OFFICERS' ORGANISATIONS.
In the early days of April the idea arose among the Headquarters'
officers of organising a "Union of the Officers of the Army and the
Navy." The initiators of the Union[28] started with the view that it
was necessary "to think alike, so as to understand alike the events
that were taking place, to work in the same direction," for up to the
present time "the voice of the officers--of all the officers--has been
heard by none. As yet we have said nothing about the great events
amidst which we are living. Everyone who chooses says for us whatever
he chooses. Military questions, and even the questions of our daily
life and internal order, are settled for us by anyone who likes and in
any way he likes." There were two objections made in principle, one
being the objection to the introduction by the officers themselves
into their ranks of those principles of collective self-government
with which the Army had been inoculated from outside, in the form of
Soviets, Committees and Congresses, and had brought disintegration
into it. The second objection was the fear lest the appearance of an
independent Officers' Organisation should deepen still more those
differences which had arisen between the soldiers and the officers.
On the basis of these views we, along with the Commander-in-Chief, at
first took up an altogether negative attitude towards this proposal.
But life had already broken out of its bounds and laughed at our
motives. A draft declaration was published, granting the Army full
freedom for forming Unions and meetings, and it would now have been an
injustice to the officers to deprive them of the right of professional
organisation, if only as a means of self-preservation. In practice,
officers' societies had sprung up in many of the Armies, and in Kiev,
Moscow, Petrograd and other towns they had done so from the earlier
days of the Revolution. They all wandered in different directions,
groping their way, while some Unions in the large centres, under the
influence of the disintegrating conditions of the rear, displayed a
strong leaning towards the policy of the Soviets.
The officers of the rear frequently lived a completely different
spiritual life from those of the Front. Thus, for instance, the Moscow
Soviet of officers' delegates passed, in the beginning of April, a
resolution to the effect that "the work of the Provisional Government
should proceed ... in the spirit of the Socialistic and political
demands of the Democracy, represented by the Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates," and expressed a wish that there should be more
representatives of the Socialist parties in the Provisional Government.
An adulteration of the officers' views was also developing on a
larger scale; the Petrograd officers' Council summoned an "All-Russia
Congress of officers' delegates, Army surgeons and officers" in
Petrograd for May 8th. This circumstance was the more undesirable in
that the initiator of the Congress--the Executive Committee, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Goushchin, of the General Staff, at its head--had
already disclosed to the full its negative policy by its participation
in the drafting of the declaration of soldiers' rights, by its active
co-operation in the Polivanov Commission and its servility before the
Council of Workmen's and Soldier's Delegates, and by its endeavours
to unite with it. A proposal in this sense being made, the Council,
however, replied that such a union was "as yet impossible on technical
grounds."
Having discounted all these circumstances, the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief gave his approval to the summoning of a Congress of
officers, on condition that no pressure should be exercised either in
his name or in that of the Chief-of-Staff. This scrupulous attitude
somewhat complicated matters. Some of the Staffs, being out of sympathy
with the idea, prevented the circulation of the appeal, while some of
the High Commanders, as, for example, the Commander of the troops of
the Omsk district, forbade the delegation of officers altogether. In
some places also this question roused the suspicion of the soldiers and
caused some complications, in consequence of which the initiators of
the Congress invited the units to delegate soldiers as well as officers
to be present at the sessions.
Despite all obstacles, over 300 officer delegates gathered in Moghilev,
76 per cent. being from the Front, 17 per cent. from fighting units in
the rear, and 7 per cent. from the rear. On May 7th the Congress was
opened with a speech by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On that day,
for the first time, the High Command said, not in a secret meeting,
not in a confidential letter, but openly, before the whole country:
"Russia is perishing." General Alexeiev said: "In appeals, in general
orders, in the columns of the Daily Press, we often meet with the short
sentence: 'Our country is in danger.'
"We have grown too well accustomed to this phrase. We feel as if we
were reading an old chronicle of bygone days, and do not ponder over
the grim meaning of this curt sentence. But, gentlemen, this is, I
regret to say, a serious fact. _Russia is perishing. She stands on
the brink of an abyss. A few more shocks, and she will crash with all
her weight into it._ The enemy has occupied one-eighth part of her
territory. He cannot be bribed by the Utopian phrase: 'Peace without
annexations or indemnities.' He says frankly that he will not leave our
soil. He is stretching forth his greedy grip to lands where no enemy
soldier has ever set foot--to the rich lands of Volynia, Podolia and
Kiev--_i.e._, to the whole right bank of our Dnieper.
"And what are we going to do? Will the Russian Army allow this to
happen? Will we not thrust this insolent foe out of our country and let
the diplomatists conclude peace afterwards, with annexations or without
them?
"Let us be frank. The fighting spirit of the Russian Army has fallen;
but yesterday strong and terrible, it now stands in fatal impotence
before the foe. Its former traditional loyalty to the Motherland has
been replaced by a yearning for peace and rest. Instead of fortitude,
the baser instincts and a thirst for self-preservation are rampant.
"At home, where is that strong authority for which the whole country
is craving? Where is that powerful authority which would force every
citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland?
"We are told that it will soon appear, but as yet it does not exist.
"Where is the love of country, where is patriotism?
"The great word 'brotherhood' has been inscribed on our banners, but
it has not been inscribed in our hearts and minds. Class enmity rages
amongst us. Whole classes which have honestly fulfilled their duty to
their country have fallen under suspicion, and on this foundation a
deep gulf has been created between two parts of the Army--the officers
and the soldiers.
"And it is at this very moment that the first Congress of officers of
the Russian Army has been summoned. I am of the opinion that a more
convenient, a more timely moment, could not have been chosen to attain
unity in our family, to form a general united family of the corps of
Russian officers, to discuss the means of breathing ardour into our
hearts, _for without ardour there is no victory, without victory there
is no salvation, no Russia_.
"May your work therefore be inspired with love for your Motherland and
with heartfelt regard for the soldier; mark the ways for raising the
moral and intellectual calibre of the soldiers, so that they may become
your sincere and hearty comrades. Do away with that estrangement which
has been artificially sown in our family.
"At the present moment--this is a disease common to all--people would
like to set all the citizens of Russia on platforms or pedestals and
scrutinise how many stand behind each of them. What does it matter that
the masses of the Army accepted the new order and the new Constitution
sincerely, honestly and with enthusiasm?
"_We must all unite on one great object: Russia is in danger. As
members of the great Army, we must save her. Let this object unite us
and give us strength to work._"
This speech, in which the leader of the Army expressed "the anxiety of
his heart," served as the prologue to his retirement. The Revolutionary
Democracy had already passed its sentence on General Alexeiev at
its memorable session with the Commanders-in-Chief on May 4th; now,
after May 7th, a bitter campaign was begun against him in the Radical
Press, in which the Soviet semi-official organ _Isvestia_ competed
with Lenin's papers in the triviality and impropriety of its remarks.
This campaign was the more significant in that the Minister of War,
Kerensky, was clearly on the side of the Soviet in this matter.
As if to supplement the words of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I said
in my speech, when touching on the internal situation in the country:
"... Under pressure of the unavoidable laws of history, autocracy has
fallen, and our country has passed under the rule of the people. We
stand on the threshold of a new life, long and passionately awaited,
for which many thousand Idealists have gone to the block, languished in
the mines and pined in the _tundras_.
"But we look to the future with anxiety and perplexity.
"For there is no liberty in the Revolutionary torture-chamber.
"There is no righteousness in misrepresenting the voice of the people.
"There is no equality in the hounding down of classes.
"And there is no strength in that insane rout where all around seek to
grasp all that they possibly can, at the expense of their suffering
country, where thousands of greedy hands are stretched out towards
power, breaking down the foundations of that country...."
Then the sessions of the Congress began. Whoever was present has
carried away, probably for the rest of his life, an indelible
impression produced by the story of the sufferings of the officers.
It could never be written, as it was told with chilling restraint by
these, Captain Bouravin and Lieutenant Albov, who touched upon their
most intimate and painful experiences. They had suffered till they
could suffer no more; in their hearts there were neither tears nor
complaints.
I looked at the boxes, where the "younger comrades" sat who had been
sent to watch for "counter-Revolution." I wanted to read in their faces
the impression produced by all that they had heard. And it seemed to me
that I saw the blush of shame. Probably it only seemed so to me, for
they soon made a stormy protest, demanded the right of voting at the
Congress, and--five roubles per day "officer's allowance."
At thirteen general meetings the Congress passed a series of
resolutions.
Among all the classes, castes, professions and trades which exhibited a
general elemental desire to get from the weak Government all that was
possible, in their own private interests, the officers were the only
Corporation which never asked anything _for itself personally_.
The officers requested and demanded _authority_--over themselves and
over the Army. A firm, single, national authority--"commanding, not
appealing." The authority of a Government leaning on the trust of the
nation, not on irresponsible organisations. Such an authority the
officers were prepared wholeheartedly and unreservedly to obey, _quite
irrespective of differences of political opinions_. I affirm, moreover,
that all the inner social class conflict which was blazing up more and
more throughout the country did not affect the officers at the Front,
who were immersed in their work and in their sorrows; it did not touch
them deeply; the conflict attracted the attention of the officers
only when its results obviously endangered the very existence of the
country, and of the Army in particular. Of course, I am speaking of the
mass of the officers; individual leanings towards reaction undoubtedly
existed, but they were in no respect characteristic of the Officers'
Corps in 1917.
One of the finest representatives of the Officers' Class, General
Markov, a thoroughly educated man, wrote to Kerensky, condemning his
system of slighting the Command: "Being a soldier by nature, birth and
education, I can judge and speak only of my own military profession.
All other reforms and alterations in the constitution of our country
interest me only as an ordinary citizen. But I know the Army; I have
devoted to it the best days of my life; I have paid for its successes
with the blood of those who were near to me, and have myself come out
of action steeped in blood." This the Revolutionary Democracy had not
understood or taken into consideration.
The Officers' Congress in Petrograd, at which about 700 delegates
were gathered (May 18-26), passed off in a totally different manner.
It split into two sharply-divided camps: the Officers and officials
of the Rear who had given themselves to politics and a smaller number
of real officers of the Line who had become delegates through a
misunderstanding of the matter. The Executive Committee drew up their
programme in strict agreement with the custom of the Soviet Congresses:
(1) The attitude of the Congress towards the Provisional Government and
the Soviet; (2) the War; (3) the Constituent Assembly; (4) the labour
question; (5) the land question; and (6) the reorganisation of the
Army on Democratic principles. An exaggerated importance was attached
to the Congress in Petrograd, and at its opening pompous speeches were
made by many members of the Government and by foreign representatives;
the Congress was even greeted in the name of the Soviet by Nahamkes.
The very first day revealed the irreconcilable differences between the
two groups. These differences were inevitable, if only because, even
on such a cardinal question as "Order No. 1.," the Vice-Chairman of
the Congress, Captain Brzozek, expressed the view that "its issue was
dictated by historical necessity: the soldier was downtrodden, and it
was imperatively necessary to free him." This declaration was greeted
with prolonged applause by part of the delegates!
After a series of stormy meetings, a resolution was passed by a
majority of 265 against 246, which stated that "the Revolutionary power
of the country was in the hands of the organised peasants, workmen and
soldiers, who form the predominating mass of the population," and that
therefore the Government must be responsible to the All-Russia Soviet!
Even the resolution advocating an advance was passed by a majority of
little more than two-thirds of those who cast their votes.
The attitude of the Petrograd Congress is to be explained by the
declaration made on May 26th by that group, which, reflecting the
real opinion of the Front, took the point of view of "all possible
support to the Provisional Government." "In summoning the Congress the
Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Officers' Delegates
did not seek for the solution of the most essential problem of the
moment--the regeneration of the Army--since the question of the
fighting capacity of the Army and of the measures for raising its
level was not even mentioned in the programme, and was included only
at our request. If we are to believe the statement--strange, to say no
more--made by the Chairman, Lieutenant-Colonel Goushchin, the object of
the summoning of the Congress was the desire of the Executive Committee
to pass under our flag into the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Delegates." This declaration led to a series of serious incidents;
three-quarters of the delegates left the meeting and the Congress came
to an end.
I have mentioned the question of the Petrograd Officers' Council and
Congress only in order to show the spirit of a certain section of the
officers of the Rear, which was in frequent contact with the official
and unofficial rulers, and represented, in the eyes of the latter, the
"voice of the Army."
The Moghilev Congress, which attracted the unflagging attention of the
Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and was much favoured by him, closed on May
22nd. At this time General Alexeiev had already been relieved of the
command of the Russian Army. So deeply had this episode affected him
that he was unable to attend the last meeting. I bade farewell to the
Congress in the following words:
"The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who is leaving his post, has
commissioned me, gentlemen, to convey to you his sincere greetings, and
to say that his heart, that of an old soldier, beats in unison with
yours, that it aches with the same pain, and lives with the same hope
for the regeneration of the disrupted, but ever great, Russian Army.
"Let me add a few words from myself.
"You have gathered here from the distant blood-bespattered marches of
our land, and laid before us your quenchless sorrow and your soul-felt
grief.
"You have unrolled before us a vivid and painful picture of the life
and work of the officers amidst the raging sea of the Army.
"You, who have stood a countless number of times in the face of death!
You, who have intrepidly led your men against the dense rows of the
enemy's barbed wire, to the rare boom of your own guns, treacherously
deprived of ammunition! You, who, hardening your hearts, but keeping
up your spirits, have cast the last handful of earth into the grave of
your fallen son, brother, or friend!
"Will you quail now?
"No!
"You who are weak, raise your heads. You who are strong, give of your
determination, of your aspirations, of your desire to work for the
happiness of your Motherland--pour them into the thinned ranks of your
comrades at the Front. You are not alone. With you are all those who
are honourable, all who think, all who have paused at the brink of that
common sense which is now being abolished.
"The soldiers also will go with you, understanding clearly that you are
leading them, not backwards, to serfdom and to spiritual poverty, but
forwards, to freedom and to light.
"And then such a thunderstorm will break over the foe as will put an
end both to him and to the War.
"These three years of the War I have lived one life with you, thought
the same thoughts, shared with you the joy of victory and the burning
pain of retreat. I have therefore the right to fling into the faces of
those who have outraged our hearts, who from the very first days of the
Revolution have wrought the work of Cain on the corps of officers--I
have the right to fling in their faces the words: 'You lie! The Russian
officer has never been either a mercenary or a Pretorian.'
"Under the old régime you were victimised, down-trodden, and deprived
of all that makes life worth living. In no less a degree than
yourselves, leading a life of semi-beggary, our officers of the Line
have managed to carry through their wretched, laborious life like a
burning torch, the thirst for achievement for the happiness of his
Motherland.
"Then let my call be heard through these walls by the builders of the
new life of the State:
"Take care of the officer! For from the beginning and till now he has
stood, faithfully and without relief, on guard over the order of the
Russian State. He can be relieved by death alone."
Printed by the Committee, the text of my speech was circulated at the
Front, and I was happy to learn, from many letters and telegrams, that
the words spoken in defence of the officer had touched his aching heart.
The Congress left a permanent institution at the Stavka--the "Chief
Committee of the Officers' Union."[29] During the first three months of
its existence the Committee did not succeed in rooting itself deeply
in the Army. Its activities were confined to organising branches of the
Union in the Armies and in military circles, to the examination of the
complaints that reached it. In exceptional cases incompetent officers
were recommended for dismissal (the "black-board"); to a certain
very limited degree officers expelled by the soldiers were granted
assistance, and declarations were addressed to the Government and to
the Press in connection with the more important events in public and
military life. After the June advance the tone of these declarations
became acrimonious, critical, and defiant, which seriously disturbed
the Prime Minister, who persistently sought to have the Chief Committee
transferred from Moghilev to Moscow, as he considered that its attitude
was a danger to the Stavka.
The Committee, which was somewhat passive during the command of General
Brussilov, did, indeed, take part afterwards in General Kornilov's
venture. But it was not this circumstance that caused the change in its
attitude. _The Committee undoubtedly reflected the general spirit with
which the Command and the Russian officers were then imbued, a spirit
which had become hostile to the Provisional Government._ Also, no
clear idea had been formed among the officers of the political groups
within the Government of the covert struggle proceeding between them,
or of the protective part played by many representatives of the Liberal
Democracy among them. A hostile attitude was thus created towards the
Government as a whole.
Having remained hitherto perfectly loyal and in the majority of cases
well-disposed, having patiently borne, much against the grain, the
experiments which the Provisional Government made, deliberately or
involuntarily, on the country and on the Army, these elements lived
only in the hope of the regeneration of the Army, of an advance and of
victory. When all these hopes crashed to the ground, then, not being
united in their ideals with the second Coalitional Government, but,
on the contrary, deeply distrusting it, the masses of the officers
abandoned the Provisional Government, which thus lost its last reliable
support.
This moment is of great historical importance, giving the key to the
understanding of many later events. As a whole, deeply democratic
in their personnel, views and conditions of life, _rejected by the
Revolutionary Democracy_ with incredible harshness and cynicism,
and finding no real support in the liberal circles in close touch
with the Government, the Russian officers found themselves in a
state of tragic isolation. This isolation and bewilderment served
more than once afterwards as a fertile soil for outside influences,
foreign to the traditions of the officer caste and to its former
political character--influences which led to dissension, and in the
end to fratricide. For there can be no doubt that all the power, all
the organisation, both of the Red and of the White Armies, rested
exclusively on the personality of the former Russian officer.
And if afterwards, in the course of three years of conflict, we have
witnessed the rise of two conflicting forces in the Russian public life
of the anti-Bolshevist camp, we must seek for their original source not
in political differences only, but also in that work of Cain towards
the officers' caste, which was wrought by the Revolutionary Democracy
from the first days of the Revolution.
As everyone realised that the "new order" and the Front itself are
on the verge of collapse, it was obvious that officers should have
attempted some organisation to meet such a contingency. But the
advocates of action were lying in prison; the Chief Council of the
Officers' Union, which was best suited for this task, had been broken
up by Kerensky in the latter days of August. The majority of the
responsible leaders of the Army were perturbed by a terrible and not
unfounded fear for the fate of the Russian officers. In this respect
the correspondence between General Kornilov and General Doukhonin is
very characteristic. After the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ on November
1 (14), 1917, General Kornilov wrote to Doukhonin from his prison in
Bykhov:
"Foreseeing the further course of events, I think that it is necessary
for you to take such measures as would create a favourable atmosphere,
while thoroughly safeguarding Headquarters, for a struggle against the
coming Anarchy."
Among these measures General Kornilov suggested "the concentration in
Moghilev, or in a point near to it, under a reliable guard, of a store
of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns, automatic guns and hand-grenades
for distribution among the officer-volunteers, who will undoubtedly
gather together in this region."
Doukhonin made a note against this point: "This might lead to excesses."
Thus the constant morbid fears of an officers' "Counter-Revolution"
proved to be in vain. Events took the officers unawares. They were
unorganised, bewildered; they did not think of their own safety, and
finally scattered their forces.