MAY AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY
ADMINISTRATION--THE RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOV AND GENERAL
ALEXEIEV--MY DEPARTURE FROM THE STAVKA--THE ADMINISTRATION OF
KERENSKY AND GENERAL BRUSSILOV.
On May 1st the Minister of War, Gutchkov, left his post. "We wished,"
so he explained the meaning of the "democratisation" of the Army which
he tried to introduce, "to give organised forms and certain channels to
follow, to that awakened spirit of independence, self-help and liberty
which had swept over all. But there is a line, beyond which lies the
beginning of the ruin of that living, mighty organism which is the
Army." Undoubtedly that line was crossed even before the first of May.
I am not preparing to characterise Gutchkov, whose sincere patriotism
I do not doubt. I am speaking only of the system. It is difficult to
decide who could have borne the heavy weight of administering the Army
during the first period of the Revolution; but, in any case, Gutchkov's
Ministry had not the slightest grounds to seek the part of guiding the
life of the Army. It did not lead the Army. On the contrary, submitting
to a "parallel power" and impelled from below, the Ministry, somewhat
restively, _followed the Army_, until it came right up to the line,
beyond which final ruin begins.
"To restrain the Army from breaking up completely under the influence
of that pressure which proceeded from the Socialists, and in particular
from their citadel--the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates--to
gain time, to allow the diseased process to be absorbed, to help the
healthy elements to gain strength, such was my aim," wrote Gutchkov to
Kornilov in June, 1917. The whole question is whether the resistance
to the destroying powers was resolute enough. The Army did not feel
this. The officers read the orders, signed by Gutchkov, which broke
up completely the foundations of military life and custom. That these
orders were the result of a painful internal drama, a painful struggle
and defeat--this the officers did not know, nor did it interest them.
Their lack of information was so great that many of them even now,
four years later, ascribe to Gutchkov the authorship of the celebrated
"Order No. 1." However it may be, the officers felt themselves deceived
and deserted. Their difficult position they ascribed principally to the
reforms of the Minister of War, against whom a hostile feeling arose,
heated still more by the grumbling of hundreds of Generals removed by
him and of the ultra-monarchical section of the officers, who could not
forgive Gutchkov his supposed share in the preparation of the Palace
_coup d'état_ and of the journey to Pskov.[48]
Thus the resignation of this Minister, even if caused "by those
conditions, in which the Government power was placed in the country,
and in particular the power of the Minister of the Army and the Navy
with respect to the Army and the fleet,"[49] had another justification
as well--the want of support among the officers and the soldiery.
In a special resolution the Provisional Government condemned Gutchkov's
action in "resigning responsibility for the fate of Russia," and
appointed Kerensky Minister of the Army and the Navy. I do not know how
the Army received this appointment in the beginning, but the Soviet
received it without prejudice. Kerensky was a complete stranger to the
art of war and to military life, but could have been surrounded by
honest men; what was then going on in the Army was simple insanity,
and this even a civilian might have understood. Gutchkov was a
representative of the Bourgeoisie, a Member of the Right, and was
distrusted; now, perhaps, a Socialist Minister, the favourite of the
Democracy, might have succeeded in dissipating the fog in which the
soldiers' consciousness was wrapped. Nevertheless, to take up such a
burden called for enormous boldness or enormous self-confidence, and
Kerensky emphasised this circumstance more than once when speaking
to an Army audience: "At a time when many soldiers, who had studied
the art of war for decades, declined the post of Minister of War,
I--a civilian, accepted it." No one, however, had ever heard that the
Ministry of War had been offered to a soldier that May.
The very first steps taken by the new Minister dissipated our hopes:
the choice of collaborators, who were even greater opportunists than
their predecessors, but void of experience in military administration
and in active service;[50] the surrounding of himself with men from
"underground"--perhaps having done very great work in the cause of the
Revolution, but without any comprehension of the life of the Army--all
this introduced into the actions of the War Ministry a new party
element, foreign to the military service.
A few days after his appointment Kerensky issued the Declaration of the
rights of the soldier, thereby predestining the entire course of his
activity.
On May 11th the Minister was passing through Moghilev to the Front. We
were surprised by the circumstance that the passage was timed for 5
a.m., and that only the Chief-of-Staff was invited into the train. The
Minister of War seemed to avoid meeting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
His conversation with me was short and touched on details--the
suppression of some disturbances or other that had broken out at one
of the railway junctions and so forth. The most capital questions of
the existence of the Army and of the coming advance, the necessity
for unity in the views of the Government and the Command, the absence
of which was showing itself with such marked clearness--all this,
apparently, did not attract the attention of the Minister. Among other
things, Kerensky passed a few cursory remarks on the inappropriateness
of Generals Gourko and Dragomirov, Commanders-in-Chief of fronts,
to their posts, which drew a protest from me. All this was very
symptomatic and created at the Stavka a condition of tense, nervous
expectation.
Kerensky was proceeding to the South-Western front, to begin his
celebrated verbal campaign which was to rouse the Army to achievement.
The _word_ created hypnosis and self-hypnosis. Brussilov reported
to the Stavka that throughout the Army the Minister of War had been
received with extraordinary enthusiasm. Kerensky spoke with unusual
pathos and exaltation, in stirring "revolutionary" images, often with
foam on his lips, reaping the applause and delight of the mob. At
times, however, the mob would turn to him the face of a wild beast,
the sight of which made words to stick in the throat and caused the
heart to fail. They sounded a note of menace, these moments, but fresh
delight drowned their alarming meaning. And Kerensky reported to
the Provisional Government that "the wave of enthusiasm in the Army
is growing and widening," and that a definite change in favour of
discipline and the regeneration of the Army was displaying itself. In
Odessa he became even more irresistibly poetical: "In your welcome I
see that great enthusiasm which has overwhelmed the country and feel
that great exaltation which the world experiences but once in hundreds
of years."
Let us be just.
Kerensky called on the Army to do its duty. He spoke of duty, honour,
discipline, obedience, trust in its commanders; he spoke of the
necessity for advancing and for victory. He spoke in the language of
the established revolutionary ritual, which ought to have reached
the hearts and minds of the "revolutionary people." Sometimes, even,
feeling his power over his audience, he would throw at it the words,
which became household words, of "rebel slaves" and "revolutionary
tyrants."
In vain!
At the conflagration of the temple of Russia, he called to the fire:
"Be quenched!" instead of extinguishing it with brimful pails of water.
Words could not fight against facts, nor heroic poems against the
stern prose of life. The replacement of the Motherland by Liberty and
Revolution did not make the aims of the conflict any clearer. The
constant scoffing at the old "discipline," at the "Czar's generals,"
the reminders of the knout, the stick, and the "former unprivileged
condition of the soldier" or of the soldier's blood "shed in vain" by
someone or other--nothing of this could bridge the chasm between the
two component parts of the Army. The passionate preaching of a "new,
conscious, iron revolutionary discipline," _i.e._, a discipline based
on the "declaration of the rights of the soldier"--a discipline of
meetings, propaganda, political agitation, absence of authority in
the commanders, and so forth--this preaching was in irreconcileable
opposition to the call to victory. Having received his impressions in
the artificially exalted, theatrical atmosphere of meetings, surrounded
both in the Ministry and in his journeyings, by an impenetrable wall of
old political friends and of all manner of delegations and deputations
from the Soviets and the Committees, Kerensky looked on the Army
through the prism of their outlook, either unwilling or unable to sink
himself in the real life of the Army and in its torments, sufferings,
searchings, and crimes, and finally to attain a real standing-ground,
get at vital themes and real words. These everyday questions of Army
life and organisation--dry in their form and deeply dramatic in their
content--never served as themes for his speeches. They contained
only a glorification of the Revolution and a condemnation of certain
perversions of the idea of national defence, created by that Revolution
itself. The masses of the soldiery, eager for sentimental scenes,
listened to the appeals of the recognised chief for self-sacrifice,
and they were inflamed with the "sacred fire"; but as soon as the
scene was over, both the chief and the audiences reverted to the daily
occupations: the chief--to the "democratisation" of the Army, and
the masses--to "deepening the Revolution." In the same way, probably,
Djerzinsky's executioners in Soviet Russia now admire, in the temple of
proletarian art, the sufferings of young Werther--before proceeding to
their customary occupation of hanging and shooting.
At any rate, there was much noise. So much, that Hindenburg sincerely
believes even to this day that in June, 1917, the South-Western Front
was commanded by Kerensky. In his book _Aus meinem Leben_ the German
Field-Marshal relates that Kerensky succeeded Brussilov, "who was
swept away from his post by the rivers of Russian blood which he shed
in Galicia and Macedonia (?) in 1916" (the Field-Marshal has confused
the theatres of war), and tells the story of Kerensky's "advance" and
victories over the Austrians near Stanislavov.
* * * * *
Meanwhile life at the Stavka was gradually waning. The wheels of
administration were still revolving, everybody was doing something,
issuing orders and giving directions. The work was purely formal,
because all the plans and directions of the Stavka were upset by
unavoidable and incalculable circumstances. Petrograd never took the
Stavka into serious account, but at that time the attitude of the
Government was somewhat hostile, and the War Ministry was conducting
the work of reorganisation without ever consulting the Stavka. This
position was a great burden to General Alexeiev, the more so that the
attacks of his old disease became more frequent. He was extremely
patient and disregarded all personal pin-pricks and all efforts at
undermining his prerogatives which emanated from the Government.
In his discussions with numerous Army chiefs, and organisations
which took advantage of his accessibility, he was likewise patient,
straightforward, and sincere. He worked incessantly, in order to
preserve the remnants of the Army. Seeking to give an example of
discipline, he protested but obeyed. He was not sufficiently strong
and masterful by nature to compel the Provisional Government and the
civilian reformers of the Army to take the demands of the Supreme
Command into account; at the same time, he never did violence to his
conscience in order to please the powers that be or the mob.
On May 20th, Kerensky stopped for a few hours at Moghilev on his way
home from the South-Western Front. He was full of impressions, praised
Brussilov, and expressed the view that the general spirit at the front
and the relations between officers and men were excellent. Although
in his conversation with Alexeiev Kerensky made no hint, we noticed
that his entourage was somewhat uneasy, and realised that decisions in
regard to certain changes had already been taken. I did not consider
it necessary to acquaint the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with these
rumours, and merely seized the first opportunity for postponing his
intended visit to the Western Front so as not to put him into a false
position.
In the night of the 22nd a telegram was received dismissing General
Alexeiev and appointing General Brussilov by order of the Provisional
Government. The Quartermaster-General Josephovitch woke up Alexeiev
and handed him the telegram. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was
deeply moved, and tears came down his cheeks. May the members of the
Provisional Government who are still alive forgive the vulgarity
of the language: in a subsequent conversation with me the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief inadvertently uttered the following words: "The
cads! They have dismissed me like a servant without notice."
A great statesman and military leader had thus left the stage, whose
virtue--one of many--was his implicit loyalty (or was it a defect?) to
the Provisional Government.
On the next day Kerensky was asked--at a meeting of the Soviet--what
steps he had taken in view of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's speech
at the officers' Conference (see Chapter XXIII). He replied that
Alexeiev had been dismissed, and that he, Kerensky, believed that a
late French politician was right in saying that "discipline of duty"
should be introduced from the top. The Bolshevik Rosenfeldt (Kamenev)
expressed satisfaction, because this decision fully coincided with
the repeated demands of the Soviet. On the same day the Government
published an official communiqué to the effect that: "In spite of
the fact that General Alexeiev was naturally very tired and needed
rest from his arduous labours, it was considered impossible to lose
the services of this exceptionally experienced and talented leader,
and General Alexeiev was therefore to remain at the disposal of the
Provisional Government." The Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued the
following Order of the Day as a farewell to the Armies.
"For nearly three years I have walked with you along the thorny path
of the Russian Army. Your glorious deeds have filled me with joyful
elation, and I was filled with sorrow in the days of our reverses.
But I continued with implicit hope in Providence, in the mission of
the Russian people, and in the prowess of the Russian soldier. Now
that the foundations of our military power are shattered, I still
preserve the same faith, as life would not be worth living without it.
I reverently salute you, my comrades in arms, all those who have done
their duty faithfully, all those whose hearts beat with the love of
their country, all those who in the days of the popular turmoil were
determined not to allow the Mother Country to be disrupted. I, the old
soldier, and your late Supreme Commander-in-Chief, once more reverently
salute you. Pray think kindly of me."
(Signed) GENERAL ALEXEIEV.
Towards the end of our work in common my intercourse with General
Alexeiev was one of cordial friendship. In parting with me, he said:
"All this structure will undoubtedly soon collapse. You will have to
resume work once again. Would you then agree to work with me again?" I
naturally expressed my readiness to collaborate in the future.
Brussilov's appointment signified definite elimination of the Stavka,
as a decisive factor, and a change in its direction. Brussilov's
unrestrained and incomprehensible opportunism, and his endeavour to
gain the reputation of a revolutionary, deprived the Commanding Staffs
of the Army of the moral support which the former Stavka still gave
them. The new Supreme Commander-in-Chief was given a very frigid and
dry reception at Moghilev. Instead of the customary enthusiastic
ovation to which the "Revolutionary General" had been accustomed,
whom the mob had carried shoulder high at Kamenetz-Podolsk, he found
a lonely railway station and a strictly conventional parade. Faces
were sulky and speeches were stereotyped. Brussilov's first steps,
insignificant but characteristic episodes, had a further disheartening
effect. As he was reviewing the Guard of Honour of men with the Cross
of St. George, he did not greet their gallant wounded Commander,
Colonel Timanovsky, or the officers, but shook hands with the men--the
messenger and the orderly. They were so much perturbed by the
unexpected inconvenience of such greetings on parade that they dropped
their rifles. Brussilov handed to me his Order of the Day intended as a
greeting to the Armies, which he had written in his own hand, and asked
me to send it to Kerensky for approval. In his speech to the members of
the Stavka, who had foregathered to bid farewell to General Alexeiev,
Brussilov tried to make excuses. For excuses they were--his confused
explanations of the sin of "deepening the Revolution" with Kerensky
and "democratising" the Army with the Committees. The closing sentence
of his Order, addressed to the retiring Chief, sounded, therefore, out
of tune: "Your name will always remain unstained and pure as that of a
man who has worked incessantly and has given himself entirely to the
service of the Army. In the dark days of the past and in the present
turmoil you have had the courage, resolutely and loyally, to oppose
violence, to combat mendacity, flattery, subservience, to resist
anarchy in the country and disruption in the ranks of its defenders."
My activities were disapproved by the Provisional Government as much as
those of General Alexeiev, and I could not work with Brussilov owing to
fundamental differences of opinion. I presume that during Kerensky's
visit to the South-Western Front, Brussilov agreed with his suggestion
of appointing General Lukomsky Chief-of-Staff. I was therefore
surprised at the conversation which took place on the first day of
Brussilov's arrival. He said to me: "Well, General, I thought I was
going to meet a comrade-in-arms and that we were going to work together
at the Stavka, but you look very surly."
"That is not quite true. I cannot stay at the Stavka any longer. I also
know that General Lukomsky is to supersede me."
"What? How have they dared to appoint him without my knowledge?"
We never touched upon that subject again. I continued to work with
Brussilov for about ten days pending my successor's arrival, and I must
confess that work was unpleasant from the moral point of view. From
the very first days of the War Brussilov and I had served together.
For the first month I was Quartermaster-General on the Staff of his
Eighth Army, then for two years in command of the 4th Rifle Division
in that same glorious Army, and Commander of the 8th Army Corps on
his front. The "Iron Division" went from victory to victory, and
Brussilov particularly favoured it and constantly acknowledged its
achievements. His attitude towards the Commander of the Division was
correspondingly cordial. I shared with Brussilov many hardships as well
as many unforgettable happy days of military triumphs. And I found it
difficult to speak to him now, for he was a different man and was so
recklessly, from the personal point of view--which, after all, did
not matter--as well as from the point of view of the interests of the
Army, throwing his reputation to the four winds. When I reported to
him, every question which might be described as "un-Democratic," but
was, in reality, an endeavour to maintain the reasonable standard of
efficiency, was invariably negatived. Argument was useless. Brussilov
sometimes interrupted me and said with strong feeling: "Do you think
that I am not disgusted at having constantly to wave the Red rag? What
can I do? Russia is sick, the Army is sick. It must be cured, and I
know of no other remedy."
The question of my appointment interested him more than it interested
me. I refused to express any definite desire and said that I would
accept any appointment. Brussilov was negotiating with Kerensky. He
once said to me, "_They_ are afraid that if I give you an appointment
at the Front, you will begin to oust the Committees." I smiled. "No, I
will not appeal to the Committees for help, but will also leave them
alone." I attributed no importance to this conversation, which was
conducted almost in jest; but on the same day a telegram was sent to
Kerensky, of which the following was the approximate wording: "I have
talked it over with Deniken. The obstacles have been removed. I request
that he be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front."
[Illustration]
[Illustration: Kerensky addressing soldiers' meeting.]
In the beginning of August I proceeded to Minsk and took General
Markov as Chief-of-Staff of the Front. I had no regrets in leaving the
Stavka. For two months I had worked like a slave and my outlook had
widened, but had I achieved anything for the preservation of the Army?
Positive results were nil. There may have been some negative results;
the process of disruption of the Army had been to a certain extent
stayed. And that is all. One of Kerensky's assistants, afterwards
High Commissar, Stankevitch, thus describes my activities: "Nearly
every week telegrams were sent to Petrograd (by Deniken) containing
provocative and harsh criticisms on the new methods in the Army;
criticisms they were, not advice. Is it possible to advise that
the Revolution should be cancelled." If that was only Stankevitch
discussing Denikin it would not matter. But these views were shared by
the wide circles of the Revolutionary Democracy and referred not to
the individual, but to all those who "impersonated the tragedy of the
Russian Army." The appreciation must therefore be answered.
Yes, the Revolution could not be cancelled, and what is more, I may
state that the majority of the Russian officers, with whom I agreed,
_did not wish to cancel the Revolution_. They demanded one thing
only--that the Army should not be revolutionised from the top. None of
us could give any other advice. And if the Commanding Staffs appeared
to be "insufficiently tied to the Revolution" they should have been
mercilessly dismissed and other people--were they but unskilled
artisans in military matters--should have been appointed, and given
full power and confidence.
Personalities do not matter. Alexeiev, Brussilov, Kornilov--represent
periods and systems. Alexeiev protested. Brussilov submitted. Kornilov
claimed. In dismissing these men one after another did the Provisional
Government have a definite idea, or were they simply distracted to
the point of convulsion and completely lost in the morass of their
own internal dissensions? Would it not appear that had the order been
changed in which the links had stood in that chain salvation might have
ensued?