THE ARMENIAN QUESTION.
A Progressive Grand Vizier--Victory of the Reactionary
Party--Egypt and the Mahdi--Rise of the Armenian Question--Russian
Intrigue--Articles of the Berlin Treaty--Autonomy Desired--The
Huntchagist Committee--Placards in Asia Minor--Burning of American
Building at Marsovan--Numerous Arrests--Armenians Exiled--Coercive
Measures of the Government--American Citizens--Threats--Huntchagists
Disowned by the Nation--Young Turkey Party--Absolute Failure of the
Huntchagist Movement.
The close of the Russo-Turkish war and the Treaty of Berlin left
Abd-ul-Hamid II with the task before him of building up an empire
which had almost fallen to pieces. On the one hand he was faced by the
demands made upon him by England; he was under obligations to make
special reforms in Asia Minor, also in Macedonia, Thessaly and Epirus,
besides granting a liberal form of administration to Crete. On the
other hand he was faced by an internal condition which was enough to
daunt the bravest man. The financial condition of the empire was in
a state of collapse; in fact there were no finances of any sort. The
regular expenditures more than doubled the regular income; the currency
was in a hopelessly disorganized condition; gold, silver, copper and
paper were in circulation. The silver, however, had several different
values. There were alloys of silver and copper of varying degrees of
purity, each with its own value; the paper currency also was never
worth the same two days in succession. The whole business of the
empire was disorganized. Various attempts, some of them honest, some
thoroughly dishonest, almost all ludicrous, were made to bring order
out of chaos. The Sultan entered upon his task with unquestionably
a sincere desire for the welfare of his country, as is shown by his
choice, within six months after the signing of the treaty of Berlin,
of a Grand Vizier who had never been identified with Constantinople
intrigue. Haireddin Pasha, a Circassian by birth, had had some years
of experience in the control of matters in Tunis. He was known as
a man of education, strictly honest and with a sense of duty very
rarely to be found in the East. He was a thorough Moslem, believing
heart and soul in the Mohammedan faith; believing also that it was
thoroughly adaptable to all needs of civilization, and that it could be
made equal in beneficent results to Christianity as set forth in the
life of Europe. His access to power was looked upon as a good omen.
On every hand the people expected him to restore in Turkey all the
ancient usages of Islam. He found a task before him which demanded all
his energies. He found officials in power in the provinces who, when
ordered to report the number of able-bodied Moslems in their districts
and draw rifles for distribution among them to check a revolt, added
10 or 20 per cent. to the actual number, drew the arms and then sold
those not required for the Turks to the Christians. Others manifested
the most atrocious lack of fidelity to their duty or of common sense in
the conduct of their office. But this was not all; in the Porte itself
the management was sincerely opposed to all real reform. The very
clerks managed by all sorts of devices to misrepresent the orders that
were given, or to so tamper with the despatches that they were made
of no avail. Orders to provincial governors sent out from the Palace
frequently set aside previous orders of the ministry; the intrigues of
the Palace clique permeated every department of the public service and
the attendants upon the Sultan succeeded in blinding him constantly to
the real situation. The first thing that Haireddin Pasha did was to
send away from Constantinople to different interior provinces nearly
all the pashas who had previously held the office of grand vizier.
This, of course, made them all his enemies and the result was that
he found himself involved in a struggle for his very existence. More
than this, he made it manifest that his idea of justice included the
Christians just as much as the Moslems, and that Moslem oppression of
Christian subjects met with no favor at his hands. All these elements,
combined with the financial stress, for which in the popular mind he
was held responsible, helped on the struggle. At last he presented an
ultimatum to the Sultan, in which he demanded his freedom, within the
limits of responsibility, from the interference of the clerks and from
intervention in the appointment of officials. The Sultan hesitated for
some time, but at last refused to give this on the ground of its being
a limitation of his royal prerogatives. Haireddin Pasha resigned, and
his place was taken by the very men whom he had sent away.
Immediately following on this experience came the trouble in Egypt.
Mehemet Ali had been followed by Abbas, a brutal voluptuary, and he by
Ismail, a man of great ability, but of no conscience, who had pushed
the country forward in some respects, but had so enslaved it by his
personal extortion as almost to ruin it. Ismail was deposed by the
demands of the European Powers interested in the conduct of the Suez
Canal and the securing of the bonds that had been placed there, and
was followed by Tewfik, a good-natured, well-disposed, but weak man,
incompetent to meet the difficulties that encompassed him on every
hand. Here again the financial question came to the front. The interest
on the bonds must be paid whether the army officials were paid or not.
Thus arose the demand for the national party and the revolt headed by
Arabi Pasha, which resulted in the bombardment of Alexandria, the war
in lower Egypt and the military occupation of the country by Great
Britain. Another important element in this was the desire of the
Sultan to regain his hold upon the country. By the firman given to
Mehemet Ali, the Sultan was really no more than suzerain. He felt that
this was derogatory to his honor and wished to reduce the Khedive to
the position of Vali. The whole story of English, French and Turkish
diplomacy here is beyond the limits as well as the scope of this book.
It is sufficient to say that it furnished an additional influence
in determining the policy of the following years, carried out by
Abd-ul-Hamid II.
Immediately consequent on the trouble in Egypt itself came the rise
of the Mahdi in the Sudan. References have already been made to the
peculiar jealousy on the part of the Arabs as to the position held
by the Sultans as caliphs of the Moslem world. That existed to a
considerable degree not merely in Arabia, but throughout Africa. It
was assisted by the terrible oppression of the Egyptian Government
under the Khedive Ismail. All through upper Egypt, and especially
in the Sudan, there was the bitterest feeling, and when in 1880 a
certain Mohammed Ahmet, a boat-builder of Dongola and belonging to the
Sennussi tribe, proclaimed himself as the Mahdi, he almost immediately
secured quite a following. The Mahdi, or last high priest, or Imam, of
the family of Ali, according to Moslem tradition, entered a cave and
henceforward disappeared from the world. The Shiite Moslems believe
that he still exists, and look forward to his issuing from it again
in pomp to rule the world. The Sunnites believe that he will appear
only at the end of the world, when he will convert all mankind to
Islam and reign as vicar of Jesus Christ. This boat-builder rapidly
won veneration from the Arabs of his section by the learning he had
acquired in the schools at Khartum and Berber, and his apparent piety.
He also manifested considerable ability and gathered a large force
of Arabs, making considerable advance, notwithstanding the fact that
the Sherif of Mecca branded him as an impostor and the ecclesiastical
Ottoman world refused to believe that he had any claim worthy of
recognition. He set forth to conquer Egypt, defeated four expeditions
sent against him by the Egyptian Government, annihilated the Egyptian
army, composed of 10,000 soldiers, with 40 European officers, and
captured Khartum, killing General Gordon Pasha, the famous English
leader. Further than this, however, his power could not go, and English
troops kept him within the region of his own Sudan.
Insignificant in a certain way in itself, this Mahdi movement exerted
considerable influence throughout the empire. It assisted to focus
attention upon the distinctively Moslem character of the Ottoman
Government and furnished quite a factor in the decision which became
manifest ere long on the part of the Sultan to conduct his empire on
different bases from those accepted by his father, Abd-ul-Medjid, or
his grandfather, Mahmud II. In truth the Sultan seemed shut up to one
of two courses. He must either enter with his whole soul into the
line marked out by Haireddin Pasha, or he must identify himself still
more closely with the distinctively Moslem element in his empire. He
found himself unable, even if he had been desirous, to do the former,
and undoubtedly seemed to himself to be shut up to the latter. His
principle, therefore, of government, as made manifest by the subsequent
history of his reign and illustrated very fully in a later chapter,
was to satisfy the Moslem element in his empire, whether the Christian
element was satisfied or not. Accordingly he commenced a systematic
course of developing the Moslem power and prestige at the expense of
the Christians. Little by little he replaced Christians by Moslems in
the administrative offices of the government; he indorsed increasingly
restrictive laws, by which the Christian communities were deprived of
very much of the advance that had been made manifest during the three
preceding reigns. At first this policy was not altogether apparent,
and it is possible that it was not definitely decided upon. Those
who know the Turkish Empire, know how many things go by default; how
one movement leads to another, and the result is a situation not
recognized and not planned for at the beginning, but which becomes,
as a matter of fact, a settled, definite policy. In this it is not
necessary to suppose that the Sultan himself laid down the definite
rules. Unquestionably a large part of it was due to the same influences
that deposed Haireddin, the local officials both in Constantinople and
the provinces. That this was true was evident in many ways. Decisions
would be secured from the officers of the Porte, orders would be
sent to the provinces with regard to various matters, and the reply
would come after awhile that the orders had not been carried out, and
investigation would make manifest the fact that at the same time that
these orders had been given, counter orders had been sent to the same
official in a private way, absolutely annulling the general orders. The
situation thus became increasingly difficult, when, after ten years or
so, the Armenian question began to assume special prominence.
The Armenian question, as such, began with the treaty of Berlin.
Previous to that there had been other questions: the Greek question,
the Bulgarian question--the former resulting in the independence of
Greece, and the latter in the independence of Bulgaria. Throughout
Asiatic Turkey there had been no distinctive question of any sort;
Armenians, Greeks, Jacobites, all had suffered alike under the
general oppression. With the treaty of Paris, however, there began an
increasing manifestation of the power of Russia in the protection of
Greeks throughout the empire. The Armenians had had no special patron,
but as they increased in wealth and in general prosperity, and also
in education, learning more of their ancient history, it was natural
that there should develop among them the idea of a renewed national
life. The growth of this has already been described in general in
the chapter on the Armenians; so also reference has been made to the
various influences that were at work in forming this national movement.
Here we dwell more especially upon the political side of that movement.
Those who have followed the very brief summary that has been given
in the preceding chapters of the political intrigues and influences,
operating throughout the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth
centuries, will see how constant was the influence of Russia, exercised
first among the Greeks on the shores of the Mediterranean, then in the
various Danubian Provinces and finally in Bulgaria; always they had for
their purpose the stirring of hostility between Turks and Christians,
and the enkindling of a feeling of dependence upon Russia as the only
Power that could secure for them such national development as they
desired. The same thing became manifest after a few years among the
Armenians. The Pan-Slavist committee that had really fanned into flame
the embers of hostility to the Turks in the Balkan Peninsula, with
a view to the incorporation of those Slavic races with the Russians
into a great Slavic empire, hardly found a congenial field among the
Armenians. These latter are of different race and schismatics in
religion and are looked upon by the Slavs everywhere as having no
particular relations to themselves. They could form no integral part
of the grand scheme, and there was no such feeling of sympathy for
them as was distinctly manifest toward the Bulgarians, Servians, and
others. Still the Russians never gave up their idea of an empire that
should take in the whole of the Eastern Roman world, and replace the
crescent by the cross on the dome of St. Sophia. Crippled even by their
victory in the Russo-Turkish war, with great problems of internal
administration staring them in the face, with opportunities opening
in the far East and on the very borders of India, Turkey assumed
for the time being a somewhat minor position in Russian diplomatic
plans. At the same time it was never entirely out of sight, and there
became manifest, before many years had passed by, the indications
of another current of influence spreading from the Armenians of the
Caucasus throughout the whole of Turkey. Whether these embassies were
directly in the employ of a Russian organization or not, it is probably
impossible to say; it may be that they were simply in sympathy with the
desire referred to in a previous chapter of establishing an Armenia
again in the ancestral region extending from Ararat on the north to Van
on the south. But whatever the immediate connection may have been, the
fact remains that Russian-Armenian influences began to make themselves
manifest within not many years after the signing of the treaty of
Berlin, especially in certain sections. They found indeed very fertile
soil in which to work. The two clauses of the treaty of Berlin to which
the Armenians looked as furnishing them the hope of a better national
life were the 61st and 62d articles, which read as follows:
“Art. 61. The Sublime Porte engages to realize without delay those
ameliorations and reforms which local needs require in the provinces
inhabited by the Armenians, and guarantees their security against the
Circassians and the Kurds. It undertakes to make known, from time to
time, the measures taken with this object to the Powers, who will watch
over their application.
“Art. 62. The Sublime Porte having expressed its willingness to
maintain the principle of religious liberty, and to give it the widest
sphere, the contracting parties take cognizance of this spontaneous
declaration. In every part of the Ottoman Empire difference of religion
should not be held as a motive of exclusion or unfitness in anything
that relates to the use of civil and political rights, admission
to public offices, duties, and honors, and the exercise of all
professions and industries, in whatever locality it may be. All should
be admitted before the tribunals, the exercise and external practice
of all religions should be entirely free, and no impediment should
be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different
communions or to their spiritual chiefs; ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and
monks of all nationalities traveling in European and Asiatic Turkey
shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privileges. The right of
official protection is accorded to the diplomatic and consular agents
of the Powers in Turkey, no less with regard to the persons above
mentioned, with their religious and charitable establishments, than
to others in the Holy Places and elsewhere. The rights conceded to
France are expressly reserved, it being well understood that the status
quo with respect to the Holy Places shall not be seriously affected
in any way. The monks of Mount Athos, whatever their nationality,
shall be maintained in possession of their possessions and previous
advantages, and shall enjoy without exception full equality of rights
and prerogatives.”
The most cursory reading of these in the light of the succeeding years
shows how completely the Turkish Government had failed to carry out any
one of the different promises made in these articles, especially in
that with regard to the Armenians. It was, perhaps, not unnatural that
the first idea of those who plead the Armenian cause at Berlin should
have been to secure an autonomous province. They had seen Bulgaria
developed; they had seen also the growth of Rumania, of Greece and of
Servia into kingdoms, and many of them could not understand why there
might not be an Armenia. They looked upon the whole section extending
south from the east end of the Black Sea, and including Van, as their
ancestral property. Whatever there was there of Kurdish or Turkish
occupation was really usurpation, and they felt that if the Powers
of Europe would simply support them, they could assert their right
and overpower these intruders. But even if there were not a distinct
national province, they had seen the success of the plan developed
in Syria. In the province of the Lebanon there were Moslems in great
numbers; nevertheless a Christian governor had been granted, and there
had been for fifteen years such peace and prosperity as had not been
known for centuries. At least this much might be secured to them. They,
however, took the position that they would get in proportion as they
asked; hence they asked for the greatest that could be given, with the
expectation probably, at least on the part of the better informed, of
securing not that, but something less, which should be after all a
great advance on the condition at that time.
As, however, the general discussion of the question came up more and
more prominently, the Armenian leaders began to see that there was
a very widespread feeling that the Armenian nation was not equal to
the position which they claimed for themselves. To begin with, they
were a distinct minority in the very country that they desired to
own; moreover the inhabitants of that section were in a considerable
degree of the more ignorant classes. They were rude in their speech,
uncultured in their manners, ignorant of almost all that pertains
to national life. True, this was not their fault; it was rather a
misfortune due to centuries of oppression. Still, there was the fact.
Moreover, there was no organization that bound all the Armenians
together. They were scattered communities with no bond of union, except
their language and their church creed. These communities were ignorant
of each other and jealous of each others’ prosperity. The first thing,
therefore, apparently that presented itself to the minds of the leaders
was a general propaganda throughout the Armenians of the Turkish
Empire, with a view to developing the national idea, and also with a
view toward some form of organization, so that when the time for action
came, they would be in a degree united. This was undoubtedly the chief
purpose of such men as Minas Tcheraz, who was at Berlin, and of the
wisest men among the leaders. They understood the situation, and set
themselves to accomplishing what they could. Had the movement remained
in their hands, there is little probability but that the ultimate
result, if not in accord with their highest ambition, would have been
a better condition than the present. Here, however, appeared another
phase.
There is in every nation a certain element of the heedless and
reckless, seeing only the end to be gained, and impatient of the best
means of reaching that end. Scattered throughout Europe were a number
of Armenians who, having imbibed the free-thought ideas developed in
the French Revolution, and fired by the experiences of 1848, were
utterly impatient of the slower process of education. They were
hot-headed and ambitious rather for themselves than for the nation,
and they pointed to the experiences of Bulgaria and of the Greeks.
They claimed that this slower process of education was all very well,
but it would accomplish nothing. It might go on for generations
without securing any definite national life. They pointed out that the
European nations would never interfere except for their own interests;
that England, France, and Europe generally, had cared nothing for
the Bulgarian troubles until the massacres compelled interference in
order to prevent Russia from overpowering themselves. From this the
argument was easy that the Armenians could accomplish nothing unless
the European Governments saw that there was such a state of anarchy
throughout Asiatic Turkey as would compel their interference in order
to prevent the general collapse, which every one feared would be the
result of a widespread European war. Their argument was simply, “These
European Governments, especially England, will never help Armenians
practically until they see that they have got to help them in order
to save themselves from great danger; the only way to secure this is
to stir the Turkish Government just as it was stirred in Bulgaria,
and secure some kind of atrocities that shall focus the attention of
the Christian world upon the Turkish Empire.” This general argument
was reinforced by the presence among the Armenians of the Nihilistic
tendencies developed in Russia.
The result was the formation of a revolutionary society called the
Huntchagists. Just where it was formed, just who were its members,
and just where and how it operated, is not yet definitely evident.
Contemporary history is seldom if ever complete. It is sufficient
to say that in Athens, Marseilles and London there were coteries of
Armenians who made it their business to stir strife throughout the
nation. They sent emissaries through the length and breadth of the
Turkish Empire. These met with the younger, more adventurous and
less scrupulous element to be found in every nation, and commenced a
general propaganda. Where there was oppression, that oppression was
made the most of in public prints; stories of the most atrocious type
were told. The Turkish rule was bad enough, but it was made to appear
infinitely worse than it was by these men. But they found that this was
not sufficient. They became apparently exasperated by their failure to
rouse their own people to the pitch of excitement which they deemed
essential in order to accomplish their purpose. Hence they commenced
attacks of one kind and another, not merely upon the Moslems, but upon
their fellow-countrymen who did not support them. Threats were allowed
to be heard of what the Armenians would do to anybody and everybody
they did not like. It was inevitable that these should be heard; it
was intended that they should be heard. Turkish governors were on the
watch. One of the shrewdest of the provincial governors, a man whose
general conduct of his office was by no means of the harshest, had
the cannon of his capital trained upon an Armenian church because of
the stories that came to him of the threats of these men. Then came
the widespread use of revolutionary placards. Apparently they were
posted by the Turks themselves, but whether this was true or not
seemed uncertain. Naturally the Turkish officials began to exercise
harshness. They felt that they were fighting some unseen foe and the
results appeared in the form of arbitrary arrests and the most cruel
punishments. Just when this general work commenced it seems to be
impossible to say. Within ten years after the treaty of Berlin there
were signs of the existence of this influence, but the most marked
indications were manifest in 1892, coming to a head in the early part
of 1893.
About this time the revolutionists, whether members of the Huntchagist
party or not, seemed to have come to the conviction that there must
be some overt act that should accomplish what they had in view--the
focusing of the attention of Europe upon themselves. They seemed at
first to be at somewhat of a loss as to the best method of doing this.
Finally, under just what influences is not evident, they gathered,
especially in the region of Marsovan and Yuzgat, and placards began
to appear, sometimes on public buildings, sometimes on the walls of
houses. On the night of the 5th of January, 1893, scores, even hundreds
of these placards, were posted in many places, all of a seditious
character, rousing opposition against the government. Two were found
affixed to the outer gate of the premises of the American Board
missionaries at Marsovan, but before the paste upon them was dry they
were pulled down by persons belonging to the college, who were passing
through the gates. These placards were addressed to the Turks and
full of denunciation of the government for its oppression and general
corruption. Within ten days arrests began to be made. The chief of
police was given full authority to investigate the matter, but his
previous record and subsequent conduct showed him to be utterly unfit
for the work. He was brutal, utterly regardless of law and simply bent
upon wreaking personal vengeance wherever possible.
Just what the object was in endeavoring to identify the American
buildings with this movement, it is not difficult to see. Americans are
almost the only foreigners dwelling in the interior of Turkey. They are
under peculiar protection by treaty rights. They are well known over
the world, and throughout the whole period of their residence in Turkey
have identified themselves very closely with the efforts to ameliorate
the condition of the people. Anything that could identify them with
anti-government manifestations would call down upon them the hostility
of the government. That would result in damage of some sort, and this
would call the attention of the foreign governments, which it was hoped
would accomplish the end in view. With this it is entirely possible
that there may have been personal bitter feeling. Not a few Armenians
have felt that the missionaries were undermining their national life
by their opposition to ecclesiastical formalism, and in their attacks
on atheism and infidelity they were charged by many with hindering the
progress of free thought. Whatever the immediate purpose, this much was
accomplished, that the attention of the Turkish Government was directed
very forcibly to the missionaries. The chief of police, who perhaps had
his own reasons for hostilities to the Americans, took advantage of the
opportunity to threaten both the college and its teachers, charging
the institution with being a source of sedition and affirming that the
placards were issued from Anatolia College, since they were written
by a cyclostyle such as the missionaries used. It was also reported
throughout the city that the buildings were to be burned, and that high
officials had declared that the college site should be a plowed field.
In less than two weeks the senior Armenian professor of the college,
Mr. Thoumaian, and a little later another member of the faculty,
Professor Kayayan, were arrested and imprisoned, and every request
to see them or to give bail for them was refused. There was not the
slightest evidence that they had had anything to do with the issuing
of the placards, and the whole charge seems to have been made for the
purpose of furnishing a basis for an attack upon the college.
On the night of February 1st, one of the buildings which was in
process of erection for the girls’ school was set on fire. The presence
of soldiers and officials near the building before alarm could possibly
have been given, indicated their connection with it, but the charge
was immediately made that the college authorities themselves had
fired the building either to excite revolt among the Armenians or
conceal the presence of arms and ammunition. These charges were sent
on to Constantinople and the animus of the government is shown in its
appointment of the same local officials, notoriously corrupt, and who
were known to have threatened the college, for the conduct of the
examination. There was general disturbance throughout the whole region,
with outbreaks in a number of places: Yuzgat, Gemerek, Cesarea, and
elsewhere. Large numbers of arrests were made until certainly between
two and three hundred Armenians, against whom no charge could be found,
were imprisoned. The professors were not released even on bail and
there was great excitement throughout the region.
Throughout the summer of 1893 the excitement continued to increase.
Commissions were appointed to try these men in prison. At the trials,
torture of the most atrocious kind was used to extort confession of
guilt and charges against prominent men. Very little, however, was
learned, and at last most of those arrested were released, though many
were transferred to the different fortresses at the Island of Rhodes,
near Mersine, and at St. Jean d’Acre in Syria. Among these were some
Protestant pastors who had had no share whatever in the disturbance,
but were looked upon with suspicion by the Turkish Government for their
liberal ideas. The professors were put on trial. No proof whatever was
found against them, and at last, on special protest by the English
Government, they were released on condition of leaving the country.
One feature in the investigations was the presence of a large number
of documents, apparently in the hand-writing of some of the arrested
men. It appeared, however, on investigation, that there were a large
number of forgeries, one of the American missionaries finding his
own name signed to some papers. The question of the burning of the
school building was taken up earnestly by the American Government and
indemnity was secured from Turkey, together with a permit to rebuild.
In one sense the revolutionists had achieved their purpose. They had
attracted attention, and it had become very evident to Europe that
matters in Turkey were going from bad to worse. The great activity of
the Turkish Government, however, made their position in Turkey quite
difficult. They appeared less and less in the country itself for some
time, but took their station outside, and through Europe and even in
this country they made general charges against the Turkish Government
and gathered funds to continue from a safe position the general
propaganda which had been started in Turkey. At this point a new phase
of their work appeared. For some time there had been considerable
effort on the part of Armenians to secure American citizenship, return
to Turkey and demand the same protection at the hands of the Turkish
Government that was accorded to native-born American citizens. The
diplomatic relations of this will be referred to in another chapter on
the relations between America and Turkey. In some respects they were
able thus to accomplish a good deal, but some serious difficulties
arose. Individuals claiming American protection were charged by the
Turkish Government with exerting seditious influence, and complaints
were made to the United States Government with regard to it. The
position was taken by this government that it could not force upon the
Turkish Government the continued presence of its own citizens who were
not desired by that government. This aroused a great cry and increasing
efforts were made to secure at the hands of this government complete
protection. The chief effect, however, was to direct attention more
than ever to their work, and letters appeared from different parts of
Turkey protesting against the influences that went forth from these
revolutionary committees, taking the ground that they were having
simply the effect of arousing the hostility of the Turkish officials,
while they were accomplishing no good purpose.
As has already been said, the extent of this revolutionary movement
it is impossible to state accurately. The members of the committees
are not known; how widely their movement had received, if not the
absolute indorsement, at least the sympathy of their own people, is
also very uncertain. This much, however, is unquestionable, that while
individuals in various parts of the empire did have this sympathy with
the revolutionary idea, there were very few indeed who carried it to
the extreme favored by the committee. Occasionally a man would be found
who would say, as one did to one of the missionaries, “If I had my way
I would kill you immediately. That would bring the whole matter to a
crisis, and it would be the best thing for us.” But this was entirely
repugnant to most of those who favored overt action, and the great
majority of Armenians in every portion of the empire not only had no
share in the plans, but where they knew of them, bitterly opposed
them. As a matter of fact the revolutionary movement has never been
a national movement. It has represented individual ideas, and while
those individuals were to a degree numerous, especially in certain
sections, they have never represented the great mass of the people. The
influence of the American missionaries, the influence of the Armenian
ecclesiastics and of the better informed in the nation, was strongly
against any such attempt. All knew that it was madness. The facts, that
the Armenians were so scattered throughout the empire, that they were
untrained in the use of arms, that so little organization was possible
among them, all combined to make the movement a most atrocious wrong
to the people. At the same time it had its effect upon the Turks, both
government and people. The appearance of the placards was attended to a
considerable degree by talk among the people, which spread until there
became a widely extended feeling that there was a revolution impending,
and the Turks in many places really felt afraid of the influence that
might be exerted through the Christian population. In some places this
amounted to panic, and there were not a few cases during 1893 and in
the early part of 1894, when Turkish officials had all they could do to
restrain the hostile manifestations of the Moslem communities. Another
effect was that it gave force to the arguments of the reactionary
Turks, who claimed that all this yielding to the desires of the
Christians was nonsense, and that the only thing for the Sultan to do
was to set himself deliberately against them and to make it very clear
that in Turkey the Turk ruled and Islam would brook no rival.
In this immediate connection mention should be made of an undoubted
fact. The elements among the Turks represented by Haireddin Pasha,
called variously the Party of Progress, or the Young Turkey Party,
were at the same time carrying on a certain propaganda, to what extent
it is impossible to say. Their leaders, among them Midhat Pasha, and
those who had been associated with him, had been exiled and put to
death. They themselves had been scattered in one way or another over
the empire. Constantinople, and indeed all Europe, was aroused by the
story of a number of young Turks who came from an interior city to
Constantinople, were seen upon the steamer, and then disappeared from
view. Whither they went no one could tell. Afterwards individuals
appeared claiming to be members of that company and saying that they
had been arrested and sent into exile only to return with great
difficulty. There was a general feeling that revolution was in the air.
The Huntchagists represented the Armenian phase of it; the Young Turkey
Party the Moslem phase of it. Each probably helped the other; each
laid upon the other the responsibility for certain acts aimed against
the government. The Armenians said that the placards at Marsovan,
etc., were posted by the Turks; the Turks retorted the charge upon the
Armenians. Just where the truth is, it will probably be some years
before it is possible to state with accuracy.
In the events that followed the massacres at Sassun, Constantinople,
Erzrum, etc., the traces of Huntchagists are apparent in some;
absolutely wanting in others. Since then the party seems to have
disappeared from view. Nothing is heard of it; nothing said about
it. If it exists, it is hiding itself, partly, it is to be hoped, in
shame and remorse for the cruelties that have at least in good measure
resulted from its folly, partly because its schemes have been brought
absolutely to naught by the dominating power of Russia. They started
out for an autonomous Armenia. They failed absolutely of securing
even a moderate reform in the condition of their people. Conceived in
conceit, in treachery and in falsehood, its fruit has been ruin and
misery of the worst type.