PARTITION OF TURKEY.
Factors in the Problem--Turkey and Europe--Topography of the
Country--Distribution of Population--Countries Interested--Russia,
England, France, Austria, Italy, Germany, Greece, Bulgaria--Desire
for Territorial Aggrandizement--Mutual Jealousies--Possible
Solution--Turkish Factor Often Overlooked--Great Difficulties to be
Met.
The subject of the partition of Turkey has been prominent before the
countries of the world for fully a century. At repeated intervals
the different journals, as well as the statesmen of this country
and of Europe, have given considerable space to plans for such a
partition. That partition has not, however, as yet taken place, and
its possibility depends upon a large number of factors which are
often overlooked. It is the purpose of this chapter to set forth the
situation as it is, as clearly as may be, not with a view to making any
prophecy of any kind--simply to furnish the basis for private judgment.
In any question of the partition of an empire, two factors are
prominent: 1st. The country to be divided, and 2d. The people among
whom it is to be divided. The first factor is the Turkish Empire; the
second, the nations of Europe.
The Turkish Empire has already in the first chapters of this book
been described in general. It is proposed here not to repeat those
statements, but to gather some of the facts and place them in their
relation to this particular topic. The first factor again is a double
one, (1) the country itself, and (2) its population.
Topographically the Turkish Empire may be divided into five sections:
1. European Turkey. 2. Asia Minor, extending from the Bosporus and
the Aegean Sea east to a somewhat irregular line drawn from Samsun
on the Black Sea south to Alexandretta. 3. Eastern Turkey, including
the section between Asia Minor and Persia, and extending south along
the borders of Persia and the Tigris as far as somewhat below Mosul.
4. Syria, including the section east of the Mediterranean as far as
Aleppo on the north and the Hauran on the east; and 5. Mesopotamia.
Arabia and Egypt practically do not enter in. Of these different
sections, European Turkey is a very irregular country, including the
eastern coast of the Adriatic, Macedonia and the southeastern part
of the Balkan Peninsula to Constantinople. It is a very diversified
section, with really no distinctive physical characteristics. Albania
is mountainous, as is also Macedonia to a certain degree, but the
mountains are by no means forbidding, and the different valleys furnish
comparatively easy access in every direction. Topographically, European
Turkey offers no particular difficulties to the progress of any
conquering Powers, the Balkans being eliminated. As we cross into Asia,
however, the situation is very different. Asia Minor consists chiefly
of a series of high plateaus averaging about 4,000 feet above the level
of the sea, separated from each other by rough rather than mountainous
sections, but all separated from the coast, north, south and west, by
mountain ranges of no very great height indeed, but extremely rugged
and difficult of passage. Eastern Turkey is entirely mountainous, with
numerous valleys, some of them of considerable extent, so that they
may fairly be called plateaus. Such are the plains of Erzrum and those
that branch off from it into the east, the plain of Mush and the plain
of Van. The mountains are, many of them, very severe, not merely of
considerable height, but extremely difficult of passage.
Passing south, Syria is divided by the Lebanon range of mountains
into the narrow coast-line occupied by the cities of Tripoli, Beirut,
Sidon, etc., and the Hauran. North of this, however, is a somewhat
extended plain or rolling country, whose chief cities are Aleppo, Urfa
and Aintab. On the north, where the Taurus Mountains form the division
between Syria and Asia Minor, there are quite a number of cities, such
as Marash, Albistan and others. Mesopotamia is pure plain, extending
from the sharply defined range that borders the southern part of Asia
Minor, and extends to a little degree into Eastern Turkey, clear to
the Persian Gulf. Often this is looked upon as desert, but there is
comparatively very little of real desert, and even the unoccupied land,
with a little irrigation, becomes fertile. The Mesopotamian plain
proper is as beautifully fertile as any section of the world.
Of these different sections the only two that are not separated from
each other are Asia Minor and Eastern Turkey. The line between them
is very vague. They are both separated very distinctly from Syria and
Mesopotamia on the south, and Syria and Mesopotamia are practically set
apart from each other by a wide extent of uninhabited land where there
is little to be found except roaming tribes of Bedouin Arabs. These
intervening ranges of mountains and tracts of uninhabited country are
traversed by almost no roads. On the Black Sea border there are really
but four roads that can be said to be available, penetrating into the
interior: Trebizond to Erzrum; Samsun to Sivas and Harput; Kerasun
to Sivas, and Ineboli to Castamuni. Only one, that from Trebizond
to Erzrum, can really be said to be a good road. That from Samsun
to Sivas was at one time fairly good, but is now in much disrepair.
Both pass over such sharp mountain ranges that they are very easily
defended in case of attack, and a comparatively small force could
hold them against a considerable invading army. The third road, from
Ineboli to Castamuni, passes over less rugged mountains, but through
a rough country, where defense is easy. On the west, the roads from
Constantinople by way of Nicomedia to Angora and from Smyrna in two
directions, on the north to Angora and on the south to Konieh, pass
over a very rough country, easily defended. On the south, from the
seaboard at Adana there is a very rough road to Cesarea; also one
extremely difficult of passage, certainly for armies, from Aleppo to
Sivas and Harput. From Mosul and Mardin to Diarbekir and on to Harput
there is a fairly good road, but that is also over a considerable
mountain pass. East of these there are really no roads at all, and the
passage from Eastern Turkey into Persia is confined to mountain paths.
Topographically thus, Asia Minor and Eastern Turkey are one country,
separated from all the countries around and from access by sea, by
mountain ranges of difficult passage.
Another thing that must be kept in mind is the general condition of
the country. Normally Asiatic Turkey is extremely fertile, not merely
the Mesopotamia plain already referred to, but the plateaus and valleys
to the north produce the most wonderful crops. Under the administration
of the past century, or the past centuries, however, this condition
has diminished marvelously, so that there are wide sections of country
practically deserted, with no cities, towns or villages, and not a sign
of cultivation, and even where there is cultivation, that is carried on
in as limited a degree as possible, because under the oppression of the
Turkish Government there is no incentive to increased production. The
most noticeable result of this condition, from the present standpoint,
is that a foreign army would find comparatively little upon which to
subsist. It would be compelled in great degree to carry its provisions
with it, especially in the face of the opposition of the people.
The second element in the first factor is the population. The general
characteristics of that population have already been stated and there
needs to be no repetition. Here it is sufficient to indicate the
general distribution. From Constantinople and the Aegean Sea through
Asia Minor and through a certain part of Eastern Turkey, the Turkish
population is in a considerable majority over all others. It occupies
the great plains of Central Asia Minor in strong force. It is found not
to so great an extent in the mountainous regions, but even there it
is the predominant element, not merely by virtue of being the ruling
class and identified with the government, but because of its force
of character. In the extreme eastern part the Kurds are in the great
majority, and they are to be found in considerable numbers through
all the mountain sections as far west even as Adana on the south,
and Samsun on the north. Through Western Asia Minor, in addition to
the Turks, there are numbers of Circassians and the tribes known as
Xeibecks, Avshars, etc. Armenians are found in very nearly equal
numbers throughout the whole section, though there is not one section
in which they predominate. They are strong in the cities of Van,
Erzrum, Harput, Sivas, Cesarea, Marsovan and the surrounding plains;
also in the mountain sections of Bitlis, Mush, Zeitun and Hajin. The
Greeks are found chiefly along the seaboard. All the way from Trebizond
on the Black Sea to Constantinople, then south through Smyrna, Adalia
to Adana, they are in large numbers, chiefly in the vicinity of Smyrna,
but they form a considerable element in Central Asia Minor. Armenians
are found to some extent all through Western Asia Minor. In no one
section, however, are the Christians even in a numerical majority over
the Moslems, and when account is taken of their general condition, the
fact that they have no arms, have not been allowed to have arms during
all these centuries, have had no training in organization, and have had
their mutual jealousies and hostilities constantly developed by the
peculiar system of government, and by their ecclesiastical differences,
it will be readily seen that it is impossible to expect of them any
organized resistance to Moslem government, or any effective assistance
to an invading army.
Passing south into Syria and Mesopotamia, very much the same condition
of things is seen. There are numerous Armenians in Northern Syria,
Marash, Aintab and Urfa. In Aleppo and Syria proper, the Syrians,
Jacobites and Maronites are the ruling Christian sects, and in
Mesopotamia the Jacobites, Chaldeans and Nestorians. The Moslems,
however, are everywhere the dominant class. Along the eastern bank
of the Tigris to a considerable distance below Mosul, the Kurds are
powerful, not merely by numbers, but in character, being of a higher
grade than their fellows to the north. Between them and the Syrian
coast, the whole country is dominated by the Arabs, all thoroughly,
even where they are not intensely, Moslem.
We come now to consider the second general factor in the question
of partition, the different countries which may be supposed to be
interested in taking their share. These countries are Russia, France,
Austria, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, England and Germany, named in the
order of their apparent interest in the acquisition of territory.
Russia’s idea has been made sufficiently clear in the preceding pages
of this book. It may be briefly stated as follows: She needs free
passage for her merchant marine into the Mediterranean, in order to
the best development of her provinces, and also for her navy, in order
that it may be kept in good condition. At the best her egress through
the Baltic is uncertain, the harbors being closed by ice through a
considerable part of the winter, and the entrance to the Baltic is too
easily defended by other nations for her to be confident of securing
an always open passage. That is the immediate necessity. Beyond that
there is the great Russian idea of an empire that shall eclipse all
previous achievements of Egyptians, Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, French
and English. The future of the Slavic race is to her bound up in her
political supremacy, and ever since the time of Peter the Great, she
has pressed toward that point with unwavering fidelity, not always
with uniform energy, frequently allowing lapses, yet always with this
ultimate idea in mind. For that the entire Turkish Empire is essential
to her. She claims herself the successor of the Byzantine Empire
through the marriage of the daughter of the last Byzantine Emperor
to Ivan III, and she looks upon every inch of territory held by that
empire as legitimately hers, and proposes to claim it in due time. More
than that, as the defender of the Orthodox Greek Church, she claims the
primacy in the Holy Places and has put forth every effort to secure
her recognition there. With Russia thus, there is practically no such
thing as partition possible. She means to have the whole. She may
indeed waive a portion of it for the time, feeling herself unequal to
accomplishing her entire purpose, but the whole she claims, and the
whole she is determined to have at some time in the future.
France has no very great designs upon Ottoman territory. Undoubtedly
Napoleon had dreams of an Eastern Empire, but it may be questioned
whether his dreams have come down to the present Republic. Still,
France stands to-day as the patron of the Roman Catholic Church and
holds hereditary primacy in the Holy Places in Palestine. More than
that, the Roman Catholic Church has extended its influence throughout
Mesopotamia in a great degree, and French commercial interests,
increasing in the far East, have not been blind to the opportunities
furnished, first, by the Suez Canal; second, by the waterways of
Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Her prompt action in 1860 secured for
her troops the occupancy of Syria and a general diplomatic precedence
in Damascus and Beirut. That she has never waived, but has rather
increased by numerous means. For Constantinople itself, it is probable
she cares comparatively little, but she does assert her claim to Syria
and her interest at least in Mesopotamia.
Austria comes next, as the Power most closely interested in a share
as residuary legatee of the Sultan’s domain. The Austrian Empire is
curiously heterogeneous in its character, embracing as it does Germans,
Czechs, Magyars, and the mountaineers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She
has the same need that Russia has, an outlet to the sea. At present she
holds only Trieste and Fiume, but has for some time looked with longing
eyes upon the rich valley of the Vardar, with its outlet at Salonica,
which she considers a legitimate addition to Bosnia. Whatever others
may gain, it is generally conceded that Austria would look for this at
least.
Next to Austria comes Greece. Her ambitions are well known and her
desires perfectly natural. She wishes Epirus and Thessaly, and it is
generally conceded that, in any division, a portion at least of those
sections should belong to her.
On the other hand, Bulgaria longs for Macedonia, and Bulgaria and
Greece together would scarcely look with approval upon a slice of
Austrian territory right between them. Bulgaria has already added
Eastern Rumelia, and the Uskup region and the upper valley of the
Vardar would almost inevitably fall to her unless Austria should come
down and claim the whole.
Italy’s interest lies less in the Sultan’s domain than in Austria. She
has long felt aggrieved by the loss of Trieste, and were Austria to
enlarge her borders south along the Adriatic coast and across to the
Aegean at Salonica, Italy might claim that her ancient port should be
restored to her.
England is ordinarily placed among the first of those interested in
the division of the Sultan’s domains. It is evident, however, that her
interests are not for the acquisition of territory, certainly beyond
the Island of Cyprus, which she now holds. Whether her occupation
of Egypt will be permanent or not, is a mooted question. There is
an increasing feeling in England that if only there can be some
international guarantee for the inviolability of the Suez Canal, it is
far better for England to withdraw her troops, and to content herself
with developing other possessions more thoroughly and entirely her own.
As a positive factor then with regard to the absorption of territory,
England does not stand in the front rank of those who look with eager
eyes upon the distribution of the spoils.
Germany comes last, because she really, so far as it appears, has no
desire whatever for territorial aggrandizement in that region, and is
mentioned merely because of her presence as a factor in the general
question.
The question of partition, however, is not by any means merely one of
special aggrandizement of the different empires. Even deeper interests
are involved in the mutual jealousies of the Powers, and the influence
that they seek to exert in preventive form, are in some respects the
most potent. While England, for instance, cares little or nothing
for territorial enlargement at the expense of the Sultan, she does
care very much that Russia should not overpower the Suez Canal. While
Germany has no designs upon Macedonia or Asia Minor, it is to her of
great importance that her nearest neighbor should not practically
surround her, by extending his domains even through to the Atlantic.
Italy cares nothing about the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, but
she does care about protecting her own borders against the incursions
of a powerful fleet exercised and trained in the Black Sea as an inland
lake. Greece may have no great desire beyond Thessaly and Epirus,
but she has no ambition to be swallowed up by the great Power of the
north. Bulgaria has fought too earnestly for independence to be willing
to lose all the ground gained during these past years. France will
scarcely be willing to see her traditional influence in Jerusalem
entirely set aside. How are these various ambitions to be gratified,
and these jealousies to be avoided? That, so far as the European Powers
are concerned, is the problem involved in the partition of Turkey.
Various solutions have been offered. The most plausible is one
outlined in a prominent English journal toward the close of 1895, which
is substantially as follows. Commencing with European Turkey: Bulgaria
to have the remainder of the southeastern part of the Balkan Peninsula
up to within a few miles of Constantinople; Austria to have the valley
of the Vardar, with the port of Salonica, and probably the Adriatic
shore, nearly to the Ionian Islands, Greece taking the remainder;
Constantinople, with the Bosporus, the littoral of the Sea of Marmora,
and the Dardanelles, to be made a Free State, with some sort of
guarantee by the European Powers, not unlike that by which Belgium
secures her independence. In Asia: Russia to be given full possession
of Eastern Turkey, including the cities of Trebizond, Erzrum, Harput,
Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir and Mardin, and, if she desires, the entire
Mesopotamia plain to Mosul, Bagdad and Bassorah, thus securing an
outlet to the Persian Gulf; France to have Syria, including the coast
cities of Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli and Alexandretta, and Damascus,
Aleppo, Aintab and Urfa; Jerusalem and the immediately surrounding
country to be made independent, under international protection, much
as Constantinople; England to be allowed Cyprus and Egypt, the Suez
Canal being under international guaranties; Greece to have Crete,
Rhodes and the other islands of the Archipelago, and Austria to yield
to Italy Trieste. Three sections remain, Arabia, Tripoli in Africa
and Asia Minor. The first would be left to itself, and Tripoli might
be divided between Italy and France; as to Asia Minor, there is more
of doubt. Until the time of the recent massacres, there was a very
general feeling that this might be left to the Sultan, with his capital
at Brusa, where his line began its reign, or at Konieh (Iconium), the
capital of the first Turkish (Seljuk) dynasty. Since the massacres,
there has arisen a popular demand that the rule of the Sultans should
cease, and two propositions have appeared: one that France should add
Asia Minor to Syria, the other that Russia should be allowed to extend
her borders west to the Aegean Sea and the vicinity of Constantinople.
In this and in all similar plans, there is an element that is
practically left out of sight, and that is the first factor mentioned
above, Turkey itself, the country and its people. There seems to be a
general impression that about all that the European Powers have to do
is to arrange among themselves, and then carry out any plan that they
may see fit. The difficulty of doing this will, however, be apparent.
To begin with, there is the country itself, difficult of access from
the outside, with such topographical characteristics as would render
it easy to carry on a guerilla warfare for a long time, necessitating
a large army of occupation, and so generally destitute that the
troops would require a considerable commissariat. There is also the
population. There are at least 6,000,000 Turks, and those who have read
the chapter on the Turks will readily see that they are by no means to
be overlooked. They are not at all the effete race they are sometimes
described, but in the interior provinces are sturdy, powerful men, of
great physical endurance, simple habits, and able to live where foreign
troops would scarcely find sustenance. Personally they are brave,
as the Russians who met them at Plevna and Shipka can testify; they
have no fear of death; indeed, under the influence of their priests,
they would throw themselves into the defense of their country with a
vigor and a recklessness that would tax the best troops of Europe. The
Turkish army may be, probably, is disorganized, yet the material for
a powerful army is ready at hand and needs only circumstances to call
it into being, and make it an engine of destructiveness whose power it
would be difficult to estimate. Account must also be taken of the other
Moslem tribes. The Kurds are, it is true, cowardly and easily subdued
in regular combat. They are, however, at home in the mountains and it
would require a pretty strong occupying force to keep them in absolute
subjection. Two and a half to three millions of such men are an element
which an occupying army can scarcely ignore. There are, too, the
Circassians and Lazes, far bolder and braver than the Kurds, cherishing
bitter resentment for their expulsion from the Caucasus, and eager to
take vengeance on any Christian within reach; the Xeibecks, Yoruks
and Avshars, of Western Asia Minor, who will not readily yield their
opportunities for plunder; the Druzes, of Syria; the Bedouins of the
desert and the milder, but by no means cowardly, Arabs of Mesopotamia.
To suppose that the entire Moslem world of Asiatic Turkey would quietly
stand by and see the European Powers apportion among themselves the
domains that have belonged to the house of Osman for six centuries,
is scarcely within the bounds of reason. It must be remembered too
that the Christians could offer little resistance to the Moslems or
be of great help to the invaders. A few, perhaps, like the Armenians
of Zeitun, or the Nestorians of Tiari, might hold their own in their
mountain fortresses for a time, but even then they would accomplish
little. Were the word to go from the minarets of the Mosques, from
Constantinople to Bagdad, that the Cross was threatening to destroy the
Crescent, there would commence a slaughter not unlike the one Kingsley
describes in “Hypatia,” when the Goths entrapped the Alexandrines and
piled the corpses in the center, keeping time to the weird notes of
their leader’s flute. In time, the succoring troops might come but they
would find the land one vast charnel house, with bones and tresses of
hair alone left to tell the story of the races that for the centuries
have kept true to their Christian faith.
It is easy, in well carpeted and luxuriously furnished drawing-rooms
and newspaper offices in Europe and America, to demand the destruction
of the Turkish Government, to lay down plans for the apportionment
of the empire, and then to deride statesmen as cowardly because they
hesitate to carry out those plans. The Cabinets of London, Paris,
Vienna and Berlin understand the situation perfectly, and they, far
better than newspaper correspondents and chance travelers, know the
real meaning of the term, “Partition of Turkey.” They know that it
means war, if not among themselves, at least with a race that has
never yet tamely submitted to the conqueror, and war in a country
difficult of access, and easily defended. War means heavy expense,
and the treasuries of Europe are by no means full. Already the cry of
the Socialists of Germany, the Nihilists of Russia, the overburdened
farmers of Italy and the peasants of Austria, is loud against increased
taxation, and partition means taxation. The object of this chapter will
have been secured if it is made clear what partition of the Turkish
Empire involves.