Keitel did this with “words.” That does not mean that this was mere
camouflage which did not reflect his inner attitude, but it does mean
that the manner, perhaps often rough and harsh, in which the Defendant
Keitel spoke to his officers, more than once led to an officer being
punished or disciplined.
Dr. Gisevius, however, perhaps wanted to suggest that Keitel had dealt
with his subordinates in the OKW in a morally reprehensible way.
He did not know the Defendant Keitel personally and therefore cannot
give a personal opinion; he had to rely on the information of officers
who were strongly opposed to Keitel, without such opposition ever
becoming apparent. No one ever contacted Keitel to entice him to join in
the conspiracy. That is plausible since the conspirators, knowing the
character and the soldierly attitude of Keitel, could not expect any
success. Since on the other hand Keitel was completely innocent, which
does not need to be proved, the following situation results:
Keitel knew nothing of conspiratorial activities; what he did encounter
appeared in the shape of technical objections or personal remarks which
were dealt with by Keitel officially and in a cordial manner, as by a
superior of whom the subordinates say that he barks but does not bite.
On the other side the so-called conspirators had to consider everyone a
foe who was not in favor of their own aim. Every move and every word was
weighed and critically judged. As every conspirator hopes for the
success of his revolutionary activities he has to gather evidence for
the coming reckoning. This is, of course, a task for a future police
minister and home secretary.
From an impartial estimation of the facts, verified by the evidence
presented, it is shown that the accusations arising from the testimony
of the witness Gisevius are not correct. But the picture would not be
complete if light were not thrown on the personality of the witness
Gisevius by his own evidence. This judgment is made up from two factors:
(1) The career and the position of the witness.
(2) The trustworthiness of his information.
On Page 92 of my text I have stated in detail the functions Dr. Gisevius
carried out. I have not emphasized anything which, from my point of
view, might impeach him in any way for having given the evidence here
which you all have heard. I have only impartially confirmed the
following:
(a) He evaded military service through falsified papers put at his
disposal by Oster.
(b) He lived in Germany during the whole time from 1933 without
restriction of liberty, and remained in office up to 20 July 1944.
(c) He was an official of the German Reich and was in its pay from the
middle of 1937 to the beginning of 1939 with the exception of leave.
(d) He was Vice Consul of the Reich in Switzerland from 1943 in the
Consulate General at Zürich, placed there through Canaris as
intelligence agent, and was naturally paid for it. At the same time he
was in touch with the enemy’s intelligence service.
(e) He had since 1933, when he worked in the Gestapo, exact knowledge of
all the horrible happenings and knew what consequences could arise there
for the German people.
(f) A special circumstance, which shows the witness Dr. Gisevius in his
true light, is the advice, or the suggestion, which he gave to the
experienced bank specialist, Dr. Schacht, that he should allow inflation
to set in and thus get the control of matters into his own hands. This
suggestion leaves only two possibilities: either complete ignorance of
the national economic importance and social effect of an inflation, or
else a boundless unscrupulousness which completely disregards the fate
of employees and workmen. An inflation brought about knowingly can be
described only as a crime against the people. Schacht described it as a
catastrophe. Schacht answered him, according to the record: “You want
the catastrophe; I want to avoid it.”
In order to judge the reliability of the statements by the witness
Gisevius before this Tribunal, I must refer to the book submitted by the
witness as evidence: _To the Bitter End_. This book is also a
“statement” of the witness Gisevius.
To err is human, but when in the year 1945, after the collapse of
Germany, a book appears in which facts and occurrences are presented of
historical and, for those personally involved, of moral and even
criminal importance, the incorrectness of which has become obvious in
the meantime, then the error is unforgivable and reference to false
information is no longer an excuse.
Of the many inaccuracies contained in this book I will only point out
briefly the four which were established before this Tribunal through the
cross-examination by Dr. Kubuschok, which refer to the Defendant Von
Papen, and I beg you to take official, cognizance of it.
(1) Dr. Gisevius has asserted in his book that Von Papen did not resign
notwithstanding the events of 30 June 1934. It is established that Von
Papen did resign and that the public announcement was simply
contemplated to be made at a later date.
(2) Dr. Gisevius asserted further that Von Papen took part in the
Cabinet meeting which he describes with exact details and when the law
was resolved that the measures taken on 30 June 1934 were correct in the
interest of the State. Actually Von Papen has never taken part in this
meeting.
(3) Dr. Gisevius asserted finally that Von Papen went to see Von
Hindenburg, but had not raised a sufficient protest against the
measures. Actually what happened was that the attempts of Von Papen to
visit Von Hindenburg were frustrated, therefore he failed to see him.
(4) The assertion in the book of Dr. Gisevius that Von Papen took part
in the meeting of the Reichstag in which the measures of 30 June were
approved, must equally be labeled incorrect information.
It could not be termed an unfounded reproach if such a statement were to
be described as dubious and the author as unreliable. It is difficult
for me as a German defense counsel to deal calmly with this problem. The
statement of Gisevius reveals the entire tragedy of the German people.
It is for me a proof of the weakness and of the decadence of certain
German circles, who played with the idea of revolt and high treason
without any feeling for the distress of the people. They were a higher
level of future ministers and generals without the backing of the large
masses of our people, the working classes, as Reich Minister Severing
has declared here very clearly.
Mr. Justice Jackson has used the word “resistance movement” in
connection with the examination of the witness Gisevius. We have often
heard during the progress of this Trial about dauntless, brave men and
women, who fought for their country, and have suffered and died for it.
They were our enemies. But no one who tries to judge these things
impartially would deny them acknowledgment of their heroism. But where
do you find this heroism in the group around Gisevius? If one has read
his book _To the Bitter End_ and has heard him here, one looks in vain
for a readily self-sacrificing man. Even the late deed of a Stauffenberg
lacks heroism, because it lacked the resolution of self-sacrifice.
Gisevius, up to 1938—when there might still have been time to succeed
in holding back the wheel of fate—always speaks about negotiations,
conferences; but all these men wished the others, that is, the generals,
to act. If one considers the knowledge of affairs which Gisevius had as
member of the Gestapo, and all his friends had; if one takes into
account the realization of the great danger hovering over the
people—then the decision to take action should not have been in doubt
for an instant for patriotic men, as the members of the group claimed
themselves to be. But what did they do? When the leaders of the army
hesitated or refused, they did not think of taking action themselves,
but turned to the foreign countries.
One would have full understanding for those Germans who were treated in
an outrageous manner or who had been thrown out by the Government,
particularly when they had no means or ways to undertake direct action.
But the Gisevius group had such means and possibilities. Men in the most
influential key positions, men in the OKW, in Hitler’s closest circle,
belonged to them; men who had the possibility to get close to Hitler and
to his evil men behind the scenes. Not one of them mustered up courage
for action when there was time. What did they do instead? They remained
in office, they helped effectively so as to allow crimes such as led to
this Trial to be committed.
I should not like to leave any doubt that the fact of the conspiracy in
itself is of no importance in the question of credibility to be
discussed here. Whoever is a conspirator out of pure motives, who risks
his life, in the full realization of the danger which threatens his
country, is not only clean, but also deserves the gratitude of the
fatherland.
If Gisevius and his friends, who owing to their positions were informed
about everything which most Germans only learned of in all its horror
through this Trial, had served their country in unselfish sacrifice,
then perhaps we and the whole world would have been spared much distress
and suffering.
Admiral Dönitz, who knew Admiral Canaris, the source of information,
well, said:
“During the time that he was in the Navy, Admiral Canaris was an
officer in whom little trust was placed. He was altogether
different from us. We said that he had seven sides to his
character.”
But, Gentlemen, what does Dr. Gisevius say about Canaris on Page 319 of
the book _To the Bitter End_?
“The successor was Canaris, at that time captain in the Navy,
quite clever and more cunning than Himmler and Heydrich put
together.”
On the subsequent pages I have analysed those personalities who have
been quoted by Gisevius as being the chief sources of information. I do
not wish to go into this in any more detail. We are concerned here with
the persons of Canaris, Nebe, and Thomas.
As regards Pages 96 to 103, I shall make the following brief summary.
With reference to Canaris, I only want to say that he was living in the
closest touch and was very friendly with Himmler, Heydrich, and the
Gestapo, although he was supposed to be their sworn enemy. Thomas, who
was also allegedly a member of the group from the beginning, was an
excellent General Staff officer, and he was an exemplary organizer and
untiring worker in the Army Economic Staff under Keitel and later in the
Army Economic Armament Staff in the High Command of the Army; you know
his publication, 2353-PS. This man was the spirit and the driving power
behind rearmament which he, as well as Keitel and others, considered
necessary to the extent which he energetically pursued. But he is also
the same man who organized the “Barbarossa-Oldenburg Plan” and who
later, under the Four Year Plan, became the head of the economic staff
of the Plan Oldenburg. The results of that plan need not be explained
here by me.
It was General Thomas who, according to very convincing outward
appearances, used all his powers for the economic direction of the war,
and who, after leaving Speer’s division, was not dismissed but was
assigned by Keitel to work with the records office so that he could
write the book which forms the main point of the Indictment with regard
to rearmament. If what Gisevius has said about Thomas is true, then
since 1933 he played a double game, and was an opportunist and not a man
who can be expected to give impartial information.
The figure of Canaris is almost mystical. This is probably necessarily
the case with men who concern themselves with matters which cannot stand
the clear light of day. His position was of great importance for the
entire conduct of the war. It is clear that such people must have to the
highest degree the confidence of both the political and military
leaders. One can judge by the amount of confidence which somebody enjoys
whether he is trustworthy. He also enjoyed the confidence of the
Defendant Keitel, with whom, as is proven, he associated in a friendly
and companionable way, and not only as a subordinate with his superior.
Jodl declared that Keitel was much too trusting. Can one believe that
such a condition existed for years if Keitel dealt with the alleged
reports of Canaris, as the witness Gisevius has testified here, or if he
could even have received an order to commit murder from Keitel, as
Lahousen would have us believe in the cases of Generals Weygand and
Giraud?
Now if Canaris enjoyed such great confidence with Hitler and Keitel, but
at the same time also worked authoritatively in Gisevius’ group, his
character must not only be considered dual, but unreliable and
untrustworthy as well. It is understandable that a person might
temporarily display such a dual nature, if it is done for the sake of a
higher aim, to serve one’s country, to liberate it from a tyrant.
However, one searches here in vain for such a serious aim, for a deed
which makes the unlawful action appear in a light of greater moral
right.
Canaris believed that he could satisfy his revolutionary duty by
expressing doubts in the circle of his trusted political associates and
raising the severest kind of criticism. He waited, like others, for the
generals to act—as an admiral he apparently did not count himself in
this circle—while he himself cultivated his confidential relations with
Hitler and Keitel. According to the testimony of the witness Gisevius,
one must assume that he permitted his political associates to establish
contacts abroad.
When did Canaris tell the truth? He was necessarily entangled in
falsehood. Did he not have to tell his political associates something,
which, in the opinion of the group, looked like activity? Did he not
also have to report on what he supposedly had told Keitel? He is the
typical example of an overrefined, highly intelligent drawing-room
conspirator, protected by the nature of his obscure activity, which to a
large extent could not be checked, in whom however the spirit of action
was lacking.
Keitel had such confidence in Canaris, and such a liking for him, that
he again and again ignored Jodl’s various warnings and even until after
20 July 1944 maintained his confidence in Canaris.
Although Canaris was the most bitter enemy of the Gestapo, he worked,
certainly not out of conviction, closely and on an astonishingly
friendly basis with Himmler and Heydrich. There existed a certain
competition; Himmler also had a central intelligence office, which at
first concentrated on the domestic sphere, although later, step by step,
it expanded abroad. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner testified that this
competition carried with it a possibility of friction, which, in view of
Himmler’s thirst for power, with which Canaris also was familiar, might
easily lead to the Counterintelligence Department becoming integrated
into the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Canaris saw himself and the
circle of conspirators endangered. He therefore did something very
clever in organizing co-operation, with the result that Himmler covered
him in various dubious affairs. For a long time this co-operation
functioned well, until the Oster case and the Ankara case afforded the
RSHA’s foreign intelligence service, organized by Kaltenbrunner, an
opportunity to discredit the Counterintelligence of the OKW so strongly
that Hitler decreed the transfer of the Counterintelligence Department.
What is important in this connection is the fact of Himmler’s particular
co-operation with Canaris, and the ensuing consequence, resulting with
compelling logic, that Canaris at no time could have presented a report
which would have seriously incriminated Himmler and his organizations.
For if Canaris had presented such a written order to Keitel, he either
would have had to refer the report to Hitler or inquire from Himmler and
the RSHA respectively. In both cases Himmler would have become informed.
The consequence would have been clear. Co-operation would have become
enmity, and enmity with Himmler meant the greatest danger for Canaris
and his group. I believe that this compelling logic is stronger than any
account by the witness Gisevius which concerns itself with alleged
statements by Canaris.
Such was the versatility of character in a man whom one may judge at
will, but who was neither a conspirator nor can lay claim to
credibility.
For an opinion on the character and credibility of General Thomas, the
following documents are important: Document 2353-PS (Green File),
Document EC-270 and Document EC-271.
(1) Document 2353-PS, entitled “Part A: Work done in the fields of war
economy and armaments industry until the beginning of mobilization in
1939” was presented by the Prosecution to prove rearmament. It does
furnish this proof, which is not being denied by the Defendant Keitel.
After being taken prisoner, Thomas made a declaration in reference to
this work of his which says that after 20 July 1944 he revised his
rather critical memorandum on the rebuilding of German war economy in
such a manner that in case of need, that is, in proceedings before a
German court, it might serve in his defense.
His declaration, which precedes and is attached to Document 2353-PS, is
either untrue, in which case it cannot be presented as evidence by the
Prosecution, or it is true, thereby raising the question of the
credibility of this immediate witness as a source of information for Dr.
Gisevius.
On the whole, the memorandum is true. It is also true, however, that
Thomas wholeheartedly co-operated not only in rearmament but also in the
organization Oldenburg, that is, in economic preparation for war against
the U.S.S.R. I refer to Exhibit USA-141 (conversation of 29 April 1941).
Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to organizational reconstruction of
the economic sector of the Barbarossa-Oldenburg Plan. There it says:
“He”—the Reich Marshal—“has delegated the task to an economic
leadership staff headed by the Chief of the
Wirtschafts-Rüstungsamt (Economy and Armaments Office)
(Thomas).”
For this task General Thomas thereby became attached to the Reich
Marshal as the chief of this entire undertaking. As explained in
Keitel’s affidavit (Document Book 2, Exhibit Number K-11), Thomas
prepared and directed the entire organizational construction of the
undertaking.
Is this consonant with the contention of Gisevius, and now also of
Thomas, that on principle they were opposed to war, and with their
convinced attitude against Hitler? The task which Thomas assumed and
organized was unmistakably incompatible with valid international law. At
no time did he protest against assumption of this office. The attitude
of General Thomas can also be ascertained from Document EC-270,
submitted by the Prosecution on 6 May 1946. It is the draft of a letter
written on 27 April 1938 by the War Economy Staff (Chief General
Thomas), addressed to Department L (National Defense within the Armed
Forces Operations Staff); it is not signed by the Defendant Keitel. This
involves the struggle for power by Plenipotentiary (GBW) Funk, and
Göring as the Delegate of the Four Year Plan. Document EC-271 shows that
the aim of General Thomas was to place the entire war economy under the
supervision of OKW, that is, under the War Economy Staff which he
headed. Under the guise of an interpretation of the decree of 4 February
1938 on “direction of German armament” he attempted to prevent Funk’s
subordination to Field Marshal Göring as Delegate of the Four Year Plan;
at the same time he also wanted to prevent the plenipotentiary from
becoming independent. It was “to be established” (Page 5 of the
document, last paragraph of the communication) “that in all questions
pertaining to the Armed Forces’ supplies, the plenipotentiary was to
carry out the instructions of OKW.”
This plan did not succeed; nor did Keitel approve it. But from Document
EC-270, with special reference to Figures 1 to 9 (Pages 2 to 4) it
follows that the endeavor of General Thomas was to extend the scope of
his office to that of a General Staff on Economics within the OKW, a
plan which Thomas had been pursuing for years already, in opposition to
Keitel and Jodl; he is the man, an opportunist and a double-dealer, who
claims to have fought against methods he terms corrupt and contrary to
international law. The Defendant Keitel admits that Thomas made reports
pointing to the scarcity of raw materials; he expressed doubts as to
whether armaments would suffice to carry on a war. But these doubts were
shared by the generals, especially by Keitel. Generaloberst Jodl
confirmed the fact that such reports were submitted to Hitler and
Thomas, so that Dr. Gisevius’ contention is proved incorrect in that
respect too.
But it is worst of all with friend Nebe. The witness Gisevius has
described Nebe as one of his most intimate friends who held the same
views as he did. According to the statements of Dr. Gisevius, Nebe had
been his friend since 1933 and was thoroughly familiar with the views of
the witness. He remained in the RSHA—an organization discussed from
many angles here—until 20 July 1944, and in the year 1944 he was in
charge of the headquarters of the Special Service (Sonderdienst) for the
prevention of the escape of prisoners of war. This is shown by Document
USSR-413 submitted by the Prosecution.
To describe this witness—from whom Dr. Gisevius, after leaving the
Gestapo, claims to have received important information continuously—it
should be pointed out that from 1933 to 1944 Nebe served in the RSHA,
evidently to the satisfaction of his superiors Himmler, Heydrich, and
Kaltenbrunner—otherwise he would not have stayed in office so long and
would not have been promoted to the rank of Police General and
SS-Gruppenführer.
So while on the one hand for 11 years he carried out the duties of his
office with the well-known methods of the Gestapo—which was under
Himmler—and later the Kripo, Dr. Gisevius refers to him as his friend
and staunch political associate. Now it might be assumed, perhaps, that
in the position he held he was able to prevent disaster, possibly even
to hold up execution of orders. Document USSR-413, just referred to,
shows that Nebe did not do this. In the deposition by Wielen, forming
part of the document, the horrible case of the 50 escaped R.A.F. fliers,
in which General Nebe, the friend of Dr. Gisevius, was involved, is
dealt with.
Wielen states as follows in this connection:
“One day during that time I received, about noon, an order by
telegraph from General Nebe to proceed to Berlin immediately, to
be entrusted with a confidential order. Arriving in Berlin on
the evening of that day, I reported to General Nebe at his
office, Wendischer Markt 5-7. I gave him a condensed report on
the position of the matter at that time. He then showed me a
teletype order signed by Kaltenbrunner, to the effect that, in
conformity with the Führer’s explicit and personal order, more
than half of the officers who escaped from Sagan were to be shot
when recaptured. General Nebe himself seemed shocked at this
order. He was deeply worried. I heard later that he did not go
to bed that night, but spent the night on his sofa in his
office. I myself was likewise shocked at this frightful step
which was to be taken, and refused to carry it out. I said it
violated rules of war and undoubtedly was bound to result in
reprisal measures against those of our own officers who were in
English camps as prisoners of war, and that I flatly refused to
take any responsibility in the matter. General Nebe declared
that in this instance I would not be in any way responsible as
the State Police was to act entirely independently, and that,
after all, orders given by the Führer had to be executed without
protest.
“Nebe furthermore added that naturally it was my duty to keep
the matter in deepest secrecy, and that the reason for his
showing me the original order was so that I would make no
trouble for the State Police.”
Any comment seems superfluous. This is significant of Nebe’s
personality. The trustworthiness of a person is an inseparable part of
his entire personality. Information obtained from a person who for more
than a decade was able to play such an abominable double role can lay no
claim to credibility.
I believe that this analysis of the statements of the witness Dr.
Gisevius and of the men belonging to the Gisevius group gives me the
right to say that the charges made against the Defendant Keitel by the
witness can be no suitable foundation for the argument of the
Prosecution, namely, that the Defendant Keitel
(1) formed a circle around Hitler;
(2) had tremendous influence on the OKW and the Armed Forces;
(3) did not submit reports on atrocities and crimes to Hitler; and
(4) did not protect his subordinates, but even threatened them with the
Gestapo.
Rather is it true that the real position of Keitel, however important it
may have seemed to outsiders, was neither decisive nor of importance
either for the total sum of events or for the basic and important
decisions of Hitler. Justice can be done to the actual importance of
this activity if one says that it was tremendous, because physically and
spiritually it went beyond human strength; because it placed the
defendant perpetually in a dilemma between his military point of view
and the unbending will of Hitler to whom he was faithfully, far too
faithfully, devoted. Physically it presented an almost insoluble
problem, for it had no sharply defined, clear outline but called for the
perpetual balancing of essential differences; the adjustment of personal
sensitiveness; the “self-protection” against encroachments of the
individual offices among themselves or against the OKW; clever
maneuvering when Hitler, in explosive reaction to disagreeable news,
wished to issue extravagant orders; the settlement of all disagreeable
matters which Hitler did not wish to attend to himself.
It was a tremendously thankless task, which found only very slight
compensation in the brilliant position in the immediate proximity to the
head of the State, in the decorative participation in all events of what
is called world history, in the representative discharge of the duties
of a field marshal.
This evidence does not appear convincing if it is intended to prove that
Keitel also actively participated in the political conversations. When
the Defendant Keitel took part in State visits and conversations with
foreign statesmen, he did not participate in the conversations, although
present. Hitler liked to have Keitel in his entourage as the
representative of the Armed Forces. Thus, Keitel was present at
Godesberg when Prime Minister Chamberlain went there, also at Munich on
30 September 1938, and at the visit of Molotov in November 1940. He was
also present at the meetings of Hitler with Marshal Pétain, General
Franco, King Boris, Regent Von Horthy, and Mussolini. This function of
Keitel is, however, insufficient to make the defendant a general who
must have taken a decisive part in the shaping of political events.
How little this assertion is justified is seen from the fact testified
to by Admiral Bürckner that Keitel was extremely careful not to encroach
on the affairs of the Foreign Office and gave his officers orders not to
engage in matters referring to foreign policy. In domestic politics the
exclusion of the Chief of the OKW resulted from the removal of the Reich
War Minister, already dealt with, and the thereby intended and achieved
elimination of political representation of the Armed Forces in the
Cabinet.
It is obvious, and has also already been pointed out, that the position
of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW involved, and in time of war
to an increased extent, his coming into some kind of contact with all
the ministries and highest offices, and dealing with them as the
representative of the OKW, that is to say, of Hitler.
That did not make Keitel a politician, that is to say, a man who took
part in an advisory capacity in the determination of the Government’s
aims, and had an influence on them. In his high office he naturally
worked to carry out these aims and bears a responsibility to that
extent, but not as a political general.
Mr. President, I am now beginning a long chapter. Do you want me to
start with it?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on reading then until 5 o’clock.
DR. NELTE: The idea of war against Russia was rejected by Keitel. This
found visible expression in the memorandum which Field Marshal Keitel
drew up, discussed with Von Ribbentrop, and handed over to Hitler.
According to his sworn statements the reasons were:
(a) military considerations;
(b) the Nonaggression Pact with the Soviet Union dated 23 August 1939.
In spite of being personally presented, the memorandum had no success.
Hitler, as usual in questions of strategic nature, rejected Keitel’s
point of view as unconvincing.
In this connection, and owing to Hitler’s curt rejection, Keitel asked
for release and transfer to the front. This is the case which Reich
Marshal Göring confirmed in his interrogation. Hitler refused, sharply
criticizing the habit of generals asking to be released or tendering
their resignation whenever he did not approve their opinions or
suggestions.
That was decisive for Keitel: he remained at his post, did his duty, and
fulfilled his obligations in carrying out the tasks incumbent upon him
within the framework of further preparations. Here, too, in keeping with
his conception of duty, Keitel did not make known to the outside world
his basically negative attitude toward the war with Russia, after Hitler
had made his decision.
This case is in several respects typical of Keitel and of the way he is
judged by others. We know—and it has been proved by the evidence—that
other generals were also opposed to war with the Soviet Union. Their
objections, too, were waived or rejected by Hitler. They, too, accepted
the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, continued to
do their duty and carried out the orders given to them. But there was
one basic difference: these other generals went back to their
headquarters after the discussion. There, in their own circle of
officers they spoke about the decision made by Hitler. Of course it was
disputed, yet they acted in accordance with it.
Since Field Marshal Keitel, due to his military conception, as already
depicted, did not make known to the generals, when they appeared in the
Führer’s headquarters for discussions, what his own attitude was, which
was also at variance, the impression was bound to arise that Field
Marshal Keitel completely agreed with Hitler and did not support the
scruples of the Armed Forces’ branches.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think you might stop there.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 July 1946 at 1000 hours._]