XXXII.

If you are confronted with an assertion, there is a short way of

getting rid of it, or, at any rate, of throwing suspicion on it, by

putting it into some odious category; even though the connection

is only apparent, or else of a loose character. You can say,

for instance, "That is Manichasism," or "It is Arianism," or

"Pelagianism," or "Idealism," or "Spinozism," or "Pantheism," or

"Brownianism," or "Naturalism," or "Atheism," or "Rationalism,"

"Spiritualism," "Mysticism," and so on. In making an objection of this

kind, you take it for granted (1) that the assertion in question is

identical with, or is at least contained in, the category cited--that

is to say, you cry out, "Oh, I have heard that before"; and (2) that

the system referred to has been entirely refuted, and does not contain

a word of truth.

The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; the Art of Controversy · 第 44 / 55 题