THE BOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE FOR POWER--THE POWER OF THE ARMY AND THE
IDEA OF A DICTATORSHIP.
In the first period--from the beginning of the Revolution until the
_coup d'état_ of November--the Bolsheviks were engaged in struggling
to seize power by destroying the Bourgeois régime and disorganising
the Army, thus paving the way for the _avénement_ of Bolshevism, as
Trotsky solemnly expressed it. On the day after his arrival in Russia
Lenin published his programme, of which I will here mention the salient
points:
(1) The War waged by the "Capitalist Government" is an
Imperialistic, plundering War. No concessions, therefore, should
be made to Revolutionary "Defensism." The representatives of that
doctrine and the Army in the field should be made clearly to
understand that the War cannot end in a truly Democratic peace,
without coercion, _unless_ Capitalism is destroyed.
The troops must fraternize with the enemy.
(2) The first stage of the Revolution by which the Bourgeoisie came
into power must be followed by the second stage in which power must
pass into the hands of the Proletariat and of the poorest peasants.
(3) No support should be given to the Provisional Government, and
the fallacy of its promises should be exposed.
(4) The fact must be acknowledged that, in the majority of the
Soviets, the Bolshevik party is in a minority. The policy must
therefore be continued of criticising and exposing mistakes, while
at the same time advocating the necessity for the transfer of
Supreme Power to the Soviet.
(5) Russia is not a Parliamentary Republic--that would have been
a step backwards--but a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen's and
Peasants' Deputies.
The police (Militia?), the Army, and the Civil Service must be
abolished.
(6) With regard to the agrarian question, the Soviets of
farm-labourers' deputies must come to the fore. All landowners'
estates must be confiscated, and all land in Russia nationalised
and placed at the disposal of Local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.
The latter to be elected among the poorest peasants.
(7) All the banks in the country must be united in one National
Bank, controlled by the Soviet.
(8) Socialism must not be introduced now, but a step must be taken
towards the ultimate control by the Soviet of all industries and of
the distribution of materials.
(9) The State shall become a Commune, and the Socialist Democratic
Bolshevik Party shall henceforward be called "The Communist Party."
I shall not dwell upon this programme, which was put into practice,
with certain reservations, in November, 1917. During the first period
the activities of the Bolsheviks, which are of great importance, were
based upon the following three principles:
(1) The overthrow of the Government and the demoralisation of the
Army.
(2) The promotion of class war in the country and discontent in the
villages.
(3) The seizure of power by the minority, which, according to
Lenin, was to be "well-organised, armed and centralised," _i.e._,
the Bolshevik party. (This was, of course, a negation of Democratic
forms of Government.)
The ideas and aims of the party were, of course, beyond the
understanding not only of the ignorant Russian peasantry, but even of
the Bolshevik underlings scattered throughout the land. The masses
wanted simple and clear watchwords to be immediately put into practice,
which would satisfy their wishes and demands arising from the turmoil
of the Revolution. That "simplified" Bolshevism inherent in all
popular movements against the established power in Russia was all the
easier to institute in that it had freed itself from all restraining
moral influences and was aiming primarily at destruction pure and
simple, ignoring the consequences of military defeat and of the ruin
of the country. The Provisional Government was the first target. In
the Bolshevik Press, at public meetings, in all the activities of
the Soviets and Congresses, and even in their conversations with
the members of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevik leaders
stubbornly and arrogantly advocated its removal, describing it as
an instrument of counter-Revolution and of International reaction.
The Bolsheviks, however, refrained from decisive action, as they
feared the political backwardness of the country as a whole. They
began what soldiers call "a reconnaissance," and carried it out with
great intensity. They seized several private houses in Petrograd, and
organised a demonstration on the 20th and 21st of April. That was the
first "review" of the proletariat, at which an estimate was made of
the Bolshevik forces. The excuse for this demonstration, in which the
workmen and the troops participated, was given by Miliukov's Note on
International Policy. I say _excuse_ because the real reason lay in
the fundamental divergence of opinion mentioned above. Everything else
was only a pretext. As a result of the demonstration there were great
disturbances and armed conflicts in the capital, and many casualties.
The crowds carried placards bearing the inscriptions: "Down with
the Miliukov Policy of Conquests," and "Down with the Provisional
Government."
The review was a failure. In the course of the debate in the Soviet on
this occasion, the Bolsheviks demanded that the Government be deposed,
but there was a note of hesitation in their speeches: "The proletariat
should first discuss the existing conditions and form an estimate of
its strength." The Soviet passed a resolution condemning both the
Government's policy of conquest and the Bolshevik demonstration,
while at the same time "congratulating the Revolutionary Democracy
of Petrograd, which had proved its intense interest in international
politics by meetings, resolutions and demonstrations."
Lenin was planning another armed demonstration on a large scale on June
10th during the Congress of the Soviets; but it was countermanded, as
the great majority of the Congress was opposed to it. The demonstration
was likewise intended as a means of seizing power. This internal
struggle between the two wings of the Revolutionary Democracy, which
were bitterly antagonistic to one another, is extremely interesting.
The Left wing made every endeavour to induce the "Defensist" block,
which was preponderant, to break with the Bourgeoisie and to assume
power. The block was also resolutely opposed to such a course.
Within the Soviets new combinations were coming into being. On certain
questions the Social Revolutionaries of the Left and the Social
Democrats--Internationalists--were leaning towards the Bolsheviks.
Nevertheless, until September the Bolsheviks were not in a majority
in the Petrograd Soviet or in many provincial Soviets. It was only on
September 25th that Bronstein Trotsky succeeded Tchkeidze as Chairman
of the Petrograd Soviet. The motto, "All Power to the Soviets,"
sounded from their lips like self-sacrifice or provocation. Trotsky
explained this contradiction by saying that, owing to constant
re-elections, the Soviets reflected the true (?) spirit of the masses
of workmen and soldiers, who were leaning to the Left, whereas, after
the break with the Bourgeoisie, extremist tendencies were bound to
prevail in the Soviets. As the true aspect of Bolshevism gradually
revealed itself these dissensions deepened, and were not limited to
the Social Democratic programme or to party tactics. It was a struggle
between Democracy and the Proletariat, between the majority and a
minority, which was intellectually backward, but strong in its mutinous
daring and headed by strong and unprincipled men. It was a struggle
between the democratic principles of Universal Suffrage, political
liberties, equality, etc., and the dictatorship of a privileged class,
madness, and imminent slavery. On the 2nd July there was a second
Ministerial crisis, for which the outward cause was the disapproval
of the Liberal Ministers of the Act of Ukrainian Autonomy. On July
3rd-5th the Bolsheviks made another riot in the Capital, in which
workmen, soldiers and sailors participated. It was done this time on
a large scale, and was accompanied by plunder and murder. There were
many victims, and the Government was in great difficulty. Kerensky
was at that time visiting us on the Western Front. His conversations
with Petrograd over the direct wire indicated that Prince Lvov and
the Government were deeply depressed. Prince Lvov summoned Kerensky
to return to Petrograd at once, but warned him that he could not
be responsible for his safety. The rebels demanded that the Soviet
and the Central Executive Committee of the Congress should assume
power. These wings of the Revolutionary Democracy returned another
categorical refusal. The movement found no support in the provinces,
and the mutiny was quelled chiefly by the Vladimir military school and
the Cossack regiments. Several companies of the Petrograd garrison
likewise remained loyal. Bronstein Trotsky wrote that the movement was
premature because there were too many passive and irresolute elements
in the garrison; but that it had nevertheless been proved that, "except
the cadets, no one wanted to fight against the Bolsheviks _for the
Government and for the leading parties in the Soviet_."
The tragedy of the Government headed by Kerensky, and of the Soviet,
lay in the fact that the masses would not follow abstract watchwords.
They proved equally indifferent to the country and to the Revolution,
as well as to the International, and had no intention of shedding their
blood and sacrificing their lives for any of these ideas. The crowd
followed those who gave practical promises and flattered its instincts.
* * * * *
When we speak of "power," with reference to the first period of the
Russian Revolution, we actually mean only its outward forms; for under
the exceptional conditions imposed by a World War on a scale unequalled
in history, when 20 per cent. of the entire male population was under
arms, the power was really concentrated in the hands of the Army. That
Army had been led astray, had been demoralised by false doctrines, had
lost all sense of duty, and all fear of authority. Last, but not least,
it had no leader. The Government, Kerensky, the Commanding Corps, the
Soviet, Regimental Committees--for many reasons none of these could
claim that title. The dissensions between all these contending forces
were reflected in the minds of the men, and hastened the ruin of the
Army. It is useless to make any surmises which cannot be proved by
realities, especially in the absence of historical perspective; but
there can be no doubt the question, whether or not it would have been
possible to erect a dam which would have stemmed the tide and preserved
discipline in the Army, will continue to arouse attention. Personally,
I believe that it was possible. At first the Supreme Command might have
done it, as well as the Government, had it shown sufficient resolve to
squash the Soviets or sufficient strength and wisdom to draw them into
the orbit of statesmanship and of truly democratic constructive work.
There can be no doubt that, in the beginning of the Revolution, the
Government was recognised by all the sane elements of the population.
The High Command, the officers, many regiments, the Bourgeoisie, and
those Democratic elements which had not been led astray by militant
Socialism adhered to the Government. The Press in those days was full
of telegrams, addresses and appeals from all parts of Russia, from
various Social, Military and class organisations and institutions whose
democratic attitude was undoubted.
As the Government weakened and was driven into two successive
coalitions, that confidence correspondingly decreased and could not
find compensation in fuller recognition by the Revolutionary Democracy;
because anarchist tendencies, repudiating all authority, were gaining
ground within these circles. In the beginning of May, after the armed
rising in the streets of Petrograd, which took place without the
knowledge of the Soviet, but with the participation of its members;
after the resignation of Miliukov and Gutchkov, the complete impotence
of the Provisional Government became so clearly apparent that Prince
Lvov appealed to the Soviet, with the consent of the Duma Committee and
of the Constitutional Democratic Party. He invited "the active creative
forces of the country to participate directly in the government which
had hitherto refrained from any such participation."
After some hesitation, the Soviet deemed it necessary to accept the
offer, thereby assuming direct responsibility for the fate of the
revolution. (Four members of the Soviet accepted Ministerial posts.)
The Soviet declined to assume full power "because the transfer of
power to the Soviets in that period of the revolution would have
weakened it and would have prematurely estranged the elements capable
of serving it, which would constitute a menace to the revolution." The
impression produced by such declarations upon the Bourgeoisie and upon
the "hostages" in the Coalition Government can be imagined. Although
the Soviet expressed full confidence in the Government and appealed
to the democracy to grant it full support, which would guarantee the
authority of the Government, that Government was already irretrievably
discredited. The Socialist circles which had sent their representatives
to join it neither altered nor strengthened its intellectual level. On
the contrary, it was weakened, inasmuch as the gulf was widened which
separated the two political groups represented in the Government.
While officially expressing confidence in the Government, the Soviet
continued to undermine its power and became somewhat lukewarm towards
the Socialist Ministers, who had been compelled by circumstances to
deviate, to a certain extent, from the programme of the Socialist
party. The people and the Army did not pay much attention to these
events, as they were beginning to forget that there was any power at
all, owing to the fact that the existence of that power had no bearing
upon their everyday life.
The blood shed during the Petrograd rising organised by the
anarchist-Bolshevik section of the Soviet on July 4th-5th, Prince
Lvov's resignation, and the formation of a new coalition in which the
Socialists, nominated by the Soviet, definitely predominated were
but stepping stones towards the complete collapse of the power of
the State. As I have already said, the first Government crisis was
occasioned by events which, however important politically, were only
"excuses." In the new Coalition the Democratic Bourgeoisie played but
a secondary part, and its "temporary" assistance was only required in
order that responsibility might be shared; while everything was decided
behind the curtain, in the circles closely connected with the Soviet.
Such a coalition could have no vitality and could not reconcile even
the opportunist elements of the Bourgeoisie with the Revolutionary
Democracy. Apart from political and social considerations, the relative
strength of the forces which were brought into play was influenced
by the growing discontent of the masses with the activities of the
Government owing to the general condition of the country. The masses
accepted the revolution not as an arduous, transitory period, linked
up with the past and present political development of Russia and of
the world, but as an independent reality of the day, carrying in its
trail real calamities such as the War, banditism, lawlessness, stoppage
of industry, cold and hunger. The masses were unable to grasp the
situation in its complex entirety and could not differentiate between
elemental, inevitable phenomena inherent in all revolutions and the
will for good or evil of departments of the Government, institutions
or individuals. They felt that the situation was intolerable and tried
to find a remedy. As a result of the universal recognition of the
impotence of the existing power, a new idea began to occupy the minds
of the people:
A DICTATORSHIP.
I emphatically declare that in the social and military circles with
which I was in touch the tendency towards a dictatorship was prompted
by a patriotic and clear consciousness of the abyss into which the
Russian people was rapidly sinking. _It was not in the slightest
degree inspired by any reactionary or counter-revolutionary motives._
There can be no doubt that the movement found adherents among the
reactionaries and among mere opportunists; but both these elements
were accessory and insignificant. Kerensky thus interpreted the rise
of the movement which he described as "the tide of conspiracy": "The
Tarnopol defeat created a movement in favour of conspiracies, while the
Bolshevik rising of July demonstrated to the uninitiated the _depth of
the disruption of Democracy, the impotence of the revolution_ against
anarchy, as well as the strength of the organised minority which acted
spontaneously." It would be difficult to find a better excuse for the
movement. In the atmosphere of popular discontent, universal disorder
and approaching anarchy, endeavours at creating a dictatorship were the
natural outcome of the existing conditions. These endeavours had their
origin in a search for a _strong national and democratic power, but not
a reactionary one_.
On the whole the Revolutionary Democracy lived in an atmosphere
poisoned by the fear of a counter-revolution. All its cares, measures,
resolutions and appeals, as well as the disruption of the Army and the
abolition of the police in the villages, tended towards a struggle with
this imaginary foe, which was supposed to menace the conquests of the
revolution. Were the conscious leaders of the Soviet really convinced
that such a danger existed, or were they fanning this unfounded fear
as a tactical move? I am inclined to accept the second solution,
because it was quite obvious, not only to myself, but to the Soviet
as well, that the activities of the Democratic Bourgeoisie meant not
counter-revolution, but merely opposition. And yet in the Russian
partisan press and in wide circles outside Russia it is precisely
in the former sense that the pre-November period of the Revolution
was interpreted. The Provisional Government proclaimed a broad,
Democratic programme upon its formation. In the circles of the Right
this programme was criticised and there was discontent; but no active
opposition. In the first four or five months after the beginning of
the Revolution there was not a single important counter-revolutionary
organisation in the country. These organisations became more or less
active and other secret circles, especially officers' circles, were
formed in July in connection with the plans for a Dictatorship. There
can be no doubt that many people with pronounced tendencies towards a
restoration joined these circles. But their main object was to combat
the unofficial government, which was a class government, as well as
the personnel of the Soviet and the Executive Committee. Had these
circles not collapsed prematurely owing to their weakness, numerical
insignificance and lack of organisation, some of the members of
those institutions might very possibly have been destroyed. While
constantly resisting counter-revolution from the Right, the Soviet gave
every opportunity for the preparations for a real counter-revolution
emanating from its own midst, from the Bolsheviks.
I remember that different persons who came to the Stavka began to
discuss the question of a dictatorship and to throw out feelers, as it
were, approximately in the beginning of June. All these conversations
were stereotyped to such an extent that I have no difficulty in
summarising them.
"Russia is moving towards inevitable ruin. The Government is utterly
powerless. We must have a strong power. Sooner or later we shall have
to come to a Dictatorship."
Nobody mentioned restoration or a change of policy in a reactionary
direction. The names were mentioned of Kornilov and Brussilov. I
warned them against hasty decisions. I must confess that we still
entertained the illusory hope that the Government--by internal
evolution, under the influence of a new, armed demonstration on the
part of the anti-National extremist elements towards which they were so
lenient--would realise the futility and hopelessness of continuing in
their present position and would come to the idea of power vested in
one man, which might be achieved in a constitutional manner. The future
seemed pregnant with disaster in the absence of a truly lawful power.
I pointed out that there were no military leaders enjoying sufficient
authority with the demoralised soldiery, but that if a military
dictatorship should become necessary for the State and practicable,
Kornilov was already very much respected by the officers, whereas
Brussilov's reputation had been injured by his opportunism.
In his book Kerensky says that "Cossack circles and certain politicians"
had suggested repeatedly to him that the impotent Government should
be replaced by a personal dictatorship. It was only when society was
disappointed in him as the "possible organiser and chief agent for
altering the system of Government" that "a search began for another
individual."
There can be no doubt that the men and social circles that appealed to
Kerensky in the question of a dictatorship were not his apologists and
did not belong to the "Revolutionary Democracy," but the mere fact of
their appeal is sufficient proof that their motives could not have been
reactionary, and that it reflected the sincere desire of the Russian
patriotic elements to see a strong man at the helm in days of storm and
strife.
Perhaps there may also have been another motive; there had been a short
period, approximately in June, when not only the Russian public, but
also the officers had succumbed to the charm of the War Minister's
impassioned oratory and pathos. The Russian officers, who were being
sacrificed wholesale, had forgotten and forgiven and were desperately
hoping that he would save the Russian Army. And their promise to die in
the front line was by no means an empty one. During Kerensky's visits
to the front, it was a painful sight to see these doomed men, their
eyes shining with exaltation, and their hearts beating with hope, a
hope that was destined to be so bitterly and mercilessly disappointed.
It is to be noted that Kerensky, seeking in his book to justify the
temporary "concentration of power" which he assumed on August 27th,
says: "In the struggle against the conspiracy conducted by a single
will, the State was compelled to set against it a will capable of
resolute and quick action. No collective power, much less a Coalition,
can possess such a single will."
I think that the internal condition of the Russian State threatened
with a monstrous joint conspiracy of the German General Staff and
the anti-national and anti-constitutional elements of the Russian
exiles was sufficiently grave to warrant the demand for a strong power
"capable of resolute and quick action."