souls together (all
flesh together) rather than of the individual soul.]
[Footnote 622: By the _regula_ inasmuch as the words "from thence he
will come to judge the quick and the dead" had a fixed place in the
confessions, and the belief in the _duplex adventus Christi_ formed one
of the most important articles of Church belief in contradistinction to
Judaism and Gnosticism (see the collection of passages in Hesse, "das
Muratorische Fragment", p. 112 f.). But the belief in the return of
Christ to this world necessarily involved the hope of a kingdom of glory
under Christ upon earth, and without this hope is merely a rhetorical
flourish.]
[Footnote 623: Cf. here the account already given in Book I., chap. 3,
Vol. I., p. 167 ff., Book I., chap. 4, Vol. I, p. 261, Book II., chap.
3, Vol. I, p. 105 f. On Melito compare the testimony of Polycrates in
Eusebius, H. E. V. 24. 5, and the title of his lost work "[Greek: peri
tou diabolou kai tês apokalupseôs Iôannou]." Chiliastic ideas are also
found in the epistle from Lyons in Eusebius, H. E. V. 1 sq. On
Hippolytus see his work "de Christo et Antichristo" and Overbeck's
careful account (l.c., p. 70 sq.) of the agreement here existing between
Irenæus and Hippolytus as well as of the latter's chiliasm on which
unfounded doubts have been cast. Overbeck has also, in my opinion, shown
the probability of chiliastic portions having been removed at a later
period both from Hippolytus' book and the great work of Irenæus. The
extensive fragments of Hippolytus' commentary on Daniel are also to be
compared (and especially the portions full of glowing hatred to Rome
lately discovered by Georgiades). With reference to Tertullian compare
particularly the writings adv. Marc. III., adv. Jud., de resurrectione
carnis, de anima, and the titles of the subsequently suppressed writings
de paradiso and de spe fidelium. Further see Commodian, Carmen apolog.,
Lactantius, Instit. div., I. VII., Victorinus, Commentary on the
Apocalypse. It is very remarkable that Cyprian already set chiliasm
aside; cf. the conclusion of the second Book of the Testimonia and the
few passages in which he quoted the last chapters of Revelation. The
Apologists were silent about chiliastic hopes, Justin even denied them
in Apol. I. 11, but, as we have remarked, he gives expression to them in
the Dialogue and reckons them necessary to complete orthodoxy. The
Pauline eschatology, especially several passages in 1 Cor. XV. (see
particularly verse 50), caused great difficulties to the Fathers from
Justin downwards. See Fragm. Justini IV. a Methodic supped. in Otto,
Corp. Apol. III., p. 254, Iren. V. 9, Tertull. de resurr. 48 sq.
According to Irenæus the heretics, who completely abandoned the
early-Christian eschatology, appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 50. The idea of a
kind of purgatory--a notion which does not originate with the realistic
but with the philosophical eschatology--is quite plainly found in
Tertullian, e.g., in de anima 57 and 58 ("modicum delictum illuc
luendum"). He speaks in several passages of stages and different places
of bliss; and this was a universally diffused idea (e.g., Scorp. 6).]
[Footnote 624: Irenæus begins with the resurrection of the body and the
proofs of it (in opposition to Gnosticism). These proofs are taken from
the omnipotence and goodness of God, the long life of the patriarchs,
the translation of Enoch and Elijah, the preservation of Jonah and of
the three men in the fiery furnace, the essential nature of man as a
temple of God to which the body also belongs, and the resurrection of
Christ (V. 3-7). But Irenæus sees the chief proof in the incarnation of
Christ, in the dwelling of the Spirit with its gifts in us (V. 8-16),
and in the feeding of our body with the holy eucharist (V. 2. 3). Then
he discusses the defeat of Satan by Christ (V. 21-23), shows that the
powers that be are set up by God, that the devil therefore manifestly
lies in arrogating to himself the lordship of the world (V. 24), but
that he acts as a rebel and robber in attempting to make himself master
of it. This brings about the transition to Antichrist. The latter is
possessed of the whole power of the devil, sums up in himself therefore
all sin and wickedness, and pretends to be Lord and God. He is described
in accordance with the Apocalypses of Daniel and John as well as
according to Matth. XXIV. and 2nd Thessalonians. He is the product of
the 4th Kingdom, that is, the Roman empire; but at the same time springs
from the tribe of Dan (V. 30. 2), and will take up his abode in
Jerusalem etc. The returning Christ will destroy him, and the Christ
will come back when 6000 years of the world's history have elapsed; for
"in as many days as the world was made, in so many thousands of years
will it be ended" (V. 28. 3). The seventh day is then the great world
Sabbath, during which Christ will reign with the saints of the first
resurrection after the destruction of Antichrist. Irenæus expressly
argued against such "as pass for orthodox, but disregard the order of
the progress of the righteous and know no stages of preparation for
incorruptibility" (V. 31). By this he means such as assume that after
death souls immediately pass to God. On the contrary he argues that
these rather wait in a hidden place for the resurrection which takes
place on the return of Christ, after which the souls receive back their
bodies and men now restored participate in the Saviour's Kingdom (V. 31.
2). This Kingdom on earth precedes the universal judgment; "for it is
just that they should also receive the fruits of their patience in the
same creation in which they suffered tribulation"; moreover, the promise
made to Abraham that Palestine would be given to him and to his seed,
i.e., the Christians, must be fulfilled (V. 32). There they will eat and
drink with the Lord in the restored body (V. 33. 1) sitting at a table
covered with food (V. 33. 2) and consuming the produce of the land,
which the earth affords in miraculous fruitfulness. Here Irenæus appeals
to alleged utterances of the Lord of which he had been informed by
Papias (V. 33. 3, 4). The wheat will be so fat that lions lying
peacefully beside the cattle will be able to feed themselves even on the
chaff (V. 33. 3, 4). Such and similar promises are everywhere to be
understood in a literal sense. Irenæus here expressly argues against any
figurative interpretation (ibid, and V. 35). He therefore adopted the
whole Jewish eschatology, the only difference being that he regards the
Church as the seed of Abraham. The earthly Kingdom is then followed by
the second resurrection, the general judgment, and the final end.]
[Footnote 625: Hippolytus in the lost book [Greek: hyper tou kata
Iôannên euangeliou kai apokalupseôs]. Perhaps we may also reckon Melito
among the literary defenders of Chiliasm.]
[Footnote 626: See Epiph., H. 51, who here falls back on Hippolytus.]
[Footnote 627: In the Christian village communities of the district of
Arsinoe the people would not part with chiliasm, and matters even went
the length of an "apostasy" from the Alexandrian Church. A book by an
Egyptian bishop, Nepos, entitled "Refutation of the allegorists"
attained the highest repute. "They esteem the law and the prophets as
nothing, neglect to follow the Gospels, think little of the Epistles of
the Apostles, and on the contrary declare the doctrine set forth in this
book to be a really great secret. They do not permit the simpler
brethren among us to obtain a sublime and grand idea of the glorious and
truly divine appearance of our Lord, of our resurrection from the dead
as well as of the union and assimilation with him; but they persuade us
to hope for things petty, perishable, and similar to the present in the
kingdom of God." So Dionysius expressed himself, and these words are
highly characteristic of his own position and that of his opponents; for
in fact the whole New Testament could not but be thrust into the
background in cases where the chiliastic hopes were really adhered to.
Dionysius asserts that he convinced these Churches by his lectures; but
chiliasm and material religious ideas were still long preserved in the
deserts of Egypt. They were cherished by the monks; hence Jewish
Apocalypses accepted by Christians are preserved in the Coptic and
Ethiopian languages.]
[Footnote 628: See Irenæus lib. IV. and Tertull. adv. Marc. lib. II. and
III.]
[Footnote 629: It would be superfluous to quote passages here; two may
stand for all Iren. IV. 9. 1: "Utraque testamenta unus et idem
paterfamilias produxit, verbum dei, dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui
et Abrahæ et Moysi collocutus est." Both Testaments are "unius et emsdem
substantiæ." IV. 2. 3: "Moysis literæ sunt verba Christi."]
[Footnote 630: See Iren. IV. 31. 1.]
[Footnote 631: Iren. III. 12. 15 (on Gal. II. 11 f.): "Sic apostoli,
quos universi actus et universæ doctrinæ dominus testes fecit, religiose
agebant circa dispositionem legis, qnæ; est secundum Moysem, ab uno et
eodem significantes esse deo"; see Overbeck "Ueber die Auffassung des
Streits des Paulus mit Petrus bei den Kirchenvatern," 1877, p. 8 f.
Similar remarks are frequent in Irenæus.]
[Footnote 632: Cf., e.g., de monog. 7: "Certe sacerdotes sumus a Christo
vocati, monogarniæ debitores, ex pristina dei lege, quæ nos tune in suis
sacerdotibus prophetavit." Here also Tertullian's Montanism had an
effect. Though conceiving the directions of the Paraclete as _new
legislation_, the Montanists would not renounce the view that these laws
were in some way already indicated in the written documents of
revelation.]
[Footnote 633: Very much may be made out with regard to this from
Origen's works and the later literature, particularly from Commodian and
the Apostolic Constitutions, lib. I.-VI.]
[Footnote 634: Where Christians needed the proof from prophecy or
indulged in a devotional application of the Old Testament, everything
indeed remained as before, and every Old Testament passage was taken for
a Christian one, as has remained the case even to the present day.]
[Footnote 635: With the chiliastic view of history this newly acquired
theory has nothing in common.]
[Footnote 636: Iren. III. 12. 11.]
[Footnote 637: See III. 12. 12.]
[Footnote 638: No _commutatio agnitionis_ takes place, says Irenæus, but
only an increased gift (IV. 11. 3); for the knowledge of God the Creator
is "principium evangelli." (III. 11. 7).]
[Footnote 639: See IV. 11. 2 and other passages, e.g., IV. 20 7: IV. 26.
1: IV. 37. 7: IV. 38. 1-4.]
[Footnote 640: Several covenants I. 10. 3; four covenants (Adam, Noah,
Moses, Christ) III. II. 8; the two Testaments (Law and New Covenant) are
very frequently mentioned.]
[Footnote 641: This is very frequently mentioned; see e.g., IV. 13. 1:
"Et quia dominus naturalia legis, per quæ homo iustificatur, quæ etiam
ante legisdationem custodiebant qui fide iustificabantur et placebant
deo non dissolvit etc." IV. 15, 1.]
[Footnote 642: Irenæus, as a rule, views the patriarchs as perfect
saints; see III. II. 8: "Verbum dei illis quidem qui ante Moysem fuerunt
patriarchis secundum divinitatem et gloriam colloquebatur", and
especially IV. 16. 3. As to the Son's having descended from the
beginning and having thus appeared to the patriarchs also, see IV. 6. 7.
Not merely Abraham but all the other exponents of revelation knew both
the Father and the Son. Nevertheless Christ was also obliged to descend
to the lower world to the righteous, the prophets, and the patriarchs,
in order to bring them forgiveness of sins (IV. 27. 2).]
[Footnote 643: On the contrary he agrees with the teachings of a
presbyter, whom he frequently quotes in the 4th Book. To Irenæus the
heathen are simply idolaters who have even forgotten the law written in
the heart; wherefore the Jews stand much higher, for they only lacked
the _agnitio filii_. See III. 5. 3: III. 10. 3: III. 12. 7, IV. 23, 24.
Yet there is still a great want of clearness here. Irenæus cannot get
rid of the following contradictions. The pre-Christian righteous know
the Son and do not know him; they require the appearance of the Son and
do not require it; and the _agnitio filii_ seems sometimes a new, and in
fact the decisive, _veritas_, and sometimes that involved in the
knowledge of God the Creator.]
[Footnote 644: Irenæus IV. 16. 3. See IV. 15. 1: "Decalogum si quis non
fecerit, non habet salutem".]
[Footnote 645: As the Son has manifested the Father from of old, so also
the law, and indeed even the ceremonial law, is to be traced back to
him. See IV. 6. 7: IV. 12. 4: IV. 14. 2: "his qui inquieti erant in
eremo dans aptissimam legem ... per omnes transiens verbum omni
conditioni congruentem et aptam legem conscribens". IV. 4. 2. The law is
a law of bondage; it was just in that capacity that it was necessary;
see IV. 4. 1: IV. 9. 1: IV. 13. 2, 4: IV. 14. 3: IV. 15: IV. 16: IV. 32:
IV. 36. A part of the commandments are concessions on account of
hardness of heart (IV. 15. 2). But Irenæus still distinguishes very
decidedly between the "people" and the prophets. This is a survival of
the old view. The prophets he said knew very well of the coming of the
Son of God and the granting of a new covenant (IV. 9. 3: IV. 20. 4, 5:
IV. 33. 10); they understood what was typified by the ceremonial law,
and to them accordingly the law had only a typical signification.
Moreover, Christ himself came to them ever and anon through the
prophetic spirit. The preparation for the new covenant is therefore
found in the prophets and in the typical character of the old. Abraham
has this peculiarity, that both Testaments were prefigured in him: the
Testament of faith, because he was justified before his circumcision,
and the Testament of the law. The latter occupied "the middle times",
and therefore come in between (IV. 25. 1). This is a Pauline thought,
though otherwise indeed there is not much in Irenæus to remind us of
Paul, because he used the moral categories, _growth_ and _training_,
instead of the religious ones, _sin_ and _grace_.]
[Footnote 646: The law, i.e., the ceremonial law, reaches down to John,
IV. 4. 2. The New Testament is a law of freedom, because through it we
are adopted as sons of God, III. 5. 3: III. 10. 5: III. 12. 5: III. 12.
14: III. 15. 3: IV. 9. 1, 2: IV. 11. 1: IV. 13. 2, 4: IV. 15. 1, 2: IV.
16. 5: IV. 18: IV. 32: IV. 34. 1: IV. 36. 2. Christ did not abolish the
_natus alia legis_, the Decalogue, but extended and fulfilled them; here
the old Gentile-Christian moral conception based on the Sermon on the
Mount, prevails. Accordingly Irenæus now shows that in the case of the
children of freedom the situation has become much more serious, and that
the judgments are now much more threatening. Finally, he proves that the
fulfilling, extending, and sharpening of the law form a contrast to the
blunting of the natural moral law by the Pharisees and elders; see IV.
12. 1 ff.: "Austero dei præcepto miscent seniores aquatam traditionem".
IV. 13. 1. f.: "Christus naturalia legis (which are summed up in the
commandment of love) extendit et implevit ... plenitudo et extensio ...
necesse fuit, auferri quidem vincula servitutis, superextendi vero
decreta libertatis". That is proved in the next passage from the Sermon
on the Mount: we must not only refrain from evil works, but also from
evil desire. IV. 16. 5: "Hæc ergo, quæ in servitutem et in signum data
sunt illis, circumscripsit novo libertatis testamento. Quæ autem
naturalia et liberalia et communia omnium, auxit et dilatavit, sine
invidia largiter donans hominibus per adoptionem, patrem scire deum ...
auxit autem etiam timorem: filios enim plus timere oportet quam servos".
IV. 27. 2. The new situation is a more serious one; the Old Testament
believers have the death of Christ as an antidote for their sins,
"propter eos vero, qui nunc peccant, Christus non iam morietur". IV. 28.
1 f.: under the old covenant God punished "typice et temporaliter et
mediocrius", under the new, on the contrary, "vere et semper et
austerius" ... as under the new covenant "fides aucta est", so also it
is true that "diligentia conversationis adaucta est". The imperfections
of the law, the "particularia legis", the law of bondage have been
abolished by Christ, see specially IV. 16, 17, for the types are now
fulfilled; but Christ and the Apostles did not transgress the law;
freedom was first granted to the Gentile Christians (III. 12) and
circumcision and foreskin united (III. 5. 3). But Irenæus also proved
how little the old and new covenants contradict each other by showing
that the latter also contains concessions that have been granted to the
frailty of man; see IV. 15. 2 (1 Cor. VII.).]
[Footnote 647: See III. II. 4. There too we find it argued that John the
Baptist was not merely a prophet, but also an Apostle.]
[Footnote 648: From Irenæus' statement in IV. 4 about the significance
of the city of Jerusalem we can infer what he thought of the Jewish
nation. Jerusalem is to him the vine-branch on which the fruit has
grown; the latter having reached maturity, the branch is cut off and has
no further importance.]
[Footnote 649: No special treatment of Tertullian is required here, as
he only differs from Irenæus in the additions he invented as a
Montanist. Yet this is also prefigured in Irenæus' view that the
concessions of the Apostles had rendered the execution of the stern new
law more easy. A few passages may be quoted here. De orat. I: "Quidquid
retro fuerat, aut demutatum est (per Christum), ut circumcisio, aut
suppletum ut reliqua lex, aut impletum ut prophetia, aut perfectum ut
fides ipsa. Omnia de carnalibus in spiritalia renovavit nova dei gratia
superducto evangelio, expunctore totius retro vetustatis." (This
differentiation strikingly reminds us of the letter of Ptolemy to Flora.
Ptolemy distinguishes those parts of the law that originate with God,
Moses, and the elders. As far as the divine law is concerned, he again
distinguishes what Christ had to complete, what he had to supersede and
what he had to spiritualise, that is, perficere, solvere, demutare). In
the _regula fidei_ (de præscr. 13): "Christus prædicavit novam legem et
novam promissionem regni coelorum"; see the discussions in adv. Marc.
II., III., and adv. Iud.; de pat. 6: "amplianda adimplendaque lex."
Scorp. 3, 8, 9; ad uxor. 2; de monog. 7: "Et quoniam quidam interdum
nihil sihi dicunt esse cum lege, quam Christus non dissolvit, sed
adimplevit, interdum quæ volunt legis arripiunt (he himself did that
continually), plane et nos sic dicimus legem, ut onera quidem eius,
secundum sententiam apostolorum, quæ nec patres sustinere valuerunt,
concesserint, quæ vero ad iustitiam spectant, non tantum reservata
permaneant, verum et ampliata." That the new law of the new covenant is
the moral law of nature in a stricter form, and that the concessions of
the Apostle Paul cease in the age of the Paraclete, is a view we find
still more strongly emphasised in the Montanist writings than in
Irenæus. In ad uxor. 3 Tertullian had already said: "Quod permittitur,
bonum non est," and this proposition is the theme of many arguments in
the Montanist writings. But the intention of finding a basis for the
laws of the Paraclete, by showing that they existed in some fashion even
in earlier times, involved Tertullian in many contradictions. It is
evident from his writings that Montanists and Catholics in Carthage
alternately reproached each other with judaising tendencies and an
apostasy to heathen discipline and worship. Tertullian, in his
enthusiasm for Christianity, came into conflict with all the authorities
which he himself had set up. In the questions as to the relationship of
the Old Testament to the New, of Christ to the Apostles, of the Apostles
to each other, of the Paraclete to Christ and the Apostles, he was also
of necessity involved in the greatest contradictions. This was the case
not only because he went more into details than Irenæus; but, above all,
because the chains into which he had thrown his Christianity were felt
to be such by himself. This theologian had no greater opponent than
himself, and nowhere perhaps is this so plain as in his attitude to the
two Testaments. Here, in every question of detail, Tertullian really
repudiated the proposition from which he starts. In reference to one
point, namely, that the Law and the prophets extend down to John, see
Noldechen's article in the Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie,
1885, p. 333 f. On the one hand, in order to support certain trains of
thought, Tertullian required the proposition that prophecy extended down
to John (see also the Muratorian Fragment: "completus numerus
prophetarum", Sibyll. I. 386: [Greek: kai tote dê pausis estai metepeita
prophêtôu], scil. after Christ), and on the other, as a Montanist, he
was obliged to assert the continued existence of prophecy. In like
manner he sometimes ascribed to the Apostles a unique possession of the
Holy Spirit, and at other times, adhering to a primitive Christian idea,
he denied this thesis. Cf. also Baith "Tertullian's Auffassung des
Apostels Paulus und seines Verhaltnisses zu den Uraposteln" (Jahrbuch
fur protestantische Theologie, Vol. III. p. 706 ff.). Tertullian strove
to reconcile the principles of early Christianity with the authority of
ecclesiastical tradition and philosophical apologetics. Separated from
the general body of the Church, and making ever increasing sacrifices
for the early-Christian enthusiasm, as he understood it, he wasted
himself in the solution of this insoluble problem.]
[Footnote 650: In addition to this, however, they definitely established
within the Church the idea that there is a "Christian" view in all
spheres of life and in all questions of knowledge. Christianity appears
expanded to an immense, immeasurable breadth. This is also Gnosticism.
Thus Tertullian, after expressing various opinions about dreams, opens
the 45th chapter of his work "de anima" with the words: "Tenemur hie de
sommis quoque Christianam sententiam expromere". Alongside of the
antignostic rule of faith as the "doctrine" we find the casuistic system
of morality and penance (the Church "disciplina") with its media of
almsgiving, fasting, and prayer; see Cypr, de op et eleemos., but before
that Hippol., Comm. in Daniel ([Greek: Ekkl Alêth]. 1886, p. 242):
[Greek: hoi eis tu onoma ton Theou pisteuontes kai di' agathoergias to
prosôpon autou exilaskomenoi.]]
[Footnote 651: In the case of Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian we
already find that they observe a certain order and sequence of books
when advancing a detailed proof from Scripture.]
[Footnote 652: It is worthy of note that there was not a single Arian
ecclesiastic of note in the Novatian churches of the 4th century, so far
as we know. All Novatian's adherents, even those in the West (see
Socrates' Ecclesiastical History), were of the orthodox Nicæan type.
This furnishes material for reflection.]
[Footnote 653: Owing to the importance of the matter we shall give
several Christological and trinitarian disquisitions from the work "de
trinitate". The archaic attitude of this Christology and trinitarian
doctrine is evident from the following considerations. (1) Like
Tertullian, Novatian asserts that the Logos was indeed always with the
Father, but that he only went forth from him at a definite period of
time (for the purpose of creating the world). (2) Like Tertullian, he
declares that Father, Son, and Spirit have one substance (that is, are
[Greek: homoousioi], the _homoousia_ of itself never decides as to
equality in dignity); but that the Son is subordinate and obedient to
the Father and the Spirit to the Son (cc. 17, 22, 24), since they derive
their origin, essence, and function from the Father (the Spirit from the
Son). (3) Like Tertullian, Novatian teaches that the Son, after
accomplishing his work, will again become intermingled with the Father,
that is, will cease to have an independent existence (c. 31); whence we
understand why the West continued so long to be favourable to Marcellus
of Ancyra; see also the so-called symbol of Sardika. Apart from these
points and a few others of less consequence, the work, in its formulæ,
exhibits a type which remained pretty constant in the West down to the
time of Augustine, or, till the adoption of Johannes Damascenus'
dogmatic. The sharp distinction between "deus" and "homo" and the use
that is nevertheless made of "permixtio" and synonymous words are also
specially characteristic. Cap. 9: "Christus deus dominus deus noster,
sed dei filius"; c. 11: "non sic de substantia corporis ipsius
exprimimus, ut solum tantum hominem illum esse dicamus, sed ut
divinitate sermonis in ipsa concretione permixta etiam deum illum
teneamus"; c. 11 Christ has _auctoritas divina_, "tam enim scriptura
etiam deum adnuntiat Christum, quam etiam ipsum hominem adnuntiat deum,
tam hominem descripsit Iesum Christum, quam etiam deum quoque descripsit
Christum dominum." In c. 12 the term "Immanuel" is used to designate
Christ as God in a way that reminds one of Athanasius; c. 13: "præsertim
cum animadvertat, scripturam evangelicam utramque istam substantiam in
unam nativitatis Christi foederasse concordiam"; c. 14: "Christus ex
verbi et carnis coniunctione concretus"; c. 16: "... ut neque homo
Christo subtrahatur, neque divinitas negetur ... utrumque in Christo
confoederatum est, utrumque coniunctum est et utrumque connexum est ...
pignerata in illo divinitatis et humilitatis videtur esse concordia ...
qui mediator dei et hominum effectus exprimitur, in se deum et hominem
sociasse reperitur ... nos sermonem dei scimus indutum carnis
substantiam ... lavit substantiam corporis et materiam carnis abluens,
ex parte suscepti hominis, passione"; c. 17: "... nisi quoniam
auctoritas divini verbi ad suscipiendum hominem interim conquiescens nec
se suis viribus exercens, deiicit se ad tempus atque deponit, dum
hominem fert, quem suscepit"; c. 18: "... ut in semetipso concordiam
confibularet terrenorum pariter atque cælestium, dum utriusque partis in
se connectens pignora et deum homini et hominem deo copularet, ut merito
filius dei per assumptionem carnis filius hominis et filius hominis per
receptionem dei verbi filius dei effici possit"; c. 19: "hic est enim
legitimus dei filius qui ex ipso deo est, qui, dum sanctum illud (Luke
I. 35) assumit, sibi filium hominis annectit et illum ad se rapit atque
transducit, connexione sua et permixtione sociata præstat et filium
illum dei facit, quod ille naturaliter non fuit (Novatian's teaching is
therefore like that of the Spanish Adoptionists of the 8th century), ut
principalitas nominis istius 'filius dei' in spiritu sit domini, qui
descendit et venit, ut sequela nominis istius in filio dei et hominis
sit, et merito consequenter his filius dei factus sit, dum non
principaliter filius dei est, atque ideo dispositionem istam anhelus
videns et ordinem istum sacramenti expediens non sic cuncta confundens,
ut nullum vestigium distinctionis collocavit, distinctionem posuit
dicendo. 'Propterea et quod nascetur ex te sanctum vocabitur filius
dei'. Ne si distributionem istam cum libramentis suis non dispensasset,
sed in confuso permixtum reliquisset, vere occasionem hæreticis
contulisset, ut hominis filium qua homo est, eundum et dei et hominis
filium pronuntiare deberent.... Filius dei, dum filium hominis in se
suscepit, consequenter illum filium dei fecit, quoniam illum filius sibi
dei sociavit et iunxit, ut, dum filius hominis adhæret in nativitate
filio dei, ipsa permixtionem foeneratum et mutuatum teneret, quod ex
natura propria possidere non posset. Ac si facta est angeli voce, quod
nolunt hæretici, inter filium dei hominisque cum sua tamen sociatione
distinctio, urgendo illos, uti Christum hominis filium hominem
intelligant quoque dei filium et hominem dei filium id est dei verbum
deum accipiant, atque ideo Christum Iesum dominum ex utroque connexum,
et utroque contextum atque concretum et in eadem utriusque substantiæ
concordia mutui ad invicem foederis confibulatione sociatum, hominem et
deum, scripturæ hoc ipsum dicentis veritate cognoscant". c. 21:
"hæretici nolunt Christum secundam esse personam post patrem, sed ipsum
patrem;" c. 22: "Cum Christus 'Ego' dicit (John X. 30), deinde patrem
infert dicendo, 'Ego et pater', proprietatem personæ suæ id est filii a
paterna auctoritate discernit atque distinguit, non tantummodo de sono
nominis, sed etiam de ordine dispositæ potestatis ... unum enim
neutraliter positum, societatis concordiam, non unitatem personæ sonat
... unum autem quod ait, ad concordiam et eandem sententiam et ad ipsam
charitatis societatem pertinet, ut merito unum sit pater et filius per
concordiam et per amorem et per dilectionem. Et quoniam ex patre est,
quicquid illud est, filius est, manente tamen distinctione ... denique
novit hanc concordiæ unitatem est apostolus Paulus cum personarum tamen
distinctione." (Comparison with the relationship between Paul and
Apollos! "Quos personæ ratio invicem dividit, eosdem rursus invicem
religionis ratio conducit; et quamvis idem atque ipsi non sint, dum idem
sentiunt, ipsum sunt, et cum duo sint, unum sunt"); c. 23: "constat
hominem a deo factum esse, non ex deo processisse; ex deo autem homo
quomodo nou processit, sic dei verbum processit". In c. 24 it is argued
that Christ existed before the creation of the world and that not merely
"predestinatione", for then he would be subsequent and therefore
inferior to Adam, Abel, Enoch etc. "Sublata ergo prædestinatione quæ non
est posita, in substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem"; c.
31: "Est ergo deus pater omnium institutor et creator, solus originem
nesciens(!), invisibilis, immensus, immortalis, æternus, unus deus(!),
... ex quo quando ipse voluit, sermo filius natus est, qui non in sono
percussi aeris aut tono coactæ de visceribus vocis accipitur, sed in
substantia prolatæ a deo virtutis agnoscitur, cuius sacræ et divinas
nativitatis arcana nec apostolus didicit ..., filio soli nota sunt, qui
patris secreta cognovit. Hic ergo cum sit genitus a patre, semper est in
patre. Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem; sed qui
ante omne tempus est, semper in patre fuisse discendus est, nec enim
tempus illi assignari potest, qui ante tempus est; semper enim in patre,
ne pater non semper sit pater: quia et pater illum etiam præcedit, quod
necesse est, prior sit qua pater sit. Quoniam antecedat necesse est eum,
qui habet originem, ille qui originem nescit. Simul ut hic minor sit,
dum in illo esse se scit habens originem quia nascitur, et per patrem
quamvis originem habet qua nascitur, vicinus in nativitate, dum ex eo
patre, qui solus originem non habet, nascitur ..., substantia scilicet
divina, cuius nomen est verbum ..., deus utique procedens ex deo
secundam personam efficiens, sed non eripiens illud patri quod unus est
deus.... Cuius sic divinitas traditur, ut non aut dissonantia aut
inæqualitate divinitatis duos deos reddidisse videatur.... Dum huic, qui
est deus, omnia substrata traduntur et cuncta sibi subiecta filius
accepta refert patri, totam divinitatis auctoritatem rursus patri
remittit, unus deus ostenditur verus et æternus pater, a quo solo hæc
vis divinitatis emissa, etiam in filium tradita et directa rursus per
substantiæ; communionem ad patrem revolvitur."]
[Footnote 654: If I am not mistaken, the production or adaptation of
Apocalypses did indeed abate in the third century, but acquired fresh
vigour in the 4th, though at the same time allowing greater scope to the
influence of heathen literature (including romances as well as
hagiographical literature).]
[Footnote 655: I did not care to appeal more frequently to the Sibylline
oracles either in this or the preceding chapter, because the literary
and historical investigation of these writings has not yet made such
progress as to justify one in using it for the history of dogma. It is
well known that the oracles contain rich materials in regard to the
doctrine of God, Christology, conceptions of the history of Jesus, and
eschatology; but, apart from the old Jewish oracles, this material
belongs to several centuries and has not yet been reliably sifted.]
CHAPTER VI.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITION INTO A PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION, OR THE ORIGIN OF THE SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY AND DOGMATIC OF THE
CHURCH.
Clement and Origen.
The Alexandrian school of catechists was of inestimable importance for
the transformation of the heathen empire into a Christian one, and of
Greek philosophy into ecclesiastical philosophy. In the third century
this school overthrew polytheism by scientific means whilst at the same
time preserving everything of any value in Greek science and culture.
These Alexandrians wrote for the educated people of the whole earth;
they made Christianity a part of the civilisation of the world. The
saying that the Christian missionary to the Greeks must be a Greek was
first completely verified within the Catholic Church in the person of
Origen, who at the same time produced the only system of Christian dogma
possessed by the Greek Church before John Damascenus.
1. _The Alexandrian Catechetical School. Clement of Alexandria._[656]
"The work of Irenæus still leaves it undecided whether the form of the
world's literature, as found in the Christian Church, is destined only
to remain a weapon to combat its enemies, or is to become an instrument
of peaceful labour within its own territory." With these words Overbeck
has introduced his examination of Clement of Alexandria's great
masterpiece from the standpoint of the historian of literature. They may
be also applied to the history of theology. As we have shown, Irenæus,
Tertullian (and Hippolytus) made use of philosophical theology to expel
heretical elements; but all the theological expositions that this
interest suggested to them as necessary, were in their view part of the
faith itself. At least we find in their works absolutely no clear
expression of the fact that faith is one thing and theology another,
though rudimentary indications of such distinctions are found. Moreover,
their adherence to the early-Christian eschatology in its entirety, as
well as their rejection of a qualitative distinction between simple
believers and "Gnostics," proved that they themselves were deceived as
to the scope of their theological speculations, and that moreover their
Christian interest was virtually satisfied with subjection to the
authority of tradition, with the early-Christian hopes, and with the
rules for a holy life. But since about the time of Commodus, and in some
cases even earlier, we can observe, even in ecclesiastical circles, the
growing independence and might of the aspiration for a scientific
knowledge and treatment of the Christian religion, that is of Christian
tradition.[657] There is a wish to maintain this tradition in its
entirety and hence the Gnostic theses are rejected. The selection from
tradition, made in opposition to Gnosticism--though indeed in accordance
with its methods--and declared to be apostolic, is accepted. But there
is a desire to treat the given material in a strictly scientific manner,
just as the Gnostics had formerly done, that is, on the one hand to
establish it by a critical and historical exegesis, and on the other to
give it a philosophical form and bring it into harmony with the spirit
of the times. Along with this we also find the wish to incorporate the
thoughts of Paul which now possessed divine authority.[658] Accordingly
schools and scholastic unions now make their appearance afresh, the old
schools having been expelled from the Church.[659] In Asia Minor such
efforts had already begun shortly before the time when the canon of holy
apostolic tradition was fixed by the ecclesiastical authorities (Alogi).
From the history of Clement of Alexandria, the life of bishop Alexander,
afterwards bishop of Jerusalem, and subsequently from the history of
Origen (we may also mention Firmilian of Cæsarea), we learn that there
was in Cappadocia about the year 200 a circle of ecclesiastics who
zealously applied themselves to scientific pursuits. Bardesanes, a man
of high repute, laboured in the Christian kingdom of Edessa about the
same time. He wrote treatises on philosophical theology, which indeed,
judged by a Western standard, could not be accounted orthodox, and
directed a theological school which maintained its ground in the third
century and attained great importance.[660] In Palestine, during the
time of Heliogabalus and Alexander (Severus), Julius Africanus composed
a series of books on scientific theology, which were specifically
different from the writings of Irenæus and Tertullian; but which on the
other hand show the closest relationship in point of form to the
treatises of the so-called Gnostics. His inquiries into the relationship
of the genealogies of Jesus and into certain parts of the Greek
Apocalypse of Daniel showed that the Church's attention had been drawn
to problems of historical criticism. In his chronography the apologetic
interest is subordinate to the historical, and in his [Greek: Kestoi],
dedicated to Alexander Severus (Hippolytus had already dedicated a
treatise on the resurrection to the wife of Heliogabalus), we see fewer
traces of the Christian than of the Greek scholar. Alexander of Ælia and
Theoktistus of Cæsarea, the occupants of the two most important sees in
Palestine, were, contemporaneously with him, zealous patrons of an
independent science of theology. Even at that early time the former
founded an important theological library; and the fragments of his
letters preserved to us prove that he had caught not only the language,
but also the scientific spirit of the age. In Rome, at the beginning of
the third century, there was a scientific school where textual criticism
of the Bible was pursued and where the works of Aristotle, Theophrastus,
Euclid, and Galen were zealously read and utilised. Finally, the works
of Tertullian show us that, even among the Christians of Carthage, there
was no lack of such as wished to naturalise the pursuit of science
within the Church; and Eusebius (H. E. V. 27) has transmitted to us the
titles of a series of scientific works dating as far back as the year
200 and ascribed to ecclesiastics of that period.
Whilst all these phenomena, which collectively belong to the close of
the second and beginning of the third century, show that it was indeed
possible to suppress heresy in the Church, but not the impulse from
which it sprang, the most striking proof of this conclusion is the
existence of the so-called school of catechists in Alexandria. We cannot
now trace the origin of this school, which first comes under our notice
in the year 190,[661] but we know that the struggle of the Church with
heresy was concluded in Alexandria at a later period than in the West.
We know further that the school of catechists extended its labours to
Palestine and Cappadocia as early as the year 200, and, to all
appearance, originated or encouraged scientific pursuits there.[662]
Finally, we know that the existence of this school was threatened in the
fourth decade of the third century; but Heraclas was shrewd enough to
reconcile the ecclesiastical and scientific interests.[663] In the
Alexandrian school of catechists the whole of Greek science was taught
and made to serve the purpose of Christian apologetics. Its first
teacher, who is well known to us from the writings he has left, is
_Clement of Alexandria_.[664] His main work is epoch-making. "Clement's
intention is nothing less than an introduction to Christianity, or,
speaking more correctly and in accordance with the spirit of his work,
an initiation into it. The task that Clement sets himself is an
introduction to what is inmost and highest in Christianity itself. He
aims, so to speak, at first making Christians perfect Christians by
means of a work of literature. By means of such a work he wished not
merely to repeat to the Christian what life has already done for him as
it is, but to elevate him to something still higher than what has been
revealed to him by the forms of initiation that the Church has created
for herself in the course of a history already dating back a century and
a half." To Clement therefore Gnosis, that is, the (Greek) philosophy of
religion, is not only a means of refuting heathenism and heresy, but at
the same time of ascertaining and setting forth what is highest and
inmost in Christianity. He views it as such, however, because, apart
from evangelical sayings, the Church tradition, both collectively and in
its details, is something foreign to him; he has subjected himself to
its authority, but he can only make it intellectually his own after
subjecting it to a scientific and philosophical treatment.[665] His
great work, which has rightly been called the boldest literary
undertaking in the history of the Church,[666] is consequently the first
attempt to use Holy Scripture and the Church tradition together with the
assumption that Christ as the Reason of the world is the source of all
truth, as the basis of a presentation of Christianity which at once
addresses itself to the cultured by satisfying the scientific demand for
a philosophical ethic and theory of the world, and at the same time
reveals to the believer the rich content of his faith. Here then is
found, in form and content, the scientific Christian doctrine of
religion which, while not contradicting the faith, does not merely
support or explain it in a few places, but raises it to another and
higher intellectual sphere, namely, out of the province of authority and
obedience into that of clear knowledge and inward, intellectual assent
emanating from love to God.[667] Clement cannot imagine that the
Christian faith, as found in tradition, can of itself produce the union
of intellectual independence and devotion to God which he regards as
moral perfection. He is too much of a Greek philosopher for that, and
believes that this aim is only reached through knowledge. But in so far
as this is only the deciphering of the secrets revealed in the Holy
Scriptures through the Logos, secrets which the believer also gains
possession of by subjecting himself to them, all knowledge is a
reflection of the divine revelation. The lofty ethical and religious
ideal of the man made perfect in fellowship with God, which Greek
philosophy had developed since the time of Plato and to which it had
subordinated the whole scientific knowledge of the world, was adopted
and heightened by Clement, and associated not only with Jesus Christ but
also with ecclesiastical Christianity. But, whilst connecting it with
the Church tradition, he did not shrink from the boldest remodelling of
the latter, because the preservation of its wording was to him a
sufficient guarantee of the Christian character of the speculation.[668]
In Clement, then, ecclesiastical Christianity reached the stage that
Judaism had attained in Philo, and no doubt the latter exercised great
influence over him.[669] Moreover, Clement stands on the ground that
Justin had already trodden, but he has advanced far beyond this
Apologist. His superiority to Justin not only consists in the fact that
he changed the apologetic task that the latter had in his mind into a
systematic and positive one; but above all in the circumstance that he
transformed the tradition of the Christian Church, which in his days was
far more extensive and more firmly established than in Justin's time,
into a real scientific dogmatic; whereas Justin neutralised the greater
part of this tradition by including it in the scheme of the proof from
prophecy. By elevating the idea of the Logos who is Christ into the
highest principle in the religious explanation of the world and in the
exposition of Christianity, Clement gave to this idea a much more
concrete and copious content than Justin did. Christianity is the
doctrine of the creation, training, and redemption of mankind by the
Logos, whose work culminates in the perfect Gnostics. The philosophy of
the Greeks, in so far as it possessed the Logos, is declared to be a
counterpart of the Old Testament law;[670] and the facts contained in
the Church tradition are either subordinated to the philosophical
dogmatic or receive a new interpretation expressly suited to it. The
idea of the Logos has a content which is on the one hand so wide that he
is found wherever man rises above the level of nature, and on the other
so concrete that an authentic knowledge of him can only be obtained from
historical revelation. The Logos is essentially the rational law of the
world and the teacher; but in Christ he is at the same time officiating
priest, and the blessings he bestows are a series of holy initiations
which alone contain the possibility of man's raising himself to the
divine life.[671] While this is already clear evidence of Clement's
affinity to Gnostic teachers, especially the Valentinians, the same
similarity may also be traced in the whole conception of the task
(Christianity as theology), in the determination of the formal principle
(inclusive of the recourse to esoteric tradition; see above, p. 35
f.),[672] and in the solution of the problems. But Clement's great
superiority to Valentinus is shown not only in his contriving to
preserve in all points his connection with the faith of the main body of
Christendom, but still more in his power of mastering so many problems
by the aid of a single principle, that is, in the art of giving the most
comprehensive presentation with the most insignificant means. Both facts
are indeed most closely connected. The rejection of all conceptions that
could not be verified from Holy Scripture, or at least easily reconciled
with it, as well as his optimism, opposed as this was to Gnostic
pessimism, proved perhaps the most effective means of persuading the
Church to recognise the Christian character of a dogmatic that was at
least half inimical to ecclesiastical Christianity. Through Clement
theology became the crowning stage of piety, the highest philosophy of
the Greeks was placed under the protection and guarantee of the Church,
and the whole Hellenic civilisation was thus at the same time
legitimised within Christianity. The Logos is Christ, but the Logos is
at the same time the moral and rational in all stages of development.
The Logos is the teacher, not only in cases where an intelligent
self-restraint, as understood by the ancients, bridles the passions and
instincts and wards off excesses of all sorts; but also, and here of
course the revelation is of a higher kind, wherever love to God alone
determines the whole life and exalts man above everything sensuous and
finite.[673] What Gnostic moralists merely regarded as contrasts
Clement, the Christian and Greek, was able to view as stages; and thus
he succeeded in conceiving the motley society that already represented
the Church of his time as a unity, as the humanity trained by one and
the same Logos, the Pedagogue. His speculation did not drive him out of
the Church; it rather enabled him to understand the multiplicity of
forms she contained and to estimate their relative justification; nay,
it finally led him to include the history of pre-Christian humanity in
the system he regarded as a unity, and to form a theory of universal
history satisfactory to his mind.[674] If we compare this theory with
the rudimentary ideas of a similar kind in Irenæus, we see clearly the
meagreness and want of freedom, the uncertainty and narrowness, in the
case of the latter. In the Christian faith as he understood it and as
amalgamated by him with Greek culture, Clement found intellectual
freedom and independence, deliverance from all external authority. We
need not here directly discuss what apparatus he used for this end.
Irenæus again remained entangled in his apparatus, and much as he speaks
of the _novum testamentum libertatis_, his great work little conveys the
impression that its author has really attained intellectual freedom.
Clement was the first to grasp the task of future theology. According to
him this task consists in utilising the historical traditions, through
which we have become what we are, and the Christian communion, which is
imperative upon us as being the only moral and religious one, in order
to attain freedom and independence of our own life by the aid of the
Gospel; and in showing this Gospel to be the highest revelation by the
Logos, who has given evidence of himself whenever man rises above the
level of nature and who is consequently to be traced throughout the
whole history of humanity.
But does the Christianity of Clement correspond to the Gospel? We can
only give a qualified affirmation to this question. For the danger of
secularisation is evident, since apostasy from the Gospel would be
completely accomplished as soon as the ideal of the self-sufficient
Greek sage came to supplant the feeling that man lives by the grace of
God. But the danger of secularisation lies in the cramped conception of
Irenæus, who sets up authorities which have nothing to do with the
Gospel, and creates facts of salvation which have a no less deadening
effect though in a different way. If the Gospel is meant to give freedom
and peace in God, and to accustom us to an eternal life in union with
Christ Clement understood this meaning. He could justly say to his
opponents: "If the things we say appear to some people diverse from the
Scriptures of the Lord, let them know that they draw inspiration and
life therefrom and, making these their starting-point give their meaning
only, not their letter" ([Greek: kan heteroia tisi tôn pollôn
kataphainêtai ta hyph' hêmôn legomena tôn kyriakôn graphôn, isteon hoti
ekeithen anapnei te kai zê kai tas aphormas ap' autôn echonta ton noun
monon, ou tên lexin, paristan epangelletai]).[675] No doubt Clement
conceives the aim of the whole traditionary material to be that of Greek
philosophy, but we cannot fail to perceive that this aim is blended with
the object which the Gospel puts before us, namely, to be rich in God
and to receive strength and life from him. The goodness of God and the
responsibility of man are the central ideas of Clement and the
Alexandrians; they also occupy the foremost place in the Gospel of Jesus
Christ. If this is certain we must avoid that searching of the heart
which undertakes to fix how far he was influenced by the Gospel and how
far by philosophy.
But, while so judging, we cannot deny that the Church tradition was here
completely transformed into a Greek philosophy of religion on a
historical basis, nor do we certify the Christian character of Clement's
"dogmas" in acknowledging the evangelical spirit of his practical
position. What would be left of Christianity, if the practical aim,
given by Clement to this religious philosophy, were lost? A
depotentiated system which could absolutely no longer be called
Christian. On the other hand there were many valuable features in the
ecclesiastical _regula_ literally interpreted; and the attempts of
Irenæus to extract an authoritative religious meaning from the literal
sense of Church tradition and of New Testament passages must be regarded
as conservative efforts of the most valuable kind. No doubt Irenæus and
his theological _confrères_ did not themselves find in Christianity that
freedom which is its highest aim; but on the other hand they preserved
and rescued valuable material for succeeding times. If some day trust in
the methods of religious philosophy vanishes, men will revert to
history, which will still be recognisable in the preserved tradition, as
prized by Irenæus and the rest, whereas it will have almost perished in
the artificial interpretations due to the speculations of religious
philosophers.
The importance that the Alexandrian school was to attain in the history
of dogma is not associated with Clement, but with his disciple
Origen.[676] This was not because Clement was more heterodox than
Origen, for that is not the case, so far as the Stromateis is concerned
at least;[677] but because the latter exerted an incomparably greater
influence than the former; and, with an energy perhaps unexampled in the
history of the Church, already mapped out all the provinces of theology
by his own unaided efforts. Another reason is that Clement did not
possess the Church tradition in its fixed Catholic forms as Origen did
(see above, chapter 2), and, as his Stromateis shows, he was as yet
incapable of forming a theological system. What he offers is portions of
a theological Christian dogmatic and speculative ethic. These indeed are
no fragments in so far as they are all produced according to a definite
method and have the same object in view, but they still want unity. On
the other hand Origen succeeded in forming a complete system inasmuch as
he not only had a Catholic tradition of fixed limits and definite type
to fall back upon as a basis; but was also enabled by the previous
efforts of Clement to furnish a methodical treatment of this
tradition.[678] Now a sharp eye indeed perceives that Origen personally
no longer possessed such a complete and bold religious theory of the
world as Clement did, for he was already more tightly fettered by the
Church tradition, some details of which here and there led him into
compromises that remind us of Irenæus; but it was in connection with his
work that the development of the following period took place. It is
therefore sufficient, within the framework of the history of dogma, to
refer to Clement as the bold forerunner of Origen, and, in setting forth
the theology of the latter, to compare it in important points with the
doctrines of Clement.
2. _The system of Origen._[679]
Among the theologians of ecclesiastical antiquity Origen was the most
important and influential alongside of Augustine. He proved the father
of ecclesiastical science in the widest sense of the word, and at the
same time became the founder of that theology which reached its complete
development in the fourth and fifth centuries, and which in the sixth
definitely denied its author, without, however, losing the form he had
impressed on it. Origen created the ecclesiastical dogmatic and made the
sources of the Jewish and Christian religion the foundation of that
science. The Apologists, in their day, had found everything clear in
Christianity; the antignostic Fathers had confused the Church's faith
and the science that treats of it. Origen recognised the problem and the
problems, and elevated the pursuit of Christian theology to the rank of
an independent task by freeing it from its polemical aim. He could not
have become what he did, if two generations had not preceded him in
paving the way to form a mental conception of Christianity and give it a
philosophical foundation. Like all epoch-making personalities, he was
also favoured by the conditions in which he lived, though he had to
endure violent attacks. Born of a Christian family which was faithfully
attached to the Church, he lived at a time when the Christian
communities enjoyed almost uninterrupted peace and were being
naturalised in the world; he was a member of a Christian Church where
the right of scientific study was already recognised and where this had
attained a fixed position in an organised school.[680] He proclaimed the
reconciliation of science with the Christian faith and the compatibility
of the highest culture with the Gospel within the bosom of the Church,
thus contributing more than any other to convert the ancient world to
Christianity. But he made no compromises from shrewd calculation: it was
his inmost and holiest conviction that the sacred documents of
Christianity contained all the ideals of antiquity, and that the
speculative conception of ecclesiastical Christianity was the only true
and right one. His character was pure, his life blameless; in his work
he was not only unwearied, but also unselfish. There have been few
Fathers of the Church whose life-story leaves such an impression of
purity behind it as that of Origen. The atmosphere which he breathed as
a Christian and as a philosopher was dangerous; but his mind remained
sound, and even his feeling for truth scarcely ever forsook him.[681] To
us his theory of the world, surveyed in its details, presents various
changing hues, like that of Philo, and at the present day we can
scarcely any longer understand how he was able to unite the different
materials; but, considering the solidity of his character and the
confidence of his decisions, we cannot doubt that he himself felt the
agreement of all essential parts of his system. No doubt he spoke in one
way to the perfect and in another to the mass of Christian people. The
narrow-minded or the immature will at all times necessarily consider
such proceedings hypocrisy, but the outcome of his religious and
scientific conception of the world required the twofold language.
Orthodox theology of all creeds has never yet advanced beyond the circle
first mapped out by his mind. She has suspected and corrected her
founder, she has thought she could lop off his heterodox opinions as if
they were accidental excrescences, she has incorporated with the simple
faith itself the measure of speculation she was obliged to admit, and
continued to give the rule of faith a more philosophic form, fragment by
fragment, in order that she might thus be able to remove the gap between
Faith and Gnosis and to banish free theology through the formula of
ecclesiastical dogma. But it may reasonably be questioned whether all
this is progress, and it is well worth investigating whether the gap
between half theological, clerical Christianity and a lay Christianity
held in tutelage is more endurable than that between Gnosis and Pistis,
which Origen preserved and bridged over.
The Christian system of Origen[682] is worked out in opposition to the
systems of the Greek philosophers and of the Christian Gnostics. It is
moreover opposed to the ecclesiastical enemies of science, the Christian
Unitarians, and the Jews.[683] But the science of the faith, as
developed by Origen, being built up with the appliances of Philo's
science, bears unmistakable marks of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism. Origen
speculated not only in the manner of Justin, but also in that of
Valentinus and therefore likewise after the fashion of Plotinus; in fact
he is characterised by the adoption of the methods and, in a certain
sense, of the axioms current in the schools of Valentinus and traceable
in Neoplatonism. But, as this method implied the acknowledgment of a
sacred literature, Origen was an exegete who believed in the Holy
Scriptures and indeed, at bottom, he viewed all theology as a methodical
exegesis of Holy Writ. Finally, however, since Origen, as an
ecclesiastical Christian, was convinced that the Church (by which he
means only the perfect and pure Church) is the sole possessor of God's
holy revelations with whose authority the faith may be justly satisfied,
nothing but the two Testaments, as preserved by her, was regarded by him
as the absolutely reliable divine revelation.[684] But, in addition to
these, every possession of the Church, and, above all, the rule of
faith, was authoritative and holy.[685] By acknowledging not only the
relative correctness of the beliefs held by the great mass of simple
Christians, as the Valentinians did, but also the indispensableness of
their faith as the foundation of speculation, Origen like Clement
avoided the dilemma of becoming a heterodox Gnostic or an ecclesiastical
traditionalist. He was able to maintain this standpoint, because in the
first place his Gnosis required a guaranteed sacred literature which he
only found in the Church, and because in the second place this same
Gnosis had extended its horizon far enough to see that what the
heretical Gnosis had regarded as contrasts were different aspects of the
same thing. The relative way of looking at things, an inheritance from
the best time of antiquity, is familiar to Origen, as it was to Clement;
and he contrived never to lose sight of it, in spite of the absolute
attitude he had arrived at through the Christian Gnosis and the Holy
Scriptures. This relative view taught him and Clement toleration and
discretion (Strom. IV. 22. 139: [Greek: hê gnôsis agapa kai tous
agnoountas didaskei te kai paideuei tên pasan ktisin tou pantokratoros
Theou timan], "Gnosis loves and instructs the ignorant and teaches us to
honour the whole creation of God Almighty"); and enabled them everywhere
to discover, hold fast, and further the good in that which was meagre
and narrow, in that which was undeveloped and as yet intrinsically
obscure.[686] As an orthodox traditionalist and decided opponent of all
heresy Origen acknowledged that Christianity embraces a salvation which
is offered to all men and attained by faith, that it is the doctrine of
historical facts to which we must adhere, that the content of
Christianity has been appropriately summarised by the Church in her rule
of faith,[687] and that belief is of itself sufficient for the renewal
and salvation of man. But, as an idealistic philosopher, Origen
transformed the whole content of ecclesiastical faith into ideas. Here
he adhered to no fixed philosophical system, but, like Philo, Clement,
and the Neoplatonists, adopted and adapted all that had been effected by
the labours of idealistic Greek moralists since the time of Socrates.
These, however, had long before transformed the Socratic saying "know
thyself" into manifold rules for the right conduct of life, and
associated with it a theosophy, in which man was first to attain to his
true self.[688] These rules made the true "sage" abstain from occupying
himself in the service of daily life and "from burdensome appearance in
public". They asserted that the mind "can have no more peculiar duty
than caring for itself." This is accomplished by its not looking without
nor occupying itself with foreign things, but, turning inwardly to
itself, restoring its own nature to itself and thus practising
righteousness.[689] Here it was taught that the wise man who no longer
requires anything is nearest the Deity, because he is a partaker of the
highest good through possession of his rich Ego and through his calm
contemplation of the world; here moreover it was proclaimed that the
mind that has freed itself from the sensuous[690] and lives in constant
contemplation of the eternal is also in the end vouchsafed a view of the
invisible and is itself deified. No one can deny that this sort of
flight from the world and possession of God involves a specific
secularisation of Christianity, and that the isolated and
self-sufficient sage is pretty much the opposite of the poor soul that
hungers after righteousness.[691] Nor, on the other hand, can any one
deny that concrete examples of both types are found in infinite
multiplicity and might shade off into each other in this multiplicity.
This was the case with Clement and Origen. To them the ethical and
religious ideal is the state without sorrow, the state of insensibility
to all evils, of order and peace--but peace in God. Reconciled to the
course of the world, trusting in the divine Logos,[692] rich in
disinterested love to God and the brethren, reproducing the divine
thoughts, looking up with longing to heaven its native city,[693] the
created spirit attains its likeness to God and eternal bliss. It reaches
this by the victory over sensuousness, by constantly occupying itself
with the divine--"Go ye believing thoughts into the wide field of
eternity"--by self-knowledge and contemplative isolation, which,
however, does not exclude work in the kingdom of God, that is in the
Church. This is the divine wisdom: "The soul practises viewing herself
as in a mirror: she displays the divine Spirit in herself as in a
mirror, if she is to be found worthy of this fellowship; and she thus
discovers the traces of a mysterious way to deification."[694] Origen
employed the Stoic and Platonic systems of ethics as an instrument for
the gradual realisation of this ideal.[695] With him the mystic and
ecstatic as well as the magic and sacramental element is still in the
background, though it is not wanting. To Origen's mind, however, the
inadequacy of philosophical injunctions was constantly made plain by the
following considerations. (1) The philosophers, in spite of their noble
thoughts of God, tolerated the existence of polytheism; and this was
really the only fault he had to find with Plato. (2) The truth did not
become universally accessible through them.[696] (3) As the result of
these facts they did not possess sufficient power.[697] In contrast to
this the divine revelation had already mastered a whole people through
Moses--"Would to God the Jews had not transgressed the law, and had not
slain the prophets and Jesus; we would then have had a model of that
heavenly commonwealth which Plato has sought to describe"[698]--and the
Logos shows his universal power in the Church (1) by putting an end to
all polytheism, and (2) by improving everyone to the extent that his
knowledge and capacity admit, and in proportion as his will is inclined
to, and susceptible of, that which is good.[699]
Not only, however, did Origen employ the Greek ethic in its varied
types, but the Greek cosmological speculation also formed the
complicated substructure of his religious system of morals. The Gnosis
is formally a philosophy of revelation, that is a Scripture
theology,[700] and materially a cosmological speculation. On the basis
of a detailed theory of inspiration, which itself, moreover, originates
with the philosophers, the Holy Scriptures are so treated that all facts
appear as the vehicles of ideas and only attain their highest value in
this aspect. Systematic theology, in undertaking its task, always
starts, as Clement and Origen also did, with the conscious or
unconscious thought of emancipating itself from the outward revelation
and community of cultus that are the characteristic marks of positive
religion. The place of these is taken by the results of speculative
cosmology, which, though themselves practically conditioned, do not seem
to be of this character. This also applies to Origen's Christian Gnosis
or scientific dogmatic, which is simply the metaphysics of the age.
However, as he was the equal of the foremost minds of his time, this
dogmatic was no schoolboy imitation on his part, but was to some extent
independently developed and was worked out both in opposition to
pantheistic Stoicism and to theoretical dualism. That we are not
mistaken in this opinion is shown by a document ranking among the most
valuable things preserved to us from the third century; we mean the
judgment passed on Origen by Porphyry in Euseb., H. E. VI. 19. Every
sentence is instructive,[701] but the culminating point is the judgment
contained in § 7: [Greek: kata men ton Bion Christianôs zôn kai
paranomôs, kata de tas peri tôn pragmatôn kai tou theou doxas Hellênizôn
kai ta Hellênôn tois othneiois hupoballomenos mythois.] ("His outward
life was that of a Christian and opposed to the law, but in regard to
his views of things and of the Deity, he thought like the Greeks,
inasmuch as he introduced their ideas into the myths of other peoples.")
We can everywhere verify this observation from Origen's works and
particularly from the books written against Celsus, where he is
continually obliged to mask his essential agreement in principles and
method with the enemy of the Christians.[702] The Gnosis is in fact the
Hellenic one and results in that wonderful picture of the world which,
though apparently a drama, is in reality immovable, and only assumes
such a complicated form here from its relation to the Holy Scriptures
and the history of Christ.[703] The Gnosis neutralises everything
connected with empiric history; and if this does not everywhere hold
good with regard to the actual occurrence of facts, it is at least
invariably the case in respect to their significance. The clearest proof
of this is (1) that Origen raised the thought of the unchangeability of
God to be the norm of his system and (2) that he denied the historical,
incarnate Logos any significance for "Gnostics." To these Christ merely
appears as the Logos who has been from eternity with the Father and has
always acted from the beginning. He alone is the object of the knowledge
of the wise man, who merely requires a perfect or, in other words, a
divine teacher.[704] The Gospel too only teaches the "shadow of the
secrets of Christ;" but the eternal Gospel, which is also the pneumatic
one, "clearly places before men's minds all things concerning the Son of
God himself, both the mysteries shown by his words, and the things of
which his acts were the riddles" ([Greek: saphôs paristêsi tois noousi
ta panta enôpion peri autou tou huiou tou Theou, kai ta paristamena
mustêria hupo tôn logôn autou, ta te pragmata, ôn ainigmata êsan hai
praxeis autou]).[705] No doubt the true theology based on revelation
makes pantheism appear overthrown as well as dualism, and here the
influence of the two Testaments cannot be mistaken; but a subtle form of
the latter recurs in Origen's system, whilst the manner in which he
rejected both made the Greek philosophy of the age feel that there was
something akin to it here. In the final utterances of religious
metaphysics ecclesiastical Christianity, with the exception of a few
compromises, is thrown off as a husk. The objects of religious knowledge
have no history or rather, and this is a genuinely Gnostic and
Neoplatonic idea, they have only a supramundane one.
This necessarily gave rise to the assumption of an esoteric and exoteric
form of the Christian religion, for it is only behind the statutory,
positive religion of the Church that religion itself is found. Origen
gave the clearest expression to this assumption, which must have been
already familiar in the Alexandrian school of catechists, and convinced
himself that it was correct, because he saw that the mass of Christians
were unable to grasp the deeper sense of Scripture, and because he
realised the difficulties of the exegesis. On the other hand, in solving
the problem of adapting the different points of his heterodox system of
thought to the _regula fidei_, he displayed the most masterly skill. He
succeeded in finding an external connection, because, though the
construction of his theory proceeded from the top downwards, he could
find support for it on the steps of the _regula fidei_, already
developed by Irenæus into the history of salvation.[706] The system
itself is to be, in principle and in every respect, monistic, but, as
the material world, though created by God out of nothing, merely appears
as a place of punishment and purification for souls, a strong element of
dualism is inherent in the system, as far as its practical application
is concerned.[707] The prevailing contrast is that between the one
transcendent essence and the multiplicity of all created things. The
pervading ambiguity lies in the twofold view of the spiritual in so far
as, on the one hand, it belongs to God as the unfolding of his essence,
and, on the other, as being created, is contrasted with God. This
ambiguity, which recurs in all the Neoplatonic systems and has continued
to characterise all mysticism down to the present day, originates in the
attempt to repel Stoic pantheism and yet to preserve the transcendental
nature of the human spirit, and to maintain the absolute causality of
God without allowing his goodness to be called in question. The
assumption that created spirits can freely determine their own course is
therefore a necessity of the system; in fact this assumption is one of
its main presuppositions[708] and is so boldly developed as to limit the
omnipotence and omniscience of God. But, as from the empirical point of
view the knot is tied for every man at the very moment he appears on
earth, and since the problem is not created by each human being as the
result of his own independent will, but lies in his organisation,
speculation must retreat behind history. So the system, in accordance
with certain hints of Plato, is constructed on the same plan as that of
Valentinus, for example, to which it has an extraordinary affinity. It
contains three parts: (1) The doctrine of God and his unfoldings or
creations, (2) the doctrine of the Fall and its consequences, (3) the
doctrine of redemption and restoration.[709] Like Denis, however, we may
also, in accordance with a premised theory of method, set forth the
system in four sections, viz., Theology, Cosmology, Anthropology,
Teleology. Origen's fundamental idea is "the original indestructible
unity of God and all spiritual essence." From this it necessarily
follows that the created spirit after fall, error, and sin must ever
return to its origin, to being in God. In this idea we have the key to
the religious philosophy of Origen.
The only sources for obtaining a knowledge of the truth are the Holy
Scriptures of both Testaments. No doubt the speculations of Greek
philosophers also contain truths, but these have only a propædeutic
value and, moreover, have no certainty to offer, as have the Holy
Scriptures, which are a witness to themselves in the fulfilment of
prophecy.[710] On the other hand Origen assumes that there was an
esoteric deeper knowledge in addition to the Holy Scriptures, and that
Jesus in particular imparted this deeper wisdom to a few;[711] but, as a
correct Church theologian, he scarcely made use of this assumption. The
first methodical principle of his exegesis is that the faith, as
professed in the Church in contradistinction to heresy, must not be
tampered with.[712] But it is the carrying out of this rule that really
forms the task of the theologian. For the faith itself is fixed and
requires no particular presentation; it never occurred to Origen to
assume that the fixing of the faith itself could present problems. It is
complete, clear, easily teachable, and really leads to victory over
sensuality and sin (see c. Cels. VII. 48 and cf. other passages), as
well as to fellowship with God, since it rests on the revelation of the
Logos. But, as it remains determined by fear and hope of reward so, as
"uninformed and irrational faith" ([Greek: pistis idiôtikê] and [Greek:
alogos]), it only leads to a "somatic Christianity" ([Greek:
Christianismos sômatikos]). It is the task of theology, however, to
decipher "spiritual Christianity" ([Greek: Christianismos pneumatikos])
from the Holy Scriptures, and to elevate faith to knowledge and clear
vision. This is effected by the method of Scripture exegesis which
ascertains the highest revelations of God.[713] The Scripture has a
threefold sense because, like the cosmos, alongside of which it stands
like a second revelation, as it were, it must contain a pneumatic,
psychic, and somatic element. The somatic or historical sense is in
every case the first that must be ascertained. It corresponds to the
stage of mere faith and has consequently the same dignity as the latter.
But there are instances where it is to be given up and designated as a
Jewish and fleshly sense. This is to be assumed in all cases where it
leads to ideas opposed to the nature of God, morality, the law of
nature, or reason.[714] Here one must judge (see above) that such
objectionable passages were meant to incite the searcher to a deeper
investigation. The psychic sense is of a moral nature: in the Old
Testament more especially most narratives have a moral content, which
one can easily find by stripping off the history as a covering; and in
certain passages one may content oneself with this meaning. The
pneumatic sense, which is the only meaning borne by many passages, an
assertion which neither Philo nor Clement ventured to make in plain
terms, has with Origen a negatively apologetic and a positively didactic
aim. It leads to the ultimate ideas which, once attained, are
self-evident, and, so to speak, pass completely over into the mind of
the theologian, because they finally obtain for him clear vision and
independent possession.[715] When the Gnostic has attained this stage,
he may throw away the ladders by which he has reached this height.[716]
He is then inwardly united with God's Logos, and from this union obtains
all that he requires. In most passages Origen presupposed the similarity
and equal value of all parts of the Holy Scriptures; but in some he
showed that even inspiration has its stages and grades, according to the
receptivity and worthiness of each prophet, thus applying his relative
view of all matters of fact in such cases also. In Christ the full
revelation of the Logos was first expressed; his Apostles did not
possess the same inspiration as he,[717] and among the Apostles and
apostolic men differences in the degrees of inspiration are again to be
assumed. Here Origen set the example of making a definite distinction
between a heroic age of the Apostles and the succeeding period. This
laid the foundation for an assumption through which the later Church
down to our time has appeased her conscience and freed herself from
demands that she could not satisfy.[718]
THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND HIS SELF-UNFOLDINGS OR CREATIONS.[719] The world
points back to an ultimate cause and the created spirit to an eternal,
pure, absolutely simple, and unchangeable spirit, who is the original
source of all existence and goodness, so that everything that exists
only does so in virtue of being caused by that One, and is good in so
far as it derives its essence from the One who is perfection and
goodness. This fundamental idea is the source of all the conclusions
drawn by Origen as to the essence, attributes, and knowableness of God.
As the One, God is contrasted with the Manifold; but the order in the
Manifold points back to the One. As the real Essence, God is opposed to
the essences that appear and seem to vanish, and that therefore have no
real existence, because they have not their principle in themselves, but
testify: "We have not made ourselves." As the absolutely immaterial
Spirit, God is contrasted with the spirit that is clogged with matter,
but which strives to get back to him from whom it received its origin.
The One is something different from the Manifold; but the order, the
dependence, and the longing of that which is created point back to the
One, who can therefore be known relatively from the Manifold. In
sharpest contrast to the heretical Gnosis, Origen maintained the
absolute causality of God, and, in spite of all abstractions in
determining the essence of God, he attributed self-consciousness and
will to this superessential Essence (in opposition to Valentinus,
Basilides, and the later Neoplatonists).[720] The created is one thing
and the Self-existent is another, but both are connected together; as
the created can only be understood from something self-existent, so the
self-existent is not without analogy to the created. The Self-existent
is in itself a living thing; it is beyond dispute that Origen with all
his abstractions represented the Deity, whom he primarily conceived as a
constant substance, in a more living, and, so to speak, in a more
personal way than the Greek philosophers. Hence it was possible for him
to produce a doctrine of the attributes of God. Here he did not even
shrink from applying his relative view to the Deity, because, as will be
seen, he never thinks of God without revelation, and because all
revelation must be something limited. The omnipresence of God indeed
suffers from no limitation. God is potentially everywhere; but he is
everywhere only potentially; that is, he neither encompasses nor is
encompassed. Nor is he diffused through the universe, but, as he is
removed from the limits of space, so also he is removed from space
itself.[721] But the omniscience and omnipotence of God have a limit,
which indeed, according to Origen, lies in the nature of the case
itself. In the first place his omnipotence is limited through his
essence, for he can only do what he wills;[722] secondly by logic, for
omnipotence cannot produce things containing an inward contradiction:
God can do nothing contrary to nature, all miracles being natural in the
highest sense[723]--thirdly, by the impossibility of that which is in
itself unlimited being comprehended, whence it follows that the extent
of everything created must be limited[724]--fourthly, by the
impossibility of realising an aim completely and without disturbing
elements.[725] Omniscience has also its corresponding limits; this is
specially proved from the freedom of spirits bestowed by God himself.
God has indeed the capacity of foreknowledge, but he knows transactions
beforehand because they happen; they do not happen because he knows
them.[726] That the divine purpose should be realised in the end
necessarily follows from the nature of the created spirit itself, apart
from the supporting activity of God. Like Irenæus and Tertullian Origen
very carefully discussed the attributes of goodness and justice in God
in opposition to the Marcionites.[727] But his exposition is different.
In his eyes goodness and justice are not two opposite attributes, which
can and must exist in God side by side; but as virtues they are to him
identical. God rewards in justice and punishes in kindness. That it
should go well with all, no matter how they conduct themselves, would be
no kindness; but it is kindness when God punishes to improve, deter, and
prevent. Passions, anger, and the like do not exist in God, nor any
plurality of virtues; but, as the Perfect One, he is all kindness. In
other places, however, Origen did not content himself with this
presentation. In opposition to the Marcionites, who declared Christ and
the Father of Christ to be good, and the creator of the world to be
just, he argued that, on the contrary, God (the foundation of the world)
is good, but that the Logos-Christ, in so far as he is the pedagogus, is
just.[728]
From the perfect goodness of God Origen infers that he reveals or
communicates himself, from his immutability that he _always_ reveals
himself. The eternal or never beginning communication of perfection to
other beings is a postulate of the concept "God". But, along with the
whole fraternity of those professing the same philosophy, Origen assumed
that the One, in becoming the Manifold and acting in the interests of
the Manifold, can only effect his purpose by divesting himself of
absolute apathy and once more assuming a form in which he can act, that
is, procuring for himself an adequate organ--_the Logos_. The content of
Origen's teaching about this Logos was not essentially different from
that of Philo and was therefore quite as contradictory; only in his case
everything is more sharply defined and the hypostasis of the Logos (in
opposition to the Monarchians) more clearly and precisely stated.[729]
Nevertheless the personal independence of the Logos is as yet by no
means so sharply defined as in the case of the later Arians. He is still
the Consciousness of God, the spiritual Activity of God. Hence he is on
the one hand the idea of the world existing in God, and on the other the
product of divine wisdom originating with the will of God. The following
are the most important propositions.[730] The Logos who appeared in
Christ, as is specially shown from Joh. I. 1 and Heb. I. 1, is the
perfect image[731] of God. He is the Wisdom of God, the reflection of
his perfection and glory, the invisible image of God. For that very
reason there is nothing corporeal in him[732] and he is therefore really
God, not [Greek: autotheos], nor [Greek: ho Theos], nor [Greek: anarchos
archê] ("beginningless beginning"), but the second God.[733] But, as
such, immutability is one of his attributes, that is, he can never lose
his divine essence, he can also in this respect neither increase nor
decrease (this immutability, however, is not an independent attribute,
but he is perfect as being an image of the Father's perfection).[734]
Accordingly this deity is not a communicated one in the sense of his
having another independent essence in addition to this divine nature;
but deity rather constitutes his essence: [Greek: ho sotêr ou kata
metousian, alla kat' ousian esti Theos][735] ("the Saviour is not God by
communication, but in his essence"). From this it follows that he shares
in the essence of God, therefore of the Father, and is accordingly
[Greek: homoousios] ("the same in substance with the Father") or, seeing
that, as Son, he has come forth from the Father, is engendered from the
essence of the Father.[736] But having proceeded, like the will, from
the Spirit, he was always with God; there was not a time when he was
not,[737] nay, even this expression is still too weak. It would be an
unworthy idea to think of God without his wisdom or to assume a
beginning of his begetting. Moreover, this begetting is not an act that
has only once taken place, but a process lasting from all eternity; the
Son is always being begotten of the Father.[738] It is the theology of
Origen which Gregory Thaumaturgus has thus summed up:[739] [Greek: eis
kurios, monos ek monou, theos ek theou, charaktêr kai eikôn tês
theotêtos, logos energos, sophia tês tôn holôn sustaseôs periektikê kai
dunamis tês holês ktiseôs poiêtikê, huios alêthinos alêthinou patros,
aoratos aoratou kai aphthartos aphthartou kai athanatos athanatou kai
aidios aidiou]. ("One Lord, one from one, God from God, impress and
image of Godhead, energetic word, wisdom embracing the entire system of
the universe and power producing all creation, true Son of a true
Father, the invisible of the invisible and incorruptible of the
incorruptible, the immortal of the immortal, the eternal of the
eternal"). The begetting is an indescribable act which can only be
represented by inadequate images: it is no emanation--the expression
[Greek: probolê] is not found, so far as I know[740]--but is rather to
be designated as an act of the will arising from an inner necessity, an
act which for that very reason is an emanation of the essence. But the
Logos thus produced is really a personally existing being; he is not an
impersonal force of the Father, though this still appears to be the case
in some passages of Clement, but he is the "sapientia dei
substantialiter subsistens"[741] ("the wisdom of God substantially
existing") "figura expressa substantial patris" ("express image of the
Father's substance"), "virtus altera in sua proprietate subsistens" ("a
second force existing in its own characteristic fashion"). He is, and
here Origen appeals to the old Acts of Paul, an "animal vivens" with an
independent existence.[742] He is another person,[743] namely, the
second person in number.[744] But here already begins Origen's second
train of thought which limits the first that we have set forth. As a
particular hypostasis, which has its "first cause" ([Greek: prôton
aition]) in God, the Son is "that which is caused" ([Greek: aitiaton]),
moreover as the fulness of ideas, as he who comprehends in himself all
the forms that are to have an active existence, the Son is no longer an
absolute _simplex_ like the Father.[745] He is already the first stage
of the transition from the One to the Manifold, and, as the medium of
the world-idea, his essence has an inward relation to the world, which
is itself without beginning.[746] As soon therefore as the category of
causality is applied--which moreover dominates the system--and the
particular contemplation of the Son in relation to the Father gives way
to the general contemplation of his task and destination, the Son is not
only called [Greek: ktisma] and [Greek: dêmiourgêma], but all the
utterances about the quality of his essence receive a limitation. We
nowhere find the express assertion that this quality is inferior or of a
different kind when compared with that of God; but these utterances lose
their force when it is asserted that complete similarity between Father
and Son only exists in relation to the world. We have to acknowledge the
divine being that appeared in Christ to be the manifestation of the
Deity; but, from God's standpoint, the Son is the hypostasis appointed
by and _subordinated_ to him.[747] The Son stands between the uncreated
One and the created Many; in so far as unchangeableness is an attribute
of self-existence he does not possess it.[748] It is evident why Origen
was obliged to conceive the Logos exactly as he did; it was only in this
form that the idea answered the purpose for which it was intended. In
the description of the essence of the Logos much more heed continues to
be given to his creative than to his redeeming significance. Since it
was only a teacher that Origen ultimately required for the purpose of
redemption, he could unfold the nature and task of the Logos without
thinking of Christ, whose name indeed he frequently mentions in his
disquisitions, but whose person is really not of the slightest
importance there.[749]