THAT A PHILOSOPHER OUGHT CHIEFLY TO CONVERSE WITH GREAT MEN.[200]

1. The resolution which you have taken to enter into the friendship

and familiarity of Sorcanus, that by the frequent opportunities of

conversing with him you may cultivate and improve a soil which gives

such early promises of a plentiful harvest, is an undertaking which

will not only oblige his relations and friends, but redound very much

to the advantage of the public; and (notwithstanding the peevish

censures of some morose or ignorant people) it is so far from being an

argument of an aspiring and vain-glorious temper, that it shows you to

be a lover of virtue and good manners, and a zealous promoter of the

common interest of mankind.

They themselves are rather to be accused of an indirect but more

vehement sort of ambition, who would not upon any terms be found in the

company or so much as be seen to give a civil salute to a person of

quality. For how unreasonable would it be to enforce a well-disposed

young gentleman, and one who needs the direction of a wise governor,

to such complaints as these: “Would that I might change myself from

a Pericles or a Cato to a cobbler like Simon or a grammarian like

Dionysius, that I might like them have the conversation of such a man

as Socrates, enjoy his company, and hear his instructive lessons of

morality.”

So far, I am sure, was Aristo of Chios from being of their humor, that

when he was censured for exposing and prostituting the dignity of

philosophy by his freedom to all comers, he answered, that he could

wish that Nature had given understanding to wild beasts, that they

too might be capable of being his hearers. Shall we then deny that

privilege to men of interest and power, which this good man would have

communicated (if it had been possible) to the brute beasts? But these

men have taken a false notion of philosophy, they make it much like the

art of statuary, whose business it is to carve out a lifeless image in

the most exact figure and proportions, and then to raise it upon its

pedestal, where it is to continue for ever. The true philosophy is of a

quite different nature; it is a spring and principle of motion wherever

it comes; it makes men active and industrious, it sets every wheel and

faculty a going, it stores our minds with axioms and rules by which to

make a sound judgment, it determines the will to the choice of what

is honorable and just; and it wings all our faculties to the swiftest

prosecution of it. It is accompanied with an elevation and nobleness

of mind, joined with a coolness and sweetness of behavior, and backed

with a becoming assurance and inflexible resolution. And from this

diffusiveness of the nature of good it follows, that the best and most

accomplished men are inclined to converse with persons of the highest

condition. Indeed a physician, if he have any good nature and sense of

honor, would be more ready to cure an eye which is to see and watch

for a great many thousands, than that of a private person; how much

more then ought a philosopher to form and fashion, to rectify and cure

the soul of such a one, who is (if I may so express it) to inform the

body politic,—who is to think and understand for so many others, to

be in so great measure the rule of reason, the standard of law, and

model of behavior, by which all the rest will square and direct their

actions? Suppose a man to have a talent at finding out springs and

contriving of aqueducts (a piece of skill for which Hercules and other

of the ancients are much celebrated in history), surely he could not so

satisfactorily employ himself in sinking a well or deriving water to

some private seat or contemptible cottage, as in supplying conduits to

some fair and populous city, in relieving an army just perishing with

thirst, or in refreshing and adorning with fountains and cool streams

the beautiful gardens of some glorious monarch. There is a passage of

Homer very pertinent to this purpose, in which he calls Minos Διὸς

μεγάλου ὀαριστήν ὀαριστήν, which, as Plato interprets it, signifies _the

disciple and companion of Jupiter_. For it were beneath his dignity

indeed to teach private men, such as care only for a family or indulge

their useless speculations; but kings are scholars worthy the tuition

of a God, who, when they are well advised, just, good, and magnanimous,

never fail to procure the peace and prosperity of all their subjects.

The naturalists tell us that the eryngium hath such a property with

it, that if one of the flock do but taste it, all the rest will stand

stock still in the same place till the shepherd hath taken it out

of its mouth. Such quickness of action does it have, pervading and

spreading itself over every thing that is near it, as if it were fire.

The effects of philosophy, however, are different according to the

difference of inclinations in men. If indeed it lights on one who loves

a dull and inactive sort of life, that makes himself the centre and

the little conveniences of life the circumference of all his thoughts,

such a one does contract the sphere of her activity, so that having

only made easy and comfortable the life of a single person, it fails

and dies with him; but when it finds a man of a ruling genius, one

fitted for conversation and able to grapple with the difficulties of

public business, if it once possess him with principles of honesty,

honor, and religion, it takes a compendious method, by doing good to

one, to oblige a great part of mankind. Such was the effect of the

conversation of Anaxagoras with Pericles, of Plato with Dion, and of

Pythagoras with the principal statesmen of all Italy. Cato himself took

a voyage, when he had the concern of an expedition lying upon him, to

see and hear Athenodorus; and Scipio sent for Panaetius, when he was

commissioned by the senate “to take a survey alike of the outrages

and the good order which were practised in their provinces,”[201] as

Posidonius observes. Now what a pretty sort of return would it have

been in Panaetius to send word back,—“If indeed you were in a private

capacity, John a Nokes or John a Stiles, that had a mind to get into

some obscure corner or cell, to state cases and resolve syllogisms, I

should very gladly have accepted your invitation; but now, because you

are the son of Paulus Aemilius who was twice consul, and grandson of

that Scipio who was surnamed from his conquest of Hannibal and Africa,

I cannot with honor hold any conversation with you!”

2. The objections which they bring from the two kinds of discourse, one

of which is mental, the other expressed in words or interpretative of

the former, are so stale and pedantical, that they are best answered by

laughter or silence; and we merely quote the old saying, “I knew this

before Theognis was born.” However, thus much shall be said, that the

end of them both is friendship,—in the first case with ourselves, in

the second case with another. For he that hath attained to virtue by

the methods of philosophy hath his mind all in tune and good temper;

he is not struck with those reproaches of conscience, which cause the

acutest sense of pain and are the natural punishments of our follies;

but he enjoys (the great prerogative of a good man) to be always easy

and in amity with himself.

No factious lusts reason’s just power control,

Nor kindle civil discord in his soul.

His passion does not stand in defiance to his reason, nor do his

reasonings cross and thwart one the other, but he is always consistent

with himself. But the very joys of wicked men are tumultuary and

confused, like those who dwell in the borders of two great empires at

variance, always insecure, and in perpetual alarms; whilst a good man

enjoys an uninterrupted peace and serenity of mind, which excels the

other not only in duration, but in sense of pleasure too. As for the

other sort of discourse, that which consists in expression of itself

to others, Pindar says very well, that it was not mercenary in old

time, nor indeed is it so now; but by the baseness and ambition of a

few it is made use of to serve their poor secular interests. For if

the poets represent Venus herself as much offended with those who make

a trade and traffic of the passion of love, how much more reasonably

may we suppose that Urania and Clio and Calliope have an indignation

against those who set learning and philosophy to sale? Certainly the

gifts and endowments of the Muses ought to be privileged from such mean

considerations.

If indeed some have made fame and reputation one of the ends of their

studies, they used it only as an instrument to get friends; since we

find by common observation that men praise only those whom they love.

If they sought its own praise, they were as much mistaken as Ixion

when he embraced a cloud instead of Juno; for there is nothing so

fleeting, so changeable, and so inconstant as popular applause; it is

but a pompous shadow, and hath no manner of solidity and duration in

it. But a wise man, if he design to engage in business and matters of

state, will so far aim at fame and popularity as that he may be better

enabled to benefit others; for it is a difficult and very unpleasant

task to do good to those who are disaffected to our persons. It is the

good opinion men have of us which disposes men to give credit to our

doctrine. As light is a greater good to those who see others by it

than to those who only are seen, so is honor of a greater benefit to

those who behold it than to those whose glory is beheld. But even one

who withdraws himself from the noise of the world, who loves privacy

and indulges his own thoughts, will show that respect to the good word

of the people which Hippolytus did to Venus,—though he abstain from

her mysteries, he will pay his devotions at a distance;[202] but he

will not be so cynical and sullen as not to hear with gladness the

commendations of virtuous men like himself; he will neither engage

himself in a restless pursuit of wealth, interest, or honor, nor will

he on the other hand be so rustic and insensible as to refuse them in

a moderate degree, when they fairly come in his way; in like manner he

will not court and follow handsome and beautiful youth, but will rather

choose such as are of a teachable disposition, of a gentle behavior,

and lovers of learning. The charms and graces of youth will not make

a philosopher shy of their conversation, when the endowments of their

minds are answerable to the features of their bodies. The case is the

same when greatness of place and fortune concur with a well-disposed

mind in the same person; he will not therefore forbear loving and

respecting such a one, nor be afraid of the name of a courtier, nor

think it a curse that such attendance and dependence should be his fate.

They that strive most Dame Venus to eschew

Do fault as much as they who her pursue.[203]

The application is easy to the matter in hand.

A philosopher therefore, if he is of a retired humor, will not shun

such persons; while one who generously designs his studies for the

public advantage will cheerfully embrace their advances of friendship,

will not force them after a troublesome manner to hear him, will

lay aside his scholastical terms and distinctions, and will rejoice

to discourse and pass his time with them when they are willing and

disposed.

3. I plough the spacious Berecynthian fields,

Full six days’ journey wide,[204]

says one boastingly in the poet; the same man, if he were as much a

lover of mankind as of husbandry, would much rather bestow his pains on

such a farm, the fruits of which would serve a great number, than to

be always dressing the olive-yard of some cynical malecontent, which,

when all was done, would scarce yield oil enough to dress a salad or

to supply his lamp in the long winter evenings. Epicurus himself, who

places happiness in the profoundest quiet and sluggish inactivity, as

the only secure harbor from the storms of this troublesome world, could

not but confess that it is both more noble and delightful to do than to

receive a kindness;[205] for there is nothing which produces so humane

and genuine a sort of pleasure as that of doing good. He who first

gave the names to the three Graces well understood this, for they all

signify delectation and joy,[206] and these surely are far greater and

purer in him who does the good turn. This is so evidently true, that

we all receive good turns blushing and with some confusion, but we are

always gay and well pleased when we are conferring one.

If then it is so pleasant to do good to a few, how are their hearts

dilated with joy who are benefactors to whole cities, provinces, and

kingdoms? And such benefactors are they who instil good principles into

those upon whom so many millions do depend. On the other hand, those

who debauch the minds of great men—as sycophants, false informers, and

flatterers, worse than both, manifestly do—are the centre of all the

curses of a nation, as men who do not only infuse deadly poison into

the cistern of a private house, but into the public springs of which

so many thousands are to drink. The people therefore laughed at the

hangers-on of Callias, whom, as Eupolis says, neither fire nor brass

nor steel could keep from supping with him; but as for the favorites

of those execrable tyrants Apollodorus, Phalaris, and Dionysius, they

racked them, they flayed them alive, they roasted them at slow fires,

they looked on them as the very pests of society and disgraces of

human nature; for to debauch a simple person is indeed an ill thing,

but to corrupt a prince is an infinite mischief. In like manner, he

who instructs an ordinary man makes him to pass his life decently and

with comfort; but he who instructs a prince, by correcting his errors

and clearing his understanding, is a philosopher for the public, by

rectifying the very mould and model by which whole nations are formed

and regulated. It is the custom of all nations to pay a peculiar honor

and deference to their priests; and the reason of it is, because they

do not only pray for good things for themselves, their own families and

friends, but for whole communities, for the whole state of mankind.

Yet we are not so fond as to think that the priests cause the Gods to

be givers of good things, or inspire a vein of beneficence into them;

but they only make their supplications to a being which of itself is

inclinable to answer their requests. But in this a good tutor hath

the privilege above the priests,—he effectually renders a prince more

disposed to actions of justice, moderation, and mercy, and therefore

hath a greater satisfaction of mind when he reflects upon it.

4. For my own part, I cannot but think that an ordinary mechanic—for

instance, a maker of musical instruments—would be much more attentive

and pleased at his work, if he knew that his harp would be touched by

the famous Amphion, and in his hand serve for the builder of Thebes,

or if that Thales had bespoke it, who was so great a master that

by the force of his music he pacified a popular tumult amongst the

Lacedaemonians. A good-natured shipwright would ply his work more

heartily, if he were making the steerage for the admiral galley of

Themistocles when he fought for the liberty of Greece, or of Pompey

when he went on his expedition against the pirates: what ecstasy of

delight then must a philosopher be in, when he reflects that his

scholar is a man of authority, a prince or great potentate, that he is

employed in so public a work, giving laws to him who is to give laws to

a whole nation, who is to punish vice, and to reward the virtuous with

riches and honor? The builder of the Argo certainly would have been

mightily pleased, if he had known what noble mariners were to row in

his ship, and that at last she should be translated into heaven; and a

carpenter would not be half so much pleased to make a coach or plough,

as to make the tablets on which Solon’s laws were to be engraved. In

like manner the discourses and rules of philosophy, being once deeply

stamped and imprinted on the minds of great personages, will stick so

close, that the prince shall seem no other than justice incarnate and

animated law. This was the design of Plato’s voyage into Sicily,—he

hoped that the lectures of his philosophy would serve for laws to

Dionysius, and bring his affairs again into a good posture. But the

soul of that unfortunate prince was like paper scribbled all over with

the characters of vice; its piercing and corroding quality had stained

quite through, and sunk into the very substance of his soul. Whereas,

if such persons are to profit by sage lessons, they must be taken when

they are at full speed.

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