Regardless of the individual responsibility of every defendant the
Tribunal must examine whether the concept of a “Reich Government” as
defined by the Prosecution is correct, that is, practical; whether, as
to the composition of this group, the Prosecution’s concept of a “Reich
Government” appears justified. In any case it is not sufficient to
accept as correct the assertion of the Prosecution in this respect.
I assume that my colleague Dr. Kubuschok will enlarge on this during his
case.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal feels that you are taking a very
long time over this question of whether Keitel was—what his exact
position was.
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, that the Prosecution also took a
great deal of time to make clear what position Field Marshal Keitel
occupied in their opinion. He is not here as Field Marshal, but as the
Chief of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they have, I must confess that I have forgotten.
It seems to me and the Tribunal generally that you are taking up far too
long on this topic. You have got many other topics which are of very
great importance to the defendant, and you have already been speaking
for several hours, and you occupied a large number of pages in order to
try and define what Keitel’s position was. I thought you might be able
to cut it down.
DR. NELTE: I shall try.
I have explained that Defendant Keitel did not belong to Group 1; that
is to say, that he was not a minister.
He was neither chief of a Government department, nor a Reich minister
without portfolio, nor a state minister having the functions of a Reich
minister, nor an official who was entitled to attend Cabinet sessions.
In the hearing of evidence it was proved that despite the Führer Decree
of 4 February 1938 there never existed a Secret Cabinet Council; that
such council was never set up; that it never held a session; and that no
persons involved ever received a commission. Thus, it is proved that the
defendant was also never a member of the Secret Cabinet Council.
It is true that Keitel was a member of the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich. Witness Dr. Lammers has confirmed that the fact of
his becoming a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich did not change Keitel’s official position, and especially did not
make him a minister. In his affidavit of 25 November 1945, Codefendant
Dr. Frick says that Keitel worked in the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich as “liaison man.”
Although he is not listed among the members of the Reich Cabinet,
Keitel’s capacities as a member of the so-called “Dreimänner-Kollegium”
(Three Man College) and as a member of the Reich Defense Council have
been mentioned by the Prosecution. I believe I may refer to the result
of the hearing of evidence. It was shown that a Three Man College as a
Government committee never existed, and that the Reich Defense Council,
after the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 1938, never held sessions, or
in any case that it never held conferences, or passed resolutions.
In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility and competence
it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement
be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion.
The very fact that the Prosecution makes a sweeping and fundamental
assertion...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, may I ask what you have been doing if you have
not been analyzing the concept of the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Up to now I have explained Keitel’s position as Chief of the
OKW. In statements on Page 74 and the following pages I wanted to
explain to you that the Prosecution, and others as well, have talked
about the OKW: and “OKW” is a word which has three different types of
significance.
Mr. President, if you will be good enough to permit me to submit this in
its written form, and if you would consider it as having been presented
in Court, then I am willing to leave out the pages up to 77 and submit
them to you. In any case, it appears to me to be an important part of
the explanation regarding the interpretation of the word “OKW,” and the
fact that this is not identical with Keitel is particularly important.
May I do that?
[_The President nodded his assent._]
In that case, then, I shall continue at Page 77.
In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility and competence
it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement
be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion.
The very fact that the Prosecution makes a sweeping and fundamental
assertion, and that the French Prosecution undertakes a pointedly legal
examination of the question as to the office in which each defendant was
active with regard to the counts he is charged with, makes it my duty to
clear up a mistake made by the Prosecution. However, this mistake is all
the more excusable, because not only foreign countries but large groups
at home, even within the Armed Forces, did not know what OKW meant. It
became a popular collective term for the supreme command of the Armed
Forces without anybody taking the trouble to find out who and what was
behind the three words “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.” This corresponds to
the law of inertia governing the association of human beings, to the
almost pathological mania to abbreviate titles of military commands.
Since, furthermore, the communiqués of the High Command of the Armed
Forces were published daily, and all announcements referring to war
events began with the words: “The High Command of the Armed Forces
announces,” not only did these words become impressed upon the public’s
mind, but also the conception that the “High Command of the Armed
Forces” was the supreme military command. The conception would be
correct had the words OKW not been translated with Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) but rather as Supreme
Commander (Oberkommandierender) of the Armed Forces. It was Hitler
alone, as “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” who was the
incarnation of what everybody imagined the OKW to be, namely, the
central military planning and command headquarters and thus the supreme
command and executive headquarters for all military matters. In this
respect the OKW was synonymous with Hitler as “Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces,” which was his official title.
If, in naming the headquarters of the supreme commander, it was desired
to avoid the title “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” which was in
accordance with the prevalent Leadership Principle, the title
“Oberkommando der Wehrmacht” was bound to be used. This headquarters
comprises the supreme commander himself, that is, Hitler, and his
assistants, his staff.
The Führer Decree of 4 February 1938 bearing the heading: “Decree
concerning the Command of the Armed Forces” resulted, through the
unfortunate and vague nature of its wording, in an interpretation that
the “Chief OKW” mentioned therein was the chief in the sense of
director, of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is true that it
follows from the decree that “Chief OKW” is to mean “Chief of Staff
OKW,” that is chief of Hitler’s bureau in his capacity as Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces. But since then, every time that people
have spoken and speak of the OKW, everybody thinks of Keitel without
examining whether the expression means: OKW-Oberkommandierender (Supreme
Commander) of the Armed Forces, OKW-Headquarters of the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, or OKW-Staff of the Headquarters of the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
The Prosecution makes no distinction in this respect, just as the German
agencies were unaware of the exact difference, or at any rate paid no
attention to it. They, just like the Prosecution now, thought it right
to claim the OKW’s jurisdiction and responsibility for anything having a
connection with the Armed Forces or members of the Armed Forces. From
this viewpoint to claiming Keitel’s personal jurisdiction by virtue of
the title “Chief OKW” there is only a short step. For Germans and
foreigners the recollection of the first World War was a contributing
factor in forming this opinion, which was not based on an examination
according to constitutional law. The relationship between Hitler and
Keitel prompted the comparison with the relationship between the Kaiser
and Von Hindenburg. This comparison had results for the Defendant Keitel
which are shown at this Trial. Without thinking of the fundamental
differences between Von Hindenburg as Chief of the Great General Staff
which existed until 1918, and Keitel as the chief of Hitler’s military
executive staff, and without knowing the field of Keitel’s jurisdiction
and what possibilities Keitel had as regards Hitler’s plans and measures
by virtue of the functions assigned to him, comparisons were made which
gave rise to doubts about him. When furthermore—after the catastrophe
had set in—Keitel once again came to play an outwardly similar part as
representative of the Armed Forces when he had to execute the signature
for unconditional surrender, this comparison also turned out to his
disadvantage. People do not ask about jurisdiction when things go badly,
but look for a guilty person and the guilty person is judged by external
appearances. Quite naturally the great attention paid to Keitel’s person
at this Trial can largely be traced to the fact that after Hitler’s
death Keitel came into the public eye.
In order to see clearly what part Keitel really played, and what share
he had in what happened, I now wish—after investigating his legal
competencies—to examine what actual influence he had upon the
development and carrying-out of the measures, the effects of which
constitute the subject of this Trial. From everyday experience we know
that it does not matter so much what a person is supposed to be in a
particular position, but what he has made of that position by virtue of
his personality. I believe I may say that in the course of this Trial
the personality of no other defendant has been judged in such varying
and contradictory ways as that of the Defendant Keitel.
Decisive for Keitel’s material responsibility is his actual position in
the tug-of-war with and around Hitler, his effective influence upon that
group, and thus on those circumstances as a whole which could have
influenced the operations of Hitler’s headquarters in the military
field.
I shall deal with this fundamental topic when taking up the charges made
by the Prosecution against Keitel and other defendants on the strength
of the cross-examination of Dr. Gisevius, in other words, after the
presentation of evidence for Keitel has been completed.
In view of the comprehensive scope of Justice Jackson’s questions and
the answers given thereto by Dr. Gisevius, the testimony of Dr. Gisevius
has become of tremendous importance in the case of the Defendant Keitel.
Had Dr. Gisevius’ statements about Keitel been true—that is, statements
made by him on the basis of information, in most instances in terms of
conclusive findings—the Defendant Keitel could not have told the truth
during the presentation of evidence. The importance of that fact becomes
evident when it is considered that a negative opinion on truthfulness
would of necessity destroy Keitel’s defense, which in its essence draws
on the subjective aspect of facts as a whole. In view of this fact and
the importance of the testimony of Dr. Gisevius also for other
defendants, it becomes my duty to explain the contrast between Keitel’s
answers and the testimony of the witness Gisevius.
Experience teaches us that dead witnesses are the best witnesses,
because their purported utterances cannot be directly refuted. Evidence
on the strength of information belongs to another group of statements
which almost defy refutation. The testimony of Gisevius combines both
possibilities, in that he bases his testimony primarily on information
obtained from witnesses who are dead. Justice Jackson used Dr. Gisevius
as star witness in his comprehensive attack on the Defendant Keitel.
After the completion of the presentation of evidence against Keitel, he
did not bring forward one individual circumstance, but an Indictment on
all Counts and a general judgment, on Keitel’s answers.
The counterevidence is concerned with proving the objective
incorrectness of facts based upon information obtained from certain
individuals and further, with establishing proof of the unreliability of
the information. I call to mind the words which the Defendant Keitel
said under oath upon completion of his direct examination by me while in
the witness box:
“One may hold it against me that I was wrong and made mistakes,
that my attitude toward the Führer Adolf Hitler was wrong and
weak, but it should not be said of me that I was a coward, that
I was untruthful, and that I was disloyal.”
I sum up in condensed form the charges made against the Defendant Keitel
during interrogation by the Prosecution, as follows:
(1) Keitel built an impenetrable ring round Hitler so that the latter
could be told nothing.
(2) Keitel failed to pass on to Hitler reports he had received from
Canaris whenever they concerned atrocities, crimes, and the like, or he
gave orders to modify them.
(3) Keitel had a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army.
(4) Keitel threatened his subordinates, when they made political
statements, that he would not protect them; he even said that he would
turn them over to the Gestapo.
Dr. Gisevius says in one part of his statement that Keitel had no
influence over Hitler. He exonerates Hitler by explaining that Keitel
had formed a ring round Hitler, in order that the latter should be told
nothing. The British and American Prosecution in their Indictment called
Keitel a powerful staff officer who had exerted great influence over
Hitler; the French Prosecution described Keitel as a willing tool of
Hitler; the German generals called him a “yes man” who could not carry
anything through; and now Keitel grows, according to the statement of
Dr. Gisevius, into a real handyman and buffer for Hitler, who hid from
the latter anything bad, who submitted to him only what he saw fit, and
permitted no one to approach Hitler.
To assert that Keitel blocked access to Hitler, can only be maintained
by somebody who did not know the conditions prevailing around Hitler.
Before the war Keitel worked in Berlin in Bendler Strasse, while Hitler
was in Wilhelmstrasse. Keitel came perhaps once a week to report, or on
special order. At that time, on account of the distance, it was in fact
impossible for Keitel to exert any influence over access to the Führer.
It was equally impossible when Hitler was at the Berghof near
Berchtesgaden for weeks at a time, while Keitel remained in Berlin.
At the beginning of operations, Keitel was with Jodl and the Armed
Forces Operations Staff at the Führer’s headquarters. Here also they
were separated. Keitel did not sit in Hitler’s anteroom, but rather in
other buildings or barracks. He came from time to time with General Jodl
to the conference on the situation, in which, besides Hitler, some 15 or
20 officers of all three branches of the Armed Forces took part. Apart
from the conferences on the situation there was no personal contact.
When Hitler wanted Keitel for anything he sent for him. Personally and
individually there was closer contact in Berlin between Hitler and his
adjutants, the Chief of the Party Chancellery, the Chief of the
Presidential Chancellery, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. Keitel
not only could not decide who should see Hitler, he also could not
possibly prevent anybody going to Hitler.
Hitler’s sources of information were the responsible heads of each
department; it was occasionally not clear whence Hitler obtained his
information, as I have already stated. Gisevius did not know these
conditions from his own experience; he himself was never near Keitel,
who never saw or spoke to him and did not know his name. When he gave
his opinion here, he could only base it on information given him by
Canaris, Thomas, and Oster.
General Jodl has been heard regarding this question. He certainly is the
best witness in this matter, since he, as well as Keitel, lived in
direct proximity to Hitler and therefore could form his own judgment. He
stated concerning this matter:
“Unfortunately, it was impossible to keep things from Hitler.
Many channels of information led directly to Hitler.”
Upon my interrogation, at the suggestion of the Tribunal, Jodl fully
confirmed that what Keitel had testified was quite correct, and that
what witness Gisevius stated in this respect was, in general, merely
figures of speech.
The Codefendants, Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, have confirmed that the
allegation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel was able to keep the
commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces away from Hitler
is false. If, however, this was not the case, it follows that the way
from the branches of the Armed Forces to the Führer was open at any
time. Through the hearing of witnesses it was also established that
apart from Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Canaris
in particular had direct access to Hitler. Thus, the accusation of the
witness Gisevius that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler is proved
false.
The witness Gisevius has declared that reports were submitted to Keitel
by Canaris about atrocities in connection with deportations,
extermination of Jews, concentration camps, the persecution of the
Church, and the killing of insane persons, all of which Keitel withheld
from Hitler. The same is alleged about the reports of General Thomas,
Chief of the War Economy Office, the purpose of which was to inform
Hitler about the war potential of the enemy and make him listen to
reason.
Concerning Admiral Canaris’ reports, it must be said that as chief of
espionage and counterintelligence he naturally delivered regular reports
which concerned the conduct of the war, including the conduct of
economic warfare. It is affirmed that reports were submitted on subjects
which belonged neither to the jurisdiction of the Counterintelligence
Office nor to that of the OKW. It has been proved that Hitler took
strict care that every worker confined himself to his own special field,
and it was particularly forbidden for military offices to concern
themselves with political affairs.
Keitel has declared under oath that he knew nothing about the
atrocities, and especially the extermination of the Jews and the
concentration camps. This is in absolute contradiction to the assertion
of the witness Gisevius that Canaris submitted reports to the Defendant
Keitel on the above-mentioned subjects.
One can assert that reports of any kind whatsoever were delivered to
Keitel without fear of being contradicted, especially when one has no
fear that these reports will be found. For if they are not delivered
they cannot be found, because they do not exist. Now Gisevius has
declared that he collected documents from the beginning which contained
incriminating material. Is it not remarkable, under these circumstances,
that up to now none of these reports have been produced? As far as they
were available at the OKW, they have been used in the accusation and as
evidence. Can it be sufficient under these circumstances for a witness
to declare that he knows from third parties that such reports were
submitted to Keitel?
Canaris, because of his particular activity, which took him constantly
to foreign countries on personal secret errands for Hitler, had access
to Hitler at all times. He would thus have had an opportunity to go to
Hitler immediately if he had had such serious misgivings of conscience,
as Gisevius has declared he had. Why did he not do so?
Now, Gisevius, who in general has pronounced comprehensive and damning
accusations, has, luckily for Keitel, at one point of his deposition
made a positive declaration that permits of objective verification. I
quote:
“...I believe that I have still two examples to mention, which
to me are particularly characteristic: First, the attempt was
made by all possible means to induce Field Marshal Keitel to
warn Hitler against the invasion of Holland and Belgium, that
is, to inform Hitler that the information submitted by Keitel
about alleged violations of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians
was false. The Counterintelligence Office was to prepare reports
incriminating the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that
time refused to sign these reports. I request that this be
verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that this report which was
ostensibly made by the OKW was false. This is an instance where
Herr Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he was supposed to
have transmitted...”
I have submitted to General Jodl, here on the witness stand, Document
790-PS, which refers to the case of the _White Paper_ concerning
violations of neutrality by Holland and Belgium. Jodl testified
literally, and I quote:
“...I understand the question, and would like very briefly to
state the facts how it was possible—if disgust does not choke
me. I was present when Canaris came to the Field Marshal in the
Reich Chancellery with these report notes and laid before him
the draft of the Foreign Office’s _White Paper_. Field Marshal
Keitel then looked it through, above all paying attention to the
comments which Canaris had made at the request of the Foreign
Office, namely, that the reports were perhaps still somewhat in
need of improvement, that he should confirm the fact that a
military operation against Holland and Belgium was absolutely
necessary, and that, as is expressed here, a final really
striking violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before
Canaris had said a word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on
the table and said: ‘I refuse to do this, why should I take any
responsibility at all for a political decision? In this _White
Paper_ there appear word for word, true and correct, the very
same reports that you, yourself, Canaris, brought to me.’ To
this Canaris said: I am entirely of the same point of view. It
is, in my opinion too, entirely superfluous to have this
document signed on the part of the Armed Forces, and the reports
that we have here are altogether quite sufficient to prove the
violations of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and
Belgium.’ And he advised Field Marshal Keitel not to sign it at
all. That is the way it happened. The Field Marshal then took
the paper with him and I do not know what happened
subsequently...”
Keitel did not sign the _White Paper_. Therefore in the only verifiable
case a clear proof is obtained of the incorrectness of Gisevius’
testimony.
According to the statement of the witness Gisevius, Keitel exerted a
tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army. These words, without any
presentation of concrete facts, are only a phrase in the mouth of a man
who had no contact whatsoever with Keitel. They are refuted by the
statements of Reich Marshal Göring, Admiral Dönitz, and Admiral Raeder.
Jodl has defined this statement as merely a figure of speech.
Insofar as the witness speaks of his tremendous influence on the OKW, it
must appear questionable what he really means. Naturally, Keitel as
Chief of Staff had influence in the OKW, influence which resulted from
his position, which I have already discussed. His position in relation
to his subordinates will be taken up later. The important thing,
however, is whether Keitel had a decisive and culpable influence on what
happened. That this was not the case has even been confirmed by
Gisevius, and also the fact that he had no decisive influence on the
branches of the Armed Forces; it has also been established by the
results of the testimony.
A particularly damaging charge against the Defendant Keitel was “that
instead of placing himself in front of his subordinate officers to
protect them, he threatened to hand them over to the Gestapo.”
In contradiction to this it has been established that no chief of office
in the OKW was dismissed in the years up to 1944; furthermore, until 20
July 1944, the day of the attempt on Hitler’s life and the transfer of
the judicial power in the home Army to Himmler, no officer of the OKW
was turned over to the Police. Admiral Dönitz has confirmed that the
branches of the Armed Forces and the OKW were very scrupulous in
maintaining the privileges of the Armed Forces in relation to the
Police.
The Court has also seen here how General Jodl spoke about his
relationship to the Defendant Keitel. I think this remark has a special
importance, not only because Keitel lived on companionable and friendly
terms with his official subordinate, General Jodl, during their long
years of co-operation. As natural as that may appear, the less natural
it is if one reflects that Jodl, in spite of his officially subordinate
position, in reality became more and more Hitler’s sole strategic
adviser. What this means, considering the preponderance of the
operational tasks in the war, has been convincingly demonstrated here by
General Jodl.
If Keitel accepted this without jealousy, freely acknowledging the
superiority of his subordinate Jodl in this domain, this proves that
Keitel possessed a trait of character which refutes the information
derived from obscure sources by the witness Gisevius.
The proven fact that Keitel lived on friendly and companionable terms
with his subordinate Chief of Office, Canaris, is also in contrast with
the assertion to the contrary by the witness Gisevius.
In this connection it is necessary to refer to the fact, not submitted
by Keitel but testified to by Jodl without Keitel’s consent, that the
latter supported and helped Canaris’ family after his arrest. I only
refer to this to refute the perhaps most serious personal reproach,
according to which Keitel did not behave decently toward his
subordinates and abused his superior position—which was especially
powerful in military life—even to the point of threatening them with
violence.
In reality, according to Gisevius’ evidence, Admiral Canaris not only
played a double role officially, but also with respect to the Defendant
Keitel; in exploiting the friendship shown to him he expressed a similar
attitude, whereas among his own group he openly spoke in a spiteful way
about Keitel.
Finally, in this connection reference must still be made to the evidence
of the witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels (Session of 8 May 1946) from
which it is clear that Keitel always treated the officers of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff kindly.
The witness mentions a quarrel between himself and Lieutenant Colonel
Ziervogel on the one hand and Himmler on the other, in which Keitel, to
whom the incident was reported, immediately and energetically intervened
in writing to protect his subordinates against Himmler. The affidavit of
the Chief of Office in Canaris’ office, Admiral Bürckner, to which I
refer, testifies in the same way to Keitel’s kindly attitude toward his
subordinates. At any rate, it must be said in clarification that Keitel
many times had occasion to speak energetically to his office and
department chiefs.
I shall then continue by explaining that officers did not generally
concern themselves with politics, and that only when the situation
became worse did they make political information the subject of their
argumentation. And I add that Keitel has, in fact, defined his attitude
with words based on the assumption that the soldier in war must declare
his faith and obedience, and if Keitel ever heard anything about such
matters, he would reprimand these officers.
Dr. Gisevius himself has said here that it was strictly forbidden for
officers to concern themselves with political questions. The Defendant
Keitel has stated that Hitler several times categorically declared the
politicians were not allowed to concern themselves with military
questions because they knew nothing of them; neither were the generals
allowed to concern themselves with politics, because they knew nothing
about that either.
Hitler’s fundamental attitude in this question is shown in the decree
dating from 1936, or the winter 1936-37, by which political reports to
or for the Armed Forces were prohibited.
In logical execution of Führer Order Number 1, Hitler not only wanted an
absolute separation of the fields of activity, but also that no office
should ever be informed of the proceedings in another office. It was
only a logical consequence that Hitler strictly prohibited any
discussion of political questions by officers, and that the Defendant
Keitel, while carrying out this prohibition which he himself approved,
charged his officers, when there was reason to do so, to refrain from
such discussions.
It is obvious that this was not a question of an academic discussion of
political problems, but of an attitude revealing itself as negative
toward the position of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. As
long as there were successes, there was no question of this. After
Stalingrad one could hear expressions of opinion, which at that time
were characterized by Keitel as the expressions of a weak nature.
In accordance with his fundamental attitude that a soldier in wartime
should show unconditional and natural loyalty toward his people and
fatherland as represented by the head of the State and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces (and to an extreme degree when reverses set in),
Keitel was actually ruthless in condemning such expressions. He did not
wish even to cause the impression that he was of a different opinion
than his superior, that he personally had fears.