NATIONAL UNITS.
In the old Russian Army the national question scarcely existed. Among
the soldiery the representatives of the races inhabiting Russia
experienced somewhat greater hardships in the service, caused by their
ignorance or imperfect knowledge of the Russian language, in which
their training was carried on. It was only this ground--the technical
difficulties of training--and perhaps that of general roughness and
barbarism, but in no case that of racial intolerance, that often led to
that friction, which made the position of the alien elements difficult,
the more so that, according to the system of mixed drafting, they
were generally torn from their native lands; the territorial system
of filling the ranks of the Army was considered to be technically
irrational and politically--not void of danger. The Little Russian
question in particular did not exist _at all_. The Little Russian
speech (outside the limits of official training), songs and music
received full recognition and did not rouse in anyone any feeling of
separateness, being accepted as Russian, as one's own. In the Army,
with the exception of the Jews, all the other alien elements were
absorbed fairly quickly and permanently; the community of the Army
was in no way a conductor either for compulsory Russification or for
national Chauvinism.
Still less were national differences to be noticed in the community of
officers. Qualities and virtues--corporative, military, pertaining to
comradeship or simply human, overshadowed or totally obliterated racial
barriers. Personally, during my twenty-five years of service before the
revolution, it never came into my head to introduce this element into
my relations as commander, as colleague, or as comrade. And this was
done intuitively, not as the result of certain views and convictions.
The national questions which _were raised outside the Army_, in the
political life of the country, interested me, agitated me, were settled
by me in one or the other direction, harshly and irreconcilably at
times, but always without trespassing on the boundaries of military
life.
The Jews occupied a somewhat different position. I shall return to this
question later. But it may be said that, with respect to the old Army,
this question was of popular rather than of political significance.
It cannot be denied that in the Army there was a certain tendency to
oppress the Jews, but it was not at all a part of any system, was not
inspired from above, but sprang up in the lower strata and in virtue
of complex causes, which spread far outside of the life, customs, and
mutual relations of the military community.
In any case, the war overthrew all barriers, while the revolution
brought with it the repeal, in legislative order, of all religious and
national restrictions.
With the beginning of the revolution and the weakening of the
Government, a violent centrifugal tendency arose in the borderlands
of Russia, and along with it a tendency towards the nationalisation,
_i.e._, the dismemberment, of the Army. Undoubtedly, the need of such
dismemberment did not at that time spring from the consciousness
of the masses and had no real foundation (I do not speak of the
Polish formations). The sole motives for nationalisation then lay
in the seeking of the political upper strata of the newly formed
groups to create a real support for their demands, and in the
feeling of self-preservation which urged the military element to
seek in new and prolonged formations a temporary or permanent relief
from military operations. Endless national military congresses
began, without the permission of the Government and of the High
Command. All races suddenly began to speak; the Lithuanians, the
Esthonians, the Georgians, the White Russians, the Little Russians,
the Mohammedans--demanding the "self-determination" proclaimed--from
cultural national autonomy to full independence inclusive, and
principally the immediate formation of separate bodies of troops.
Finally, more serious results, undoubtedly negative as regards the
integrity of the Army, were attained by the Ukrainian, Polish, and
partially by the Trans-Caucasian formations. The other attempts were
nipped in the bud. It was only during the last days of the existence
of the Russian Army, in October, 1917, that General Shcherbatov,
seeking to preserve the Roumanian front, began the classification of
the Army, on a large scale, according to race--an attempt which ended
in complete failure. I must add that one race only made no demand
for self-determination with regard to military service--the Jewish.
And whenever a proposal was made from any source--in reply to the
complaints of the Jews--to organise special Jewish regiments, this
proposal roused a storm of indignation among the Jews and in the
circles of the Left, and was stigmatised as deliberate provocation.
The Government showed itself markedly opposed to the reorganisation
of the Army according to race. In a letter to the Polish Congress
(June 1st, 1917) Kerensky expressed the following view: "The great
achievement of the liberation of Russia and Poland can be arrived at
only under the condition that the organism of the Russian Army is
not weakened, that no alterations in its organisation infringe its
unity.... The extrusion from it of racial troops ... would, at this
difficult moment, tear its body, break its power, and spell ruin both
for the revolution and for the freedom of Russia, Poland, and of the
other nationalities inhabiting Russia."
The attitude of the commanding element towards the question of
nationalisation was dual. The majority was altogether opposed to
it; the minority regarded it with some hope that, by breaking their
connection with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the
newly created national units might escape the errors and infatuations
of democratisation and become a healthy nucleus for fortifying the
front and building up the army. General Alexeiev resolutely opposed
all attempts at nationalisation, but encouraged the Polish and
Tchekho-Slovak formations. General Brussilov allowed the creation
of the first Ukrainian formation on his own responsibility, after
requesting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief "not to repeal it and not
to undermine his authority thereby."[41] The regiment was allowed to
exist. General Ruzsky, also without permission, began the Esthonian
formations,[42] and so forth. From the same motives, probably, which
led some commanders to allow formations, but with a reverse action,
the whole of the Russian revolutionary democracy, in the person of the
Soviets and the army committees, rose against the nationalisation of
the Army. A shower of violent resolutions poured in from all sides.
Among others, the Kiev Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates,
about the middle of April, characterised Ukrainisation in rude and
indignant language, as simple desertion and "hide-saving," and by
a majority of 264 against 4 demanded the repeal of the formation
of Ukrainian regiments. It is interesting to note that as great an
opponent of nationalisation was found in the Polish "Left," which had
split off from the military congress of the Poles in June, because of
the resolution for the formation of Polish troops.
The Government did not long adhere to its original firm decision
against nationalisation. The declaration of July 2nd, along with
the grant of autonomy to the Ukraine, also decided the question of
nationalising the troops: "The Government considers it possible to
continue its assistance to a closer national union of the Ukrainians
in the ranks of the Army itself, or to the drafting into individual
units of Ukrainians exclusively, in so far as such a measure does not
injure the fighting capacity of the Army ... and considers it possible
to attract to the fulfilment of those tasks the Ukrainian soldiers
themselves, who are sent by the Central Rada to the War Ministry, the
General Staff, and the Stavka."
A great "migration of peoples" began.
Other Ukrainian agents journeyed along the front, organising Ukrainian
_gromadas_ and committees, getting resolutions passed for transfers
to Ukrainian units, or concerning reluctance to go to the front under
the plea that "the Ukraine was being stifled" and so forth. By October
the Ukrainian committee of the Western front was already calling for
armed pressure on the Government for the immediate conclusion of
peace. Petlura affirmed that he had 50,000 Ukrainian troops at his
disposal. Yet the commander of the Kiev military district, Colonel
Oberoutchev,[43] bears witness as follows: "At the time when heroic
exertions were being made to break the foe (the June advance) _I was
unable to send a single soldier to reinforce the active army_. As
soon as I gave an order to some reserve regiment or other to send
detachments to reinforce the front, a meeting would be called by a
regiment which had until then lived, peaceably, without thinking of
Ukrainisation, the yellow and blue Ukrainian flag would be unfurled and
the cry raised: 'Let us march under the Ukrainian flag!'
"And after that they would not move. Weeks would pass, a month, but the
detachments would not stir, either under the red, or under the blue and
yellow flag."
Was it possible to combat this unconcealed care for their own safety?
The answer is given by Oberoutchev again--an answer very characteristic
in its lifeless party rigour:
"Of course, I could have used force to get my orders obeyed. And that
force lay in my hands." But "by using force against the disobedient,
who are acting under the Ukrainian flag, one risks the reproach
that one is struggling not against acts of anarchy, but against
national freedom and the self-determination of nations. And for me, a
Socialist-Revolutionary, to risk such a reproach, and in the Ukraine
too, with which I had been connected all my life, was impossible. And
so I decided to resign."[44]
And he resigned. True, it was only in October, shortly before the
Bolshevist _coup d'état_, having occupied the post of commander of the
troops in the most important district next the front for nearly five
months.
As a development of the orders of the Government, the Stavka appointed
special divisions on each front for Ukrainisation, and on the
South-Western front also the 34th Army Corps, which was under the
command of General Skoropadsky. To these units, which were mostly
quartered in the deep reserve, the soldiers flocked from the whole
front, without leave asked or given. The hopes of the optimists on
the one hand and the fears of the Left circles on the other that
nationalisation would create "firm units" (counter-revolutionary in the
terminology of the Left) were speedily dispersed. The new Ukrainian
troops were permeated with the same elements of disintegration as the
regulars.
Meanwhile, among the officers and old soldiers of many famous regiments
with a great historical past, now transformed into Ukrainian units,
this measure roused acute pain and the recognition that the end
of the Army was near.[45] In August, when I was in command of the
South-Western front, bad news began to come to me from the 34th Army
Corps. The corps seemed to be escaping from direct subordination,
receiving both directions and reinforcements from the "General
Secretary Petlura" directly. His commissary was attached to the Staff
of the corps, over which waved the "yellow-blue flag." The former
Russian officers and sergeants, left in the regiments because there was
no Ukrainian command, were treated with contumely by the often ignorant
Ukrainian ensigns set over them and by the soldiers. An extremely
unhealthy atmosphere of mutual hostility and estrangement was gathering
in these units.
I sent for General Skoropadsky and invited him to moderate the violent
course of the process of Ukrainisation and, in particular, either to
restore the rights of the Commanders or to release them from service
in the corps. The future Hetman declared that a mistaken idea had been
formed of his activity, probably because of the historical past of the
Skoropadsky family,[46] that he was a true Russian, an officer of the
Guards and was altogether free of all seeking for self-determination,
that he was only obeying orders, for which he himself had no sympathy.
But immediately afterwards Skoropadsky went to the Stavka, whence my
Staff received directions to aid the speedy Ukrainisation of the 34th
Army Corps.
The question of the Polish formations was in a somewhat different
position. The Provisional Government had declared the independence
of Poland, and the Poles now counted themselves "foreigners"; Polish
formations had long ago existed on the South-Western front, though they
were breaking up (with the exception of the Polish Lancers); having
given permission to the Ukrainians, the Government could not refuse it
to the Poles. Finally, the Central Powers, by creating the appearance
of Polish independence, also had in view the formation of a Polish
Army, which, however, ended in failure. America also formed a Polish
Army on French territory.
In July, 1917, the formation of a Polish corps was assigned to the
Western front, of which I was then Commander-in-Chief. At the head of
the corps I put General Dovbor-Mousnitsky,[47] who is now in command
of the Polish Army at Poznan. A strong, energetic, resolute man, who
fearlessly waged war on the disintegration of the Russian troops and
on the Bolshevism among them, he succeeded in a short time in creating
units which, if not altogether firm, were, in any case, strikingly
different from the Russian troops in their discipline and order. It
was the old discipline, rejected by the Revolution--without meetings,
commissaries or committees. Such units roused another attitude towards
them in the Army, notwithstanding the rejection of nationalisation in
principle. Being supplied with the property of the disbanded mutinous
divisions and treated with complaisance by the Chief of Supplies, the
corps was soon able to organise its own commissariat. By order, the
ranks of the officers in the Polish corps were filled by the transfer
of those who desired it, and the ranks of the soldiers--exclusively
by volunteers or from reserve battalions; practically, however, the
inevitable current from the front set in, caused by the same motives
which influenced the Russian soldiers, devastating the thinned ranks of
the Army.
In the end the Polish formations turned out to be altogether useless to
us. Even at the June military congress of the Poles, fairly unanimous
and unambiguous speeches were heard which defined the aims of these
formations. Their synthesis was thus expressed by one of the delegates:
"It is a secret for no one that the War is coming to an end, and we
need the Polish Army, not for the War, not for fighting; we need it so
that at the coming international conference we may be reckoned with,
that there should be power at our backs."
And indeed the corps did not make its appearance at the front--it is
true that it was not yet finally formed; it did not wish to interfere
in the "home affairs" of the Russians (October and later--the struggle
against Bolshevism) and soon assumed completely the position of "a
foreign army," being taken over and supported by the French command.
But neither were the hopes of the Polish nationalists fulfilled. In the
midst of the general break-down and fall of the front in the beginning
of 1918 and after the irruption of the Germans into Russia, part of the
corps was captured and disarmed, part of it dispersed and the remnants
of the Polish troops afterwards found a hospitable asylum in the ranks
of the Volunteer Army.
Personally, I cannot but say a good word for the 1st Polish Corps, to
the units of which, quartered in Bykhov, we owe much in the protection
of the lives of General Kornilov and the other Bykhov prisoners, in the
memorable days of September to November.
Centrifugal forces were scattering the country and the Army. To
class and party intolerance was added the embitterment of national
dissensions, partly based on the historically-created relations between
the races inhabiting Russia and the Imperial Government, and partly
altogether baseless, absurd, fed by causes which had nothing in common
with healthy national feeling. Latent or crushed at an earlier date,
these dissensions broke out rudely at just that moment, unfortunately,
when the general Russian authority was voluntarily and conscientiously
taking the path of recognition of the historical rights and the
national cultural self-determination of the component elements of the
Russian State.
[Illustration: General Alexeiev's (centre) farewell.]