_Concluding Remarks on the Relationships to one another of the

Classes of the Arthropoda._--Our general conclusion from a survey of

the Arthropoda amounts to this, that whilst Peripatus, the Diplopoda,

and the Arachnida represent terrestrial offshoots from successive

lower grades of primitive aquatic Arthropoda which are extinct, the

Crustacea alone present a fairly full series of representatives

leading upwards from unspecialized forms. The latter were not very far

removed from the aquatic ancestors (Trilobites) of the Arachnida, but

differed essentially from them by the higher specialization of the

head. We can gather no indication of the forefathers of the Hexapoda

or of the Chilopoda less specialized than they are, whilst possessing

the essential characteristics of these classes. Neither embryology nor

palaeontology assists us in this direction. On the other hand, the

facts that the Hexapoda and the Chilopoda have triprosthomerous heads,

that the Hexapoda have the same total number of somites as the

nomomeristic Crustacea, and the same number of opisthomeres in the

head as the more terrestrial Crustacea, together with the same

adaptation of the form of important appendages in corresponding

somites, and that the compound eyes of both Crustacea and Hexapoda are

extremely specialized and elaborate in structure and identical in that

structure, all lead to the suggestion that the Hexapoda, and with

them, at no distant point, the Chilopoda, have branched off from the

Crustacean main stem as specialized terrestrial lines of descent. And

it seems probable that in the case of the Hexapoda, at any rate, the

point of departure was subsequent to the attainment of the

nomomeristic character presented by the higher grade of Crustacea. It

is on the whole desirable to recognize such affinities in our schemes

of classification.

We may tabulate the facts as to head-structure in Chaetopoda and

Arthropoda as follows:--

Grade x (below the Arthropoda).--AGNATHA, APROSTHOMERA.

Without parapodial jaws; without the addition of originally post-oral

somites to the prae-oral region, which is a simple prostomial lobe of

the first somite; the first somite is perforated by the mouth and its

parapodia are not modified as jaws.

= CHARTOPODA.

Grade 1 (of the Arthropoda).--MONOGNATHA, MONOPROSTHOMERA.

With a single pair of parapodial jaws carried by the somite which is

perforated by the mouth; this is not the first somite, but the second.

The first somite has become a prosthomere, and carries a pair of

extensile antennae.

= ONYCHOPHORA (_Peripatus, &c._).

Grade 2 (of the Arthropoda).--DIGNATHA, MONOPROSTHOMERA.

The third somite as well as the second develops a pair of parapodial

jaws; the first somite is a prosthomere carrying jointed antennae.

= DIPLOPODA.

Grade 3 (of the Arthropoda).--PANTOGNATHA, DIPROSTHOMERA.

A gnathobase is developed (in the primitive stock) on every pair of

post-oral appendages; two prosthomeres present, the second somite as

well as the first having passed in front of the mouth, but only the

second has appendages.

= ARACHNIDA.

Grade 4 (of the Arthropoda).--PANTOGNATHA, TRIPROSTHOMERA.

The original stock, like that of the last grade, has a gnathobase on

every post-oral appendage, but three prosthomeres are now present, in

consequence of the movement of the oral aperture from the third to the

fourth somite. The later eyes are polymeniscous, with specialized

vitrellae and retinulae of a definite type peculiar to this grade.

= CRUSTACEA, CHILOPODA, HEXAPODA.

According to older views the increase of the number of somites in

front of the mouth would have been regarded as a case of intercalation

by new somite-budding of new prae-oral somites in the series. We are

prohibited by a general consideration of metamerism in the Arthropoda

from adopting the hypothesis of intercalation of somites. However

strange it may seem, we have to suppose that one by one in the course

of long historical evolution somites have passed forwards and the

mouth has passed backwards. In fact, we have to suppose that the

actual somite which in grades 1 and 2 bore the mandibles lost those

mandibles, developed their rami as tactile organs, and came to occupy

a position in front of the mouth, whilst its previous jaw-bearing

function was taken up by the next somite in order, into which the oral

aperture had passed. A similar history must have been slowly brought

about when this second mandibulate somite in its turn became agnathous

and passed in front of the mouth. The mandibular parapodia may be

supposed during the successive stages of this history to have had,

from the first, well-developed rami (one or two) of a palp-like form,

so that the change required when the mouth passed away from them would

merely consist in the suppression of the gnathobase. The solid

palpless mandible such as we now see in some Arthropoda is,

necessarily, a late specialization. Moreover, it appears probable that

the first somite never had its parapodia modified as jaws, but became

a prosthomere with tactile appendages before parapodial jaws were

developed at all, or rather _pari passu_ with their development on the

second somite. It is worth while bearing in mind a second possibility

as to the history of the prosthomeres, viz. that the buccal

gnathobasic parapodia (the mandibles) were in each of the three grades

of prosthomerism only developed after the recession of the mouth and

the addition of one, of two, or of three post-oral somites to the

prae-oral region had taken place. In fact, we may imagine that the

characteristic adaptation of one or more pairs of post-oral parapodia

to the purposes of the mouth as jaws did not occur until after

ancestral forms with one, with two, and with three prosthomeres had

come into existence. On the whole the facts seem to be against this

supposition, though we need not suppose that the gnathobase was very

large or the rami undeveloped in the buccal parapodia which were

destined to lose their mandibular features and pass in front of the

mouth.

REFERENCES.--1. Bateson, _Materials for the Study of Variation_

(Macmillan, 1894), p. 85; 2. Lankester, "Primitive Cell-layers of the

Embryo." _Annals and Mag. Nat. Hist._ (1873), p. 336; 3. Korschelt and

Heider, _Entwickelungsgeschichte_ (Jena, 1892), cap. xv. p. 389; 4.

Folsom, "Development of the Mouth Parts of Anurida," _Bulletin Mus.

Comp. Zool. Harvard College_, vol. xxxvi. No. 5 (1900), pp. 142-146;

5. Lankester, "Observations and Reflections on the Appendages and

Nervous System of Apus Cancriformis," _Quart. Journ. Micr. Sci._ vol.

xxi. (1881); 6. Hofer, "Ein Krebs mit einer Extremitat statt eines

Stielauges," _Verhandl. d. deutschen zool. Gesellsch._ (1894); 7.

Watase, "On the Morphology of the Compound Eyes of Arthropods,"

_Studies from the Biol. Lab. of the Johns Hopkins University_, vol.

iv. pp. 287-334; 8. Benham describes backward shifting of the oral

aperture in certain Chaetopods, _Proc. Zoolog. Soc. London_ (1900),

No. lxiv. p. 976. N.B.--References to the early literature concerning

the group Arthropoda will be found in Carus, _Geschichte der

Zoologie_. The more important literature up to 1892 is given in the

admirable treatise on Embryology by Professors Korschelt and Heider.

Detailed references will be found under the articles on the separate

groups of Arthropoda. (E. R. L.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The group Arthropoda itself, thus constituted, was precisely

identical in its area with the Insecta of Linnaeus, the Entoma of

Aristotle. But the word "Insect" had become limited since the days of

Linnaeus to the Hexapod Pterygote forms, to the exclusion of his

Aptera. Lamarck's penetrating genius is chiefly responsible for the

shrinkage of the word Insecta, since it was he who, forty years after

Linnaeus's death, set up and named the two great classes Crustacea

and Arachnida (included by Linnaeus under Insecta as the order

"Aptera"), assigning to them equal rank with the remaining Insecta of

Linnaeus, for which he proposed the very appropriate class-name

"Hexapoda." Lamarck, however, appears not to have insisted on this

name Hexapoda, and so the class of Pterygote Hexapods came to retain

the group-name Insecta, which is, historically or etymologically, no

more appropriate to them than it is to the classes Crustacea and

Arachnida. The tendency to retain the original name of an old and

comprehensive group for one of the fragments into which such group

becomes divided by the advance of knowledge--instead of keeping the

name for its logical use as a comprehensive term, including the new

divisions, each duly provided with a new name--is most curiously

illustrated in the history of the word physiology. Cicero says,

"Physiologia naturae ratio," and such was the meaning of the name

_Physiologus_, given to a cyclopaedia of what was known and imagined

about earth, sea, sky, birds, beasts and fishes, which for a thousand

years was the authoritative source of information on these matters,

and was translated into every European tongue. With the revival of

learning, however, first one and then another special study became

recognized--anatomy, botany, zoology, mineralogy, until at last the

great comprehensive term physiology was bereft of all its

once-included subject-matter, excepting the study of vital processes

pursued by the more learned members of the medical profession.

Professional tradition and an astute perception on their part of the

omniscience suggested by the terms, have left the medical men in

English-speaking lands in undisturbed but illogical possession of the

words physiology, physic and physician.

[2] H. Milne-Edwards, who was followed by Huxley, long ago formulated

the conclusion that the eye-stalks of Crustacea are modified

appendages, basing his argument on a specimen of Palinurus (figured

in Bateson's book (1), in which the eye-stalk of one side is replaced

by an antenniform palp. Hofer (6) in 1894 described a similar case in

Astacus.

[3] Embryological evidence of this is still wanting. In the other

classes of Arthropoda we have more or less complete embryological

evidence on the subject. It appears from observation of the embryo

that whilst the first prosthomere of Centipedes has its appendages

reduced and represented only by eye-patches (as in Arachnida,

Crustacea and Hexapoda). the second has a rudimentary antenna, which

disappears, whilst the third carries the permanent antennae, which

accordingly correspond to the second antennae of Crustacea, and are

absent in Hexapoda.

ARTHUR (Fr. _Artus_), the central hero of the cycle of romance known as

the _Matiere de Bretagne_ (see ARTHURIAN LEGEND). Whether there was an

historic Arthur has been much debated; undoubtedly for many centuries

after the appearance of Geoffrey of Monmouth's _Historia Britonum_

(circ. 1136), the statements therein recorded of a mighty monarch, who

ruled over Britain in the 5th-6th centuries, and carried his conquests

far afield, even to the gates of Rome, obtained general, though not

universal, credence. Even in the 12th century there were some who

detected, and derided, the fictitious character of Geoffrey's "History."

As was naturally to be expected, the pendulum swung to the other

extreme, and in a more critical age the existence of Arthur was roundly

denied. The truth probably lies midway between the two. The words of

Wace, the Norman poet who translated the _Historia_ into verse, are here

admirably to the point. Speaking of the tales told of Arthur, he says:--

"Ne tot mencunge, ne tot veir,

Ne tot fable, ne tot saveir,

Tant ont li conteor conte,

Et li fableor tant fable

Por lor contes embeleter

Que tout ont fait fable sembler."[1]

The opinion now generally accepted by scholars is that the evidence of

Nennius, whose _Historia Britonum_ preceded that of Geoffrey by some 400

years, is in the main to be relied on. He tells us that Arthur was _Dux

bellorum_, and led the armies of the British kings against the Saxon

invaders, whom he defeated in twelve great battles. _Tunc Arthur

pugnabat cum regibus Britonum, sed ipse dux erat bettorum._

The traditional site of these battles covers a very wide area, and it is

supposed that Arthur held a post analogous to that of the general who,

under the Roman occupation, was known as _Comes Britanniae_, and held a

roving commission to defend the island wherever attacked, in

contradistinction to the _Dux Britanniarum_, who had charge of the

forces in the north, and the _Comes Littoris Saxonici_, whose task it

was to defend the south-east line. The Welsh texts never call Arthur

_gwledig_ (prince), but _amheradawr_ (Latin _imperator_) or emperor, a

title which would be bestowed on the highest official in the island. The

truth thus appears to be that, while there was never a _King_ Arthur,

there was a noted chieftain and general of that name. If we say that he

carried on a successful war against the Saxons, was probably betrayed by

his wife and a near kinsman, and fell in battle, we have stated all

which can be claimed as an historical nucleus for his legend. It is now

generally admitted that the representation of Arthur as world conqueror,

_Welt-Kaiser_, is due to the influence of the Charlemagne cycle. In the

12th century the _Matiere de France_ was waning, the _Matiere de

Bretagne_ waxing in popularity, and public opinion demanded that the

central figure of the younger cycle (for whatever the date of the

subject matter, as a literary cycle the Arthurian is the younger) should

not be inferior in dignity and importance to that of the earlier. When

we add to this the fact that the writers of the 12th century represented

the personages and events of the 6th in the garb, and under the

conditions, of their own time, we can understand the reason of the

manifold difficulties which beset the study of the cycle.

But into the figure of Arthur as we know him, other elements have

entered; he is not merely an historic personality, but at the same time

a survival of pre-historic myth, a hero of romance, and a fairy king;

and all these threads are woven together in one fascinating but

bewildering web. It is only possible here to summarize the leading

features which may be claimed as characteristic of each phase.

_Mythic._--Certain elements of the story point to Arthur as a culture

hero; as such his name has been identified with the _Mercurius Artaius_

of the Gauls. In this role he slays monsters, the boar Twrch Trwyth, the

giant of Mont St Michel and the Demon Cat of Losanne (Andre de Coutances

tells us that Arthur was really vanquished and carried off by the Cat,

but that one durst not tell that tale before Britons!). He never, it

should be noted, rides on purely chivalric ventures, such as aiding

distressed damsels, seeking the Grail, &c. His expeditions are all more

or less warlike. The story of his youth belongs, as Alfred Nutt

(_Folk-lore_, vol. iv.) has shown, to the group of tales classified as

the _Aryan Expulsion and Return_ formula, found in all Aryan lands.

Numerous parallels exist between the Arthurian and early Irish heroic

cycles, notably the Fenian or Ossianic. This Fenian cycle is very

closely connected with the Tuatha de Danaan, the Celtic deities of

vegetation and increase; recent research has shown that two notable

features of the Arthurian story, the Round Table and the Grail, can be

most reasonably accounted for as survivals of this Nature worship, and

were probably parts of the legend from the first.

_Romantic._--The character of Arthur as a romantic hero is, in reality,

very different from that which, mainly through the popularity of

Tennyson's _Idylls_, English people are wont to suppose. In the earlier

poems he is practically a lay figure, his court the point of departure

and return for the knights whose adventures are related in detail, but

he himself a passive spectator. In the prose romances he is a monarch,

the splendour of whose court, whose riches and generosity, are the

admiration of all; but morally he is no whit different from the knights

who surround him; he takes advantage of his _bonnes fortunes_ as do

others. He has two sons, neither of them born in wedlock; one, Modred,

is alike his son and his nephew. In certain romances, the _Perlesvaus_

and _Diu Crone_, he is a veritable _roi faineant_, overcome by sloth and

luxury. Certain traits of his story appear to show the influence of

Northern romance. Such is the story of his begetting, where Uther takes

upon him the form of Gorlois to deceive Yguerne, even as Siegfried

changed shapes with Gunther to the undoing of Brunnhilde. The sword in

the perron (stone pillar or block), the withdrawal of which proves his

right to the kingdom, is the sword of the Branstock. Morgain carries him

off, mortally wounded, to Avalon, even as the Valkyr bears the Northern

hero to Valhal. Morgain herself has many traits in common with the

Valkyrie; she is one of nine sisters, she can fly through the air as a

bird (Swan maiden); she possesses a marvellous ointment (as does Hilde,

the typical Valkyr). The idea of a slumbering hero who shall awake at

the hour of his country's greatest need is world-wide, but the most

famous instances are Northern, e.g. Olger Danske and Barbarossa, and

depend ultimately on an identification with the gods of the Northern

Pantheon, notably Thor. W. Larminie cited an instance of a rhyme current

in the Orkneys as a charm against nightmare, which confuses Arthur with

Siegfried and his winning of the Valkyr.

_Fairy._--We find that at Arthur's birth (according to Layamon, who here

differs from Wace), three ladies appeared and prophesied his future

greatness. This incident is also found in the first continuation to the

_Perceval_, where the prediction is due to a lady met with beside a

forest spring, clearly here a water fairy. In the late romance of _La

Bataille de Loquifer_ Avalon has become a purely fairy kingdom, where

Arthur rules in conjunction with Morgain. In _Huon de Bordeaux_ he is

Oberon's heir and successor, while in the romance of _Brun de la

Montagne_, preserved in a unique MS. of the Bibliotheque Nationale, we

have the curious statement that all fairy-haunted places, wherever

found, belong to Arthur:--

"Et touz ces lieux faes

Sont Artus de Bretagne."

This brief summary of the leading features of the Arthurian tradition

will indicate with what confused and complex material we are here

dealing. (See also ARTHURIAN LEGEND, GRAIL, MERLIN, ROUND TABLE; and

CELT: _Celtic literature_.)

_Texts_. Historic:--Nennius, _Historia Britonum_; H. Zimmer, _Nennius

Vindicatus_ (Berlin, 1893), an examination into the credibility of

Nennius; Geoffrey of Monmouth, _Historia Britonum_ (translations of

both histories are in Bohn's Library); Wace, the _Brut_ (ed. by Leroux

de Lincey); Layamon (ed. by Sir Fred. Madden).

Romantic:--_Merlin_--alike in the Ordinary, or Vulgate (ed. Sommer),

the _Suite_ or "Huth" _Merlin_, the 13th century _Merlin_ (ed. by G.

Paris and J. Ulrich), and the unpublished and unique version of _Bibl.

nat. fonds francais_, 337 (cf. Freymond's analysis in _Zeitschrift fur

franz. Sprache_, xxii.)--devotes considerable space to the elaboration

of the material supplied by the chronicles, the beginning of Arthur's

reign, his marriage and wars with the Saxons. The imitation of the

Charlemagne romances is here evident; the Saxons bear names of Saracen

origin, and camels and elephants appear on the scene. The _Morte

Arthur_, or _Mort au roi Artus_, a metrical romance, of which a unique

English version exists in the Thornton collection (ed. for Early

English Text Society), gives an expanded account of the passing of

Arthur; in the French prose form it is now always found incorporated

with the _Lancelot_, of which it forms the concluding section. The

remains of the Welsh tradition are to be found in the _Mabinogion_

(cf. Nutt's edition, where the stories are correctly classified), and

in the Triads. Professor Rhys' _Studies in the Arthurian Legend_ are

largely based on Welsh material, and may be consulted for details,

though the conclusions drawn are not in harmony with recent research.

These are the only texts in which Arthur is the central figure; in the

great bulk of the romances his is but a subordinate role.

(J. L. W.)

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Nor all a lie, nor all true, nor all fable, nor all known, so

much have the story-tellers told, and the fablers fabled, in order to

embellish their tales, that they have made all seem fable.

ARTHUR I. (1187-1203), duke of Brittany, was the posthumous son of

Geoffrey, the fourth son of Henry II. of England, and Constance, heiress

of Conan IV., duke of Brittany. The Bretons hoped that their young

prince would uphold their independence, which was threatened by the

English. Henry II. tried to seize Brittany, and in 1187 forced Constance

to marry one of his favourites, Randulph de Blundevill, earl of Chester

(d. 1232). Henry, however, died soon afterwards (1189). The new king of

England, Richard Coeur de Lion, claimed the guardianship of the young

Arthur, but in 1190 Richard left for the Crusade. Constance profited by

his absence by governing the duchy, and in 1194 she had Arthur

proclaimed duke of Brittany by an assembly of barons and bishops.

Richard invaded Brittany in 1196, but was defeated in 1197 and became

reconciled to Constance. On his death in 1189, the nobles of Anjou,

Maine and Touraine refused to recognize John of England, and did homage

to Arthur, who declared himself the vassal of Philip Augustus. In 1202

war was resumed between the king of England and the king of France. The

king of France recognized Arthur's right to Brittany, Anjou, Maine and

Poitou. While Philip Augustus was invading Normandy, Arthur tried to

seize Poitou. But, surprised at Mirebeau, he fell into the hands of

John, who sent him prisoner to Falaise. In the following year he was

transferred to Rouen, and disappeared suddenly. It is thought that John

killed him with his own hand. After this murder John was condemned by

the court of peers of France, and stripped of the fiefs which he

possessed in France.

See Ralph of Coggeshall, "Chronicon Anglicanum," in the _Monumenta

Britanniae historica_; Dom Lobineau, _Histoire de Bretagne_ (1702);

Dom Morice, _Histoire de Bretagne_ (1742-1756); A. de la Borderie,

_Histoire de Bretagne_, vol. iii. (1899); Bemont, "De la condamnation

de Jean-sans-Terre par la Cour des Pairs de France," in the _Revue

historique_ (1886), vol. xxxii.

ARTHUR III. (1393-1458), earl of Richmond, constable of France, and

afterwards duke of Brittany, was the third son of John IV., duke of

Brittany, and Joan of Navarre, afterwards the wife of Henry IV. of

England. His brother, John V., gave him his earldom of Richmond in

England. While still very young, he took part in the civil wars which

desolated France during the reign of Charles VI. From 1410 to 1414 he

served on the side of the Armagnacs, and afterwards entered the service

of Louis the dauphin, whose intimate friend he became. He profited by

his position at court to obtain the lieutenancy of the Bastille, the

governorship of the duchy of Nemours, and the confiscated territories of

Jean Larcheveque, seigneur of Parthenay. His efforts to reduce the

latter were, however, interrupted by the necessity of marching against

the English. At Agincourt he was wounded and captured, and remained a

prisoner in England from 1415 to 1420. Released on parole, he gained the

favour of King Henry V. by persuading his brother, the duke of Brittany,

to conclude the treaty of Troyes, by which France was handed over to the

English king. He was rewarded with the countship of Ivry.

In 1423 Arthur married Margaret of Burgundy, widow of the dauphin Louis,

and became thus the brother-in-law of Philip the Good of Burgundy, and

of the regent, the duke of Bedford. Offended, however, by Bedford's

refusal to give him a high command, he severed his connexion with the

English, and in March 1425 accepted the constable's sword from King

Charles VII. He now threw himself with ardour into the French cause,

and persuaded his brother, John V. of Brittany, to conclude with Charles

VII. the treaty of Saumur (October 7, 1425). But though he saw clearly

enough the measures necessary for success, he lacked the means to carry

them out. In the field he met with a whole series of reverses; and at

court, where his rough and overbearing manners made him disliked, his

influence was overshadowed by that of a series of incompetent

favourites. The peace concluded between the duke of Brittany and the

English in September 1427 led to his expulsion from the court, where

Georges de la Tremoille, whom he himself had recommended to the king,

remained supreme for six years, during which Richmond tried in vain to

overthrow him. In the meantime, in June 1429, he joined Joan of Arc at

Orleans, and fought in several battles under her banner, till the

influence of La Tremoille forced his withdrawal from the army. On the

5th of March 1432 Charles VII. concluded with him and with Brittany the

treaty of Rennes; but it was not until June of the following year that

La Tremoille was overthrown. Arthur now resumed the war against the

English, and at the same time took vigorous measures against the

plundering bands of soldiers and peasants known as _routiers_ or

_ecorcheurs_. On the 20th of September 1435, mainly as a result of his

diplomacy, was signed the treaty of Arras between Charles VII. and the

duke of Burgundy, to which France owed her salvation.

On the 13th of April 1436, Arthur took Paris from the English; but he

was ill seconded by the king, and hampered by the necessity for leading

frequent expeditions against the _ecorcheurs_; it was not till May 1444

that the armistice of Tours gave him leisure to carry out the

reorganization of the army which he had long projected. He now created

the _compagnies d'ordonnance_, and endeavoured to organize the militia

of the _francs archers_. This reform had its effect in the struggles

that followed. In alliance with his nephew, the duke of Brittany, he

reconquered, during September and October 1449, nearly all the Cotentin;

on the 15th of April 1450 he gained over the English the battle of

Formigny; and during the year he recovered for France the whole of

Normandy, which for the next six or seven years it was his task to

defend from English attacks. On the death of his nephew Peter II., on

the 22nd of September 1457, he became duke of Brittany, and though

retaining his office of constable of France, he refused, like his

predecessors, to do homage to the French king for his duchy. He reigned

little more than a year, dying on the 26th of December 1458, and was

succeeded by his nephew Francis II., son of his brother Richard, count

of Etampes.

Arthur was three times married: (1) to Margaret of Burgundy, duchess of

Guienne (d. 1442); (2) to Jeanne d'Albret, daughter of Charles II. of

Albret (d. 1444); (3) to Catherine of Luxemburg, daughter of Peter of

Luxemburg, count of St Pol, who survived him. He left no legitimate

children.

AUTHORITIES.--The main source for the life of Duke Arthur III. is the

chronicle of Guillaume Gruel (c. 1410-1474-1482). Gruel entered the

service of the earl of Richmond about 1425, shared in all his

campaigns, and lived with him on intimate terms. The chronicle covers

the whole period of the duke's life, but the earlier part, up to 1425,

is much less full and important than the later, which is based on

Gruel's personal knowledge and observation. In spite of a perhaps

exaggerated admiration for his hero, Gruel displays in his work so

much good faith, insight and originality that he is accepted as a

thoroughly trustworthy authority. It was first published at Paris in

1622. Of the numerous later editions, the best is that of Achille le

Vavasseur, _Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont_ (Paris, 1890). See also

E. Cosneau, _Le Connetable de Richemont_ (Paris, 1886); G. du Fresne

de Beaucourt, _Histoire de Charles VII._ (Paris, 1881, seq.).

ARTHUR, CHESTER ALAN (1830-1886), twenty-first president of the United

States, was born in Fairfield, Vermont, on the 5th of October 1830. His

father, William Arthur (1796-1875), when eighteen years of age,

emigrated from Co. Antrim, Ireland, and, after teaching in various

places in Vermont and Lower Canada, became a Baptist minister. William

Arthur had married Malvina Stone, an American girl who lived at the time

of the marriage in Canada, and the numerous changes of the family

residence afforded a basis for allegations in 1880 that the son Chester

was born not in Vermont, but in Canada, and was therefore ineligible for

the presidency. Chester entered Union College as a sophomore, and

graduated with honour in 1848. He then became a schoolmaster, at the

same time studying law. In 1853 he entered a law office in New York

city, and in the following year was admitted to the bar. His reputation

as a lawyer began with his connexion with the famous "Lemmon slave

case," in which, as one of the special counsel for the state, he secured

a decision from the highest state courts that slaves brought into New

York while in transit between two slave states were _ipso facto_ free.

In another noted case, in 1855, he obtained a decision that negroes were

entitled to the same accommodations as whites on the street railways of

New York city. In politics he was actively associated from the outset

with the Republican party. When the Civil War began he held the position

of engineer-in-chief on Governor Edwin D. Morgan's staff, and afterwards

became successively acting quartermaster-general, inspector-general, and

quartermaster-general of the state troops, in which capacities he showed

much administrative efficiency. At the close of Governor Morgan's term,

on the 31st of December 1862, General Arthur resumed the practice of his

profession, remaining active, however, in party politics in New York

city. In November 1871 he was appointed by President U.S. Grant

collector of customs for the port of New York. The custom-house had long

been conspicuous for the most flagrant abuses of the "spoils system";

and though General Arthur admitted that the evils existed and that they

rendered efficient administration impossible, he made no extensive

reforms. In 1877 President Rutherford B. Hayes began the reform of the

civil service with the New York custom-house. A non-partisan commission,

appointed by Secretary John Sherman, recommended sweeping changes. The

president demanded the resignation of Arthur and his two principal

subordinates, George H. Sharpe, the surveyor, and Alonzo B. Cornell, the

naval officer, of the Port. General Arthur refused to resign on the

ground that to retire "under fire" would be to acknowledge wrong-doing,

and claimed that as the abuses were inherent in a widespread system he

should not be made to bear the responsibility alone. His cause was

espoused by Senator Roscoe Conkling, for a time successfully; but on the

11th of July 1878, during a recess of the Senate, the collector was

removed, and in January 1879, after another severe struggle, this action

received the approval of the Senate. In 1880 General Arthur was a

delegate at large from New York to the Republican national convention.

In common with the rest of the "Stalwarts," he worked hard for the

nomination of Gen. U.S. Grant for a third term. Upon the triumph of

James A. Garfield, the necessity of conciliating the defeated faction

led to the hasty acceptance of Arthur for the second place on the

ticket. His nomination was coldly received by the public; and when,

after his election and accession, he actively engaged on behalf of

Conkling in the great conflict with Garfield over the New York

patronage, the impression was widespread that he was unworthy of his

position. Upon the death of President Garfield, on the 19th of September

1881, Arthur took the oath as his successor. Contrary to the general

expectation, his appointments were as a rule unexceptionable, and he

earnestly promoted the Pendleton law for the reform of the civil

service. His use of the veto in 1882 in the cases of a Chinese

Immigration Bill (prohibiting immigration of Chinese for twenty years)

and a River and Harbour Bill (appropriating over $18,000,000, to be

expended on many insignificant as well as important streams) confirmed

the favourable impression which had been made. The most important events

of his administration were the passage of the Tariff Act of 1883 and of

the "Edmunds Law" prohibiting polygamy in the territories, and the

completion of three great trans-continental railways--the Southern

Pacific, the Northern Pacific, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. His

administration was lacking in political situations of a dramatic

character, but on all questions that arose his policy was sane and

dignified. In 1884 he allowed his name to be presented for renomination

in the Republican convention, but he was easily defeated by the friends

of James G. Blaine. At the expiration of his term he resumed his

residence in New York city, where he died on the 18th of November 1886.

For an account of his administration see UNITED STATES: _History_.

ARTHURIAN LEGEND. By the "Arthurian legend," or _Matiere de Brelagne_,

we mean the subject-matter of that important body of medieval literature

known as the Arthurian cycle (see ARTHUR). The period covered by the

texts in their present form represents, roughly speaking, the century

1150-1250. The _History_ of Nennius is, of course, considerably earlier,

and that of Geoffrey of Monmouth somewhat antedates 1150 (1136), but

with these exceptions the dates above given will be found to cover the

composition of all our extant texts.

As to the origin of this _Matiere de Bretagne_, and the circumstances

under which it became a favourite theme for literary treatment, two

diametrically opposite theories are held. One body of scholars, headed

by Professor Wendelin Forster of Bonn, while admitting that, so far as

any historic basis can be traced, the events recorded must have happened

on insular ground, maintain that the knowledge of these events, and

their romantic development, are due entirely to the Bretons of the

continent. The British who fled before the Teutonic and Scandinavian

invasions of the 6th and 8th centuries, had carried with them to

Armorica, and fondly cherished, the remembrance of Arthur and his deeds,

which in time had become interwoven with traditions of purely Breton

origin. On the other side of the Channel, i.e. in Arthur's own land,

these memories had died out, or at most survived only as the faint echo

of historic tradition. Through the medium of French-speaking Bretons

these tales came to the cognizance of Northern French poets, notably

Chretien de Troyes, who wove them into romances. According to Professor

Forster there were no Arthurian romances previous to Chretien, and

equally, of course, no insular romantic tradition. This theory reposes

mainly on the supposed absence of pre-Chretien poems, and on the

writings of Professor H. Zimmer, who derives the Arthurian names largely

from Breton roots. This represents the prevailing standpoint of German

scholars, and may be called the "continental" theory. In opposition to

this the school of which the late Gaston Paris was the leading, and most

brilliant, representative, maintains that the Arthurian tradition,

romantic equally with historic, was preserved in Wales through the

medium of the bards, was by them communicated to their Norman

conquerors, worked up into poems by the Anglo-Normans, and by them

transmitted to the continental poets. This, the "insular" theory, in

spite of its inherent probability, has hitherto been at a disadvantage

through lack of positive evidence, but in a recently acquired MS. of the

British Museum, Add. 36614, we find the first continuator of the

_Perceval_, Wauchier de Denain, quoting as authority for stories of

Gawain a certain Bleheris, whom he states to have been "born and bred in

Wales." The identity of this Bleheris with the Bledhericus mentioned by

Giraldus Cambrensis as _Famosus ille fabulator_, living at a bygone and

unspecified date, and with the Breri quoted by Thomas as authority for

the _Tristan_ story, has been fully accepted by leading French scholars.

Further, on the evidence of certain MSS. of the _Perceval_, notably the

Paris MS. (Bibl. Nat. 1450), it is clear that Chretien was using, and

using freely, the work of a predecessor, large fragments of which have

been preserved by the copyists who completed his unfinished work. The

evidence of recent discoveries is all in favour of the insular, or

French, view.

So far as the character, as distinguished from the _provenance_, of this

subject-matter is concerned, it is largely of folk-lore origin,

representing the working over of traditions, in some cases (as e.g. in

the account of Arthur's birth and upbringing) common to all the Aryan

peoples, in others specifically Celtic. Thus there are a number of

parallels between the Arthurian and the Irish heroic cycles, the precise

nature of which has yet to be determined. So far as Arthur himself is

concerned these parallels are with the Fenian, or Ossianic, cycle, in

the case of Gawain with the Ultonian.

In its literary form the cycle falls into three

groups:--pseudo-historic: the _Histories_ of Nennius and Geoffrey, the

_Brut_ of Wace and Layamon (see ARTHUR); poetic: the works of Chretien

de Troyes, Thomas, Raoul de Houdenc and others (see GAWAIN, PERCEVAL,

TRISTAN, and the writers named above); prose: the largest and most

important group (see GRAIL, LANCELOT, MERLIN, TRISTAN). Of these three

branches the prose romances offer the most insuperable problems; none

can be dated with any certainty; all are of enormous length; and all

have undergone several redactions. Of not one do we as yet possess a

critical and comparative text, and in the absence of such texts the

publication of any definite and detailed theory as to the evolution and

relative position of the separate branches of the Arthurian cycle is to

be deprecated. The material is so vast in extent, and in so chaotic a

condition, that the construction of any such theory is only calculated

to invite refutation and discredit.

The best general study of the cycle is to be found in Gaston Paris's

manual _La Litterature francaise au moyen age_ (new and revised

edition, 1905). See also the introduction to vol. xxx. of _Histoire

litteraire de la France_. For the theories as to origin, see the

Introductions to Professor Forster's editions of the poems of Chretien

de Troyes, notably that to vol. iv., _Der Karrenritter_, which is a

long and elaborate restating of his position. Also Professor H.

Zimmer's articles in _Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen_, 12 and 20. For

the Insular view, Ferd. Lot's "Etudes sur la provenance du cycle

arthurien," _Romania_, vols. xxiv.-xxviii., are very valuable. For a

popular treatment of the subject, cf. Nos. i. and iv. of _Popular

Studies in Romance and Folk-lore_ (Nutt). Robert Huntington Fletcher's

"The Arthurian Matter in the Chronicles" (vol. x. of _Harvard Studies

and Notes in Philology and Literature_), is a most useful summary.

(J. L. W.)

ARTICHOKE. The common artichoke, _Cynara, scolymus_, is a plant

belonging to the natural order Compositae, having some resemblance to a

large thistle. It has long been esteemed as a culinary vegetable; the

parts chiefly employed being the immature receptacle or floret disk,

with the lower part of the surrounding leaf-scales, which are known as

"artichoke bottoms." In Italy the receptacles, dried, are largely used

in soups; those of the cultivated plant as _Carciofo domestico_, and of

the wild variety as _Carciofo spinoso_.

The Jerusalem artichoke, _Helianthus tuberosus_, is a distinct plant

belonging to the same order, cultivated for its tubers. It closely

resembles the sunflower, and its popular name is a corruption of the

Italian _Girasole Articiocco_, the sunflower artichoke. It is a native

of Canada and the north-eastern United States, and was cultivated by the

aborigines. The tubers are rich in the carbohydrate inulin and in sugar.

The name is derived from the northern Italian _articiocco_, or

_arciciocco_, modern _carciofo_; these words come, through the Spanish,

from the Arabic _al-kharshuf_. False etymology has corrupted the word in

many languages: it has been derived in English from "choke," and

"heart," or the Latin _hortus_, a garden; and in French, the form

_artichaut_ has been connected with _chaud_, hot, and _chou_, a cabbage.

ARTICLE (from Lat. _articulus_, a joint), a term primarily for that

which connects two parts together, and so transferred to the parts thus

joined; thus the word is used of the separate clauses or heads in

contracts, treaties or statutes and the like; of a literary composition

on some specific subject in a periodical; or of particular commodities,

as in "articles of trade and commerce." It appears also in the phrase

"in the article of death" to translate _in articulo mortis_, at the

moment of death. In grammar the term is used of the adjectives which

state the extension of a substantive, i.e. the number of individuals to

which a name applies; the indefinite article denoting one or any of a

particular class, the definite denoting a particular member of a class.

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, in English company law, the regulations for the

internal management of a joint stock company registered under the

Companies Acts. They are, in fact, the terms of the partnership agreed

upon by the shareholders among themselves. They regulate such matters as

the transfer and forfeiture of shares, calls upon shares, the

appointment and qualification of directors, their powers and

proceedings, general meetings of the shareholders, votes, dividends, the

keeping and audit of accounts, and other such matters. In regard to

these internal regulations the legislature has left the company free to

adopt whatever terms of association it chooses. It has furnished in the

schedule to the Companies Act 1862 (Table A), a model or specimen set of

regulations, but their adoption, wholly or in part, is optional; only if

a company does not register articles of its own these statutory

regulations are to apply. When, as is commonly the case, a company

decides to have articles of its own framing, such articles must be

expressed in separate paragraphs, numbered arithmetically, and signed by

the subscribers of the memorandum of association. They must also be

printed, stamped like a deed, and attested. When so perfected, they are

to be delivered, with the memorandum of association, to the registrar of

joint stock companies, who is to retain and register them. The articles

of association thereupon become a public document, which any person may

inspect on payment of a fee of one shilling. This has important

consequences, because every person dealing with the company is presumed

to be acquainted with its constitution, and to have read its articles.

The articles, also, upon registration, bind the company and its members

to the same extent as if each member had subscribed his name and affixed

his seal to them. (See also MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION; COMPANY;

INCORPORATION.)

In the United States, articles of association are any instrument in

writing which sets forth the purposes, the terms and conditions upon

which a body of persons have united for the prosecution of a joint

enterprise. When this instrument is duly executed and filed, the law

gives it the force and effects of a charter of incorporation.

ARTICULATA, a zoological name now obsolete, applied by Cuvier to

animals, such as insects and worms, in which the body displays a jointed

structure. (See ARTHROPODA.)

ARTICULATION (from Lat. _articulare_, to divide into joints), the act of

joining together; in anatomy the junction of the bones (see JOINTS); in

botany the point of attachment and separation of the deciduous parts of

a plant, such as a leaf. The word is also used for division into

distinct parts, as of human speech by words or syllables.

ARTILLERY (the O. Fr. _artiller_, to equip with engines of war, probably

comes from Late Lat. _articulum_, dim. of _ars_, art, cf. "engine" from

_ingenium_, or of _artus_, joint), a term originally applied to all

engines for discharging missiles, and in this sense used in English in

the early 17th century. In a more restricted sense, artillery has come

to mean all firearms not carried and used by hand, and also the

_personnel_ and organization by which the power of such weapons is

wielded. It is, however, not usual to class _machine guns_ (q.v.) as

artillery. The present article deals with the development and

contemporary state of the artillery arm in land warfare, in respect of

its organization, personnel and special or "formal" employment. For the

_materiel_--the guns, their carriages and their ammunition--see ORDNANCE

and AMMUNITION. For _ballistics_, see that heading, and for the work of

artillery in combination with the other arms, see TACTICS.

Artillery, as distinct from ordnance, is usually classified in

accordance with the functions it has to perform. The simplest division

is that into _mobile_ and _immobile_ artillery, the former being

concerned with the handling of all weapons so mounted as to be capable

of more or less easy movement from place to place, the latter with that

of weapons which are installed in fixed positions. Mobile artillery is

subdivided, again chiefly in respect of its employment, into _horse_ and

_field_ batteries, _heavy field_ or _position_ artillery, _field

howitzers, mountain artillery_ and _siege trains_, adapted to every kind

of terrain in which field troops may be employed, and work they may have

to do. Immobile artillery is used in fixed positions of all kinds, and

above all in permanent fortifications; it cannot, therefore, be

classified as above, inasmuch as the _raison d'etre_, and consequently

the armament of one fort or battery may be totally distinct from that of

another. "Fortress," "Garrison" and "Foot" artillery are the usual names

for this branch. The dividing line, indeed, in the case of the heavier

weapons, varies with circumstances; guns of position may remain on their

ground while elaborate fortifications grow up around them, or the

deficiencies of a field army in artillery may be made good from the

_materiel_, more frequently still from the _personnel_, of the fortress

artillery. Thus it may happen that mobile artillery becomes immobile and

vice versa. But under normal circumstances the principle of

classification indicated is maintained in all organized military forces.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

1. _Early Artillery._--Mechanical appliances for throwing projectiles

were produced early in the history of organized warfare, and "engines

invented by cunning men to shoot arrows and great stones" are mentioned

in the Old Testament. These were continually improved, and, under the

various names of _catapulta, balista, onager, trebuchet_, &c., were

employed throughout the ancient and medieval periods of warfare. The

machines finally produced were very powerful, and, even when a

propelling agent so strong as gunpowder was discovered and applied, the

supersession of the older weapons was not effected suddenly nor without

considerable opposition. The date of the first employment of cannon

cannot be established with any certainty, but there is good evidence to

show that the Germans used guns at the siege of Cividale in Italy

(1331). The terms of a commission given (1414) by Henry V. to his

_magister operationum, ingeniarum, et gunnarum ac aliarum ordinationum_,

one Nicholas Merbury, show that the organization of artillery

establishments was grafted upon that which was already in existence for

the service of the old-fashioned machines. Previously to this it is

recorded that of some 340 men forming the ordnance establishment of

Edward III. in 1344 only 12 were artillerymen and gunners. Two years

later, at Crecy, it is said, the English brought guns into the open

field for the first time. At the siege of Harfleur (1415) the ordnance

establishment included 25 "master gunners" and 50 "servitour gunners."

The "gunner" appears to have been the captain of the gun, with general

charge of the guns and stores, and the special duty of laying and firing

the piece in action.

2. _The Beginnings of Field Artillery._--It is clear, from such evidence

as we possess, that the chief and almost the only use of guns at this

time was to batter the walls of fortifications, and it is not until

later in the 15th century that their employment in the field became

general (see also CAVALRY). The introduction of field artillery may be

attributed to John Zizka, and it was in his Hussite wars (1419-1424)

that the _Wagenburg_, a term of more general application, but taken here

as denoting a cart or vehicle armed with several small guns, came into

prominence. This device allowed a relatively high manoeuvring power to

be attained, and it is found occasionally in European wars two centuries

later, as for instance at Wimpfen in 1622 and Cropredy Bridge in 1644.

In an act of attainder passed by the Lancastrian party against the

Yorkists (1459), it is stated that the latter were "traiterously ranged

in bataill ... their cartes with gonnes set before their batailles"

(Rot. Parl. 38 Henry VI., v. 348). In the London fighting of 1460, small

guns were used to clear the streets, heavy ordnance to batter the walls

of the Tower. The battle of Lose Coat Field (1469) was decided almost

entirely by Edward IV.'s field guns, while at Blackheath (1497) "some

cornets of horse, and bandes of foot, and good store of artillery

wheeling about" were sent to "put themselves beyond" the rebel camp

(Bacon, _Henry VII._). The greatest example of artillery work in the

15th century was the siege of Constantinople in 1453, at which the Turks

used a large force of artillery, and in particular some monster pieces,

some of which survived to engage a British squadron in 1807, when a

stone shot weighing some 700 lb. cut the mainmast of Admiral (Sir) J.T.

Duckworth's flagship in two, and another killed and wounded sixty men.

For siege purposes the new weapon was indeed highly effective, and the

castles of rebellious barons were easily knocked to pieces by the prince

who owned, or succeeded in borrowing, a few pieces of ordnance (cf.

Carlyle, _Frederick the Great_, book iii. chap. i.).

3. _The 16th Century._--In the Italian wars waged by Charles VIII.,

Louis XII. and Francis I. of France, artillery played a most conspicuous

part, both in siege and field warfare. Indeed, cannon did excellent

service in the field before hand firearms attained any considerable

importance. At Ravenna (1512) and Marignan (1515) field artillery did

great execution, and at the latter battle "the French artillery played a

new and distinguished part, not only by protecting the centre of the

army from the charges of the Swiss phalanxes, and causing them excessive

loss, but also by rapidly taking up such positions from time to time ...

as enabled the guns to play upon the flanks of the attacking columns"

(Chesney, _Observations on Firearms_, 1852). In this connexion it must,

however, be observed that, when the arquebus and other small arms became

really efficient (about 1525), less is heard of this small and handy

field artillery, which had hitherto been the only means of breaking up

the heavy masses of the hostile pikemen. We have seen that artillery was

not ignored in England; but, in view of the splendid and unique

efficiency of the archers, there was no great opportunity of developing

the new arm. In the time of Henry VIII., the ordnance in use in the

field consisted in the main of heavy _culverins_ and other guns of

position, and of lighter field pieces, termed _sakers, falcons_, &c. It

is to be noticed that already the lightest pieces had disappeared, the

smallest of the above being a 2-pounder. In the earlier days of field

artillery, the artillery train was a miscellaneous congeries of pontoon,

supply, baggage and tool wagons, heavy ordnance and light guns in carts.

With the development of infantry fire the use of the last-named weapons

died out, and it is largely due to this fact that "artillery" came to

imply cumbrous and immobile guns of position. Little is, therefore,

heard of smart manoeuvring, such as that at Marignan, during the latter

part of the 16th century. The guns now usually come into action in

advance of the troops, but, from their want of mobility, could neither

accompany a farther advance nor protect a retreat, and they were

generally captured and recaptured with every changing phase of the

fight. Great progress was in the meanwhile made in the adaptation of

ordnance to the attack and defence of fortresses and, in particular,

vertical fire came into vogue. A great Turkish gun, carrying a 600-lb.

stone shot, was used in the siege of Constantinople, apparently in this

way, since Gibbon records that at the range of a mile the shot buried

itself a fathom deep in earth, a fact which implies that a high angle of

elevation was given. In the celebrated siege of Malta in 1565 artillery

played a conspicuous part.

4. _The Thirty Years' War._--Such, in its broadest outlines, is the

history of artillery work during the first three centuries of its

existence. Whilst the material had undergone a very considerable

improvement, the organization remained almost unchanged, and the

tactical employment of guns had become restricted, owing to their

slowness and difficulty of movement on the march and immobility in

action. In wars of the type of the War of Dutch Independence and the

earlier part of the Thirty Years' War, this heavy artillery naturally

remained useful enough, and the _Wagenburg_ had given place to the

musketry initiated by the Spaniards at Bicocca and Pavia, which since

1525 had steadily improved and developed. It is not, therefore, until

the appearance of a captain whose secret of success was vigour and

mobility that the first serious attempt was made to produce field

artillery in the proper sense of the word, that is, a gun of good power,

and at the same time so mounted as to be capable of rapid movement. The

"carte with gonnes" had been, as is the modern machine gun, a mechanical

concentration of musketry rather than a piece of artillery. Maurice of

Nassau, indeed, helped to develop the field gun, and the French had

invented the limber, but Gustavus Adolphus was the first to give

artillery its true position on the battlefield. At the first battle of

Breitenfeld (1631) Gustavus had twelve heavy and forty-two light guns

engaged, as against Tilly's heavy 24-pounders, which were naturally far

too cumbrous for field work. At the Lech (1632) Gustavus seems to have

obtained a local superiority over his opponent owing to the handiness of

his field artillery even more than by its fire-power. At Lutzen (1632)

he had sixty guns to Wallenstein's twenty-one. His field pieces were not

the celebrated "leather" guns (which were indeed a mere makeshift used

in Gustavus' Polish wars) but iron 4-pounders. These were distributed

amongst the infantry units, and thus began the system of "battalion

guns" which survived in the armies of Europe long after the conditions

requiring it had vanished. The object of thus dispersing the guns was

doubtless to ensure in the first place more certain co-operation between

the two arms, and in the second to exercise a military supervision over

the lighter and more useful field pieces which it was as yet impossible

to exercise over the _personnel_ of the heavy artillery.

5. _Personnel and Classification._--More than 300 years after the first

employment of ordnance, the men working the guns and the transport

drivers were still civilians. The actual commander of the artillery was

indeed, both in Germany and in England, usually a soldier, and Lennart

Torstensson, the commander of Gustavus' artillery, became a brilliant

and successful general. But the transport and the drivers were still

hired, and even the gunners were chiefly concerned for the safety of

their pieces, the latter being often the property, not of the king

waging war, but of some "master gunner" whose services he had secured,

and the latter's apprentices were usually in entire charge of the

material. These civilian "artists," as they were termed, owed no more

duty to the prince than any other employes, and even Gustavus, it would

appear, made no great improvement in the matter of the reorganization of

artillery trains. Soldiers as drivers do not appear until 150 years

later, and in the meanwhile companies of "firelocks" and "fusiliers"

(q.v.) came into existence, as much to prevent the gunners and drivers

from running away as to protect them from the enemy. A further cause of

difficulties, in England at any rate, was the age of the "gunners." In

the reign of Elizabeth, some of the Tower gunners were over ninety years

of age. Complaints as to the inefficiency of these men are frequent in

the years preceding the English Civil War. Gustavus, however, has the

merit of being the first to make the broad classification of artillery,

as mobile or non-mobile, which has since been almost universally in

force. In his time the 12-pounder was the heaviest gun classed as

mobile, and the "feildpeece" _par excellence_ was the 9-pounder or

_demi-culverin_. After the death of Gustavus at Lutzen (1632), his

principles came universally into practice, and amongst them were those

of the employment of field artillery.

6. _The English Civil War._--Even in the English Civil War (Great

Rebellion), in which artillery was hampered by the previous neglect of a

century, its field work was not often contemptible, and on occasion the

arm did excellent service. But in the campaigns of this war, fought out

by men whose most ardent desire was to decide the quarrel swiftly, the

marching and manoeuvring were unusually rapid. The consequence of this

was that the guns were sometimes either late in arriving, as at

Edgehill, or absent altogether, as at Preston. The _role_ of guns was

further reduced by the fact that there were few fortresses to be

reduced, and country houses, however strong, rarely required to be

battered by a siege train. The New Model army usually sent for siege

guns only when they were needed for particular service. On such

occasions, indeed, the heavy ordnance did its work so quickly and

effectually that the assault often took place one or two days after the

guns had opened fire. Cromwell in his sieges made great use of shells,

12-inch and even larger mortars being employed. The castle of Devizes,

which had successfully resisted the Parliamentary battering guns,

succumbed at once to vertical fire. It does not, however, appear certain

that there was any separation of field from siege ordnance, although the

Swedish system was followed in almost all military matters.

7. _Artillery Progress, 1660-1740._--Cromwell's practice of relegating

heavy guns to the rear, except when a serious siege operation was in

view, and in very rapid movements leaving even the field pieces far

behind, was followed to some extent in the campaigns of the age of Louis

XIV. The number of ammunition wagons, and above all of horses, required

for each gun was four or five times as great as that required even for a

modern quick-firer. In the days of Turenne heavy guns were much

employed, as the campaigns of the French were directed as a rule to the

methodical conquest of territory and fortified towns. Similarly,

Marlborough, working amidst the fortresses of the Netherlands in 1706,

had over 100 pieces of artillery (of which 60 were mortars) to a force

of some 11,000 men, or about 9 pieces per 1000 men. On the other hand,

in his celebrated march to the Danube in 1704, he had but few guns, and

the allied armies at Blenheim brought into the field only 1 piece per

1000 men. At Oudenarde "from the _rapidity of the march_ ... the battle

was fought with little aid from artillery on either side" (Coxe,

_Marlborough_). There was less need now than ever before for rapid

manoeuvres of mobile artillery, since the pike finally disappeared from

the scene about 1700, and infantry fire-power had become the decisive

factor in battles. In the meantime, artillery was gradually ceasing to

be the province of the skilled workman, and assuming its position as an

arm of the military service. In the 17th century, when armies were as a

rule raised only "for the war" and disbanded at the conclusion of

hostilities, there had been no very pressing need for the maintenance in

peace of an expensive _personnel_ and material. Gunners therefore

remained, as civilians, outside the regular administration of the

forces, until the general adoption of the "standing army" principle in

the last years of the century (see ARMY). From this time steps were

taken, in all countries, to organize the artillery as a military force.

After various attempts had been made, the "Royal Regiment of Artillery"

came into existence in England in 1716. It is, however, stated that the

English artillery did not "begin to assume a military appearance until

the Flanders campaigns" of the War of the Austrian Succession. Even in

the War of American Independence a dispute arose as to whether a general

officer, whose regimental service had been in the Royal Artillery, was

entitled to command troops of all arms, and the artillery drivers were

not actually soldiers until 1793 at the earliest. French artillery

officers received military rank only in 1732.

8. _Artillery in the Wars of Frederick the Great._--By the time of

Frederick the Great's first wars, artillery had thus been divided into

(a) those guns moving with an army in the field, and (b) those which

were either wholly stationary or were called upon only when a siege was

expected. The _personnel_ was gradually becoming more efficient and more

amenable to discipline; the transport arrangements, however, remained in

a backward state. Siege and fortress artillery was now organized and

employed in accordance with the system of the "formal attack" as finally

developed by Vauban. For details of this, as involving the tactical

procedure of artillery in the attack and defence of fortresses, the

reader is referred to FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT. We are concerned

here more especially with the progress of field artillery. The part

played by this arm began now to vary according to the circumstances of

each action, and the "moral" support of guns was calculated as a factor

in the dispositions. In the early Silesian wars, heavy or reserve guns

protected the deployment of the army and endeavoured to prepare for the

subsequent advance by firing upon the hostile troops; the battalion guns

remained close to the infantry, accompanied its movements and assisted

in the fire fight. Their support was not without value, and the heavy

guns often provoked the enemy into a premature advance, as at Mollwitz.

But the infantry or the cavalry forced the decision. It has been

mentioned that with the final disappearance of the pike, about 1700,

infantry fire-power ruled the battlefield. Throughout the 18th century,

it will be found, when the infantry is equal to its work the guns have

only a subordinate part in the fighting of pitched battles. At

Kunersdorf (1759) the first dashing charge of the Prussian grenadiers

captured 72 guns from the Russian army. Later the total of captured

ordnance reached 180, yet the Russians, then almost wholly in flight,

were not cut to pieces, for only a few light guns of the Prussian army

could get to the front; their heavy pieces, though twelve horses were

harnessed to each, never came into action. This example will serve to

illustrate the difference between the artillery of 1760 and that of

fifty years later. According to Tempelhof, who was present, Kunersdorf

was the finest opportunity for field artillery that he had ever seen.

Yet the field artillery of the 18th century was, if anything, more

powerful than that of Napoleon's time; it was the want of mobility alone

which prevented the Prussians from turning to good account an

opportunity fully as favourable as that of the German artillery at

Sedan. That Frederick made more use of his guns in the later campaigns

of the Seven Years' War is accounted for by the fact that his infantry

and cavalry were no longer capable of forcing a decision, and also by

changes in the general character of the operations. These were fought in

and about broken country and entrenched positions, and the mobility of

the other arms sank to that of the artillery. Thus power came to the

front again, and the heavier weapons regained their former supremacy. In

a _bataille rangee_ in the open field the proportion of guns to men had

been, in 1741, 2 per 1000. At Leuthen (1757) heavy fortress guns were

brought to the front for a special purpose. At Kunersdorf the proportion

was 4 and 5 per 1000 men, with what degree of effectiveness we have

seen. In the later campaigns the Austrian artillery, which was,

throughout the Seven Years' War, the best in Europe, placed its numerous

and powerful ordnance (an "amphitheatre of 400 guns," as Frederick said)

in long lines of field works. The combination of guns and obstacles was

almost invariably too formidable to offer the slightest chance of a

successful assault. It was at this stage that Frederick, in 1759,

introduced horse artillery to keep pace with the movements of cavalry, a

proof, if proof were needed, of the inability of the field artillery to

manoeuvre. The field howitzer, the weapon _par excellence_ for the

attack of field works, has never perhaps been more extensively employed

than it was by the Prussians at that time. At Burkersdorf (1762)

Frederick placed 45 howitzers in one battery. In those days the mobile

artillery was always formed in groups or "batteries" of from 10 to 20

pieces. England too was certainly abreast of other countries in the

organization of the field artillery arm. About the middle of the 18th

century the guns in use consisted of 24-pounders, 12-pounders,

6-pounders and 3-pounders. The guns were divided into "brigades" of

four, five and six guns respectively, and began to be separated into

"heavy" and "light" brigades. Each field gun was drawn by four horses,

the two leaders being ridden by artillerymen, and had 100 rounds of shot

and 30 rounds of grape. The British artillery distinguished itself in

the latter part of the Seven Years' War. Foreign critics praised its

lightness, its elegance and the good quality of its materials. At

Marburg (1760) "the English artillery could not have been better served;

it followed the enemy with such vivacity, and maintained its fire so

well, that it was impossible for the latter to re-form," says Tempelhof,

the Prussian artillery officer who records the lost opportunity of

Kunersdorf. The merits and the faults of the artillery had been made

clear, and nowhere was the lesson taken to heart more than in France,

where General Gribeauval, a French officer who had served in the war

with the Austrian artillery, initiated reforms which in the end led to

the artillery triumphs of the Napoleonic era. While Frederick had

endeavoured to employ, as profitably as possible, the existing heavy

equipments, Gribeauval sought improvement in other directions.

9. _Gribeauval's Reforms._--At the commencement of the 18th century,

French artillery had made but little progress. The carriages and wagons

were driven by wagoners on foot, and on the field of battle the guns

were dragged about by ropes or remained stationary. Towards the middle

of the century some improvements were made. Field guns and carriages

were lightened, and the guns separated into brigades. Siege carriages

were introduced. From 1765 onwards, however, Gribeauval strove to build

up a complete system both of _personnel_ and _materiel_, creating a

distinct _materiel_ for field, siege, garrison and coast artillery.

Alive to the vital importance of mobility for field artillery, he

dismissed to other branches all pieces of greater calibre than

12-pounders, and reduced the weight of those retained. His reforms were

resisted, and for a time successfully; but in 1776 he became first

inspector-general of artillery, and was able to put his ideas into

force. The field artillery of the new system included 4-pounder

regimental guns, and for the reserve 8- and 12-pounders, with 6-inch

howitzers. For siege and garrison service Gribeauval adopted the

16-pounder and 12-pounder guns, 8-inch howitzer and 10-inch mortar, 12-,

10- and 8-inch mortars being introduced in 1785.

The carriages were constructed on a uniform model and technically

improved. The horses were harnessed in pairs, instead of in file as

formerly, but the manner in which the teams were driven remained much

the same. The _prolong_ (a sort of tow-rope) was introduced, to unite

the trail of the gun and the limber in slow retiring movements. Siege

carriages differed from those of field artillery only in details.

Gribeauval also introduced new carriages for garrison and coast service.

The great step made was in a uniform construction being adopted for all

_materiel_, and in making the parts interchangeable so far as possible.

In 1765 the _personnel_ of the French artillery was reorganized. The

corps or reserve artillery was organized in divisions of eight guns. The

battery or division was thus made a unit, with guns, munitions and

gunners complete, the horses and drivers being added at a later date.

Horse artillery was introduced into the French army in 1791. The last

step was made in 1800, when the establishment of a driver corps of

soldiers put an end to the old system of horsing by contract.

10. _British Artillery, 1793-1815._--Meanwhile the numbers of the

English artillery had increased to nearly 4000 men. For some five

centuries the word "artillery" in England meant entirely garrison

artillery; the field artillery only existed in time of war. When war

broke out, a train of artillery was organized, consisting of a certain

number of field (or siege) guns, manned by garrison gunners; and when

peace was proclaimed the train was disbanded, the _materiel_ being

returned into store, and the gunners reverting to some fort or

stronghold. In 1793 the British artillery was anything but efficient.

Guns were still dispersed among the infantry, mobility had declined

again since the Seven Years' War, and the American war had been fought

out by the other arms. The drivers were mere carters on foot with long

whips, and the whole field equipment was scarcely able to break from a

foot-pace. Prior to the Peninsular War, however, the exertions of an

able officer, Major Spearman, had done much to bring about improvement.

Horse artillery had been introduced in 1793, and the driver corps

established in 1794. Battalion guns were abolished in 1802, and field

"brigades of six guns" were formed, horse artillery batteries being

styled "troops." Military drivers were introduced, and the horses teamed

in pairs. The drivers were mounted on the near horses, the gunners

either rode the off horses or were carried on the limbers and wagons.

The equipment was lightened, and a new system of manoeuvres introduced.

A troop of horse artillery and a field brigade each had five guns and

one howitzer. The "driver corps," raised in 1794, was divided into

troops, the addition of one of which to a company of foot artillery

converted it into a field brigade. The horse artillery possessed both

drivers and horses, and required very limited assistance from the driver

corps.

11. _French Revolutionary Wars._--During the long wars of the French

Revolution and Empire the artillery of the field army by degrees became

field artillery as we know it to-day. The development of musketry in the

16th century had taken the work of preparing an assault out of the hands

of the gunners. _Per contra_, the decadence of infantry fire-power in

the latter part of the Seven Years' War had reinstated the artillery

arm. A similar decadence of the infantry arm was destined to produce, in

1807, artillery predominance, but this time with an important

difference, viz. _mobility_, and when mobility is thus achieved we have

the first modern field artillery. The new tactics of the French in the

Revolutionary wars, forced upon them by circumstances, involved an

almost complete abandonment of the fire-tactics of Frederick's day, and

the need for artillery was, from the first fight at Valmy onwards, so

obvious that its moral support was demanded even in the outpost line of

the new French armies. St Cyr (_Armies of the Rhine_, p. 112) quotes a

case in which "right in the very farthest outpost line" the original

4-pounder guns were replaced by 8-, 16-, and in the end by 24-pounders.

The cardinal principle of massing batteries was not, indeed, forgotten,

notwithstanding the weakness of raw levies. But though, as we have seen,

the _materiel_ had already been greatly improved, and the artillery was

less affected by the Revolution than other arms of the service,

circumstances were against it, and we rarely find examples of artillery

work in the Revolutionary wars which show any great improvement upon

older methods. The field guns were however, at last organized in

batteries each complete in itself, as mentioned above. The battalion gun

disappeared; it was a relic of days in which it was thought advisable,

both for other reasons and also because the short range of guns forbade

any attempt at concentration of fire from several positions at one

target, to have some force of artillery at any point that might be

threatened. Though it was officially retained in the regulations of the

French army, "officers and men combined to reject it" (Rouquerol, _Q.F.

Field Artillery_, p. 121), and its last appearances, in 1809 and in

1813, were due merely to an endeavour on the part of Napoleon to give

cohesion thereby to the battalions of raw soldiers which then

constituted his army. But, with the development of mobility, it was

probably found that sufficient guns could be taken to any threatened

point, and no one had ever denied the principle of massed batteries,

although, in practice, dispersion had been thought to be unavoidable.

12. _Napoleon's Artillery Tactics._--During the war the French artillery

steadily improved in manoeuvring power. But many years elapsed before

perfection was attained. Meanwhile, the infantry, handled without regard

to losses in every fight, had in consequence deteriorated. The final

production of the field artillery battle, usually dated as from the

battle of Friedland (June 14, 1807), therefore saved the situation for

the French. Henceforward Napoleon's battles depend for their success on

an "artillery preparation," the like of which had never been seen.

Napoleon's own maxim illustrates the typical tactics of 1807-1815. "When

once the _melee_ has begun," he says, "the man who is clever enough to

bring up an unexpected force of artillery, without the enemy knowing it,

is sure to carry the day." The guns no longer "prepared" the infantry

advance by slowly disintegrating the hostile forces. Still less was it

their business merely to cover a deployment. On the contrary, they now

went in to the closest ranges and, by actually _annihilating_ a portion

of the enemy's line with case-shot fire, "covered" the assault so

effectively that columns of cavalry and infantry reached the gap thus

created without striking a blow. It is unnecessary to give examples.

Every one of Napoleon's later battles illustrates the principle. The

most famous case is that of the great battery of 100 guns at Wagram

(q.v.) which preceded the final attack of the centre. When Napoleon at

Leipzig saw the allied guns forming up in long lines to prepare the

assault, he exclaimed, "At last they have learned something." This

"case-shot preparation," of course, involved a high degree of efficiency

in manoeuvre, as the guns had to gallop forward far in front of the

infantry. The want of this quality had retarded the development of field

artillery for 300 years, during which it had only been important

relatively to the occasional inferiority of other troops. After

Napoleon's time the art of tactics became the art of _combining the

three arms_.

[Illustration: PLATE I.

FIGS. 1 and 2.--15th Century Field Artillery (Napoleon III).

FIG. 3.--Field Artillery. 1525 (Napoleon III).

FIG. 4.--French Artillery 1735 (_Journal d'Armee_,1835).

FIG. 5.--French Field Artillery,1835 (_Journal d'Armee_,1835).

FIG. 6.--Artillery in Action, Roveredo, 1796 (C. Vernet).]

[Illustration: PLATE II.

BREACH LOADING FIELD BATTERY (15-PR. B.L.).

_Photo, Gale & Polden._

QUICK-FIRING HORSE ARTILLERY (ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY, 13-PR. Q.F.).

_Photo, Gale & Polden._

Q.F. FIELD ARTILLERY (18-PR. Q.F., R.F.A.).

_Photo, Gale & Polden._

FRENCH (75-MM. Q.F.) FIELD ARTILLERY MANOEUVRING.

_Photo, Topical Press._]

13. _Artillery, 1815-1865._--Henceforward, therefore, the history of

artillery becomes the history of its technical effectiveness,

particularly in relation to infantry fire, and of improvements or

modifications in the method of putting well-recognized principles into

action. Infantry fire, however, being more variable in its effectiveness

than that of artillery, the period 1815-1870 saw many changes in the

relations of the two arms. In the time of Napoleon, infantry fire never

equalled that of the Seven Years' War, and after the period of the great

wars the musket was less and less effectively used. Economy was,

however, practised to excess in every army of Europe during the period

1815-1850, and even if there had been great battles at this time, the

artillery, which was maintained on a minimum strength of guns, men and

horses, would not have repeated the exploits of Senarmont and Drouot in

the Napoleonic wars. The principle was well understood, but under such

conditions the practice was impossible. It was at this stage that the

general introduction of the rifled musket put an end, once for all,

to the artillery tactics of the smooth-bore days. Infantry, armed with a

far-ranging rifle, as in the American Civil War, kept the guns beyond

case-shot range, compelling them to use only round shot or common shell.

In that war, therefore, attacking infantry met, on reaching close

quarters, not regiments already broken by a _feu d'enfer_, but the full

force of the defenders' artillery and infantry, both arms fresh and

unshaken, and the full volume of their case shot and musketry. At

Fredericksburg the Federal infantry attacked, unsupported by a single

field piece; at Gettysburg the Federal artillery general Hunt was able

to reserve his ammunition to meet Lee's assault, although the infantry

of his own side was meanwhile subjected to the fire of 137 Confederate

guns. Thus, in both these cases the assault became one of infantry

against unshaken infantry and artillery. On many occasions, indeed, the

batteries on either side went into close ranges, as the traditions of

the old United States army dictated, but their losses were then totally

out of proportion to their effectiveness. Indeed, the increased range at

which battles were now fought, and the ineffectiveness of the

projectiles necessarily used by the artillery at these ranges, so far

neutralized even rifled guns that artillery generals could speak of

"idle cannonades" as the "besetting sin" of some commanders.

14. _The Franco-German War, 1870-71._--In the next great war, that of

1866 (Bohemia), guns were present on both sides in great numbers, the

average for both sides being three guns per 1000 men. Artillery,

however, played but a small part in the Prussian attacks, this being due

to the inadequate training then afforded, and also to the mixture of

rifled guns and smooth-bores in their armament. In Prussia, however, the

exertions of General v. Hindersin, the improvement of the _materiel_,

and above all the better tactical training of the batteries, were

rewarded four years later by success on the battlefield almost as

decisive as Napoleon's. In 1870 the French artillery was invariably

defeated by that of the Germans, who were then free to turn their

attention to the hostile infantry. At first, indeed, the German infantry

was too impatient to wait until the victorious artillery had prepared

the way for them by disintegrating the opposing line of riflemen. Thus

the attack of the Prussian Guards at St Privat (August 18, 1870) melted

away before the unbroken fire-power of the French, as had that of the

Federals at Fredericksburg and that of the Confederates at Gettysburg.

But such experiences taught the German infantry commanders the necessity

of patience, and at Sedan the French army was enveloped by the fire of

nearly 600 guns, which did their work so thoroughly that the Germans

annihilated the Imperial army at the cost of only 5% of casualties.

15. _Results of the War._--The tactical lessons of the war, so far as

field artillery is concerned, may be briefly summarized as (a)

employment of great masses of guns; (b) forward position of guns in the

order of march, in order to bring them into action as quickly as

possible; (c) the so-called "artillery duel," in which the assailant

subdues the enemy's artillery fire; and (d) when this is achieved, and

not before, the thorough preparation of all infantry attacks by

artillery bombardment. This theory of field artillery action has not,

even with the almost revolutionary improvements of the present period,

entirely lost its value, and it may be studied in detail in the

well-known work of von Schell, _Taktik der Feldartillerie_ (1877), later

translated into English by Major-General Sir A.E. Turner (_Tactics of

Field Artillery_, 1900). In one important matter, however, the precepts

of Schell and his contemporaries no longer hold good. "It is absolutely

necessary that the object of the infantry's attack should be cannonaded

before it advances. To accomplish this, sufficient time should be given

to the artillery, and on no account should the infantry be ordered to

advance until the fire of the guns has produced the desired effect."

This, the direct outcome of the slaughter at St Privat, represents the

best possibilities of breech-loading guns with common shell--no more

than a slow disintegration of the enemy's power of resistance by a

thorough and lengthy "artillery preparation." Against troops sheltered

behind works (as in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78) the common shell

usually failed to give satisfactory results, if for no other reason,

because the "preparation" consumed an inordinate time, and in any case

the hostile artillery had first of all to be subdued in the artillery

duel.

16. _Quick-firing Field Guns._--In 1891, a work by General Wille of the

German army (_The Field Gun of the Future_) and in 1892 another by

Colonel Langlois of the French service (_Field Artillery with the other

Arms_) foreshadowed many revolutionary changes in _materiel_ and tactics

which have now taken place. The new ideas spread rapidly, and the

quick-firing gun came by degrees to be used in every army. The original

designs have been greatly improved upon (see ORDNANCE: _Field artillery

equipments_), but the principles of these designs have not undergone

serious modification. These are, briefly, the mechanical absorption of

the recoil, by means of brakes or buffers, and the development of "time

shrapnel" as the projectile of field artillery. The absorption of recoil

of itself permits of a higher rate of fire, since the gun does not

require to be run up and relaid after every shot. Formerly such an

advantage was illusory (since aim could not be taken through the thick

bank of smoke produced by rapid fire), but the introduction of smokeless

powder removed this objection. Artillerists, no longer handicapped, at

once turned their attention to the increase of the rate of fire. At the

same time a shield was applied to the gun, for the protection of the

detachment. This advantage is solely the result of the non-recoiling

carriage. The gunners had formerly to stand clear of the recoiling gun,

and a shield was therefore of but slight value.

17. _Time Shrapnel._--The power of modern artillery owes even more to

the improvement of the projectile than to that of the gun (see

AMMUNITION). The French, always in the forefront of artillery progress,

were the first nation to realize the new significance of the time-fuze

and the shrapnel shell. These had been in existence for many years; to

the British army are due both the invention and the development of the

shrapnel, which made its first appearance in European warfare at Vimeira

in 1808. But, up to the introduction of rifled pieces, the Napoleonic

case-shot attack was universally and justly considered the best method

of fighting, and in the transition stage of the _materiel_ many soldiers

continued to put faith in the old method,--hence the Prussian artillery

in 1866 had many smooth-bore batteries in the field,--and between 1860

and 1870 gunners, now convinced of the superiority of the new

equipments, undoubtedly sought to turn to account the minute accuracy of

the rifled weapons in unnecessarily fine shooting. Thus, in 1870 the

French time-fuze was only graduated for two ranges, and the Germans used

percussion fuzes only. But this phase has passed, and General Langlois

has summarized the tactics of the newest field artillery in one phrase:

"It results in transferring to 3000 yds. the point-blank and case-shot

fire of the smooth-bore." The meaning of this will be discussed later;

here it will be sufficient to say that it is claimed for the modern gun

and the modern shell that the Napoleonic method[1] of annihilating by a

rain of bullets has been revived, with the distinction that the shell,

and not the gun, fires the bullets close up to the enemy. In the Boer

War, Pieter's Hill furnished a notable example of this "covering," as

distinct from "preparation," of an assault by artillery fire.

18. _Heavy Field, Siege and Garrison Artillery._--Amongst other results

of this war was a recrudescence of the idea of "dispersion." This will

be noticed later; the more material result of the Boer War, and of the

generally increasing specialization in the various functions of the

artillery arm, has been the reintroduction of heavy ordnance into field

armies. The field howitzer reappeared some time before the outbreak of

that war, and the British howitzers had illustrated their shell-power in

the Sudan campaign of 1898. During the latter part of the 19th century,

siege and fortress artillery underwent a development hardly less

remarkable than that of field artillery in the same time. Rifled guns,

"long" and "short" for direct and curved fire, formed the siege

artillery of the Germans in 1870-71, and with the reduction of the

old-fashioned fortresses of France began a new era in siegecraft (see

FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT). At the present time howitzers[2] (B.L.

rifled) are the principal siege weapons, while heavy direct-fire guns

(see ORDNANCE _passim_) still retain a part of the work formerly

assigned to the artillery of the attack. For an account of a siege with

modern artillery see Macalik and Langer, _Kampf um eine Festung_, which

describes an imaginary siege of Koniggratz. On the whole, it may be said

that modern artillery has caused a revolution in methods of

fortification and siegecraft, which is little less far-reaching than the

original change from the trebuchet to the bombard.

ORGANIZATION

19. _Field Artillery Organization._--A _battery_ of field artillery

comprises three elements, viz. _materiel_,--guns, carriages, ammunition

and stores; _personnel_,--officers, non-commissioned officers, gunners,

drivers and artificers; and _transport_,--almost invariably horses,

though other animals, and also motor and mechanical transport, are used

under special circumstances. As for the _materiel_, the guns used by

field artillery in almost all countries are quick-firers, throwing

shells of 13 to 18 pounds; details of these will be found in the article

ORDNANCE. The number of guns in a battery varies in different countries

between four and eight; by far the most usual number is six. With the

introduction of the quick-firing gun, the tendency towards small

batteries (of four guns) has become very pronounced, the ruling motives

being (a) better control of fire in action, and (b) more horses

available to draw the increased number of ammunition wagons required.

"Mixed" batteries of guns and howitzers were formerly employed on

occasion, and were supposed to be adapted to every kind of work.

However, the difference between the gun and the howitzer was so great

that at all times one part of the armament was idle, while the general

increase in the artillery arm has permitted batteries and brigades of

howitzers to be formed, separately, as required. Machine guns (q.v.) are

not treated in Great Britain as being artillery weapons, though abroad

they are often organized in batteries. During, and subsequent to the

Boer War, heavier machine guns, called pompoms, came into use. The

rocket (q.v.), formerly a common weapon of the artillery, is now used,

if at all, only for mountain and forest warfare against savages.

20. _Ammunition._--The vehicles of a battery include (besides guns and

limbers) ammunition wagons, store and provision carts or wagons and

forage wagons. On the amount of ammunition that should be carried with a

field battery there was formerly a considerable diversity of opinion.

The greater the amount a battery carries with it, the more independent

it is; on the other hand, every additional wagon makes the battery more

cumbrous and, by lengthening out the column, keeps back the combatant

troops marching in rear. But since the introduction of the Q.F. gun it

has been universally recognized that the gun must have a very liberal

supply of ammunition present with it in action, and the old standard

allowance of one wagon per gun has been increased to that of two and

even three. Formerly batteries were further hampered by having to carry

the reserve of small-arm ammunition for infantry and cavalry. But the

greater distances of modern warfare accentuate the difficulties of such

a system, and the reserve ammunition for all arms is now carried in

special "ammunition columns" (see AMMUNITION), the _personnel_ and

transport of which is furnished by the artillery.

21. _Interior Economy._--The organization and interior economy of a

battery is much the same in all field artillery. In England the command

is held by a major, the second in command is a captain. The battery is

divided into three "sections" of two guns each, each under a subaltern

officer, who is responsible for everything connected with his

section--men, horses, guns, carriages, ammunition and stores. Each

section again consists of two sub-sections, each comprising one gun and

its wagons, men and horses, and at the head of each is the "No. 1" of

the gun detachment--usually a sergeant--who is immediately responsible

to the section commander for his sub-section.

The No. 1 rides with the gun, there is also another mounted

non-commissioned officer who rides with the first wagon, and the gunners

are seated on the gun-carriage, wagon and limbers. The increased number

of wagons now accompanying the gun has, however, given more seating

accommodation to the detachment, and this distribution has in some cases

been altered. The three drivers ride the near horses of their respective

pairs, each gun and each wagon being drawn by six horses. On the march,

the gun is attached to the limber, a two-wheeled carriage drawn by the

gun team; the wagon consists likewise of a "body" and a limber. A

battery has also a number of non-combatant carriages, such as forge and

baggage wagons. In addition to the gunners and drivers, there are men

specially trained in range-taking, signalling, &c., in all batteries.

22. _Special Natures of Field Artillery._--_Horse Artillery_ differs

from field in that the whole gun detachment is mounted, and the gun and

wagon therefore are freed from the load of men and their equipment. The

organization of a battery of horse artillery differs but slightly from

that of a field battery; it is somewhat stronger in rank and file, as

horse-holders have to be provided for the gunners in action. Horse

artillery is often lightened, moreover, by sacrificing power (see

ORDNANCE). The essential feature of _Mountain Artillery_ in general is

the carrying of the whole equipment on the backs of mules or other

animals. The total weight is usually distributed in four or five

mule-loads. For action the loads are lifted off the saddles and

"assembled," and the time required to do this is, in well-trained

batteries, only one minute. For the technical questions connected with

the gun and its carriage, see ORDNANCE. The weight of a shell in a

mountain gun rarely exceeds 12 lb., and is usually less. In most armies

the _field howitzer_ has, after an eclipse of many years, reasserted its

place. The weapons used are B.L. or Q.F. howitzers on field carriages;

the calibre varies from about 4 to 5 in. In Great Britain the field

howitzer batteries are organized as, and form part of, the Royal Field

Artillery, two batteries of six howitzers each forming a brigade.

23. _Heavy Ordnance._--_Heavy Field Artillery_, officially defined as

"all artillery equipped with mobile guns of 4-in. calibre and upwards,"

is usually composed, in Great Britain, of 5-in. or 4.7-in. Q.F. guns on

field carriages. 6-in. Q.F. guns have also been used. A battery (4 guns)

is attached to the divisional artillery of each division, a company of

the Royal Garrison Artillery furnishing the _personnel_. The four guns

are divided into two sections, each section under an officer and each

subsection under a non-commissioned officer, as in the horse and field

batteries. _Siege_ and _garrison artillery_ have not usually the

complete and permanent organization that distinguishes field artillery.

For siege trains the _materiel_ is usually kept in store, and the

_personnel_ and transport are supplied from other sources according to

requirement. In garrison artillery, the guns mounted in fortresses and

batteries, or stored in arsenals for the purpose, furnish the

_materiel_, and the companies of garrison artillery the _personnel_. In

Great Britain, the Royal Garrison Artillery finds the mountain batteries

and the heavy field artillery in addition to its own units. The siege

trains are, as has been said, organized _ad hoc_ on each particular

occasion (see FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT). In Great Britain, the guns

and howitzers manned by the R.G.A. would be 6-in. and 8-in. howitzers,

4.7-in. and 6-in. guns, and still heavier howitzers, as well as the

field and heavy batteries belonging to the divisions making the siege.

24. _Higher Organization of Artillery._--The higher units, in almost

every country except Great Britain, are the regiment, and, sometimes,

the brigade of two or more regiments. These units are distributed to

army corps, divisions and districts, in the same way as units of other

arms (see ARMY). In Great Britain the Royal Regiment of Artillery still

comprises the whole _personnel_ of the arm, being divided into the Royal

Horse, Royal Field and Royal Garrison Artillery; to each branch Special

Reserve and Territorial artillery are affiliated. Over and above the

military command of these higher units, provision is usually made for

technical control of the _materiel_, and a variety of training and

experimental establishments, such as schools of gunnery, are maintained

in all countries. The more special unit of organization in mobile

artillery is the _brigade_, formerly called brigade-division (German,

_Abteilung_; French _groupe_). The brigade is in Great Britain the

administrative and tactical unit. Mountain artillery is not organized in

brigades in the British empire. The unit consists, in the case of guns,

of three batteries (18 guns, heavy artillery 12), in the case of field

howitzers of two batteries (12 howitzers), and in the horse artillery of

two batteries (12 guns), and is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel. To

each brigade is allotted an ammunition column. The necessity for such a

grouping of batteries will be apparent if the reader notes that 54 field

guns, 12 howitzers and 4 heavy field guns form the artillery of a single

British division of about 15,000 combatants.

25. _Grouping of the Artillery._--The "corps artillery" (formerly the

"reserve artillery") now consists only of the howitzer and heavy

brigades, with a brigade of horse artillery. The latter is held at the

disposal of the corps commander for the swift reinforcement of a

threatened point; the howitzers and the heavy guns have, of course,

functions widely different from those of the mass of guns. As the field

artillery is required to come into action at the earliest possible

moment, it has now been distributed amongst the infantry divisions, and

marches almost at the head of the various combatant columns, instead of

being relegated perhaps to the tail of the centre column. The

redistribution of the British army (1907) on a divisional basis is a

remarkable example of this; even the special natures of artillery

(except horse artillery) are distributed amongst the divisions. In

Germany two "regiments" (each of 2 _Abteilungen_ = 6 batteries) form a

brigade, under an artillery general in each division who thus disposes

of 72 field guns, and the howitzers, with such horse artillery batteries

as remain over after the cavalry has been supplied, still form a corps

or reserve artillery. In 1903 the French, after long hesitation,

assigned the whole of the field artillery to the various divisions, but

later (for reasons stated in the article TACTICS) arranged to

reconstitute the old-fashioned corps artillery in war. (See also ARMY, S

49).

TACTICAL WORK

26. _General Characteristics of Field Artillery Action._--The duty of

field artillery in action is to fire with the greatest effect on the

target which is for the moment of the greatest tactical importance. This

definition of field artillery tactics brings the student at once to

questions of combined tactics, for which consult the article TACTICS.

The purpose of the present article is to indicate the methods employed

by the gunners to give effect to their fire at the targets mentioned.

For this purpose the artillery has at its disposal two types of

projectile, common (or rather, high explosive) shell and shrapnel, and

two fuzes, "time" and "percussion" (see AMMUNITION). The actual process

of coming into action may be described in a few words. The gun is, at or

near its position in action, "unlimbered" and the gun limber and team

sent back under cover. Ammunition for the gun is first taken from the

wagon that accompanies it, as it is very desirable to keep the limbers

full as long as possible, in case of emergencies such as that of a

temporary separation from the wagon. Limber supply is, however, allowed

in certain circumstances. The wagon is now placed as a rule by the side

of the gun, an arrangement which immensely simplifies the supply of

ammunition, this being done under cover of the armour on the wagon and

of the gun-shield and also without fatigue to the men. The older method

of placing the wagon at some distance behind the gun is still

occasionally used, especially in the case of unshielded equipments. No

horses are allowed, in any case, to be actually with the line of guns.

According to the British _Field Artillery Training_ of 1906, a battery

in action would be thus distributed: first, the "fighting battery"

consisting of the six guns, each with its wagon alongside, and the

limbers of the two flank guns; then, under cover in rear, the "first

line of wagons" comprising the teams of the fighting battery, the four

remaining gun limbers, and six more wagons. The non-combatant vehicles

form the "second line of wagons."

27. _Occupation of a Position._--This depends primarily upon

considerations of tactics, for the accurate co-operation of the guns is

the first essential to success in the general task. In details, however,

the choice of position varies to some extent with the nature of the

equipment: for instance, an elevated position is better adapted than a

low one for high velocity guns firing over the heads of their own

infantry, and again, the "spade" with which nearly all equipments are

furnished (see ORDNANCE) should have soil in which it can find a hold.

Cover for the gun and its detachment cannot well be obtained from the

configuration of the ground, because, if the gun can shoot over the

covering mass of earth, the hostile shells can of course do likewise.

Sufficient protection is given by the shield, and thus "cover" for

field-guns simply means concealment. Cover for the "first line of

wagons" is, however, a very serious consideration. As to concealment, it

is stated that "the broad white flash from a gun firing smokeless powder

is visible" to an enemy "unless the muzzle is at least 10 ft. below the

covering crest" (Bethell, _Modern Guns and Gunnery_, 1907, p. 147).

Concealment therefore, means only the skilful use of ground in such a

way as to make the enemy's ranging difficult. This frequently involves

the use of retired positions, on reverse slopes, in low ground, &c., and

in all modern artillery the greatest stress is laid on practice in

firing by indirect means. Controversy has, however, arisen as to whether

inability to see the foreground is not a drawback so serious that direct

fire from a crest position, in spite of its exposure, must be taken as

the normal method. The latter is of course immensely facilitated by the

introduction of the shield. A great advantage of retired positions is

that, provided unity of direction is kept, an overwhelming artillery

surprise (see _F.A. Training_, 1906, p. 225) is carried out more easily

than from a visible position. The extent of _front_ of a battery in

action is governed by the rule that no two gun detachments should be

exposed to being hit by the bullets of one shell, and also by the

necessity of having as many guns as possible at work. These two

conditions are met by the adoption of a 20-yards interval between the

muzzles of the guns. At the present time the gun and its wagon are

placed as close together as possible, to obtain the full advantage of

the armoured equipment. The _shield_, behind which the detachments

remain at all times covered from rifle (except at very short range) and

shrapnel bullets,[3] enables the artillery commander to handle his

batteries far more boldly than formerly was the case. General Langlois

says "the shield-protected carriage is the corollary to the quick-firing

gun." Armour on the wagon, enabling ammunition supply as well as the

service of the gun, to be carried on under cover, soon followed the

introduction of the shield. The disadvantage of extra weight and

consequently increased difficulty of "man-handling" the equipment is

held to be of far less importance than the advantages obtained by the

use of armour.

28. _Laying._--"Elevation" may be defined as the vertical inclination of

the gun, "direction" as the horizontal inclination to the right or left,

necessary to direct the path of the projectile to the object aimed at.

"Laying" the gun, in the case of most modern equipments, is divided, by

means of the device called the independent line of sight (see ORDNANCE),

into two processes, performed simultaneously by different men, the

adjustment of the sights and that of the gun. The first is the act of

finding the "line of sight," or line joining the sights and the point

aimed at; for this the equipment has to be "traversed" right or left so

as to point in the proper direction, and also adjusted in the vertical

plane. The simplest form of laying for direction, or "line," is called

the "direct" method. If the point aimed at is the target, and it can be

seen by the layer, he has merely to look over the "open" sights. But the

point aimed at is rarely the target itself. In war, the target, even if

visible, is often indistinct, and in this case, as also when the guns

are under cover or engaging a target under cover, an "aiming point" or

"auxiliary mark," a conspicuous point quite apart and distinct from the

target, has to be employed ("indirect" method). In the Russo-Japanese

War the sun was sometimes used as an aiming point. When the guns are

behind cover and the foreground cannot be seen, an artificial aiming

point is often made by placing a line of "aiming posts" in the ground.

If an aiming point can be found which is in line with the target, as

would be the case when aiming posts are laid out, the laying is simple,

but it is as often as not out of the line. Finding the "line" in this

case involves the calculation, from a distant observing point, of the

angle at which the guns must be laid in order that, when the sights are

directed upon the aiming point, the shell will strike the target. It is

further necessary to find the "angle of sight" or inclination of the

line of sight to the horizontal plane. If aim be taken over the open

sights at the target, the line of sight naturally passes through the

target, but in any other case it may be above or below it. Then the

point where the projectile will meet the line of sight, which should

coincide with the target, is beyond it if the line of sight is below or

angle of sight is too small, and short of it if the line of sight is too

high--that is, range and fuze will be wrong. The process of indirect

laying for elevation therefore is, first, the measurement of the angle

of sight, and secondly, the setting of the sights to that angle by means

of a clinometer; this is called clinometer laying. In all cases the

actual elevation of the gun to enable the shell to strike the target is

a purely mechanical adjustment, performed independently; the gun is

moved relatively to the sights, which have been previously set as

described. Frequently the battery commander directs the guns from a

point at some distance, communication being maintained by signallers or

by field telephone. This is the normal procedure when the guns are

firing from cover. Instruments of precision and careful calculations

are, of course, required to fight a battery in this manner, many

allowances having to be made for the differences in height, distance and

angle between the position of the battery commander and that of the

guns.

29. _Ranging_[4] (except on the French system alluded to below) is,

first, finding the range (i.e. elevation required), and secondly,

correcting the standard length of fuze for that range in accordance with

the circumstances of each case. To find the elevation required, it is

necessary to observe the bursts of shells "on graze" with reference to

the target. The battery commander orders two elevations differing by 300

yds., e.g. "2500, 2800," and tells off a "ranging section" of two guns.

These proceed to fire percussion shrapnel at the two different

elevations, in order to obtain bursts "over" (+) and "short" (-). When

it is certain that this "long bracket" is obtained, the "100 yds.

bracket" is found, the elevations in the given case being, perhaps, 2600

and 2700 yds. "Verifying" rounds are then fired, to make certain of the

100 yds. bracket. The old "short bracket" (50 yds.) is not now required

except at standing targets. Circumstances may, of course, shorten the

process; for instance, a hit upon the target itself could be "verified"

at once. The determination of the fuze (by time shrapnel) follows. The

fuze has a standard length for the ascertained range, but the proper

correction of this standard length to suit the atmospheric conditions

has to be made. The commander has therefore already given out a series

of corrector[5] lengths, his object being to secure bursts both in air

and on graze. When he is finally satisfied he opens fire "for effect."

30. An example of the ordinary method of ranging, adapted from _Field

Artillery Training_, 1906, is given below.

Battery commander gives target, &c., and orders: "Right section

ranging section; remainder corrector 150 increase 10, 4400-4700," for

the long bracket.