THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--INTERNAL POLITICS,
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION--THE TOWN, THE VILLAGE AND THE AGRARIAN
PROBLEM.
I will deal in this and in the subsequent chapters with the internal
condition of Russia in the first period of the Revolution only in
so far as it affected the conduct of the World War. I have already
mentioned the duality of the Supreme Administration of the country and
the incessant pressure of the Soviet upon the Provisional Government. A
member of the Duma, Mr. Shulgin, wittily remarked: "The old régime is
interned in the fortress of Peter and Paul, and the new one is under
domiciliary arrest." The Provisional Government did not represent the
people as a whole; it could not and would not forestall the will of
the Constituent Assembly by introducing reforms which would shake the
political and social structure of the State to its very foundations.
It proclaimed that "not violence and compulsion, but the voluntary
obedience of free citizens to the power which they had themselves
created, constituted the foundation of the new administration of the
State. Not a single drop of blood has been shed by the Provisional
Government which has erected no barrier against the free expression
of public opinion...." This non-resistance to evil at the moment when
a fierce struggle, unfettered by moral or patriotic considerations,
was being conducted by some groups of the population for motives of
self-preservation and by others for the attainment by violence of
extreme demands, was undoubtedly a confession of impotence. In the
subsequent declarations of the second and third Coalition Governments
mention was made "of stringent measures" against the forces of
disorganisation in the country. These words, however, were never
translated into deeds.
The idea of not forestalling the will of the Constituent Assembly was
not carried out by the Government, especially in the domain of national
self-determination. The Government proclaimed the independence of
Poland, but made "the consent to such alterations of the territory of
the Russian State as may be necessary for the creation of independent
Poland" dependent upon the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. That
proclamation, the legal validity of which is contestable, was, however,
in full accord with the juridical standpoint of society. With regard to
Finland, the Government did not alter her legal status towards Russia,
but confirmed the rights and privileges of the country, cancelled all
the limitations of the Finnish Constitution and intended to convoke
the Finnish Chamber ("Seim") that was to confirm the new constitution
of the Principality. The Government subsequently adhered to their
intention to entertain favourably all the just demands of the Finns for
local reconstruction. Nevertheless, both the Provisional Government and
Finland were engaged in a protracted struggle for power on account of
the universal desire for the immediate satisfaction of the interests
of the separate nationalities. On July 6th the Finnish Assembly passed
a law (by the majority of Social-Democratic votes) proclaiming the
assumption by that body of supreme power after the abdication "of
the Finnish Grand-Duke" (the official title of the Russian Emperor).
Only foreign affairs, military legislation and administration were
left to the Provisional Government. This decision corresponded to a
certain degree with the resolution of the Congress of Soviets, which
demanded that full independence should be granted to Finland before
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, with the above-mentioned
restrictions. The Russian Government answered this declaration of
the actual independence of Finland by dissolving the Assembly, which
met, however, once again in September of its own free will. In this
struggle, the intensity of which varied according to the rise and fall
of the political barometer in Petrograd, the Finnish politicians,
disregarding the interests of the State and having no support
whatsoever in the Army, counted exclusively upon the loyalty or, to
be more correct, the weakness of the Provisional Government. Matters
never reached the stage of open rebellion. The conscious elements of
the population kept the country within the limits of reasonableness,
not out of loyalty, but perhaps because they feared the consequences
of civil war and especially of the sabotage in which the licentious
soldiers and sailors would have presumably indulged.
May and June were spent in a struggle for power between the Government
and the self-appointed Central Rada (Assembly). The All-Ukrainian
Military Congress, also convened arbitrarily on June 8th, demanded
that the Government should immediately comply with all the demands
of the Central Rada and the Congresses, and suggested that the Rada
should cease to address the Government, but should begin at once
to organise the autonomous administration of the Ukraine. On June
11th the autonomous Constitution of the Ukraine was adopted and a
Secretariat (Council of Ministers) formed under the chairmanship
of Mr. Vinnichenko. After the Government envoys--the Ministers
Kerensky, Tereschenko and Tzeretelli--had negotiated with the Rada, a
proclamation was issued on July 2nd, which forestalled the decision of
the Constituent Assembly and proclaimed the autonomy of the Ukraine
with certain restrictions. The Central Rada and the Secretariat were
gradually seizing the administration, creating a dual power on the spot
and discrediting the All-Russian Government. They thus provoked civil
strife and provided moral excuses for every endeavor to shirk civic
and military duties to the common Mother Country. The Central Rada,
moreover, contained from the outset sympathisers with Germany and was
undoubtedly connected through the "Union for the Liberation of the
Ukraine" with the headquarters of the Central Powers. Bearing in mind
the ample material collected by the Stavka, Vinnichenko's half-hearted
confession to a French correspondent (?) with regard to Germanophil
tendencies in the Rada, and finally the report of the Procurator of the
Kiev Court of Appeal at the end of August, 1917, I cannot doubt that
the Rada played a criminal part. The Procurator complained that the
complete destruction of the machinery of intelligence and of criminal
investigation deprived the Government prosecutors of the possibility
of investigating the situation; he said that not only German espionage
and propaganda, but the mutinies of the Ukrainian troops, as well as
the destination of obscure funds of undoubted Austro-German origin ...
could be traced to the Rada.
* * * * *
The Ministry of the Interior, which, in the old days, practically
controlled the Autocracy and provoked universal hatred, now went to the
other extreme. It all but abolished itself, and the functions of that
branch of the administration were divided among local, self-appointed
organisations. The history of the organs of the Ministry of the
Interior is, in many ways, similar to the fate of the Supreme Command.
On March 5th the Minister-President issued an order for the suppression
of the offices of Governor and of Inspector of Police ("Ispravnik"),
which were to be replaced by the presidents of the Provincial and
District self-governing Councils ("Oupravas"), and for the police
to be replaced by a militia organised by Social Institutions. This
measure, adopted owing to the universal dislike for the agents of
the old régime, was, in fact, the only actual manifestation of the
Government's will; because the status of the Commissars was not
established by law until the month of September. The instructions and
orders of the Government were, on the whole, of an academic nature,
because life followed its own course, and was regulated, or, to be more
correct, muddled up, by local revolutionary changes of the law. The
office of Government Commissars became a sinecure from the very outset.
They had no power or authority, and became entirely dependent upon
revolutionary organisations. When the latter passed a vote of censure
upon the activities of a Commissar, he could practically do nothing
more. The organisations elected a new one, and his confirmation in
office by the Provisional Government was a mere formality. In the first
six weeks seventeen Provincial Commissars and a great many District
Commissars were thus removed. Later, in July, Tzeretelli, during his
tenure of the office of Minister of the Interior, which lasted for a
fortnight, gave official sanction to this procedure and sent a circular
to the Local Soviets and Committees, inviting them to send in to him
the names of desirable candidates, which were to replace the unsuitable
ones. Thus there remained no representatives of the Central power on
the spot. In the beginning of the Revolution the so-called "Social
Committees" or "Soviets of Social Organisation" really represented
a social Institution comprising the union of towns and _Zemstvos_,
of Municipal Dumas, professional Unions, Co-operatives, Magistrates,
etc. Things went from bad to worse when these Social Committees were
dissolved into class and party organisations. Local power passed into
the hands of the Soviets of Workmen and Soldiers and in places before
the law had been produced to "democratised" Socialistic Dumas, closely
reminiscent of semi-Bolshevik Soviets.
The regulations issued by the Government on April 15th, on the
organisation of Municipal Self-Government, comprised the following main
points:
(1) All citizens of both sexes, having attained the age of twenty,
were given the suffrage in the town.
(2) No domiciliary qualification was established.
(3) A proportional system of elections was introduced.
(4) The Military were given the suffrage in the localities in which
the respective garrisons were quartered.
I will not examine in detail these regulations, which are probably the
most Democratic ever known in Municipal Law, because the experience
gained in their application was too short to afford any ground for
discussion. I will only note one phenomenon which accompanied the
introduction of these regulations in the autumn of 1917. The free vote
in many places became a mockery. Throughout the length and breadth of
Russia, all the non-Socialist and politically neutral parties were
under suspicion and were subjected to persecution. They were not
allowed to conduct propaganda, and their meetings were dispersed.
Electioneering was characterised by blatant abuses. Occasionally
election agents were subjected to violence and lists of candidates
destroyed. At the same time the licentious and demoralised soldiery
of many garrisons--chance guests in the town in which, as often as
not, they had only appeared a day or two before--rushed to the polls
and presented lists drawn up by the extreme Anti-National parties.
There were cases when military units, arriving after the elections,
demanded a re-election and accompanied this demand by threats and
sometimes murders. There can be no doubt that, among the circumstances
that affected the August elections in Petrograd to the Municipal Duma,
to which sixty-seven Bolsheviks out of two hundred were elected, the
presence in the Capital of numerous demoralised garrisons was not the
least important. The authorities were silent because they were absent.
The _Petite Bourgeoisie_, the intellectual workers, in a word, the Town
Democracy in the widest sense, was the weakest party and was always
defeated in that Revolutionary struggle. The mutinies, rebellions,
and separations of various Republics--the precursors of the bloody
Soviet Régime--had the most painful effect on the life of that portion
of the community. The "self-determination" of the soldiers caused
uneasiness and even fear of unrestricted violence. Even travelling
was unsafe and difficult, because the railways fell into the hands of
deserters. The "self-determination" of the workmen resulted in the
impossibility of obtaining supplies of the most necessary commodities,
owing to a tremendous rise in prices. The "self-determination" of the
villages produced a stoppage of supplies, and the villages were thus
left to starve; not to mention the moral ordeal of the class which was
subjected to insults and degradation. The Revolution had raised hopes
for the betterment of the conditions of life for everyone except the
_Bourgeois_ Democracy, because even the moral conquests proclaimed
by the new Revolutionary power--liberty of speech, of the Press and
of meetings, etc.--soon belonged exclusively to the Revolutionary
Democracy. The upper _Bourgeoisie_ (intellectually superior) was
organised to a certain extent by means of the Constitutional Democratic
Party, but the _Petite Bourgeoisie_ (the _Bourgeois_ Democracy) had
no organisation whatsoever and no means for an organised struggle.
The Democratic Municipalities were losing their true Democratic
aspect--not as a result of the new Municipal law, but of Revolutionary
practice--and became mere class organs of the Proletariat, or the
representatives of purely Socialistic parties, completely out of touch
with the people.
Self-government in the districts and in the villages in the first
period of the Revolution was of more or less the same nature. Towards
the autumn there should have been a Democratic system of _Zemstvo_
Administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities.
The District (Volost) _Zemstvo_ was to undertake the administration
of local agriculture, education, order and safety. As a matter
of fact, the villages were administered--if such a word can be
applied to Anarchy--by a complex agglomeration of revolutionary
organisations, such as peasant Congresses, Supply and Land Committees,
Popular Soviets, Village Councils, etc. Very often another peculiar
organisation--that of the deserters--dominated them all. At any rate,
the All-Russian Union of Peasants agreed with the following declaration
made by the left wing: "All our work for the organisation of various
Committees will be of no avail if these Social Organisations are to
remain under the constant threat of being terrorised by accidental
armed bands."
The only question that deeply perturbed the minds of the peasantry
and overshadowed all other events, was the old, painful, traditional
question:
THE QUESTION OF THE LAND.
It was an exceptionally complex and tangled question. It arose more
than once in the shape of fruitless mutinies, which were ruthlessly
suppressed. The wave of agrarian troubles which swept over Russia in
the years of the First Revolution (1905-6) and left a trail of fire
and ruined estates was an indication of the consequences that were
bound to follow the Revolution of 1917. It is difficult to form an
exhaustive idea of the motives which prompted the land-owners to defend
their rights so stubbornly and so energetically: was it atavism, a
natural yearning for the land, statesmanlike considerations as to the
desirability of increasing the productivity of the land by introducing
higher methods of agriculture, a desire to maintain a direct influence
over the people, or was it merely selfishness?... One thing is
certain--the agrarian reforms were overdue. Retribution could not fail
to overtake the Government and the Ruling Classes for the long years of
poverty, oppression, and, what is most important, the incredible moral
and intellectual darkness in which the peasant masses were kept, their
education being entirely neglected.
The peasants demanded that all land should be surrendered to them, and
would not wait for the decision of the Central Land Committee or of the
Constituent Assembly. This impatience was undoubtedly due, to a great
extent, to the weakness of the Government and to outside influences,
which will be described later. There was no divergence of opinion as
to the fundamental idea of the reforms. The Liberal Democracy and
the _Bourgeoisie_, the Revolutionary Democracy and the Provisional
Government, all spoke quite definitely about "handing the land over to
the workers." With the same unanimity these elements favoured the idea
of leaving the final decision on the reform of the land and legislation
on the subject to the Constituent Assembly. This irreconcilable
divergence of opinion arose by reason of the very essence of land
reform. Liberal circles in Russia stood for the private ownership of
the land--an idea which found increasing favour with the peasants--and
demanded that the peasants should receive allotments rather than that
the land should be entirely redistributed. On the other hand, the
Revolutionary Democracy advocated, at all meetings of every party,
class and profession, the adoption of the Resolution of the All-Russian
Congress of Peasants, which was passed on May 25th, with the approval
of the Minister Tchernov on "the transfer of all lands ... _to the
people as a whole, as their patrimony, on the basis of equal possession
without any payment_." The peasants did not or would not understand
this Social Revolutionary Resolution, which caused dissensions. The
peasants were private owners by nature and could not understand the
principle of nationalisation. The principle of equal possession meant
that many millions of peasants, whose allotments were larger than the
normal, would lose their surplus allotments, and the whole question
of the redistribution of the land would lead to endless civil war;
because there were innumerable peasants who had no land at all, and
only 45,000,000 dessiatines of arable land which did not belong to the
peasants to divide among 20,000,000 peasant households.
The Provisional Government did not consider itself entitled to solve
the land problem. Under the pressure of the masses, it transferred
its rights partly to the Ministry of Agriculture, partly to the
Central Land Committee, which was organised on the basis of broad,
democratic representation. The latter was entrusted with the task of
collecting data and of drawing up a scheme of land reform, as well
as of regulating the existing conditions with regard to the land. In
practice, the use of the land transfer, rent, employment of labour,
etc., were dealt with by the Local Land Committees. These bodies
contained illiterate elements--the intellectuals as a rule were
excluded--which had selfish motives and had no perception either of the
extent or of the limits of their powers. The Central Representative
Institutions and the Ministry of Agriculture, under Tchernov, issued
appeals against arbitrariness and for the preservation of the land,
pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly. At the same time
they overtly encouraged "temporary possession of the land," as seizure
of the land was then described, on the excuse that the Government
were obliged to sell as much land as possible. The propaganda that
was conducted on a large scale in the villages by irresponsible
representatives of Socialist and Anarchist circles completed Tchernov's
work.
The results of this policy were soon apparent. In one of his circulars
to Provincial Commissars, the Minister of the Interior, Tzeretelli,
admitted that complete anarchy reigned in the villages: "Land is being
seized and sold, agricultural labourers are forced to stop working, and
landowners are faced with demands which are economically impossible.
Breeding stock is being destroyed and implements plundered. Model farms
are being ruined. Forests are being cut down irrespective of ownership,
timber and logs are being stolen, and their shipment prevented. No
sowing is done on privately-owned farms, and harvests of grain and hay
are not reaped." The Minister accused the Local Committees and the
Peasant Congresses of organising arbitrary seizures of the land, and
came to the conclusion that the existing conditions of agriculture and
forestry "would inevitably bring about endless calamities for the Army
and the country, and threatened the very existence of the State." If
we recall the fires, the murders, the lynchings, the destruction of
estates, which were often filled with treasures of great historical
and artistic value, we shall have a true picture of the life of the
villages in those days.
The question of the ownership of the land by the landlords was thus
not merely a matter of selfish class interest, all the more as, not
only the landlords but the wealthy peasants were subjected to violence
by order of the Committees, and in spite of them. One village rose
against another. It was not a question of the transfer of riches
from one class or individual to another, but of the destruction of
treasures, of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the State.
The instincts of proprietorship inherent in the peasantry irresistibly
grew as these seizures and partitions took place. The mental attitude
of the peasantry upset all the plans of the Revolutionary Democracy.
By converting the peasants into a _Petite Bourgeoisie_, it threatened
to postpone to an indefinite date the triumph of Socialism. The
villagers were obsessed by the idea of land distribution and by
their own interests, and were not in the least concerned with the
War, with politics, or with social questions which did not directly
affect them. The workers of the village were being killed and maimed
at the front, and the village, therefore, considered the War as a
burden. The authorities disallowed seizures of the land and imposed
restrictions in the shape of monopolies and fixed prices for corn. The
peasantry, therefore, bore a grudge against the Government. The towns
ceased to supply manufactured goods and the villages were estranged
from the towns and ceased to supply them with grain. This was the only
real "conquest" made by the Revolution, and those who profited by it
grew very anxious as to the attitude of future Governments towards
the arbitrary solution of the land question. They therefore actively
encouraged anarchy in the villages, condoned seizures and undermined
the authority of the Provisional Government. By this means they hoped
to bring the peasants over to their side as supporters, or, at least,
as a neutral element, in the impending decisive struggle for power.
* * * * *
The abolition of the police by the order issued on April 17th was one
of the acts of the Government which seriously complicated the normal
course of life. In reality, this act only confirmed the conditions
which had arisen almost everywhere in the first days of the Revolution,
and were directly due to the wrath of the people against the Executive
of the old regime, and especially of those who had been oppressed and
persecuted by the police and had suddenly found themselves on the crest
of the wave. It would be a hopeless task to defend the Russian police
as an institution. It could only be considered good by comparing it
with the militia and with the Extraordinary Bolshevik Commission....
In any case it would have been useless to resist the abolition of the
police, because it was a psychological necessity. There can be no
doubt that the attitude and actions of the old police were due less to
their political opinions than to the instructions of their employers
and to their own personal interests. No wonder, therefore, that the
gendarmes and the policemen, insulted and persecuted, introduced a
very bad element into the Army, into which they were subsequently
forcibly drafted. The Revolutionary Democracy, in self defence, grossly
exaggerated their counter-revolutionary activities in the Army;
nevertheless, it is absolutely true that a great many ex-officers of
the police and of the gendarmerie, partly, perhaps, from motives of
self-defence, chose for themselves a most lucrative profession--that
of the demagogue and the agitator. The fact is that the abolition of
the police in the very midst of the turmoil--when crime was on the
increase and the guarantees of public safety and of the safety of
individual property were weakened--was a real calamity. The militia,
indeed, far from being a substitute for the police, was a caricature
of them. In Western countries the police is placed as a united force
under the orders of a Department of the Central Government. The
Provisional Government placed the militia under the orders of _Zemstvo_
and Municipal Administrations. The Government Commissars were only
entitled to make use of the militia for certain definite purposes. The
cadres of the militia were filled by untrained men, devoid of technical
experience, and, as often as not, criminals. By virtue of the new
law, there were admitted to the militia persons under arrest or who
had served a term of imprisonment for comparatively grave offences.
The system of recruiting practised by some forcibly "democratised"
_Zemstvo_ and Municipal institutions tended quite as much as the new
law towards the deterioration of the personnel of the militia.
The Chief of the Central Administration of the Militia himself admitted
that escaped convicts were sometimes placed in command of the militia.
The villages were sometimes without any militia at all, and they
administered themselves as best they could.
In its proclamation of April 25th the Provisional Government gave
an accurate description of the condition of the country in stating
that "the growth of new social ties was slower than the process of
disruption caused by the collapse of the old régime." In every feature
of the life of the people this fact was clearly to be observed.