[Footnote 384: The Apology which Miltiades addressed to Marcus Aurelius

and his fellow-emperor perhaps bore the title: [Greek: huper tês kata

Christianous philosophias] (Euseb., H. E. V. 17. 5). It is certain that

Melito in his Apology designated Christianity as [Greek: hê kath' hêmas

philosophia] (l.c., IV. 26. 7). But, while it is undeniable that this

writer attempted, to a hitherto unexampled extent, to represent

Christianity as adapted to the Empire, we must nevertheless beware of

laying undue weight on the expression "philosophy." What Melito means

chiefly to emphasise is the fact that Christianity, which in former

times had developed into strength among the barbarians, began to

flourish in the provinces of the Empire simultaneously with the rise of

the monarchy under Augustus, that as foster-sister of the monarchy, it

increased in strength with the latter, and that this mutual relation of

the two institutions had given prosperity and splendour to the state.

When in the fragments preserved to us he twice, in this connection,

calls Christianity "philosophy," we must note that this expression

alternates with the other "[Greek: ho kath' hêmas logos]", and that he

uses the formula: "Thy forefathers held this philosophy in honour along

with the other cults" [Greek: pros tais allais thrêskeichis]. This

excludes the assumption that Melito in his Apology merely represented

Christian as philosophy (see also IV. 26. 5, where the Christians are

called "[Greek: to tôn theosebôn genos]"). He also wrote a treatise

[Greek: peri ktiseôs kai geneseôs Christou]. In it (fragment in the

Chron. Pasch) he called Christ [Greek: Theou logos pro aiônôn].]

[Footnote 385: See my treatise "Tatian's Rede an die Griechen übers."

1884 (Giessener Programm). Daniel, Tatianus, 1837. Steuer, Die Gottes-

und Logoslehre des Tatian, 1893.]

[Footnote 386: But see Orat. 4 init., 24 fin., 25 fin., 27 init.]

[Footnote 387: He not only accentuated the disagreement of philosophers

more strongly than Justin, but insisted more energetically than that

Apologist on the necessity of viewing the practical fruits of philosophy

in life as a criterion; see Orat. 2, 3, 19, 25. Nevertheless Socrates

still found grace in his eyes (c. 3). With regard to other philosophers

he listened to foolish and slanderous gossip.]

[Footnote 388: Orat. 13, 15 fin., 20. Tatian also gave credence to it

because it imparts such an intelligible picture of the creation of the

world (c. 29).]

[Footnote 389: Orat. 12: [Greek: ta tês hêmeteras paideias estin anôterô

tês kosmikês katalêpseôs]. Tatian troubled himself very little with

giving demonstrations. No other Apologist made such bold assertions.]

[Footnote 390: See Orat. 12 (p. 54 fin.), 20 (p. 90), 25 fin., 26 fin.,

29, 30 (p. 116), 13 (p. 62), 15 (p. 70), 36 (p. 142), 40 (p. 152 sq.).

The section cc. 12-15 of the Oratio is very important (see also c. 7

ff); for it shows that Tatian denied the natural immortality of the

soul, declared the soul (the material spirit) to be something inherent

in all matter, and accordingly looked on the distinction between men and

animals in respect of their inalienable natural constitution as only one

of degree. According to this Apologist the dignity of man does not

consist in his natural endowments: but in the union of the human soul

with the divine spirit, for which union indeed he was planned. But, in

Tatian's opinion, man lost this union by falling under the sovereignty

of the demons. The Spirit of God has left him, and consequently he has

fallen back to the level of the beasts. So it is man's task to unite the

Spirit again with himself, and thereby recover that religious principle

on which all wisdom and knowledge rest. This anthropology is opposed to

that of the Stoics and related to the "Gnostic" theory. It follows from

it that man, in order to reach his destination, must raise himself above

his natural endowment; see c. 15: [Greek: anthrôpon legô ton porrô men

anthrôptêtos pros auton de ton Theon kechôrêkota]. But with Tatian this

conception is burdened with radical inconsistency; for he assumes that

the Spirit reunites itself with every man who rightly uses his freedom,

and he thinks it still possible for every person to use his freedom

aright (11 fin., 13 fin., 15 fin.) So it is after all a mere assertion

that the natural man is only distinguished from the beast by speech. He

is also distinguished from it by freedom. And further it is only in

appearance that the blessing bestowed in the "Spirit" is a _donum

superadditum et supernaturale_. For if a proper spontaneous use of

freedom infallibly leads to the return of the Spirit, it is evident that

the decision and consequently the realisation of man's destination

depend on human freedom. That is, however, the proposition which all the

Apologists maintained. But indeed Tatian himself in his latter days

seems to have observed the inconsistency in which he had become involved

and to have solved the problem in the Gnostic, that is, the religious

sense. In his eyes, of course, the ordinary philosophy is a useless and

pernicious art; philosophers make their own opinions laws (c. 27);

whereas of Christians the following holds good (c. 32): [Greek: logou

tou dêmosiou kai epigeiou kechôrismenoi kai peithomenoi theou

parangelmasi kai nomô patros aphtharsias hepomenoi, pan to en doxê

keimenon anthrôpinê paraitoumetha].]

[Footnote 391: C. 31. init.: [Greek: hê hêmetera philosophia]. 32 (p.

128): [Greek: hoi boulomenoi philosophein par' hêmin anthrôpoi]. In c.

33 (p. 130) Christian women are designated [Greek: hai par hêmin

philosophousai]. C. 35: [Greek: hê kath' hêmas barbaros philosophia]. 40

(p. 152): [Greek: hoi kata Môusea kai homoiôs autô philosophountes]. 42:

[Greek: ho kata barbarous philosophôn Tatianos]. The [Greek: dogmata] of

the Christians: c. 1 (p. 2), 12 (p. 58), 19 (p. 86), 24 (p. 102), 27 (p.

108), 35 (p. 138), 40, 42. But Tatian pretty frequently calls

Christianity "[Greek: hê hêmetera paideia]", once also "[Greek:

nomothesia]" (12; cf. 40: [Greek: hoi hêmeteroi nomoi]), and often

[Greek: politeia].]

[Footnote 392: See, e.g., c. 29 fin.: the Christian doctrine gives us

[Greek: ouch hoper mê elabomen, all' hoper labontes hupo tês planês

echein ekoluthêmen].]

[Footnote 393: Tatian gave still stronger expression than Justin to the

opinion that it is the demons who have misled men and rule the world,

and that revelation through the prophets is opposed to this demon rule;

see c. 7 ff. The demons have fixed the laws of death; see c. 15 fin. and

elsewhere.]

[Footnote 394: Tatian also cannot at bottom distinguish between

revelation through the prophets and through Christ. See the description

of his conversion in c. 29. where only the Old Testament writings are

named, and c. 13 fin., 20 fin.. 12 (p. 54) etc.]

[Footnote 395: Knowledge and life appear in Tatian most closely

connected. See, e.g., c. 13 init.: "In itself the soul is not immortal,

but mortal; it is also possible, however, that it may not die. If it has

not attained a knowledge of that truth it dies and is dissolved with the

body; but later, at the end of the world, it will rise again with the

body in order to receive death in endless duration as a punishment. On

the contrary it does not die, though it is dissolved for a time, if it

is equipped with the knowledge of God."]

[Footnote 396: Barbarian: the Christian doctrines are [Greek: ta tôn

barbarôn dogmata] (c. 1): [Greek: kath' hêmas barbaros philosophia] (c.

35); [Greek: hê barbarikê nomothesia] (c. 12); [Greek: graphai

barbarikai] (c. 29); [Greek: kainotomein ta barbarôn dogmata] (c. 35);

[Greek: ho kata barbarous philosophôn Tatianos] (c. 42); [Greek: Môusês

pasês barbarou philosophias archêgos] (c. 31); see also c. 30, 32. In

Tatian's view barbarians and Greeks are the decisive contrasts in

history.]

[Footnote 397: See the proof from antiquity, c. 31 ff.]

[Footnote 398: C. 30 (p. 114): [Greek: toutôn oun tên katalêpsin

memuêmenos].]

[Footnote 399: Tatian's own confession is very important here (c. 26):

"Whilst I was reflecting on what was good it happened that there fell

into my hands certain writings of the barbarians, too old to be compared

with the doctrines of the Greeks, too divine to be compared with their

errors. And it chanced that they convinced me through the plainness of

their expressions, through the unartificial nature of their language,

through the intelligible representation of the creation of the world,

through the prediction of the future, the excellence of their precepts,

and the summing up of all kinds under one head. My soul was instructed

by God and I recognised that those Greek doctrines lead to perdition,

whereas the others abolish the slavery to which we are subjected in the

world, and rescue us from our many lords and tyrants, though they do not

give us blessings we had not already received, but rather such as we had

indeed obtained, but were not able to retain in consequence of error."

Here the whole theology of the Apologists is contained _in nuce_; see

Justin, Dial. 7-8. In Chaps. 32, 33 Tatian strongly emphasises the fact

that the Christian philosophy is accessible even to the most uneducated;

see Justin, Apol. II. 10; Athenag. 11 etc.]

[Footnote 400: The unknown author of the [Greek: Logos pros Ellênas]

also formed the same judgment as Tatian (Corp. Apolog., T. III., p. 2

sq., ed. Otto; a Syrian translation, greatly amplified, is found in the

Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658. It was published by Cureton, Spic.

Syr., p. 38 sq. with an English translation). Christianity is an

incomparable heavenly wisdom, the teacher of which is the Logos himself.

"It produces neither poets, nor philosophers, nor rhetoricians; but it

makes mortals immortal and men gods, and leads them away upwards from

the earth into super-Olympian regions." Through Christian knowledge the

soul returns to its Creator: [Greek: dei gar apokatatathênai othen

apestê].]

[Footnote 401: Nor is Plato "[Greek: ho dokôn en autois semnoteron

pephilosophêkenai]" any better than Epicurus and the Stoics (III. 6).

Correct views which are found in him in a greater measure than in the

others ([Greek: ho dokôn Hellênôn sophôteros gegenêsthai]), did not

prevent him from giving way to the stupidest babbling (III. 16).

Although he knew that the full truth can only be learned from God

himself through the law (III. 17), he indulged in the most foolish

guesses concerning the beginning of history. But where guesses find a

place, truth is not to be found (III. 16: [Greek: ei de eikasmô, ouk ara

alêthê estin ta hup' autou eirêmena]).]

[Footnote 402: Theophilus confesses (I. 14) exactly as Tatian does:

[Greek: kai gar egô êpistoun touto esesthai, alla nun katanoêsas auta

pisteuô, hama kai epituchôn hierais graphais tôn agiôn prophêtôn, hoi

kai proeipon dia pneumatos Theou ti progegonota ô tropô gegonen kai ta

enestôta tini tropô ginetai, kai ta eperchomena poia taxei

apartisthêsetai. Apodeixin oun labôn tôn ginomenôn kai

proanapephônêmenôn ouk apistô]; see also II. 8-10, 22, 30, 33-35: III.

10, 11, 17. Theophilus merely looks on the Gospel as a continuation of

the prophetic revelations and injunctions. Of Christ, however, he did

not speak at all, but only of the Logos (Pneuma), which has operated

from the beginning. To Theophilus the first chapters of Genesis already

contain the sum of all Christian knowledge (II. 10-32).]

[Footnote 403: See II. 8: [Greek: hupo daimonôn de empneusthentes kai

hup' autôn phusiôthentes ha eipon di' autôn eipon].]

[Footnote 404: The unknown author of the work _de resurrectione_, which

goes under the name of Justin (Corp. Apol., Vol. III.) has given a

surprising expression to the thought that it is simply impossible to

give a demonstration of truth. ([Greek: O men tês alêtheias logos estin

eleutheroste kai autexousios, upo mêdemian basanon elegchou thelôn

piptein mêde tên para tois akouousi di' apodeixeôs exetasin hupomenein.

To gar eugenes autou kai pepoithos autô tô pempsanti pisteuesthai

thelei]). He inveighs in the beginning of his treatise against all

rationalism, and on the one hand professes a sort of materialistic

theory of knowledge, whilst on the other, for that very reason, he

believes in inspiration and the authority of revelation; for all truth

originates with revelation, since God himself and God alone is the

truth. Christ revealed this truth and is for us [Greek: tôn olôn pistis

kai apodeixis]. But it is far from probable that the author would really

have carried this proposition to its logical conclusion (Justin, Dial. 3

ff. made a similar start). He wishes to meet his adversaries "armed with

the arguments of faith which are unconquered" (c. 1, p. 214), but the

arguments of faith are still the arguments of reason. Among these he

regarded it as most important that even according to the theories about

the world, that is, about God and matter, held by the "so-called sages,"

Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, the assumption of a resurrection of the

flesh is not irrational (c. 6, p. 228 f.). Some of these, viz.,

Pythagoras and Plato, also acknowledged the immortality of the soul.

But, for that very reason, this view is not sufficient, "for if the

Redeemer had only brought the message of the (eternal) life of the soul

what new thing would he have proclaimed in addition to what had been

made known by Pythagoras, Plato, and the band of their adherents?" (c.

10, p. 246.) This remark is very instructive, for it shows what

considerations led the Apologists to adhere to the belief in the

resurrection of the body. Zahn, (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol.

VIII., pp. 1 f., 20 f.) has lately reassigned to Justin himself the

fragment de resurr. His argument, though displaying great plausibility,

has nevertheless not fully convinced me. The question is of great

importance for fixing the relation of Justin to Paul. I shall not

discuss Hermias' "Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum," as the period when

this Christian disputant flourished is quite uncertain. We still possess

an early-Church Apology in Pseudo-Melito's "Oratio ad Antoninum Cæsarem"

(Otto, Corp. Apol. IX., p. 423 sq.). This book is preserved (written?)

in the Syrian language and was addressed to Caracalla or Heliogabalus

(preserved in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658). It is probably

dependent on Justin, but it is less polished and more violent than his

Apology.]

[Footnote 405: Massebieau (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1887, Vol.

XV. No. 3) has convinced me that Minucius wrote at a later period than

Tertullian and made use of his works.]

[Footnote 406: Cf. the plan of the "Octavius." The champion of

heathenism here opposed to the Christian is a philosopher representing

the standpoint of the middle Academy. This presupposes, as a matter of

course, that the latter undertakes the defence of the Stoical position.

See, besides, the corresponding arguments in the Apology of Tertullian,

e.g., c. 17, as well as his tractate: "de testimonio animæ naturaliter

Christianæ." We need merely mention that the work of Minucius is

throughout dependent on Cicero's book, "de natura deorum." In this

treatise he takes up a position more nearly akin to heathen syncretism

than Tertullian.]

[Footnote 407: In R. Kühn's investigation ("Der Octavius des Min.

Felix," Leipzig, 1882)--the best special work we possess on an early

Christian Apology from the point of view of the history of dogma--based

on a very careful analysis of the Octavius, more emphasis is laid on the

difference than on the agreement between Minucius and the Greek

Apologists. The author's exposition requires to be supplemented in the

latter respect (see Theologische Litteratur-Zeitung, 1883, No. 6).]

[Footnote 408: C. 20: "Exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum....

ut quivis arbitretur, aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut

philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos."]

[Footnote 409: See Minucius, 31 ff. A quite similar proceeding is

already found in Tertullian, who in his _Apologeticum_ has everywhere

given a Stoic colouring to Christian ethics and rules of life, and in c.

39 has drawn a complete veil over the peculiarity of the Christian

societies.]

[Footnote 410: Tertullian has done exactly the same thing; see Apolog.

46 (and de præscr. 7.)]

[Footnote 411: Tertull., de testim. I.: "Sed non eam te (animam) advoco,

quæ scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, academiis et porticibus

Atticis pasta sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et rudem et impoliitam et

idioticam compello, qualem te habent qui te solam habent... Imperitia

tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulæ peritiæ tuæ nemo credit."]

[Footnote 412: Tertull., Apol. 46: "Quid simile philosophus et

Christianas? Græciæ discipulus et coeli?" de præscr. 7: "Quid ergo

Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiæ et ecclesiæ?" Minuc. 38.5:

"Philosophorum supercilia contemnimus, quos corruptores et adulteros

novimus... nos, qui non habitu sapientiam sed mente præferimus, non

eloquimur magna sed vivimus, gloriamur nos consecutos, quod illi summa

intentione quæsiverunt nec invenire potuerunt. Quid ingrati sumus, quid

nobis invidemus, si veritas divinitatis nostri temporis ælate

maturuit?"]

[Footnote 413: Minucius did not enter closely into the significance of

Christ any more than Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus; he merely

touched upon it (9. 4: 29. 2). He also viewed Christianity as the

teaching of the Prophets; whoever acknowledges the latter must of

necessity adore the crucified Christ. Tertullian was accordingly the

first Apologist after Justin who again considered it necessary to give a

detailed account of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos (see the 21st

chapter of the Apology in its relation to chaps. 17-20).]

[Footnote 414: Among the Greek Apologists the unknown author of the work

"de Monarchia," which bears the name of Justin, has given clearest

expression to this conception. He is therefore most akin to Minucius

(see chap. I.). Here monotheism is designated as the [Greek: katholikê

doxa] which has fallen into oblivion through bad habit; for [Greek: tês

anthrôpinês phuseôs to kat' archên suzugian suneseôs kai sôtêrias

labousês eis epignôsin alêtheias thrêskeias te tês eis ton hena kai

pantôn despotên.] According to this, then, only an awakening is

required.]

[Footnote 415: But almost all the Apologists acknowledged that

heathendom possessed prophets. They recognise these in the Sibyls and

the old poets. The author of the work "de Monarchia" expressed the most

pronounced views in regard to this. Hermas (Vis. II. 4), however, shows

that the Apologists owed this notion also to an idea that was widespread

among Christian people.]

[Footnote 416: See Justin, Apol. I. 31, Dial. 7, p. 30 etc.]

[Footnote 417: See Tatian, c. 31 ff.]

[Footnote 418: In the New Testament the content of the Christian faith

is now here designated as dogma. In Clement (I. 11.), Hermas, and

Polycarp the word is not found at all; yet Clement (I. 20. 4, 27. 5)

called the divine order of nature [Greek: ta dedogmatismena hupo Theou].

In Ignatius (ad Magn. XIII. 1) we read: [Greek: spoudazete oun

bebaiôthênai en tois dogmasin tou kuriou kai tôn apostolôn], but [Greek:

dogmata] here exclusively mean the rules of life (see Zahn on this

passage), and this is also their signification in [Greek: Didachê] XI.

3. In the Epistle of Barnabas we read in several passages (I. 6: IX. 7:

X. 1, 9 f.) of "dogmas of the Lord;" but by these he means partly

particular mysteries, partly divine dispensations. Hence the Apologists

are the first to apply the word to the Christian faith, in accordance

with the language of philosophy. They are also the first who employed

the ideas [Greek: theologein] and [Greek: theologia]. The latter word is

twice found in Justin (Dial. 56) in the sense of "aliquem nominare

deum." In Dial. 113, however, it has the more comprehensive sense of "to

make religio-scientific investigations." Tatian (10) also used the word

in the first sense; on the contrary he entitled a book of which he was

the author "[Greek: pros tous apophênamenous ta peri Theou]" and not

"[Greek: pros tous theologountas]". In Athenagoras (Suppl. 10) theology

is the doctrine of God and of all beings to whom the predicate "Deity"

belongs (see also 20, 22). That is the old usage of the word. It was

thus employed by Tertullian in ad nat. II. 1 (the threefold division of

theology; in II. 2, 3 the expression "theologia physica, mythica" refers

to this); Cohort, ad Gr. 3, 22. The anonymous writer in Eusebius (H. E.

V. 28. 4, 5) is instructive on the point. Brilliant demonstrations of

the ancient use of the word "theology" are found in Natorp, Thema und

Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik (Philosophische Monatshefte,

1887, Parts I and 2, pp. 55-64). The title "theology," as applied to a

philosophic discipline, was first used by the Stoics; the old poets were

previously called "theologians," and the "theological" stage was the

prescientific one which is even earlier than the "childhood" of

"physicists" (so Aristotle speaks throughout). To the Fathers of the

Church also the old poets are still [Greek: hoi palaioi theologoi]. But

side by side with this we have an adoption of the Stoic view that there

is also a philosophical theology, because the teaching of the old poets

concerning the gods conceals under the veil of myth a treasure of

philosophical truth. In the Stoa arose the "impossible idea of a

'theology' which is to be philosophy, that is, knowledge based on

reason, and yet to have positive religion as the foundation of its

certainty." The Apologists accepted this, but added to it the

distinction of a [Greek: kosmikê] and [Greek: theologikê sophia.]]

[Footnote 419: Christ has a relation to all three parts of the scheme,

(1) as [Greek: logos]; (2) as [Greek: nomos, nomothetês], and [Greek:

kritês]; (3) as [Greek: didaskalos] and [Greek: sotêr].]

[Footnote 420: In the reproduction of the apologetical theology

historians of dogma have preferred to follow Justin; but here they have

constantly overlooked the fact that Justin was the most Christian among

the Apologists, and that the features of his teaching to which

particular value is rightly attached, are either not found in the others

at all (with the exception of Tertullian), or else in quite rudimentary

form. It is therefore proper to put the doctrines common to all the

Apologists in the foreground, and to describe what is peculiar to Justin

as such, so far as it agree with New Testament teachings or contains an

anticipation of the future tenor of dogma.]

[Footnote 421: Cicero's proposition (de nat. deor. II. 66. 167): "nemo

vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit," which was the

property of all the idealistic philosophers of the age, is found in the

Apologists reproduced in the most various forms (see, e.g., Tatian 29).

That all knowledge of the truth, both among the prophets and those who

follow their teaching, is derived from inspiration was in their eyes a

matter of certainty. But here they were only able to frame a theory in

the case of the prophets; for such a theory strictly applied to all

would have threatened the spontaneous character of the knowledge of the

truth.]

[Footnote 422: Justin, Apol. I. 3: [Greek: Hêmeteron oun ergon kai biou

kai mathêmatôn tên episkepsin pasi parechein].]

[Footnote 423: See the exposition of the doctrine of God in Aristides

with the conclusion found in all the Apologists, that God requires no

offerings and presents.]

[Footnote 424: Even Tatian says in c. 19: [Greek: Kosmou men gar ê

kataskeuê kalê, to de en autô politeuma phaulon].]

[Footnote 425: Tatian 5: [Greek: Oute anarchos ê hulê kathaper ho Theos,

oude dia to anarchon kai autê isodunamos tô Theô gennêtê de kai ouch

hupo tou allou gegonuia monon de hupo tou pantôn dêmiourgou

probeblêmenê]. 12. Even Justin does not seem to have taught otherwise,

though that is not quite certain; see Apol. I. 10, 59, 64, 67: II. 6.

Theophilus I. 4: II. 4, 10, 13 says very plainly: [Greek: ex ouk ontôn

ta panta epoiêsen.... ti de mega, ei ho theos ex hupokeimenês hulês

epoiei ton kosmon].]

[Footnote 426: Hence the knowledge of God and the right knowledge of the

world are most closely connected; see Tatian 27: [Greek: hê Theou

katalêpsis ên echô peri tôn holôn].]

[Footnote 427: The beginning of the fifth chapter of Tatian's Oration is

specially instructive here.]

[Footnote 428: According to what has been set forth in the text it is

incorrect to assert that the Apologists adopted the Logos doctrine in

order to reconcile monotheism with the divine honours paid to the

crucified Christ. The truth rather is that the Logos doctrine was

already part of their creed before they gave any consideration to the

person of the historical Christ, and _vice versâ_ Christ's right to

divine honours was to them a matter of certainty independently of the

Logos doctrine.]

[Footnote 429: We find the distinction of Logos (Son) and Spirit in

Justin, Apol. I. 5, and in every case where he quotes formulæ (if we are

not to assume the existence of interpolation in the text, which seems to

me not improbable; see now also Cramer in the Theologische Studien,

1893. pp. 17 ff., 138 ff.). In Tatian 13 fin. the Spirit is represented

as [Greek: ho diakonos tou peponthotos Theou]. The conception in Justin,

Dial. 116, is similar. Father, Word, and prophetic Spirit are spoken of

in Athenag. 10. The express designation [Greek: trias] is first found in

Theophilus (but see the Excerpta ex Theodoto); see II. 15: [Greek: hai

treis hêmerai tupoi heisin tês triados, tou Theou kai tou logou autou

kai tês sophias autou]; see II. 10, 18. But it is just in Theophilus

that the difficulty of deciding between Logos and Wisdom appears with

special plainness (II. 10). The interposition of the host of good angels

between Son and Spirit found in Justin, Apol. I. 5 (see Athenag.), is

exceedingly striking. We have, however, to notice, provided the text is

right, (1) that this interposition is only found in a single passage,

(2) that Justin wished to refute the reproach of [Greek: atheotês], (3)

that the placing of the Spirit after the angels does not necessarily

imply a position inferior to theirs, but merely a subordination to the

Son and the Father common to the Spirit and the angels, (4) that the

good angels were also invoked by the Christians, because they were

conceived as mediators of prayer (see my remark on I. Clem, ad Corinth.

LVI. 1); they might have found a place here just for this latter reason.

On the significance of the Holy Spirit in the theology of Justin, see

Zahn's Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 228: "If there be any one theologian of

the early Church who might be regarded as depriving the Holy Spirit of

all scientific _raison d'etre_ at least on the ground of having no

distinctive activity, and the Father of all share in revelation, it

is Justin." We cannot at bottom say that the Apologists possessed a

doctrine of the Trinity.]

[Footnote 430: To Justin the name of the Son is the most important; see

also Athenag. 10. The Logos had indeed been already called the Son of

God by Philo, and Celsus expressly says (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31); "If

according to your doctrine the Word is really the Son of God then we

agree with you;" but the Apologists are the first to attach the name of

Son to the Logos as a proper designation. If, however, the Logos is

intrinsically the Son of God, then Christ is the Son of God, not because

he is the begotten of God in the flesh (early Christian), but because

the spiritual being existing in him is the antemundane reproduction of

God (see Justin, Apol. II. 6: [Greek: ho huios tou patros kai Theou, ho

monos legomenos kuriôs huios])--a momentous expression.]

[Footnote 431: Athenag., 10; Tatian, Orat. 5.]

[Footnote 432: The clearest expression of this is in Tatian 5, which

passage is also to be compared with the following: [Greek: Theos ên en

archê, tên de archên logou dunamin pareilêphamen. Ho gar despotês tôn

holôn, autos huparchôn tou pantos hê hupostasis, kata men tên mêdepô

gegenêmenên poiêsin monos ên, katho de pasa dunamis, horatôn te kai

aoratôn autos hupostasis ên, sun autô ta panta sun autô dia logikês

dunameôs autos kai ho logos, hos ên auto, hupestêse. Thelêmati de tês

aplotêtos autou propêda logos, ho de logos, ou kata kenou chôrêsas,

ergon prôtotokon tou patros ginetai. Touton ismen tou kosmou tên archên.

Gegone de kata merismon, ou kata apokopên to gar apotmêthen tou prôtou

kechôristai, to de meriothen oikonomas tên hairesin proslabon ouk endea

ton hothen eilêptai pepoiêken. Ôsper gar aro mias dados anaptetai men

pura polla, tês de prôtês dados dia tên exapsin tôn pollôn dadôn ouk

elattoutai to phôs, houtô kai ho logos proelthôn ek tês tou patros

dunameôs ouk alogon pepoiêke ton gegennêkota]. In the identification of

the divine consciousness, that is, the power of God, with the force to

which the world is due the naturalistic basis of the apologetic

speculations is most clearly shown. Cf. Justin, Dial. 128, 129.]

[Footnote 433: The word "beget" ([Greek: gennan]) is used by the

Apologists, especially Justin, because the name "Son" was the recognised

expression for the Logos. No doubt the words [Greek: exereugesthai,

proballesthai, proerchesthai, propêdan] and the like express the

physical process more exactly in the sense of the Apologists. On the

other hand, however, [Greek: gennan] appears the more appropriate word

in so far as the relation of the essence of the Logos to the essence of

God is most clearly shown by the name "Son."]

[Footnote 434: None of the Apologists has precisely defined the Logos

idea. Zahn, l.c., p. 233, correctly remarks: "Whilst the distinction

drawn between the hitherto unspoken and the spoken word of the Creator

makes Christ appear as the thought of the world within the mind of God,

yet he is also to be something real which only requires to enter into a

new relation to God to become an active force. Then again this Word is

not to be the thought that God thinks, but the thought that thinks in

God. And again it is to be a something, or an Ego, in God's thinking

essence, which enters into reciprocal intercourse with something else in

God; occasionally also the reason of God which is in a state of active

exercise and without which he would not be rational." Considering this

evident uncertainty it appears to me a very dubious proceeding to

differentiate the conceptions of the Logos in Justin, Athenagoras,

Tatian, and Theophilus, as is usually done. If we consider that no

Apologist wrote a special treatise on the Logos, that Tatian (c. 5) is

really the only one from whom we have any precise statements, and that

the elements of the conception are the same in all, it appears

inadvisable to lay so great stress on the difference as Zahn, for

instance, has done in the book already referred to, p. 232 f. Hardly any

real difference can have existed between Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus

in the Logos doctrine proper. On the other hand Athenagoras certainly

seems to have tried to eliminate the appearance of the Logos in time,

and to emphasise the eternal nature of the divine relationships,

without, however, reaching the position which Irenæus took up here.]

[Footnote 435: This distinction is only found in Theophilus (II. 10);

but the idea exists in Tatian and probably also in Justin, though it is

uncertain whether Justin regarded the Logos as having any sort of being

before the moment of his begetting.]

[Footnote 436: Justin, Apol. II. 6., Dial. 61. The Logos is not produced

out of nothing, like the rest of the creatures. Yet it is evident that

the Apologists did not yet sharply and precisely distinguish between

begetting and creating, as the later theologians did; though some of

them certainly felt the necessity for a distinction.]

[Footnote 437: All the Apologists tacitly assume that the Logos in

virtue of his origin has the capacity of entering the finite. The

distinction which here exists between Father and Son is very pregnantly

expressed by Tertullian (adv. Marc. II. 27): "Igitur quæcumque exigitis

deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido

et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quæcumque autem ut indigna

reprehenditis deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso,

arbitro patris et ministro." But we ought not to charge the Apologists

with the theologoumenon that it was an inward necessity for the Logos to

become man. Their Logos hovers, as it were, between God and the world,

so that he appears as the highest creature, in so far as he is conceived

as the production of God; and again seems to be merged in God, in so far

as he is looked upon as the consciousness and spiritual force of God. To

Justin, however, the incarnation is irrational, and the rest of the

Greek Apologists are silent about it.]

[Footnote 438: The most of the Apologists argue against the conception

of the natural immortality of the human soul; see Tatian 13; Justin,

Dial. 5; Theoph. II. 27.]

[Footnote 439: The first chapter of Genesis represented to them the sum

of all wisdom, and therefore of all Christianity. Perhaps Justin had

already written a commentary to the Hexaëmeron (see my Texte und

Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 169 f.). It is certain that in the second

century Rhodon (Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 8), Theophilus (see his 2nd Book ad

Autol.), Candidus, and Apion (Euseb., H. E. V. 27) composed such. The

Gnostics also occupied themselves a great deal with Gen. I.-III.; see,

e.g., Marcus in Iren. I. 18.]

[Footnote 440: See Theophilus ad Aut. II. 27: [Greek: Ei gar ho Theos

athanaton ton anthrôpon ap' archês pepoiêkei, Theon auton pepoiêkei;

palin ei thnêton auton pepoiêkei edokei an ho Theos aitios einai tou

thanatou autou. Oute oun athanaton auton epoiêsen oute mên thnêton, alla

dektikon amphoterôn, hina, ei rhepsê epi ta tês athanasias têrêsas tên

entolên tou Theou, misthon komisêtai par' autou tên athanasian kai

genêtai Theos, ei d' au trapê epi ta tou thanatou pragmata parakousas

tou Theou, autos eautô aitios ê tou thanatou.]]

[Footnote 441: See Justin, Apol. I. 14 ff. and the parallel passages in

the other Apologists.]

[Footnote 442: See Tatian, Orat. II. and many other passages.]

[Footnote 443: Along with this the Apologists emphasise the resurrection

of the flesh in the strongest way as the specific article of Christian

anticipation, and prove the possibility of realising this irrational

hope. Yet to the Apologists the ultimate ground of their trust in this

early-Christian idea is their reliance on the unlimited omnipotence of

God and this confidence is a proof of the vividness of their idea of

him. Nevertheless this conception assumes that in the other world there

will be a return of the flesh, which on this side the grave had to be

overcome and regarded as non-existent. A clearly chiliastic element is

found only in Justin.]

[Footnote 444: No uniform conception of this is found in the Apologists;

see Wendt, Die Christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit

1882, pp. 8-20. Justin speaks only of a heavenly destination for which

man is naturally adapted. With Tatian and Theophilus it is different.]

[Footnote 445: The idea that the demon sovereignty has led to some

change in the psychological condition and capacities of man is

absolutely unknown to Justin (see Wendt, l.c., p. 11 f., who has

successfully defended the correct view in Engelhardt's "Das Christenthum

Justin's des Märtyrers" pp. 92 f. 151. f. 266 f., against Stählin,

"Justin der Märtyrer und sein neuester Beurtheiler" 1880, p. 16 f.).

Tatian expressed a different opinion, which, however, involved him in

evident contradictions (see above, p. 191 ff.). The apologetic theology

necessarily adhered to the two following propositions: (1) The freedom

to do what is good is not lost and cannot be. This doctrine was opposed

to philosophic determinism and popular fatalism. (2) The desires of the

flesh resulting from the constitution of man only become evil when they

destroy or endanger the sovereignty of reason. The formal _liberum

arbitrium_ explains the possibility of sin, whilst its actual existence

is accounted for by the desire that is excited by the demons. The

Apologists acknowledge the universality of sin and death, but refused to

admit the necessity of the former in order not to call its guilty

character in question. On the other hand they are deeply imbued with the

idea that the sovereignty of death is the most powerful factor in the

perpetuation of sin. Their believing conviction of the omnipotence of

God, as well as their moral conviction of the responsibility of man,

protected them in theory from a strictly dualistic conception of the

world. At the same time, like all who separate nature and morality in

their ethical system, though in other respects they do not do so, the

Apologists were obliged in practice to be dualists.]

[Footnote 446: Death is accounted the worst evil. When Theophilus (II.

26) represents it as a blessing, we must consider that he is arguing

against Marcion. Polytheism is traced to the demons; they are accounted

the authors of the fables about the gods; the shameful actions of the

latter are partly the deeds of demons and partly lies.]

[Footnote 447: The Old Testament therefore is not primarily viewed as

the book of prophecy or of preparation for Christ, but as the book of

the full revelation which cannot be surpassed. In point of content the

teaching of the prophets and of Christ is completely identical. The

prophetical details in the Old Testament serve only to attest the _one_

truth. The Apologists confess that they were converted to Christianity

by reading the Old Testament. Cf. Justin's and Tatian's confessions.

Perhaps Commodian (Instruct. I. 1) is also be understood thus.]

[Footnote 448: The _Oratio_ of Tatian is very instructive in this

respect. In this book he has nowhere spoken _ex professo_ of the

incarnation of the Logos in Christ; but in c. 13 fin. he calls the Holy

Spirit "the servant of God who has suffered," and in c. 21 init. he

says: "we are not fools and do not adduce anything stupid, when we

proclaim that God has appeared in human form." Similar expressions are

found in Minucius Felix. In no part of Aristides' Apology is there any

mention of the pre-Christian appearance of the Logos. The writer merely

speaks of the revelation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ.]

[Footnote 449: We seldom receive an answer to the question as to why

this or that particular occurrence should have been prophesied.

According to the ideas of the Apologists, however, we have hardly a

right to put that question; for, since the value of the historical

consists in its having been predicted, its content is of no importance.

The fact that Jesus finds the she-ass bound to a vine (Justin, Apol. I.

32) is virtually quite as important as his being born of a virgin. Both

occurrences attest the prophetic teachings of God, freedom, etc.]

[Footnote 450: In Justin's polemical works this must have appeared in a

still more striking way. Thus we find in a fragment of the treatise

[Greek: pros Markiôna], quoted by Irenæus (IV. 6. 2), the sentence

"unigenitus filius venit ad nos, suum plasma in semetipsum

recapitulans." So the theologoumenon of the _recapitulatio per Christum_

already appeared in Justin. (Vide also Dial. c. Tryph. 100.) If we

compare Tertullian's _Apologeticum_ with his Antignostic writings we

easily see how impossible it is to determine from that work the extent

of his Christian faith and knowledge. The same is probably the case,

though to a less extent, with Justin's apologetic writings.]

[Footnote 451: Christians do not place a man alongside of God, for

Christ is God, though indeed a second God. There is no question of two

natures. It is not the divine nature that Justin has insufficiently

emphasised--or at least this is only the case in so far as it is a

second Godhead--but the human nature; see Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p.

39 ff.]

[Footnote 452: We find allusions in Justin where the various incidents

in the history of the incarnate Logos are conceived as a series of

arrangements meant to form part of the history of salvation, to paralyse

mankind's sinful history, and to regenerate humanity. He is thus a

forerunner of Irenæus and Melito.]

[Footnote 453: Even the theologoumenon of the definite number of the

elect, which must be fulfilled, is found in Justin (Apol. I. 28, 45).

For that reason the judgment is put off by God (II. 7). The Apology of

Aristides contains a short account of the history of Jesus; his

conception, birth, preaching, choice of the 12 Apostles, crucifixion,

resurrection, ascension, sending out of the 12 Apostles are mentioned.]

[Footnote 454: "To Justin faith is only an acknowledgment of the mission

and Sonship of Christ and a conviction of the truth of his teaching.

Faith does not justify, but is merely a presupposition of the

justification which is effected through repentance, change of mind, and

sinless life. Only in so far as faith itself is already a free decision

to serve God has it the value of a saving act, which is indeed of such

significance that one can say, 'Abraham was justified by faith.' In

reality, however, this took place through [Greek: metanoia]." The idea

of the new birth is exhausted in the thought: [Greek: Theos kalei eis

metanoian], that of the forgiveness of sins in the idea: "God is so good

that he overlooks sins committed in a state of ignorance, if man has

changed his mind." Accordingly, Christ is the Redeemer in so far as he

has brought about all the conditions which make for repentance.]

[Footnote 455: This is in fact already the case in Justin here and

there, but in the main there are as yet mere traces of it: the

Apologists are no mystics.]

[Footnote 456: If we consider how largely the demons bulked in the ideas

of the Apologists, we must rate very highly their conviction of the

redeeming power of Christ and of his name, a power continuously shown in

the victories over the demons. See Justin Apol. II. 6, 8; Dial. II, 30,

35, 39, 76, 85, 111, 121; Tertull., Apol. 23, 27, 32, 37 etc. Tatian

also (16 fin.) confirms it, and c. 12, p. 56, line 7 ff. (ed. Otto) does

not contradict this.]

[Footnote 457: Von Engelhardt, Christenthum Justin's, p. 432 f., has

pronounced against its genuineness; see also my Texte und Untersuchungen

I. 1, 2, p. 158. In favour of its genuineness see Hilgenfeld,

Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1883, p. 26 f. The fragment

is worded as follows: [Greek: Plasas ho Theos kat' archas ton anthrôpon

tês gnômês autou ta tês phuseôs apêôrêsen entolê mia poiêsamenos tên

diapeiran. Phulaxanta men gar tautên tês athantou lêxeôs pepoiêken

esesthai, parabanta de tês enantias. Outô gegonôs ho anthrôpos kai pros

tên parabasin euthus elthôn tên phthoran phusikôs eisedexato. Phusei de

tês phthoras prosgenomenês anankaion ên hoti sôsai boulomenos ên tên

phthoropoion ousian aphanisas. Touto de ouk ên heteros genesthai, ei

mêper hê kata phusin zôê proseplakê tô tên phthoran dexamenô,

aphanizousa men tên phthoran, athanaton de tou loipou to dexamenon

diatêrousa. Dia touto ton logon edeêsen en sômati genesthai, hina (tou

thanatou) tês kata phusin hêmas phthoras eleutherôsê. Ei gar, hôs phate,

neumati monon ton thanaton hêmôn apekôlusen, ou prosêi men dia tên

boulêsin ho thanatos, ouden de êtton phthartoi palin êmen phuikên en

heautois tên phthoran peripherontes].]

[Footnote 458: Weizsäcker, Jahrbücher fur deutsche Theologie, 1867, p.

119, has with good reason strongly emphasised this element. See also

Stählin, Justin der Martyrer, 1880, p. 63 f., whose criticism of Von

Engelhardt's book contains much that is worthy of note, though it

appears to me inappropriate in the main.]

[Footnote 459: Loofs continues: "The Apologists, viewing the

transference of the concept 'Son' to the preëxistent Christ as a matter

of course, enabled the Christological problem of the 4th century to be

started. They removed the point of departure of the Christological

speculation from the historical Christ back into the preëxistence and

depreciated the importance of Jesus' life as compared with the

incarnation. They connected the Christology with the cosmology, but were

not able to combine it with the scheme of salvation. Their Logos

doctrine is not a 'higher' Christology than the prevailing form; it

rather lags behind the genuine Christian estimate of Christ. It is not

God who reveals himself in Christ, but the Logos, the depotentiated God,

who _as God_ is subordinate to the supreme Deity."]

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNINGS OF AN ECCLESIASTICO-THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION AND

REVISION OF THE RULE OF FAITH IN OPPOSITION TO GNOSTICISM ON THE BASIS

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE APOLOGISTS:

MELITO, IRENÆUS, TERTULLIAN, HIPPOLYTUS, NOVATIAN.[460]

1. _The theological position of Irenæus and the later contemporary

Church teachers_.

Gnosticism and the Marcionite Church had compelled orthodox Christianity

to make a selection from tradition and to make this binding on

Christians as an apostolical law. Everything that laid claim to validity

had henceforth to be legitimised by the faith, i.e., the baptismal

confession and the New Testament canon of Scripture (see above, chap. 2,

under A and B). However, mere "prescriptions" could no longer suffice

here. But the baptismal confession was no "doctrine;" if it was to be

transformed into such it required an interpretation. We have shown above

that the _interpreted_ baptismal confession was instituted as the guide

for the faith. This interpretation took its _matter_ from the sacred

books of _both_ Testaments. It owed its guiding lines, however, on the

one hand to philosophical theology, as set forth by the Apologists, and

on the other to the earnest endeavour to maintain and defend against all

attacks the traditional convictions and hopes of believers, as professed

in the past generation by the enthusiastic forefathers of the Church. In

addition to this, certain interests, which had found expression in the

speculations of the so-called Gnostics, were adopted in an increasing

degree among all thinking Christians, and also could not but influence

the ecclesiastical teachers.[461] The theological labours, thus

initiated, accordingly bear the impress of great uniqueness and

complexity. In the first place, the old Catholic Fathers, Melito,[462]

Rhodon,[463] Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian were in every case

convinced that all their expositions contained the universal Church

faith itself and nothing else. Though the faith is identical with the

baptismal confession, yet every interpretation of it derived from the

New Testament is no less certain than the shortest formula.[464] The

creation of the New Testament furnished all at once a quite unlimited

multitude of conceptions, the whole of which appeared as "doctrines" and

offered themselves for incorporation with the "faith."[465] The limits

of the latter therefore seem to be indefinitely extended, whilst on the

other hand tradition, and polemics too in many cases, demanded an

adherence to the shortest formula. The oscillation between this brief

formula, the contents of which, as a rule, did not suffice, and that

fulness, which admitted of no bounds at all, is characteristic of the

old Catholic Fathers we have mentioned. In the second place, these

fathers felt quite as much need of a rational proof in their arguments

with their christian opponents, as they did while contending with the

heathen;[466] and, being themselves children of their time, they

required this proof for their own assurance and that of their

fellow-believers. The epoch in which men appealed to charisms, and

"knowledge" counted as much as prophecy and vision, because it was still

of them same nature, was in the main a thing of the past.[467] Tradition

and reason had taken the place of charisms as courts of appeal. But this

change had neither come to be clearly recognized,[468] nor was the right

and scope of rational theology alongside of tradition felt to be a

problem. We can indeed trace the consciousness of the danger in

attempting to introduce new _termini_ and regulations not prescribed by

the Holy Scriptures.[469] The bishops themselves in fact encouraged this

apprehension in order to warn people against the Gnostics,[470] and

after the deluge of heresy, representatives of Church orthodoxy looked

with distrust on every philosophic-theological formula.[471] Such

propositions of rationalistic theology as were absolutely required,

were, however, placed by Irenæus and Tertullian on the same level as the

hallowed doctrines of tradition, and were not viewed by them as

something of a different nature. Irenæus uttered most urgent warnings

against subtle speculations;[472] but yet, in the naivest way,

associated with the faithfully preserved traditional doctrines and

fancies of the faith theories which he likewise regarded as tradition

and which, in point of form, did not differ from those of the Apologists

or Gnostics.[473] The Holy Scriptures of the New Testament were the

basis on which Irenæus set forth the most important doctrines of

Christianity. Some of these he stated as they had been conceived by the

oldest tradition (see the eschatology), others he adapted to the new

necessities. The qualitative distinction between the _fides credenda_

and theology was noticed neither by Irenæus nor by Hippolytus and

Tertullian. According to Irenæus I. 10. 3 this distinction is merely

quantitative. Here faith and theological knowledge are still completely

intermixed. Whilst stating and establishing the doctrines of tradition

with the help of the New Testament, and revising and fixing them by

means of intelligent deduction, the Fathers think they are setting forth

the faith itself and nothing else. Anything more than this is only

curiosity not unattended with danger to Christians. Theology is

interpreted faith.[474]

Corresponding to the baptismal confession there thus arose at the first

a loose system of dogmas which were necessarily devoid of strict style,

definite principle, or fixed and harmonious aim. In this form we find

them with special plainness in Tertullian.[475] This writer was still

completely incapable of inwardly connecting his rational (Stoic)

theology, as developed by him for apologetic purposes, with the

Christological doctrines of the _regula fidei_, which, after the example

of Irenæus, he constructed and defended from Scripture and tradition in

opposition to heresy. Whenever he attempts in any place to prove the

_intrinsic_ necessity of these dogmas, he seldom gets beyond rhetorical

statements, holy paradoxes, or juristic forms. As a systematic thinker,

a cosmologist, moralist, and jurist rather than a theosophist, as a

churchman, a masterly defender of tradition, as a Christian exclusively

guided in practical life by the strict precepts and hopes of the Gospel,

his theology, if by that we understand his collective theological

disquisitions, is completely devoid of unity, and can only be termed a

mixture of dissimilar and, not unfrequently, contradictory propositions,

which admit of no comparison with the older theology of Valentinus or

the later system of Origen.[476] To Tertullian everything lies side by

side; problems which chance to turn up are just as quickly solved. The

specific faith of Christians is indeed no longer, as it sometimes seems

to be in Justin's case, a great apparatus of proof for the doctrines of

the only true philosophy; it rather stands, in its own independent

value, side by side with these, partly in a crude, partly in a developed

form; but inner principles and aims are nearly everywhere sought for in

vain.[477] In spite of this he possesses inestimable importance in the

history of dogma; for he developed and created, in a disconnected form

and partly in the shape of legal propositions, a series of the most

important dogmatic formulæ, which Cyprian, Novatian, Hosius, and the

Roman bishops of the fourth century, Ambrosius and Leo I., introduced

into the general dogmatic system of the Catholic Church. He founded the

terminology both of the trinitarian and of the Christological dogma; and

in addition to this was the first to give currency to a series of

dogmatic concepts (_satisfacere_, _meritum_, _sacramentum_, _vitium

originis_ etc., etc._). Finally it was he who at the very outset

imparted to the type of dogmatic that arose in the West its momentous

bias in the direction of _auctoritas et ratio_, and its corresponding

tendency to assume a legal character (_lex_, formal and material),

peculiarities which were to become more and more clearly marked as time

went on.[478] But, great as is his importance in this respect, it has no

connection at all with the fundamental conception of Christianity

peculiar to himself, for, as a matter of fact, this was already out of

date at the time when he lived. What influenced the history of dogma was

not his Christianity, but his masterly power of framing formulæ.

It is different with Irenæus. The Christianity of this man proved a

decisive factor in the history of dogma in respect of its content. If

Tertullian supplied the future Catholic dogmatic with the most important

part of its formulæ, Irenæus clearly sketched for it its fundamental

idea, by combining the ancient notion of salvation with New Testament

(Pauline) thoughts.[479] Accordingly, as far as the essence of the

matter is concerned, the great work of Irenæus is far superior to the

theological writings of Tertullian. This appears already in the task,

voluntarily undertaken by Irenæus, of giving a relatively complete

exposition of the doctrines of ecclesiastical Christianity on the basis

of the New Testament, in opposition to heresy. Tertullian nowhere

betrayed a similar systematic necessity, which indeed, in the case of

the Gallic bishop too, only made its appearance as the result of

polemical motives. But Irenæus to a certain degree succeeded in

amalgamating philosophic theology and the statements of ecclesiastical

tradition viewed as doctrines. This result followed (1) because he never

lost sight of a fundamental idea to which he tried to refer everything,

and (2) because he was directed by a confident view of Christianity as a

religion, that is, a theory of its purpose. The first fundamental idea,

in its all-dominating importance, was suggested to Irenæus by his

opposition to Gnosticism. It is the conviction that the Creator of the

world and the supreme God are one and the same.[480] The other theory as

to the aim of Christianity, however, is shared by Irenæus with Paul,

Valentinus, and Marcion. It is the conviction that Christianity is real

redemption, and that this redemption was only effected by the appearance

of Christ. The working out of these two ideas is the most important

feature in Irenæus' book. As yet, indeed, he by no means really

succeeded in completely adapting to these two fundamental thoughts all

the materials to be taken from Holy Scripture and found in the rule of

faith; he only thought with systematic clearness within the scheme of

the Apologists. His archaic eschatological disquisitions are of a

heterogeneous nature, and a great deal of his material, as, for

instance, Pauline formulæ and thoughts, he completely emptied of its

content, inasmuch as he merely contrived to turn it into a testimony of

the oneness and absolute causality of God the Creator; but the

repetition of the same main thoughts to an extent that is wearisome to

us, and the attempt to refer everything to these, unmistakably

constitute the success of his work.[481] God the Creator and the one

Jesus Christ are really the middle points of his theological system, and

in this way he tried to assign an intrinsic significance to the several

historical statements of the baptismal confession. Looked at from this

point of view, his speculations were almost of an identical nature with

the Gnostic.[482] But, while he conceives Christianity as an explanation

of the world and as redemption, his Christocentric teaching was opposed

to that of the Gnostics. Since the latter started with the conception of

an original dualism they saw in the empiric world a faulty combination

of opposing elements,[483] and therefore recognised in the redemption by

Christ the separation of what was unnaturally united. Irenæus, on the

contrary, who began with the idea of the absolute causality of God the

Creator, saw in the empiric world faulty estrangements and separations,

and therefore viewed the redemption by Christ as the reunion of things

unnaturally separated--the "recapitulatio" ([Greek:

anakephalaiôsis]).[484] This speculative thought, which involved the

highest imaginable optimism in contrast to Gnostic pessimism, brought

Irenæus into touch with certain Pauline trains of thought,[485] and

enabled him to adhere to the theology of the Apologists. At the same

time it opened up a view of the person of Christ, which supplemented the

great defect of that theology,[486] surpassed the Christology of the

Gnostics,[487] and made it possible to utilise the Christological

statements contained in certain books of the New Testament.[488]

So far as we know at least, Irenæus is the first ecclesiastical

theologian after the time of the Apologists (see Ignatius before that)

who assigned a quite specific significance to the person of Christ and

in fact regarded it as the vital factor.[489] That was possible for him

because of his realistic view of redemption. Here, however, he did not

fall into the abyss of Gnosticism, because, as a disciple of the

"elders", he adhered to the early-Christian eschatology, and because, as

a follower of the Apologists, he held, along with the realistic

conception of salvation, the other dissimilar theory that Christ, as the

teacher, imparts to men, who are free and naturally constituted for

fellowship with God, the knowledge which enables them to imitate God,

and thus by their own act to attain communion with him. Nevertheless to

Irenæus the pith of the matter is already found in the idea that

Christianity is real redemption, i.e., that the highest blessing

bestowed in Christianity is the deification of human nature through the

gift of immortality, and that this deification includes the full

knowledge and enjoying of God (visio dei). This conception suggested to

him the question as to the cause of the incarnation as well as the

answer to the same. The question "cur deus--homo", which was by no means

clearly formulated in the apologetic writings, in so far as in these

"homo" only meant _appearance_ among men, and the "why" was answered by

referring to prophecy and the necessity of divine teaching, was by

Irenæus made the central point. The reasons why the answer he gave was

so highly satisfactory may be stated as follows: (1) It proved that the

Christian blessing of salvation was of a specific kind. (2) It was

similar in point of form to the so-called Gnostic conception of

Christianity, and even surpassed it as regards the promised extent of

the sphere included in the deification. (3) It harmonised with the

eschatological tendency of Christendom, and at the same time was fitted

to replace the material eschatological expectations that were fading

away. (4) It was in keeping with the mystic and Neoplatonic current of

the time, and afforded it the highest imaginable satisfaction. (5) For

the vanishing trust in the possibility of attaining the highest

knowledge by the aid of reason it substituted the sure hope of a

supernatural transformation of human nature which would even enable it

to appropriate that which is above reason. (6) Lastly, it provided the

traditional historical utterances respecting Christ, as well as the

whole preceding course of history, with a firm foundation and a definite

aim, and made it possible to conceive a history of salvation unfolding

itself by degrees [Greek: oikonomia Theou]. According to this conception

the central point of history was no longer the Logos as such, but Christ

as the _incarnate God_, while at the same time the moralistic interest

was balanced by a really religious one. An approach was thus made to the

Pauline theology, though indeed in a very peculiar way and to some

extent only in appearance. A more exact representation of salvation

through Christ has, however, been given by Irenæus as follows:

Incorruptibility is a _habitus_ which is the opposite of our present one

and indeed of man's natural condition. For immortality is at once God's

manner of existence and his attribute; as a created being man is only

"capable of incorruption and immortality" ("_capax incorruptionis et

immortalitatis_");[490] thanks to the divine goodness, however, he is

intended for the same, and yet is empirically "subjected to the power of

death" ("sub condicione mortis"). Now the sole way in which immortality

as a physical condition can be obtained is by its possessor uniting

himself _realiter_ with human nature, in order to deify it "by adoption"

("_per adoptionem_"), such is the technical term of Irenæus. The deity

must become what we are in order that we may become what he is.

Accordingly, if Christ is to be the Redeemer, he must himself be God,

and all the stress must fall upon his birth as man. "By his birth as man

the eternal Word of God guarantees the inheritance of life to those who

in their natural birth have inherited death."[491] But this work of

Christ can be conceived as _recapitulatio_ because God the Redeemer is

identical with God the Creator; and Christ consequently brings about a

final condition which existed from the beginning in God's plan, but

could not be immediately realised in consequence of the entrance of sin.

It is perhaps Irenæus' highest merit, from a historical and

ecclesiastical point of view, to have worked out this thought in

pregnant fashion and with the simplest means, i.e., without the

apparatus of the Gnostics, but rather by the aid of simple and

essentially Biblical ideas. Moreover, a few decades later, he and

Melito, an author unfortunately so little known to us, were already

credited with this merit. For the author of the so-called "Little

Labyrinth" (Euseb., H. E. V. 28. 5) can indeed boast with regard to the

works of Justin, Miltiades, Tatian, Clement, etc., that they declared

Christ to be God, but then continues: [Greek: Ta Eirênaiou te kai

Melitônos kai tôn loipôn tis agnoei biblia, theon kai anthrôpon

katangellonta ton Christon] ("Who is ignorant of the books of Irenæus,

Melito, and the rest, which proclaim Christ to be God and man"). The

progress in theological views is very precisely and appropriately

expressed in these words. The Apologists also professed their belief in

the full revelation of God upon earth, that is, in revelation as the

teaching which necessarily leads to immortality;[492] but Irenæus is the

first to whom Jesus Christ, God and man, is the centre of history and

faith.[493] Following the method of Valentinus, he succeeded in

sketching a history of salvation, the gradual realising of the [Greek:

oikonomia Theou] culminating in the deification of believing humanity,

but here he always managed to keep his language essentially within the

limits of the Biblical. The various acting æons of the Gnostics became

to him different stages in the saving work of the one Creator and his

Logos. His system seemed to have absorbed the rationalism of the

Apologists and the intelligible simplicity of their moral theology, just

as much as it did the Gnostic dualism with its particoloured mythology.

Revelation had become history, the history of salvation; and dogmatics

had in a certain fashion become a way of looking at history, the

knowledge of God's ways of salvation that lead historically to an

appointed goal.[494]

But, as this realistic, quasi-historical view of the subject was by no

means completely worked out by Irenæus himself, since the theory of

human freedom did not admit of its logical development, and since the

New Testament also pointed in other directions, it did not yet become

the predominating one even in the third century, nor was it consistently

carried out by any one teacher. The two conceptions opposed to it, that

of the early Christian eschatology and the rationalistic one, were still

in vogue. The two latter were closely connected in the third century,

especially in the West, whilst the mystic and realistic view was almost

completely lacking there. In this respect Tertullian adopted but little

from Irenæus. Hippolytus also lagged behind him. Teachers like

Commodian, Arnobius, and Lactantius, however, wrote as if there had been

no Gnostic movement at all, and as if no Antignostic Church theology

existed. The immediate result of the work carried on by Irenæus and the

Antignostic teachers in the Church consisted in the fixing of tradition

and in the intelligent treatment of individual doctrines, which

gradually became established. The most important will be set forth in

what follows. On the most vital point, the introduction of the

philosophical Christology into the Church's rule of faith, see Chapter

7.

The manner in which Irenæus undertook his great task of expounding and

defending orthodox Christianity in opposition to the Gnostic form was

already a prediction of the future. The oldest Christian motives and

hopes; the letter of both Testaments, including even Pauline thoughts;

moralistic and philosophical elements, the result of the Apologists'

labours; and realistic and mystical features balance each other in his

treatment. He glides over from the one to the other; limits the one by

the other; plays off Scripture against reason, tradition against the

obscurity of the Scriptures; and combats fantastic speculation by an

appeal sometimes to reason, sometimes to the limits of human knowledge.

Behind all this and dominating everything, we find his firm belief in

the bestowal of divine incorruptibility on believers through the work of

the God-man. This eclectic method did not arise from shrewd calculation.

It was equally the result of a rare capacity for appropriating the

feelings and ideas of others, combined with the conservative instincts

that guided the great teacher, and the consequence of a happy blindness

to the gulf which lay between the Christian tradition and the world of

ideas prevailing at that time. Still unconscious of the greatest

problem, Irenæus with inward sincerity sketched out that future dogmatic

method according to which the theology compiled by an eclectic process

is to be nothing else than the simple faith itself, this being merely

illustrated and explained, developed and by that very process

established, as far as "stands in the Holy Scripture," and--let us

add--as far as reason requires. But Irenæus was already obliged to

decline answering the question as to how far unexplained faith can be

sufficient for most Christians, though nothing but this explanation can

solve the great problems, "why more covenants than one were given to

mankind, what was the character of each covenant, why God shut up every

man unto unbelief, why the Word became flesh and suffered, why the

advent of the Son of God only took place in the last times etc." (I. 10.

3). The relation of faith and theological Gnosis was fixed by Irenæus to

the effect that the latter is simply a continuation of the former.[495]

At the same time, however, he did not clearly show how the collection of

historical statements found in the confession can of itself guarantee a

sufficient and tenable knowledge of Christianity. Here the speculative

theories are as a matter of fact quite imbedded in the historical

propositions of tradition. Will these obscurities remain when once the

Church is forced to compete in its theological system with the whole

philosophical science of the Greeks, or may it be expected that, instead

of this system of eclecticism and compromise, a method will find

acceptance which, distinguishing between faith and theology, will

interpret in a new and speculative sense the whole complex of tradition?

Irenæus' process has at least this one advantage over the other method:

according to it everything can be reckoned part of the faith, providing

it bears the stamp of truth, without the faith seeming to alter its

nature. It is incorporated in the theology of facts which the faith here

appears to be.[496] The latter, however, imperceptibly becomes a

revealed system of doctrine and history; and though Irenæus himself

always seeks to refer everything again to the "simple faith" ([Greek:

philê pistis]), and to believing simplicity, that is, to the belief in

the Creator and the Son of God who became man, yet it was not in his

power to stop the development destined to transform the faith into

knowledge of a theological system. The pronounced hellenising of the

Gospel, brought about by the Gnostic systems, was averted by Irenæus and

the later ecclesiastical teachers by preserving a great portion of the

early Christian tradition, partly as regards its letter, partly as

regards its spirit, and thus rescuing it for the future. But the price

of this preservation was the adoption of a series of "Gnostic" formulæ.

Churchmen, though with hesitation, adopted the adversary's way of

looking at things, and necessarily did so, because as they became ever

further and further removed from the early-Christian feelings and

thoughts, they had always more and more lost every other point of view.

The old Catholic Fathers permanently settled a great part of early

tradition for Christendom, but at the same time promoted the gradual

hellenising of Christianity.

2. _The Doctrines of the Church._

In the following section we do not intend to give a presentation of the

theology of Irenæus and the other Antignostic Church teachers, but

merely to set forth those points of doctrine to which the teachings of

these men gave currency in succeeding times.

Against the Gnostic theses[497] Irenæus and his successors, apart from

the proof from prescription, adduced the following intrinsic

considerations: (1) In the case of the Gnostics and Marcion the Deity

lacks absoluteness, because he does not embrace everything, that is, he

is bounded by the _kenoma_ or by the sphere of a second God; and also

because his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence have a

corresponding limitation.[498] (2) The assumption of divine emanations

and of a differentiated divine _pleroma_ represents the Deity as a

composite, i.e.,[499] finite being; and, moreover, the personification

of the divine qualities is a mythological freak, the folly of which is

evident as soon as one also makes the attempt to personify the

affections and qualities of man in a similar way.[500] (3) The attempt

to make out conditions existing within the Godhead is in itself absurd

and audacious.[501] (4) The theory of the passion and ignorance of

Sophia introduces sin into the pleroma itself, i.e., into the

Godhead.[502] With this the weightiest argument against the Gnostic

cosmogony is already mentioned. A further argument against the system is

that the world and mankind would have been incapable of improvement, if

they had owed their origin to ignorance and sin.[503] Irenæus and

Tertullian employ lengthy arguments to show that a God who has created

nothing is inconceivable, and that a Demiurge occupying a position

alongside of or below the Supreme Being is self-contradictory, inasmuch

as he sometimes appears higher than this Supreme Being, and sometimes so

weak and limited that one can no longer look on him as a God.[504] The

Fathers everywhere argue on behalf of the Gnostic Demiurge and against

the Gnostic supreme God. It never occurs to them to proceed in the

opposite way and prove that the supreme God may be the Creator. All

their efforts are rather directed to show that the Creator of the world

is the only and supreme God, and that there can be no other above this

one. This attitude of the Fathers is characteristic; for it proves that

the apologetico-philosophical theology was their fundamental assumption.

The Gnostic (Marcionite) supreme God is the God of religion, the God of

redemption; the Demiurge is the being required to explain the world. The

intervention of the Fathers on his behalf, that is, their assuming him

as the basis of their arguments, reveals what was fundamental and what

was accidental in their religious teaching. At the same time, however,

it shows plainly that they did not understand or did not feel the

fundamental problem that troubled and perplexed the Gnostics and

Marcion, viz., the qualitative distinction between the spheres of

creation and redemption. They think they have sufficiently explained

this distinction by the doctrine of human freedom and its consequences.

Accordingly their whole mode of argument against the Gnostics and

Marcion is, in point of content, of an abstract, philosophico-rational

kind.[505] As a rule they do not here carry on their controversy with

the aid of reasons taken from the deeper views of religion. As soon as

the rational argument fails, however, there is really an entire end to

the refutation from inner grounds, at least in the case of Tertullian;

and the contest is shifted into the sphere of the rule of faith and the

Holy Scriptures. Hence, for example, they have not succeeded in making

much impression on the heretical Christology from dogmatic

considerations, though in this respect Irenæus was still very much more

successful than Tertullian.[506] Besides, in adv. Marc. II. 27, the

latter betrayed what interest he took in the preëxistent Christ as

distinguished from God the Father. It is not expedient to separate the

arguments advanced by the Fathers against the Gnostics from their own

positive teachings, for these are throughout dependent on their peculiar

attitude within the sphere of Scripture and tradition.

Irenæus and Hippolytus have been rightly named Scripture theologians;

but it is a strange infatuation to think that this designation

characterises them as evangelical. If indeed we here understand

"evangelical" in the vulgar sense, the term may be correct, only in this

case it means exactly the same as "Catholic." But if "evangelical"

signifies "early-Christian," then it must be said that Scripture

theology was not the primary means of preserving the ideas of primitive

Christianity; for, as the New Testament Scriptures were also regarded as

_inspired_ documents and were to be interpreted according to the

_regula_, their content was just for that reason apt to be obscured.

Both Marcion and the chiefs of the Valentinian school had also been

Scripture theologians. Irenæus and Hippolytus merely followed them. Now

it is true that they very decidedly argued against the arbitrary method

of interpreting the Scriptures adopted by Valentinus, and compared it to

the process of forming the mosaic picture of a king into the mosaic

picture of a fox, and the poems of Homer into any others one might

choose;[507] but they just as decidedly protested against the rejection

by Apelles and Marcion of the allegorical method of interpretation,[508]

and therefore were not able to set up a canon really capable of

distinguishing their own interpretation from that of the Gnostics.[509]

The Scripture theology of the old Catholic Fathers has a twofold aspect.

The religion of the Scripture is no longer the original form; it is the

mediated, scientific one to be constructed by a learned process; it is,

on its part, the strongest symptom of the secularisation that has begun.

In a word, it is the religion of the school, first the Gnostic then the

ecclesiastical. But it may, on the other hand, be a wholesome reaction

against enthusiastic excess and moralistic frigidity; and the correct

sense of the letter will from the first obtain imperceptible recognition

in opposition to the "spirit" arbitrarily read into it, and at length

banish this "spirit" completely. Irenæus certainly tried to mark off the

Church use of the Scriptures as distinguished from the Gnostic practice.

He rejects the accommodation theory of which some Gnostics availed

themselves;[510] he emphasises more strongly than these the absolute

sufficiency of the Scriptures by repudiating all esoteric

doctrines;[511] he rejects all distinction between different kinds of

inspiration in the sacred books;[512] he lays down the maxim that the

obscure passages are to be interpreted from the clear ones, not vice

versa;[513] but this principle being in itself ambiguous, it is rendered

quite unequivocal by the injunction to interpret everything according to

the rule of faith[514] and, in the case of all objectionable passages,

to seek the type.[515] Not only did Irenæus explain the Old Testament

allegorically, in accordance with traditional usage;[516] but according

to the principle: "with God there is nothing without purpose or due

signification" ("nihil vacuum neque sine signo apud deum") (IV. 21. 3),

he was also the first to apply the scientific and mystical explanation

to the New Testament, and was consequently obliged to adopt the Gnostic

exegesis, which was imperative as soon as the apostolic writings were

viewed as a New Testament. He regards the fact of Jesus handing round

food to those _lying_ at table as signifying that Christ also bestows

life on the long dead generations;[517] and, in the parable of the

Samaritan, he interprets the host as the Spirit and the two denarii as

the Father and Son.[518] To Irenæus and also to Tertullian and

Hippolytus all numbers, incidental circumstances, etc., in the Holy

Scriptures are virtually as significant as they are to the Gnostics, and

hence the only question is what hidden meaning we are to give to them.

"Gnosticism" is therefore here adopted by the ecclesiastical teachers in

its full extent, proving that this "Gnosticism" is nothing else than the

learned construction of religion with the scientific means of those

days. As soon as Churchmen were forced to bring forward their proofs and

proceed to put the same questions as the "Gnostics," they were obliged

to work by their method. Allegory, however, was required in order to

establish the continuity of the tradition from Adam down to the present

time--not merely down to Christ--against the attacks of the Gnostics and

Marcion. By establishing this continuity a historical truth was really

also preserved. For the rest, the disquisitions of Irenæus, Tertullian,

and Hippolytus were to such an extent borrowed from their opponents that

there is scarcely a problem that they propounded and discussed as the

result of their own thirst for knowledge. This fact not only preserved

to their works an early-Christian character as compared with those of

the Alexandrians, but also explains why they frequently stop in their

positive teachings, when they believe they have confuted their

adversaries. Thus we find neither in Irenæus nor Tertullian a discussion

of the relation of the Scriptures to the rule of faith. From the way in

which they appeal to both we can deduce a series of important problems,

which, however, the Fathers themselves did not formulate and

consequently did not answer.[519]

_The doctrine of God_ was fixed by the old Catholic Fathers for the

Christendom of succeeding centuries, and in fact both the methodic

directions for forming the idea of God and their results remained

unchanged. With respect to the former they occupy a middle position

between the renunciation of all knowledge--for God is not abyss and

silence--and the attempt to fathom the depths of the Godhead.[520]

Tertullian, influenced by the Stoics, strongly emphasised the

possibility of attaining a knowledge of God. Irenæus, following out an

idea which seems to anticipate the mysticism of later theologians, made

love a preliminary condition of knowledge and plainly acknowledged it as

the principle of knowledge.[521] God can be known from revelation,[522]

because he has really revealed himself, that is, both by the creation

and the word of revelation. Irenæus also taught that a sufficient

knowledge of God, as the creator and guide, can be obtained from the

creation, and indeed this knowledge always continues, so that all men

are without excuse.[523] In this case the prophets, the Lord himself,

the Apostles, and the Church teach no more and nothing else than what

must be already plain to the natural consciousness. Irenæus certainly

did not succeed in reconciling this proposition with his former

assertion that the knowledge of God springs from love resting on

revelation. Irenæus also starts, as Apologist and Antignostic, with the

God who is the First Cause. Every God who is not that is a phantom;[524]

and every sublime religious state of mind which does not include the

feeling of dependence upon God as the Creator is a deception. It is the

extremest blasphemy to degrade God the Creator, and it is the most

frightful machination of the devil that has produced the _blasphemia

creatoris_.[525] Like the Apologists, the early Catholic Fathers confess

that the doctrine of God the Creator is the first and most important of

the main articles of Christian faith;[526] the belief in his oneness as

well as his absoluteness is the main point.[527] God is all light, all

understanding, all Logos, all active spirit;[528] everything

anthropopathic and anthropomorphic is to be conceived as incompatible

with his nature.[529] The early-Catholic doctrine of God shows an

advance beyond that of the Apologists, in so far as God's attributes of

goodness and righteousness are expressly discussed, and it is proved in

opposition to Marcion that they are not mutually exclusive, but

necessarily involve each other.[530]

In the case of the _Logos doctrine_ also, Tertullian and Hippolytus

simply adopted and developed that of the Apologists, whilst Irenæus

struck out a path of his own. In the _Apologeticum_ (c. 21) Tertullian

set forth the Logos doctrine as laid down by Tatian, the only noteworthy

difference between him and his predecessor consisting in the fact that

the appearance of the Logos in Jesus Christ was the uniform aim of his

presentation.[531] He fully explained his Logos doctrine in his work

against the Monarchian Praxeas.[532] Here he created the formulæ of

succeeding orthodoxy by introducing the ideas "substance" and "person"

and by framing, despite of the most pronounced subordinationism and a

purely economical conception of the Trinity, definitions of the

relations between the persons which could be fully adopted in the Nicene

creed.[533] Here also the philosophical and cosmological interest

prevails; the history of salvation appears only to be the continuation

of that of the cosmos. This system is distinguished from Gnosticism by

the history of redemption appearing as the natural continuation of the

history of creation and not simply as its correction. The thought that

the unity of the Godhead is shown in the _una substantia_ and the _una

dominatio_ was worked out by Tertullian with admirable clearness.

According to him the unfolding of this one substance into several

heavenly embodiments, or the administration of the divine sovereignty by

emanated _persons_ cannot endanger the unity; the "arrangement of the

unity when the unity evolves the trinity from itself" ("dispositio

unitatis, quando unitas ex semetipsa [trinitatem] derivat") does not

abolish the unity, and, moreover, the Son will some day subject himself

to the Father, so that God will be all in all.[534] Here then the

Gnostic doctrine of æons is adopted in its complete form, and in fact

Hippolytus, who in this respect agrees with Tertullian, has certified

that the Valentinians "acknowledge that the one is the originator of

all" ("[Greek: ton hena homologousin aition tôn pantôn]"), because with

them also, "the whole goes back to one" ("[Greek: to pan eis hena

anatrechei]").[535] The only difference is that Tertullian and

Hippolytus limit the "economy of God" ([Greek: oikonomia tou Theou]) to

Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, while the Gnostics exceed this number.[536]

According to Tertullian "a rational conception of the Trinity

constitutes truth, an irrational idea of the unity makes heresy"

("trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituit, unitas

irrationaliter collecta hæresim facit") is already the watchword of the

Christian dogmatic. Now what he considers a rational conception is

keeping in view the different stages of God's economy, and

distinguishing between _dispositio_, _distinctio_, _numerus_ on the one

hand and _divisio_ on the other. At the beginning God was alone, but

_ratio_ and _sermo_ existed within him. In a certain sense then, he was

never alone, for he thought and spoke inwardly. If even men can carry on

conversations with themselves and make themselves objects of reflection,

how much more is this possible with God.[537] But as yet he was the only

_person_.[538] The moment, however, that he chose to reveal himself and

sent forth from himself the word of creation, the Logos came into

existence as a real being, before the world and for the sake of the

world. For "that which proceeds from such a great substance and has

created such substances cannot itself be devoid of substance." He is

therefore to be conceived as permanently separate from God "secundus a

deo consititutus, perseverans in sua forma"; but as unity of substance

is to be preserved ("_alius pater, alius filius, alius non

aliud_"--"_ego et pater unum sumus ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri

singularitatem dictum est_"--"_tres unum sunt, non unus_"--"the Father

is one person and the Son is another, different persons not different

things", "_I and the Father are one_ refers to unity of substance, not

to singleness in number"--"the three are one thing not one person"), the

Logos must be related to the Father as the ray to the sun, as the stream

to the source, as the stem to the root (see also Hippolytus, c. Noëtum

10).[539] For that very reason "Son" is the most suitable expression for

the Logos that has emanated in this way ([Greek: kata merismon]).

Moreover, since he (as well as the Spirit) has the same substance as the

Father ("unius substantia" = [Greek: homoousios]) he has also the same

_power_[540] as regards the world. He has all might in heaven and earth,

and he has had it _ab initio_, from the very beginning of time.[541] On

the other hand this same Son is only a part and offshoot; the Father is

the whole; and in this the mystery of the economy consists. What the Son

possesses has been given him by the Father; the Father is therefore

greater than the Son; the Son is subordinate to the Father.[542] "Pater

tota substantia est, filius vero derivatio totius et portio".[543] This

paradox is ultimately based on a philosophical axiom of Tertullian: the

whole fulness of the Godhead, i.e., the Father, is incapable of entering

into the finite, whence also he must always remain invisible,

unapproachable, and incomprehensible. The Divine Being that appears and

works on earth can never be anything but a part of the transcendent

Deity. This Being must be a derived existence, which has already in some

fashion a finite element in itself, because it is the hypostatised Word

of creation, which has an origin.[544] We would assert too much, were we

to say that Tertullian meant that the Son was simply the world-thought

itself; his insistance on the "unius substantiæ" disproves this. But no

doubt he regards the Son as the Deity depotentiated for the sake of

self-communication; the Deity adapted to the world, whose sphere

coincides with the world-thought, and whose power is identical with that

necessary for the world. From the standpoint of humanity this Deity is

God himself, i.e., a God whom men can apprehend and who can apprehend

them; but from God's standpoint, which speculation can fix but not

fathom, this Deity is a subordinate, nay, even a temporary one.

Tertullian and Hippolytus know as little of an immanent Trinity as the

Apologists; the Trinity only _appears_ such, because the unity of the

substance is very vigorously emphasised; but in truth the Trinitarian

process as in the case of the Gnostics, is simply the background of the

process that produces the history of the world and of salvation. This is

first of all shown by the fact that in course of the process of the

world and of salvation the Son grows in his sonship, that is, goes

through a finite process;[545] and secondly by the fact that the Son

himself will one day restore the monarchy to the Father.[546] These

words no doubt are again spoken not from the standpoint of man, but from

that of God; for so long as history lasts "the Son continues in his

form." In its point of departure, its plan, and its details this whole

exposition is not distinguished from the teachings of contemporaneous

and subsequent Greek philosophers,[547] but merely differs in its aim.

In itself absolutely unfitted to preserve the primitive Christian belief

in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, its importance consists in

its identification of the historical Jesus with this Logos. By its aid

Tertullian united the scientific, idealistic cosmology with the

utterances of early Christian tradition about Jesus in such a way as to

make the two, as it were, appear the totally dissimilar wings of one and

the same building,[548] With peculiar versatility he contrived to make

himself at home in both wings.

It is essentially otherwise with the Logos doctrine of Irenæus.[549]

Whereas Tertullian and Hippolytus developed their Logos doctrine without

reference to the historical Jesus, the truth rather being that they

simply add the incarnation to the already existing theory of the

subject, there is no doubt that Irenæus, as a rule, made Jesus Christ,

whom he views as God and man, the _starting-point_ of his speculation.

Here he followed the Fourth Gospel and Ignatius. It is of Jesus that

Irenæus almost always thinks when he speaks of the Logos or of the Son

of God; and therefore he does not identify the divine element in Christ

or Christ himself with the world idea or the creating Word or the Reason

of God.[550] That he nevertheless makes Logos ([Greek: monogenês,

prôtotokos], "only begotten," "first born") the regular designation of

Christ as the preëxistent One can only be explained from the apologetic

tradition which in his time was already recognised as authoritative by

Christian scholars, and moreover appeared justified and required by John

I. 1. Since both Irenæus and Valentinus consider redemption to be the

special work of Christ, the cosmological interest in the doctrine of the

second God becomes subordinate to the soteriological. As, however, in

Irenæus' system (in opposition to Valentinus) this real redemption is to

be imagined as _recapitulatio_ of the creation, redemption and creation

are not opposed to each other as antitheses; and therefore the Redeemer

has also his place in the history of creation. In a certain sense then

the Christology of Irenæus occupies a middle position between the

Christology of the Valentinians and Marcion on the one hand and the

Logos doctrine of the Apologists on the other. The Apologists have a

cosmological interest, Marcion only a soteriological, whereas Irenæus

has both; the Apologists base their speculations on the Old Testament,

Marcion on a New Testament, Irenæus on both Old and New.

Irenæus expressly refused to investigate what the divine element in

Christ is, and why another deity stands alongside of the Godhead of the

Father. He confesses that he here simply keeps to the rule of faith and

the Holy Scriptures, and declines speculative disquisitions on

principle. He does not admit the distinction of a Word existing in God

and one coming forth from him, and opposes not only ideas of emanation

in general, but also the opinion that the Logos issued forth at a

definite point of time. Nor will Irenæus allow the designation "Logos"

to be interpreted in the sense of the Logos being the inward Reason or

the spoken Word of God. God is a simple essence and always remains in

the same state; besides we ought not to hypostatise qualities.[551]

Nevertheless Irenæus, too, calls the preëxistent Christ the Son of God,

and strictly maintains the personal distinction between Father and Son.

What makes the opposite appear to be the case is the fact that he does

not utilise the distinction in the interest of cosmology.[552] In

Irenæus' sense we shall have to say: The Logos is the revelation

hypostasis of the Father, "the self-revelation of the self-conscious

God," and indeed the eternal self-revelation. For according to him the

Son _always_ existed with God, _always_ revealed the Father, and it was

always the _full_ Godhead that he revealed in himself. In other words,

he is God in his specific nature, _truly_ God, and there is no

distinction of essence between him and God.[553] Now we might conclude

from the strong emphasis laid on "always" that Irenæus conceived a

relationship of Father and Son in the Godhead, conditioned by the

essence of God himself and existing independently of revelation. But the

second hypostasis is viewed by him as existing from all eternity, just

as much in the quality of Logos as in that of Son, and his very

statement that the Logos has revealed the Father from the beginning

shows that this relationship is always within the sphere of revelation.

The Son then exists because he gives a revelation. Little interested as

Irenæus is in saying anything about the Son, apart from his historical

mission, naïvely as he extols the Father as the direct Creator of the

universe, and anxious as he is to repress all speculations that lead

beyond the Holy Scriptures, he could not altogether avoid reflecting on

the problems: why there is a second deity alongside of God, and how the

two are related to one another. His incidental answers are not

essentially different from those of the Apologists and Tertullian; the

only distinction is this incidental character. Irenæus too looked on the

Son as "the hand of God," the mediator of creation; he also seems in one

passage to distinguish Father and Son as the naturally invisible and

visible elements of God; he too views the Father as the one who

dominates all, the head of Christ, i.e., he who bears the creation and

_his_ Logos.[554] Irenæus had no opportunity of writing against the

Monarchians, and unfortunately we possess no apologetic writings of his.

It cannot therefore he determined how he would have written, if he had

had less occasion to avoid the danger of being himself led into Gnostic

speculations about æons. It has been correctly remarked that with

Irenæus the Godhead and the divine personality of Christ merely exist

beside each other. He did not want to weigh the different problems,

because, influenced as he was by the lingering effects of an

early-Christian, anti-theological interest, he regarded the results of

this reflection as dangerous; but, as a matter of fact, he did not

really correct the premises of the problems by rejecting the

conclusions. We may evidently assume (with Zahn) that, according to

Irenæus, "God placed himself in the relationship of Father to Son, in

order to create after his image and in his likeness the man who was to

become his Son;"[555] but we ought not to ask if Irenæus understood the

incarnation as a definite purpose necessarily involved in the Sonship,

as this question falls outside the sphere of Patristic thinking. No

doubt the incarnation constantly formed the preëminent interest of

Irenæus, and owing to this interest he was able to put aside or throw a

veil over the mythological speculations of the Apologists regarding the

Logos, and to proceed at once to the soteriological question.[556]

Nothing is more instructive than an examination of Irenæus' views with

regard to the _destination of man_, the _original state_, the _fall_,

and _sin_; because the heterogeneous elements of his "theology," the

apologetic and moralistic the realistic, and the Biblical (Pauline), are

specially apparent here, and the inconsistencies into which he was led

are very plain. But these very contradictions were never eliminated from

the Church doctrinal system of succeeding centuries and did not admit of

being removed; hence his attitude on these points is typical.[557] The

apologetic and moralistic train of thought is alone developed with

systematic clearness. Everything created is imperfect, just from the

very fact of its having had a beginning; therefore man also. The Deity

is indeed capable of bestowing perfection on man from the beginning, but

the latter was incapable of grasping or retaining it from the first.

Hence perfection, i.e., incorruptibility, which consists in the

contemplation of God and is conditional on voluntary obedience, could

only be the _destination_ of man, and he must accordingly have been made

_capable_ of it.[558] That destination is realised through the guidance

of God and the free decision of man, for goodness not arising from free

choice has no value. The capacity in question is on the one hand

involved in man's possession of the divine image, which, however, is

only realised in the body and is therefore at bottom a matter of

indifference; and, on the other, in his likeness to God, which consists

in the union of the soul with God's Spirit, but only comes about when

man is obedient to him. Along with this Irenæus has also the idea that

man's likeness consists in freedom. Now, as man became disobedient

immediately after the creation, this likeness to God did not become

perfect.[559] Through the fall he lost the fellowship with God to which

he was destined, i.e., he is forfeit to death. This death was

transmitted to Adam's whole posterity.[560] Here Irenæus followed

sayings of Paul, but adopted the words rather than the sense; for, in

the first place, like the Apologists, he very strongly emphasises the

elements that palliate man's fall[561] and, secondly, he contemplates

the fall as having a teleological significance. It is the fall itself

and not, as in Paul's case, the consequences of the fall, that he thus

views; for he says that disobedience was conducive to man's development.

Man had to learn by experience that disobedience entails death, in order

that he might acquire wisdom and choose freely to fulfil the

commandments of God. Further, man was obliged to learn through the fall

that goodness and life do not belong to him by nature as they do to

God.[562] Here life and death are always the ultimate question to

Irenæus. It is only when he quotes sayings of Paul that he remembers sin

in connection with redemption; and ethical consequences of the fall are

not mentioned in this connection. "The original destination of man was

not abrogated by the fall, the truth rather being that the fall was

intended as a means of leading men to attain this perfection to which

they were destined."[563] Moreover, the goodness of God immediately

showed itself both in the removal of the tree of life and in the

sentence of temporal death.[564] What significance belongs to Jesus

Christ within this conception is clear: he is the man who first realised

in his person the destination of humanity; the Spirit of God became

united with his soul and accustomed itself to dwell in men. But he is

also the teacher who reforms mankind by his preaching, calls upon them

to direct their still existing freedom to obedience to the divine

commandments, thereby restoring, i.e., strengthening, freedom, so that

humanity is thus rendered capable of receiving incorruptibility.[565]

One can plainly see that this is the idea of Tatian and Theophilus, with

which Irenæus has incorporated utterances of Paul. Tertullian and

Hippolytus taught essentially the same doctrine;[566] only Tertullian

beheld the image and likeness of God expressly and exclusively in the

fact that man's will and capacity are free, and based on this freedom an

argument in justification of God's ways.[567]

But, in addition to this, Irenæus developed a second train of thought.

This was the outcome of his Gnostic and realistic doctrine of

recapitulation, and evinces clear traces of the influence of Pauline

theology. It is, however, inconsistent with the moralistic teachings

unfolded above, and could only be united with them at a few points. To

the Apologists the proposition: "it is impossible to learn to know God

without the help of God" ("impossibile est sine deo discere deum") was a

conviction which, with the exception of Justin, they subordinated to

their moralism and to which they did not give a specifically

Christological signification. Irenæus understood this proposition in a

Christological sense,[568] and at the same time conceived the blessing

of salvation imparted by Christ not only as the incorruptibility

consisting in the beholding of God bestowed on obedience IV. 20. 5-7:

IV. 38, but also as the divine sonship which has been won for us by

Christ and which is realised in constant fellowship with God and

dependence on him.[569] No doubt he also viewed this divine sonship as

consisting in the transformation of human nature; but the point of

immediate importance here is that it is no longer human freedom but

Christ that he contemplated in this connection. Corresponding to this he

has now also a different idea of the original destination of man, of

Adam, and of the results of the fall. Here comes in the mystical

Adam-Christ speculation, in accordance with the Epistles to the

Ephesians and Corinthians. Everything, that is, the "longa hominum

expositio," was recapitulated by Christ in himself; in other words he

restored humanity _to what it originally was_ and again included under

one head what was divided.[570] If humanity is restored, then it must

have lost something before and been originally in good condition. In

complete contradiction to the other teachings quoted above, Irenæus now

says: "What we had lost in Adam, namely, our possession of the image and

likeness of God, we recover in Christ."[571] Adam, however, is humanity;

in other words, as all humanity is united and renewed through Christ so

also it was already summarised in Adam. Accordingly "the sin of

disobedience and the loss of salvation which Adam consequently suffered

may now be viewed as belonging to all mankind summed up in him, in like

manner as Christ's obedience and possession of salvation are the

property of all mankind united under him as their head."[572] In the

first Adam we offended God by not fulfilling his commandments; in Adam

humanity became disobedient, wounded, sinful, bereft of life; through

Eve mankind became forfeit to death; through its victory over the first

man death descended upon us all, and the devil carried us all away

captive etc.[573] Here Irenæus always means that in Adam, who represents

all mankind as their head, the latter became doomed to death. In this

instance he did not think of a hereditary transmission, but of a mystic

unity[574] as in the case of Christ, viewed as the second Adam. The

teachings in III. 21. 10-23[575] show what an almost naturalistic shape

the religious quasi-historical idea assumed in Irenæus' mind. This is,

however, more especially evident from the assertion, in opposition to

Tatian, that unless Adam himself had been saved by Christ, God would

have been overcome by the devil.[576] It was merely his moralistic train

of thought that saved him from the conclusion that there is a

restoration of _all_ individual men.

This conception of Adam as the representative of humanity corresponds to

Irenæus' doctrine of the God-man. The historical importance of this

author lies in the development of the Christology. At the present day,

ecclesiastical Christianity, so far as it seriously believes in the

unity of the divine and human in Jesus Christ and deduces the divine

manhood from the work of Christ as his deification, still occupies the

same standpoint as Irenæus did. Tertullian by no means matched him here;

he too has the formula in a few passages, but he cannot, like Irenæus,

account for its content. On the other hand we owe to him the idea of the

"two natures," which remain in their integrity--that formula which owes

its adoption to the influence of Leo I. and at bottom contradicts

Irenæus' thought "the Son of God became the Son of man," ("filius dei

factus filius hominis"). Finally, the manner in which Irenæus tried to

interpret the historical utterances about Jesus Christ from the

standpoint of the Divine manhood idea, and to give them a significance

in regard to salvation is also an epoch-making fact.

"Filius dei filius hominis factus," "it is one and the same Jesus

Christ, not a Jesus and a Christ, nor a mere temporary union of an æon

and a man, but one and the same person, who created the world, was born,

suffered, and ascended"--this along with the dogma of God the Creator is

the cardinal doctrine of Irenæus:[577] "Jesus Christ truly man and truly

God" ("Jesus Christus, vere homo, vere deus").[578] It is only the

Church that adheres to this doctrine, for "none of the heretics hold the

opinion that the Word of God became flesh" ("secundum nullam sententiam

hæreticorum verbum dei caro factum est").[579] What therefore has to be

shown is (1) that Jesus Christ is really the Word of God, i.e., is God,

(2) that this Word really became man and (3) that the incarnate Word is

an inseparable unity. Irenæus maintains the first statement as well

against the "Ebionites" as against the Valentinians who thought that

Christ's advent was the descent of one of the many æons. In opposition

to the Ebionites he emphasises the distinction between natural and

adopted Sonship, appeals to the Old Testament testimony in favour of the

divinity of Christ,[580] and moreover argues that we would still be in

the bondage of the old disobedience, if Jesus Christ had only been a

man.[581] In this connection he also discussed the birth from the

virgin.[582] He not only proved it from prophecy, but his recapitulation

theory also suggested to him a parallel between Adam and Eve on the one

hand and Christ and Mary on the other, which included the birth from the

virgin.[583] He argues in opposition to the Valentinians that it was

really the eternal Word of God himself, who was always with God and

always present to the human race, that descended.[584] He who became man

was not a being foreign to the world--this is said in opposition to

Marcion--but the Lord of the world and humanity, the Son of God, and

none other. The reality of the body of Christ, i.e., the essential

identity of the humanity of Christ with our own, was continually

emphasised by Irenæus, and he views the whole work of salvation as

dependent on this identity.[585] In the latter he also includes the fact

that Jesus must have passed through and been subjected to all the

conditions of a complete human life from birth to old age and

death.[586] Jesus Christ is therefore the Son of God who has really

become the Son of man; and these are not two Christs but one, in whom

the Logos is permanently united with humanity.[587] Irenæus called this

union "union of the Word of God with the creature" ("adunitio verbi dei

ad plasma")[588] and "blending and communion of God and man" ("commixtio

et communio dei et hominis")[589] without thereby describing it any more

clearly.[590] He views it as perfect, for, _as a rule_, he will not

listen to any separation of what was done by the man Jesus and by God

the Word.[591] The explicit formula of two substances or natures in

Christ is not found in Irenæus; but Tertullian already used it. It never

occurred to the former, just because he was not here speaking as a

theologian, but expressing his belief.[592] In his utterances about the

God-man Tertullian closely imitates Irenæus. Like the latter he uses the

expression "man united with God" ("homo deo mixtus")[593] and like him

he applies the predicates of the man to the Son of God.[594] But he goes

further, or rather, in the interest of formal clearness, he expresses

the mystery in a manner which shows that he did not fully realise the

religious significance of the proposition, "the Son of God made Son of

man" ("filius dei filius hominis factus"). He speaks of a "corporal and

spiritual, i.e., divine, substance of the Lord", ("corporalis et

spiritalis (i.e., divina) substantia domini")[595] of "either substance

of the flesh and spirit of Christ" ("utraque substantia et carnis et

spiritus Christi"), of the "creation of two substances which Christ

himself also possesses," ("conditio duarum substantiarum, quas Christus

et ipse gestat")[596] and of the "twofold condition not blended but

united in one person--God and man" ("duplex status _non confusus sed

conjunctus_ in una persona--deus et homo".)[597] Here we already have in

a complete form the later Chalcedonian formula of the two substances in

one person.[598] At the same time, however, we can clearly see that

Tertullian went beyond Irenæus in his exposition.[599] He was, moreover,

impelled to combat an antagonistic principle. Irenæus had as yet no

occasion to explain in detail that the proposition "the Word became

flesh" ("verbum caro factum") denoted no transformation. That he

excludes the idea of change, and that he puts stress on the Logos'

assumption of flesh from the Virgin is shown by many passages.[600]

Tertullian, on the other hand, was in the first place confronted by

(Gnostic) opponents who understood John's statement in the sense of the

Word's transforming himself into flesh, and therefore argued against the

"assumption of flesh from the Virgin" ("assumptio carnis ex

virgine");[601] and, in the second place, he had to do with Catholic

Christians who indeed admitted the birth from the Virgin, but likewise

assumed a change of God into flesh, and declared the God thus invested

with flesh to be the Son.[602] In this connection the same Tertullian,

who in the Church laid great weight on formulæ like "the crucified God,"

"God consented to be born" ("deus crucifixus," "nasci se voluit deus")

and who, impelled by opposition to Marcion and by his apologetic

interest, distinguished the Son as capable of suffering from God the

Father who is impassible, and imputed to him human weaknesses--which was

already a further step,--sharply emphasised the "distinct function"

("distincte agere") of the two substances in Christ and thus separated

the persons. With Tertullian the interest in the Logos doctrine, on the

one hand, and in the real humanity, on the other, laid the basis of that

conception of Christology in accordance with which the unity of the

person is nothing more than an assertion. The "deus factus homo"

("verbum caro factus") presents quite insuperable difficulties, as soon

as "theology" can no longer be banished. Tertullian smoothed over these

difficulties by juristic distinctions, for all his elucidations of

"substance" and "person" are of this nature.

A somewhat paradoxical result of the defence of the Logos doctrine in

the struggle against the "Patripassians" was the increased emphasis that

now began to be laid on the integrity and independence of the human

nature in Christ. If the only essential result of the struggle with

Gnosticism was to assert the substantial reality of Christ's body, it

was Tertullian who distinguished what Christ did as man from what he did

as God in order to prove that he was not a _tertium quid_. The

discriminating intellect which was forced to receive a doctrine as a

problem could not proceed otherwise. But, even before the struggle with

Modalism, elements were present which repressed the naïve confidence of

the utterances about the God-man. If I judge rightly, there were two

features in Irenæus both of which resulted in a splitting up of the

conception of the perfect unity of Christ's person. The first was the

intellectual contemplation of the perfect humanity of Jesus, the second

was found in certain Old and New Testament texts and the tradition

connected with these.[603] With regard to the first we may point out

that Irenæus indeed regarded the union of the human and divine as

possible only because man, fashioned from the beginning by and after the

pattern of the Logos, was an image of the latter and destined for union

with God. Jesus Christ is the realisation of our possession of God's

image;[604] but this thought, if no further developed, may be still

united with the Logos doctrine in such a way that it does not interfere

with it, but serves to confirm it. The case becomes different when it is

not only shown that the Logos was always at work in the human race, but

that humanity was gradually more and more accustomed by him (in the

patriarchs and prophets) to communion with God,[605] till at last the

perfect man appeared in Christ. For in this view it might appear as if

the really essential element in Jesus Christ were not the Logos, who has

become the new Adam, but the new Adam, who possesses the Logos. That

Irenæus, in explaining the life of Jesus as that of Adam according to

the recapitulation theory, here and there expresses himself as if he

were speaking of the perfect man, is undeniable: If the acts of Christ

are really to be what they seem, the man concerned in them must be

placed in the foreground. But how little Irenæus thought of simply

identifying the Logos with the perfect man is shown by the passage in

III. 19. 3 where he writes: "[Greek: hôsper gar ên anthrôpos hina

peirasthê, houtô kai logos hina doxasthê. êsychazontos men tou logou en

tô peirazesthai kai staurousthai kai apothnêskein sugginomenou de tô

anthrôpô en tô nikan kai hypomenein kai chrêsteuesthai kai anistasthai

kai analambanesthai]" ("For as he was man that he might be tempted, so

also he was the Logos that he might be glorified. The Logos remained

quiescent during the process of temptation, crucifixion and death, but

aided the human nature when it conquered, and endured, and performed

deeds of kindness, and rose again from the dead, and was received up

into heaven"). From these words it is plain that Irenæus preferred to

assume that the divine and human natures existed side by side, and

consequently to split up the perfect unity, rather than teach a mere

ideal manhood which would be at the same time a divine manhood. The

"discrete agere" of the two natures proves that to Irenæus the perfect

manhood of the incarnate Logos was merely an incidental quality he

possessed. In reality the Logos is the perfect man in so far as his

incarnation creates the perfect man and renders him possible, or the

Logos always exists behind Christ the perfect man. But nevertheless this

very way of viewing the humanity in Christ already compelled Irenæus to

limit the "deus crucifixus" and to lay the foundation for Tertullian's

formulæ. With regard to the second point we may remark that there were

not a few passages in both Testaments where Christ appeared as the man

chosen by God and anointed with the Spirit. These as well as the

corresponding language of the Church were the greatest difficulties in

the way of the Logos Christology. Of what importance is an anointing

with the Spirit to him who is God? What is the meaning of Christ being

born by the power of the Holy Ghost? Is this formula compatible with the

other, that he as the Logos himself assumed flesh from the Virgin etc.?

Irenæus no doubt felt these difficulties. He avoided them (III. 9. 3) by

referring the bestowal of the Spirit at baptism merely to the _man_

Jesus, and thus gave his own approval to that separation which appeared

to him so reprehensible in the Gnostics.[606] This separation indeed

rescued to future ages the minimum of humanity that was to be retained

in the person of Christ, but at the same time it laid the foundation of

those differentiating speculations, which in succeeding times became the

chief art and subject of dispute among theologians. The fact is that one

cannot think in realistic fashion of the "deus homo factus" without

thinking oneself out of it. It is exceedingly instructive to find that,

in some passages, even a man like Irenæus was obliged to advance from

the creed of the one God-man to the assumption of two independent

existences in Christ, an assumption which in the earlier period has only

"Gnostic" testimony in its favour. Before Irenæus' day, in fact, none

but these earliest theologians taught that Jesus Christ had two natures,

and ascribed to them particular actions and experiences. The Gnostic

distinction of the Jesus _patibilis_ ("capable of suffering") and the

Christ [Greek: apathês] ("impassible") is essentially identical with the

view set forth by Tertullian adv. Prax., and this proves that the

doctrine of the two natures is simply nothing else than the Gnostic,

i.e., scientific, adaptation of the formula: "filius dei filius hominis

factus." No doubt the old early-Christian interest still makes itself

felt in the _assertion_ of the one person. Accordingly we can have no

historical understanding of Tertullian's Christology or even of that of

Irenæus without taking into account, as has not yet been done, the

Gnostic distinction of Jesus and Christ, as well as those old

traditional formulæ: "deus passus, deus crucifixus est" ("God suffered,

God was crucified").[607]