ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS.

The simple Philistine believes that life is something infinite and

unconditioned, and tries to look upon it and live it as though it left

nothing to be desired. By method and principle the learned Philistine

does the same: he believes that his methods and his principles are

unconditionally perfect and objectively valid; so that as soon as he

has found them, he has nothing to do but apply them to circumstances,

and then approve or condemn. But happiness and truth are not to be

seized in this fashion. It is phantoms of them alone that are sent to

us here, to stir us to action; the average man pursues the shadow of

happiness with unwearied labour; and the thinker, the shadow of truth;

and both, though phantoms are all they have, possess in them as much

as they can grasp. Life is a language in which certain truths are

conveyed to us; could we learn them in some other way, we should not

live. Thus it is that wise sayings and prudential maxims will never

make up for the lack of experience, or be a substitute for life

itself. Still they are not to be despised; for they, too, are a part

of life; nay, they should be highly esteemed and regarded as the

loose pages which others have copied from the book of truth as it is

imparted by the spirit of the world. But they are pages which must

needs be imperfect, and can never replace the real living voice. Still

less can this be so when we reflect that life, or the book of truth,

speaks differently to us all; like the apostles who preached at

Pentecost, and instructed the multitude, appearing to each man to

speak in his own tongue.

* * * * *

Recognise the truth in yourself, recognise yourself in the truth; and

in the same moment you will find, to your astonishment, that the home

which you have long been looking for in vain, which has filled your

most ardent dreams, is there in its entirety, with every detail of it

true, in the very place where you stand. It is there that your heaven

touches your earth.

* * * * *

What makes us almost inevitably ridiculous is our serious way of

treating the passing moment, as though it necessarily had all the

importance which it seems to have. It is only a few great minds that

are above this weakness, and, instead of being laughed at, have come

to laugh themselves.

* * * * *

The bright and good moments of our life ought to teach us how to act

aright when we are melancholy and dull and stupid, by preserving the

memory of their results; and the melancholy, dull, and stupid moments

should teach us to be modest when we are bright. For we generally

value ourselves according to our best and brightest moments; and those

in which we are weak and dull and miserable, we regard as no proper

part of us. To remember them will teach us to be modest, humble, and

tolerant.

Mark my words once for all, my dear friend, and be clever. Men are

entirely self-centred, and incapable of looking at things objectively.

If you had a dog and wanted to make him fond of you, and fancied that

of your hundred rare and excellent characteristics the mongrel would

be sure to perceive one, and that that would be sufficient to make him

devoted to you body and soul--if, I say, you fancied that, you would

be a fool. Pat him, give him something to eat; and for the rest, be

what you please: he will not in the least care, but will be your

faithful and devoted dog. Now, believe me, it is just the same with

men--exactly the same. As Goethe says, man or dog, it is a miserable

wretch:

_Denn ein erbärmlicher Schuft, so wie der Mensch, ist der hund_.

If you ask why these contemptible fellows are so lucky, it is just

because, in themselves and for themselves and to themselves, they are

nothing at all. The value which they possess is merely comparative;

they exist only for others; they are never more than means; they are

never an end and object in themselves; they are mere bait, set to

catch others.[1] I do not admit that this rule is susceptible of any

exception, that is to say, complete exceptions. There are, it is true,

men--though they are sufficiently rare--who enjoy some subjective

moments; nay, there are perhaps some who for every hundred subjective

moments enjoy a few that are objective; but a higher state of

perfection scarcely ever occurs. But do not take yourself for an

exception: examine your love, your friendship, and consider if your

objective judgments are not mostly subjective judgments in disguise;

consider if you duly recognise the good qualities of a man who is not

fond of you. Then be tolerant: confound it! it's your duty. As you are

all so self-centred, recognise your own weakness. You know that you

cannot like a man who does not show himself friendly to you; you know

that he cannot do so for any length of time unless he likes you, and

that he cannot like you unless you show that you are friendly to him;

then do it: your false friendliness will gradually become a true one.

Your own weakness and subjectivity must have some illusion.

[Footnote 1: All this is very euphemistically expressed in the

Sophoclean verse:

(Greek: _charis charin gar estin ha tiktous aei_)]

This is really an _à priori_ justification of politeness; but I could

give a still deeper reason for it.

* * * * *

Consider that chance, which, with error, its brother, and folly, its

aunt, and malice, its grandmother, rules in this world; which every

year and every day, by blows great and small, embitters the life of

every son of earth, and yours too; consider, I say, that it is to this

wicked power that you owe your prosperity and independence; for it

gave you what it refused to many thousands, just to be able to give it

to individuals like you. Remembering all this, you will not behave as

though you had a right to the possession of its gifts; but you will

perceive what a capricious mistress it is that gives you her favours;

and therefore when she takes it into her head to deprive you of some

or all of them, you will not make a great fuss about her injustice;

but you will recognise that what chance gave, chance has taken

away; if needs be, you will observe that this power is not quite so

favourable to you as she seemed to be hitherto. Why, she might have

disposed not only of what she gave you, but also of your honest and

hard-earned gains.

But if chance still remains so favourable to you as to give you more

than almost all others whose path in life you may care to examine, oh!

be happy; do not struggle for the possession of her presents; employ

them properly; look upon them as property held from a capricious lord;

use them wisely and well.

* * * * *

The Aristotelian principle of keeping the mean in all things is ill

suited to the moral law for which it was intended; but it may easily

be the best general rule of worldly wisdom, the best precept for a

happy life. For life is so full of uncertainty; there are on all sides

so many discomforts, burdens, sufferings, dangers, that a safe and

happy voyage can be accomplished only by steering carefully through

the rocks. As a rule, the fear of the ills we know drive us into the

contrary ills; the pain of solitude, for example, drives us into

society, and the first society that comes; the discomforts of society

drive us into solitude; we exchange a forbidding demeanour for

incautious confidence and so on. It is ever the mark of folly to avoid

one vice by rushing into its contrary:

_Stulti dum vitant vitia in contraria currunt_.

Or else we think that we shall find satisfaction in something, and

spend all our efforts on it; and thereby we omit to provide for the

satisfaction of a hundred other wishes which make themselves felt at

their own time. One loss and omission follows another, and there is no

end to the misery.

[Greek: Maeden agan] and _nil admirari_ are, therefore, excellent

rules of worldly wisdom.

* * * * *

We often find that people of great experience are the most frank and

cordial in their intercourse with complete strangers, in whom

they have no interest whatever. The reason of this is that men of

experience know that it is almost impossible for people who stand in

any sort of mutual relation to be sincere and open with one another;

but that there is always more or less of a strain between them, due

to the fact that they are looking after their own interests, whether

immediate or remote. They regret the fact, but they know that it

is so; hence they leave their own people, rush into the arms of a

complete stranger, and in happy confidence open their hearts to him.

Thus it is that monks and the like, who have given up the world and

are strangers to it, are such good people to turn to for advice.

* * * * *

It is only by practising mutual restraint and self-denial that we can

act and talk with other people; and, therefore, if we have to converse

at all, it can only be with a feeling of resignation. For if we seek

society, it is because we want fresh impressions: these come from

without, and are therefore foreign to ourselves. If a man fails to

perceive this, and, when he seeks the society of others, is unwilling

to practise resignation, and absolutely refuses to deny himself, nay,

demands that others, who are altogether different from himself,

shall nevertheless be just what he wants them to be for the moment,

according to the degree of education which he has reached, or

according to his intellectual powers or his mood--the man, I say, who

does this, is in contradiction with himself. For while he wants some

one who shall be different from himself, and wants him just because

he is different, for the sake of society and fresh influence, he

nevertheless demands that this other individual shall precisely

resemble the imaginary creature who accords with his mood, and have no

thoughts but those which he has himself.

Women are very liable to subjectivity of this kind; but men are not

free from it either.

I observed once to Goethe, in complaining of the illusion and vanity

of life, that when a friend is with us we do not think the same of him

as when he is away. He replied: "Yes! because the absent friend is

yourself, and he exists only in your head; whereas the friend who is

present has an individuality of his own, and moves according to laws

of his own, which cannot always be in accordance with those which you

form for yourself."

* * * * *

A good supply of resignation is of the first importance in providing

for the journey of life. It is a supply which we shall have to extract

from disappointed hopes; and the sooner we do it, the better for the

rest of the journey.

* * * * *

How should a man be content so long as he fails to obtain complete

unity in his inmost being? For as long as two voices alternately speak

in him, what is right for one must be wrong for the other. Thus he is

always complaining. But has any man ever been completely at one with

himself? Nay, is not the very thought a contradiction?

That a man shall attain this inner unity is the impossible and

inconsistent pretension put forward by almost all philosophers.[1] For

as a man it is natural to him to be at war with himself as long as

he lives. While he can be only one thing thoroughly, he has the

disposition to be everything else, and the inalienable possibility

of being it. If he has made his choice of one thing, all the other

possibilities are always open to him, and are constantly claiming to

be realised; and he has therefore to be continuously keeping them

back, and to be overpowering and killing them as long as he wants to

be that one thing. For example, if he wants to think only, and not

act and do business, the disposition to the latter is not thereby

destroyed all at once; but as long as the thinker lives, he has every

hour to keep on killing the acting and pushing man that is within him;

always battling with himself, as though he were a monster whose head

is no sooner struck off than it grows again. In the same way, if he is

resolved to be a saint, he must kill himself so far as he is a being

that enjoys and is given over to pleasure; for such he remains as long

as he lives. It is not once for all that he must kill himself: he

must keep on doing it all his life. If he has resolved upon pleasure,

whatever be the way in which it is to be obtained, his lifelong

struggle is with a being that desires to be pure and free and holy;

for the disposition remains, and he has to kill it every hour. And so

on in everything, with infinite modifications; it is now one side of

him, and now the other, that conquers; he himself is the battlefield.

If one side of him is continually conquering, the other is continually

struggling; for its life is bound up with his own, and, as a man, he

is the possibility of many contradictions.

[Footnote 1: _Audacter licet profitearis, summum bonum esse anímí

concordian_.--Seneca.]

How is inner unity even possible under such circumstances? It exists

neither in the saint nor in the sinner; or rather, the truth is that

no man is wholly one or the other. For it is _men_ they have to be;

that is, luckless beings, fighters and gladiators in the arena of

life.

To be sure, the best thing he can do is to recognise which part of him

smarts the most under defeat, and let it always gain the victory. This

he will always be able to do by the use of his reason, which is an

ever-present fund of ideas. Let him resolve of his own free will to

undergo the pain which the defeat of the other part involves. This

is _character_. For the battle of life cannot be waged free from all

pain; it cannot come to an end without bloodshed; and in any case

a man must suffer pain, for he is the conquered as well as the

conqueror. _Haec est vivendi conditio_.

* * * * *

The clever man, when he converses, will think less of what he is

saying that of the person with whom he is speaking; for then he is

sure to say nothing which he will afterwards regret; he is sure not to

lay himself open, nor to commit an indiscretion. But his conversation

will never be particularly interesting.

An intellectual man readily does the opposite, and with him the person

with whom he converses is often no more than the mere occasion of a

monologue; and it often happens that the other then makes up for his

subordinate _rôle_ by lying in wait for the man of intellect, and

drawing his secrets out of him.

* * * * *

Nothing betrays less knowledge of humanity than to suppose that, if

a man has a great many friends, it is a proof of merit and intrinsic

value: as though men gave their friendship according to value and

merit! as though they were not, rather, just like dogs, which love the

person that pats them and gives them bits of meat, and never trouble

themselves about anything else! The man who understands how to pat his

fellows best, though they be the nastiest brutes,--that's the man who

has many friends.

It is the converse that is true. Men of great intellectual worth, or,

still more, men of genius, can have only very few friends; for their

clear eye soon discovers all defects, and their sense of rectitude is

always being outraged afresh by the extent and the horror of them. It

is only extreme necessity that can compel such men not to betray their

feelings, or even to stroke the defects as if they were beautiful

additions. Personal love (for we are not speaking of the reverence

which is gained by authority) cannot be won by a man of genius, unless

the gods have endowed him with an indestructible cheerfulness of

temper, a glance that makes the world look beautiful, or unless he has

succeeded by degrees in taking men exactly as they are; that is to

say, in making a fool of the fools, as is right and proper. On the

heights we must expect to be solitary.

* * * * *

Our constant discontent is for the most part rooted in the impulse of

self-preservation. This passes into a kind of selfishness, and makes a

duty out of the maxim that we should always fix our minds upon what we

lack, so that we may endeavour to procure it. Thus it is that we are

always intent on finding out what we want, and on thinking of it;

but that maxim allows us to overlook undisturbed the things which we

already possess; and so, as soon as we have obtained anything, we give

it much less attention than before. We seldom think of what we have,

but always of what we lack.

This maxim of egoism, which has, indeed, its advantages in procuring

the means to the end in view, itself concurrently destroys the

ultimate end, namely, contentment; like the bear in the fable that

throws a stone at the hermit to kill the fly on his nose. We ought to

wait until need and privation announce themselves, instead of

looking for them. Minds that are naturally content do this, while

hypochondrists do the reverse.

* * * * *

A man's nature is in harmony with itself when he desires to be nothing

but what he is; that is to say, when he has attained by experience a

knowledge of his strength and of his weakness, and makes use of the

one and conceals the other, instead of playing with false coin, and

trying to show a strength which he does not possess. It is a harmony

which produces an agreeable and rational character; and for the simple

reason that everything which makes the man and gives him his mental

and physical qualities is nothing but the manifestation of his will;

is, in fact, what he _wills_. Therefore it is the greatest of all

inconsistencies to wish to be other than we are.

* * * * *

People of a strange and curious temperament can be happy only under

strange circumstances, such as suit their nature, in the same way as

ordinary circumstances suit the ordinary man; and such circumstances

can arise only if, in some extraordinary way, they happen to meet with

strange people of a character different indeed, but still exactly

suited to their own. That is why men of rare or strange qualities are

seldom happy.

* * * * *

All this pleasure is derived from the use and consciousness of power;

and the greatest of pains that a man can feel is to perceive that

his powers fail just when he wants to use them. Therefore it will be

advantageous for every man to discover what powers he possesses, and

what powers he lacks. Let him, then, develop the powers in which he is

pre-eminent, and make a strong use of them; let him pursue the path

where they will avail him; and even though he has to conquer his

inclinations, let him avoid the path where such powers are requisite

as he possesses only in a low degree. In this way he will often have a

pleasant consciousness of strength, and seldom a painful consciousness

of weakness; and it will go well with him. But if he lets himself be

drawn into efforts demanding a kind of strength quite different from

that in which he is pre-eminent, he will experience humiliation; and

this is perhaps the most painful feeling with which a man can be

afflicted.

Yet there are two sides to everything. The man who has insufficient

self-confidence in a sphere where he has little power, and is never

ready to make a venture, will on the one hand not even learn how to

use the little power that he has; and on the other, in a sphere in

which he would at least be able to achieve something, there will be

a complete absence of effort, and consequently of pleasure. This is

always hard to bear; for a man can never draw a complete blank in any

department of human welfare without feeling some pain.

* * * * *

As a child, one has no conception of the inexorable character of the

laws of nature, and of the stubborn way in which everything persists

in remaining what it is. The child believes that even lifeless things

are disposed to yield to it; perhaps because it feels itself one with

nature, or, from mere unacquaintance with the world, believes that

nature is disposed to be friendly. Thus it was that when I was a

child, and had thrown my shoe into a large vessel full of milk, I was

discovered entreating the shoe to jump out. Nor is a child on its

guard against animals until it learns that they are ill-natured and

spiteful. But not before we have gained mature experience do we

recognise that human character is unalterable; that no entreaty, or

representation, or example, or benefit, will bring a man to give up

his ways; but that, on the contrary, every man is compelled to follow

his own mode of acting and thinking, with the necessity of a law of

nature; and that, however we take him, he always remains the same. It

is only after we have obtained a clear and profound knowledge of this

fact that we give up trying to persuade people, or to alter them

and bring them round to our way of thinking. We try to accommodate

ourselves to theirs instead, so far as they are indispensable to us,

and to keep away from them so far as we cannot possibly agree.

Ultimately we come to perceive that even in matters of mere

intellect--although its laws are the same for all, and the subject

as opposed to the object of thought does not really enter into

individuality--there is, nevertheless, no certainty that the whole

truth of any matter can be communicated to any one, or that any one

can be persuaded or compelled to assent to it; because, as Bacon says,

_intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est_: the light of the human

intellect is coloured by interest and passion.

* * * * *

It is just because _all happiness is of a negative character_ that,

when we succeed in being perfectly at our ease, we are not properly

conscious of it. Everything seems to pass us softly and gently, and

hardly to touch us until the moment is over; and then it is the

positive feeling of something lacking that tells us of the happiness

which has vanished; it is then that we observe that we have failed to

hold it fast, and we suffer the pangs of self-reproach as well as of

privation.

* * * * *

Every happiness that a man enjoys, and almost every friendship that

he cherishes, rest upon illusion; for, as a rule, with increase of

knowledge they are bound to vanish. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere, a

man should courageously pursue truth, and never weary of striving to

settle accounts with himself and the world. No matter what happens to

the right or to the left of him,--be it a chimaera or fancy that makes

him happy, let him take heart and go on, with no fear of the desert

which widens to his view. Of one thing only must he be quite certain:

that under no circumstances will he discover any lack of worth in

himself when the veil is raised; the sight of it would be the Gorgon

that would kill him. Therefore, if he wants to remain undeceived, let

him in his inmost being feel his own worth. For to feel the lack of

it is not merely the greatest, but also the only true affliction;

all other sufferings of the mind may not only be healed, but may be

immediately relieved, by the secure consciousness of worth. The man

who is assured of it can sit down quietly under sufferings that would

otherwise bring him to despair; and though he has no pleasures, no

joys and no friends, he can rest in and on himself; so powerful is the

comfort to be derived from a vivid consciousness of this advantage; a

comfort to be preferred to every other earthly blessing. Contrarily,

nothing in the world can relieve a man who knows his own

worthlessness; all that he can do is to conceal it by deceiving people

or deafening them with his noise; but neither expedient will serve him

very long.

* * * * *

We must always try to preserve large views. If we are arrested by

details we shall get confused, and see things awry. The success or the

failure of the moment, and the impression that they make, should count

for nothing.[1]

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Schopenhauer, for some reason that

is not apparent, wrote this remark in French.]

* * * * *

How difficult it is to learn to understand oneself, and clearly to

recognise what it is that one wants before anything else; what it is,

therefore, that is most immediately necessary to our happiness; then

what comes next; and what takes the third and the fourth place, and so

on.

Yet, without this knowledge, our life is planless, like a captain

without a compass.

* * * * *

The sublime melancholy which leads us to cherish a lively conviction

of the worthlessness of everything of all pleasures and of all

mankind, and therefore to long for nothing, but to feel that life is

merely a burden which must be borne to an end that cannot be very

distant, is a much happier state of mind than any condition of desire,

which, be it never so cheerful, would have us place a value on the

illusions of the world, and strive to attain them.

This is a fact which we learn from experience; and it is clear, _à

priori_, that one of these is a condition of illusion, and the other

of knowledge.

Whether it is better to marry or not to marry is a question which in

very many cases amounts to this: Are the cares of love more endurable

than the anxieties of a livelihood?

* * * * *

The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; the Art of Controversy · 第 53 / 55 题