“A: ‘There were two pamphlets issued; one issued by Sauckel, and
the other issued in conjunction with DAF and Sauckel and the
Ministry for the East.’
“Q: ‘Has he one handy?’
“A: ‘I have not got a copy of this pamphlet.’
“(Signed) Beil.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal rely on counsel, you know; and
when you tell us that this is an important affidavit, we rely on what
you tell us. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the reading of the
affidavit was an absolute waste of the Tribunal’s time.
DR. THOMA: I should like to put another request to the Tribunal. I have
asked that I be granted an interrogatory for the
Reichshauptstellenleiter Dr. Oeppert, of the office of the Delegate of
the Führer for the supervision of the entire ideological and mental
relation of the NSDAP under Rosenberg’s office. This affidavit has not
been granted to me, but I already have it on hand.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution seen it?
DR. THOMA: No, Mr. President, I do not think so. I submitted an
application to the General Secretary. Whether this request has already
been transmitted to the Prosecution, I do not know.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only application that we have got, as far as I
can see, is an interrogatory to Dr. Köppen in lieu of Dr. Stellbrecht.
Is that the one that you are speaking about now?
DR. THOMA: No. Mr. President, I was granted permission to interrogate
Dr. Köppen instead of Dr. Stellbrecht, and the interrogatory has already
been sent off. This, however, is a new application regarding Dr. Oeppert
and has not yet been decided upon.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better submit it to the Prosecution and see
whether they have any comment to make on it, and we can take it up
tomorrow.
DR. THOMA: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the case of Papen there are six interrogatories which
have not been disposed of. Three of them have been returned in the last
few days and are in the stage of being translated. I asked, when I
received my last interrogatory, to be allowed to submit all six at one
time to the Tribunal.
Then, without my taking any steps to get it, I received an affidavit 3
days ago from a foreign journalist, Rademacher von Unna, from Milan,
Italy. This affidavit is being translated at present. I submitted it to
the British prosecutor, and he does not object. I ask to be allowed to
submit this affidavit later with the remainder of my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly you may submit it. We shall then pass an
opinion upon it as to its admissibility.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you, Mr. President.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Frank and Hess): Mr. President,
I ask permission to submit the answers to the interrogatories from the
witnesses which have not yet been submitted. As Exhibit Frank-19 I
submit the answers to the interrogatory given by the witness Dr. Ernst
Böpple. Böpple was State Secretary in the Government General, and he has
answered 41 questions in all.
As Number Frank-20, I submit the answers to an interrogatory given by
the witness Max Meidinger. Meidinger was chief of the chancellery of the
Government General. He has answered 43 questions. This interrogatory, as
well as the first interrogatory by Böpple, as far as I could make out,
has not been translated yet, although I handed these interrogatories in
to be translated about 10 days ago. But attached to the interrogatory
there is an English translation which was made during the interrogation.
As Number Frank-21 I submit the answers given by the witness Gassner,
who answered 49 questions. Gassner was press chief in the Government
General.
Number Frank-22 will be the interrogatory deposed by the witness Dr.
Stepp, who in the end was president of the Court of Appeals
(Oberlandesgericht). He deals mainly with the efforts made by the
Defendant Frank in the years 1933 and 1934, in his capacity as Bavarian
Minister of Justice, for the dissolution of the concentration camp at
Dachau.
I should also like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, of pointing
out an error of translation which does not refer to the documents of
Frank but to a document which was submitted on behalf of the Defendant
Hess. Although it was not used by the Prosecution with regard to the
personal responsibility of Rudolf Hess, it is found in the document
book, and the document concerned is Exhibit USA-696, Document 062-PS.
That is a directive of 13 March 1940, the same directive which was
mentioned last Saturday in the case of the Defendant Bormann, on which
occasion the President himself read Figure 4 of this directive, which
was submitted as an appendix to this directive of 13 March. There is a
very serious error in translation, which completely distorts the sense
of the directive and which, I must say, can have very dangerous
consequences.
Under Figure 4 the words “unschädlich gemacht” (made harmless) were
translated as “liquidated.”
THE PRESIDENT: If there is an error in the translation, you had better
apply to the General Secretary; and he will have the matter gone into by
the Translation Division.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, but the matter does not seem to be as
simple as that. The translator obviously had the feeling himself that
his translation was not reproducing the sense quite accurately, because
in parentheses he added “unschädlich gemacht.” In my opinion this
sentence must be translated as follows: “Likewise, enemy parachutists
are immediately to be arrested or made harmless.” The sense was
obviously that the parachutists...
THE PRESIDENT: I dare say, Dr. Seidl, but we do not have the document
before us and we do not all of us understand the German language.
Therefore, it had better be referred to the Translation Division. It is
no good referring it to us.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall put a written application to the General
Secretary, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution any objection to these
interrogatories which Dr. Seidl has been dealing with? Have the
Prosecution had the opportunity of putting cross-interrogatories if they
wanted to do so?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I am told that we think so, with the possible
exception of the last one. Perhaps I could look into it overnight.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will look into that point and let the Tribunal know.
My Lord, the Prosecution have a few documents to put in. I have eight,
and I think my friend Mr. Dodd has three. I could do it very quickly,
but it might be more convenient to do it tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: We will go into all these documents tomorrow morning.
There will be some others on behalf of some of the other defendants. We
will also hear the witnesses Kempka and Walkenhorst, I believe it is,
whom Dr. Bergold wishes to call.
The Tribunal desires Dr. Bergold to be here tomorrow morning in order to
be able to examine these witnesses.
The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 July 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 3 July 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Bergold asked any of the defendants’ counsel to
represent him?
[_There was no response._]
Has the Marshal been able to get in touch with Dr. Bergold?
MARSHAL: No, Sir.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, Dr. Bergold was advised yesterday that his
presence would be required in the courtroom today. As far as I have
heard—and I have only heard this—the General Secretary also got in
touch with him regarding this matter. I am sorry I cannot tell you any
more about it. As far as I know, he did not ask anyone to represent him
in Court today.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I shall look into this matter immediately,
to see whether he has arrived or whether I can contact him.
THE PRESIDENT: Very good; and Dr. Stahmer, I think the best course would
be for the Tribunal to consider the various applications with reference
to interrogatories and documents, which I think you and other counsel
wish to offer in evidence, and the Tribunal will then examine these
witnesses if Dr. Bergold is not here by that time. The Tribunal, of
course, expect him to be here if it is possible. Perhaps you will
communicate with him, and the Marshal should also communicate with Dr.
Bergold.
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
MARSHAL: Yes, Sir.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr.
President, I have learned that the son of Dr. Bergold returned yesterday
unexpectedly and suddenly from a prisoner-of-war camp. Therefore, Dr.
Bergold went to his home, a short distance from Nuremberg. I asked his
secretary to go to Dr. Bergold’s home and to bring him here and I assume
he will be here within approximately half an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you have some interrogatories, I think,
which you want to offer in evidence, have you not?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Sir. At the end of my presentation I still had some
interrogatories which I had been permitted to present but which had not
arrived.
First of all, I shall turn to the interrogatory of Kammhuber, who was a
general in the Air Force. He submitted an organizational study for 1950,
which was completed on 2 May 1938. He was questioned about the purpose
and significance of this study and he stated—I will give a short
summary—that a part of it, which came under the heading of “long term
objective” was a tentative sketch based on theoretical assumptions. Then
there was a second part which gave the deadline of 1942, and the interim
solution for 1 October 1938. This was a positive proposal for the
organization of the Luftwaffe.
This study was compiled by the author on his own initiative. The witness
does not know whether it was actually submitted to Göring. He considers
it improbable, but he does assume that he did suggest the positive
proposal for the organization of the Luftwaffe to Göring.
That is the substance of this interrogatory which will be called Exhibit
Number Göring-54.
I have another interrogatory which I should like to submit, which
originates from General Kurt Student. This deals with the air attack on
Rotterdam in May of 1940. It is an explanation...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies of these affidavits, I mean these
interrogatories? We have got this one you are now offering of Student,
but we have not got the one of Kammhuber.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I submitted this material to the Translation
Division and I asked that the translations should be ready. I shall look
into the matter and see what has become of it. At any rate, I did submit
the originals to the Translation Division.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; the General Secretary will look into it. And this
one of Student, has that been applied for and granted? It is not on my
list.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, it has been granted, and the
Prosecution has submitted a counterinterrogatory to this one. I
believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. STAHMER: If I am not mistaken, this interrogatory of Student’s was
granted on 14 February, if I remember rightly.
Student deals with the air attack on Rotterdam in May 1940. He gives the
necessary explanation as to how it came about that during capitulation
negotiations bombs were still being dropped on Rotterdam. Here, too, I
believe, I can refer to this interrogatory. The facts were that
capitulation negotiations were in progress when an air attack had been
planned and the squadron which was being employed could not be advised
in time by wireless. Then the ground troops gave signals, which were
misunderstood by one group...
THE PRESIDENT: It appears that it covers the same ground that has
already been covered in evidence; does it not?
DR. STAHMER: It has been dealt with in the examination; yes, that is
correct, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then it should not be read under any circumstances now.
DR. STAHMER: Then I shall submit this document...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, offer it in evidence. But I mean, you need not read
it in detail.
DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President. This will be Exhibit Number
Göring-53.
Then, Mr. President, I have another interrogatory by a general of the
Air Force, Koller, which I should like to submit. This will be submitted
as Exhibit Number Göring-55.
Mr. President, I ask the permission of the High Tribunal to read these
questions, for there is a special significance connected with the
testimony given by this witness in relation to the defendant in this
proceeding:
“Question 1: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring at any time
issue an order that enemy airmen who had been shot down should
be handed over to the Police, the SD, or that they should be
shot without a trial?
“Answer: As far as I know, no. In any case, I know of no such
order issued by the Reich Marshal.
“Question 2: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring help to
formulate an order on the strength of which the British flying
officers who escaped from Stalag III at Sagan in March 1944 were
shot by the Police or SD?
“Answer: General Korten told me that the Luftwaffe, the Air
Force—meaning the Reich Marshal and he, Korten, himself—had no
part in the issuing of this order.
“Question 3: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring learn of the
fact contained in Question 2 only after the order given by
Hitler had been carried out?
“Answer: General Korten told me that he and the Reich Marshal
did not get to know of it until later.
“Question 4: On what day was this order issued by Hitler?
“Answer: I do not know.
“Question 5: On what day, or on what days, was this order
carried out?
“Answer: I do not know.
“Question 6: Do you know whether the former Reich Marshal Göring
very strongly condemned the shooting of these 50 British Air
Force officers?
“Answer: General Korten told me that the Reich Marshal was very
angry about this shooting.
“Question 7: Have you any knowledge as to whether the former
Reich Marshal Göring and his deputy for the Air Force, the Chief
of the General Staff, repeatedly remonstrated with Hitler about
the measures which Hitler had ordered to be taken against the
enemy terror-fliers who had been shot down?
“Answer: According to statements which General Korten made to me
in June of 1944, that is correct. I remember too that some time
afterward it was reported to me that the Reich Marshal had
complained to the Führer about the action taken by Party
organizations and individuals among the population against
so-called terror-fliers, for the reason that some of our own air
crews had come to harm.
“In March of 1945 he flatly turned down the order given by the
Führer that all enemy crews which had been shot down and which
would be shot down in the future should be turned over to the
SD.
“Replying to Questions 1 to 7, I should like to state in
explanation and in supplement: During the period which is
covered by the report I was Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations
Staff. In February 1944 the Führer’s headquarters transferred to
Berchtesgaden the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Reich
Marshal with his personal entourage and the Chief of the General
Staff of the Air Force, General Korten, together with two or
three ordnance officers. I had to stay with the High Command of
the Luftwaffe, that is, with the whole working staff known as
Robinson, in East Prussia, as it was expected that the Führer’s
headquarters would have to be moved back quickly. The whole
signal apparatus and the apparatus for the issuing of orders for
Luftwaffe supplies was to be under the control of Robinson.
“Due to the separation of the High Command of the Luftwaffe on
the one hand and the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General
Staff on the other hand, a separation which was prolonged from
week to week, we in East Prussia did not have knowledge about
many things which were being handled directly in Berchtesgaden.
Often we received no knowledge at all of important Führer
directives, or if we did, we received the information very late.
It was not until the beginning of June—I believe it was the
week after Whitsun—that I, together with some assistant
officers, was transferred to Berchtesgaden. From February until
that time, I think I had attended only one conference at
Berchtesgaden.
“As to Questions 2 to 6, which deal with Sagan, it was from
General Korten that I learned, and I believe Colonel Christian
informed me almost at the same time, that the airmen who had
escaped from Sagan had been shot by order of the Führer. I
rather think I heard about it first from General Korten, who, if
I remember rightly, told me about it during one of the rather
long telephone conversations which we had every evening. Korten
made it quite clear that he disapproved of this, for the reasons
which I mentioned in reply to Questions 2, 3, and 6. The
conversation must have taken place at the end of March or the
beginning of April. However, I cannot give the exact date.
“In reply to Questions 1 and 7, concerning the terror-fliers, it
was approximately the beginning of June 1944—at first I thought
that it was in July, but I think now that it must have been
June—when General Korten advised me that the Führer intended to
order that terror-fliers be left to the fury of the people.
“We discussed this matter repeatedly and we all agreed in our
opposition. We had always considered the direct attacks by
low-flying enemy aircraft on the civilian population, on women
and children, gatherings of civilians, civilian passenger
trains, hospitals, school children who were out for a walk, our
own crews who were parachuting to earth, and farmers who were
tilling their fields, cruel and contrary to international law,
but we did not consider the decree which the Führer intended to
issue to be the proper way to solve this very difficult problem.
Our reasons for this refusal were articles of war, international
law, it was against fundamental soldierly principles, and it
would lead to many misunderstandings inflicting harm not only to
enemy fliers, but also to our own men and affecting the morale
of our own crews...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, is this not really going into argument and
not dealing with facts? It really is not necessary for you to read all
this witness’ arguments about it. He is not really dealing with facts at
all now and it is in detail...
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, these are the facts which he discussed with
General Korten, the facts which decided them to reject the Führer’s
order. These were the reasons which he and Korten discussed...
THE PRESIDENT: Some of what you have read no doubt is a matter of fact,
but what you are now reading is a matter of argument.
DR. STAHMER: No, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, surely you can summarize the rest of this.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document is of great importance to the
defendant because it deals with just those points with which he is
accused and which distress him most and...
THE PRESIDENT: I heard you say it is of great importance and therefore
you have been reading it and insofar as it is statement of fact, it
seems to me that there is some excuse for reading it in detail. But when
you come to matters of argument, it seems to me there is no excuse for
reading it, because argument by a particular witness is not really
relevant for the Tribunal’s consideration at all. Summarize the
argument, if you like. I mean, you have read the factual part. Summarize
the rest which—maybe you can tell us, if you like, what the argument
is.
DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President. General Korten further stated
that all the documents which are relevant to the question of
terror-fliers and the shooting of the Royal Air Force officers have been
submitted to him and after perusing them he arrived at the conclusion
that the contents of these documents is proof of the fact that the High
Command of the Armed Forces as well as the Reich Marshal opposed this
action and did everything in their power to prevent the measure intended
by Hitler from being put into effect. He particularly points out that in
one of these letters there is a marginal note to the effect that it was
not possible to get a reply from the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force, and he concludes from that that the Reich Marshal personally
opposed any final decision of this matter.
Then there is a further incident dealt with in:
“Question 8: Did the Führer, for the reason stated under Figure
5, on the occasion of a situation discussion and in the presence
of all who attended it, excitedly accuse the German Luftwaffe of
having made a mutual coward’s agreement with the Allied Air
Forces?
“Answer: During the first half of March 1945, Bormann showed the
Führer a note taken from a correspondent’s report in the Allied
press. The gist of this note was: The crew of an American
fighter plane, which shortly before had been shot down over
Germany, had been picked up by advancing American troops. The
crew had testified that the enraged civilians had mishandled
them, had threatened them with death, and in all probability
they would have been lynched if it had not been for the German
soldiers who had liberated them and protected them. Bormann
pointed out to Hitler in a few words that this confirmed the
fact that German soldiers, in instances such as this, were going
against their own countrymen; and he concluded his remarks
somewhat as follows: ‘My Führer, that is the way your orders are
being carried out.’ Thereupon in the presence of all who
attended the situation discussion the Führer made some very
excited statements and among other things the Führer said to me,
‘If my orders are not being carried out it is due to the
cowardice of the Luftwaffe because the men in the Luftwaffe are
cowards and they are afraid that something might happen to them,
too, some day. The whole business is nothing but a cowards’
agreement between the German Luftwaffe and the English and
American airmen.’ I reported this to the Reich Marshal.
“Whether Hitler made the same remark to the Reich Marshal
personally, that I am not able to say; but I consider it quite
probable, because when making reproaches of this kind,
especially if they applied to the Luftwaffe, he often repeated
himself and used the same expressions.
“Question 9: On what day did this discussion take place?
“Answer: I cannot give the date.”
Now we come to:
“Question 10: Did the Führer repeatedly order the former Reich
Marshal to divulge the name of the officer of the Luftwaffe who,
in May of 1944, protected an Allied airman who had been shot
down in Munich from being lynched by the population? But despite
repeated inquiries on the part of the Führer, the Reich Marshal
gave no instructions to find out the name of this officer and to
make it known to the Führer?”
I can summarize the answer. He says he cannot state this from his own
experience; it had only been reported to him that an officer of the
Luftwaffe and an Ortsgruppenleiter had interfered on behalf of this
American crew; that the Ortsgruppenleiter, who was known, was shot on
Hitler’s order; that Hitler then demanded to have the name of the
Luftwaffe officer given to him and that he had not been told the name.
He said further that if the Reich Marshal had actually wanted to find
out the name of this Luftwaffe officer, he could easily have done so.
“Question 11: At the end of the war did the Luftwaffe ever
receive orders to destroy Dachau Concentration Camp with bombs
at the approach of the enemy? In particular, was an order to
that effect given by the Gauleiter in Munich under the code word
‘Wolke’? Could a Gauleiter give such instructions to the
Luftwaffe?”
Here again I can summarize the answer. The witness says,
“I do not recall any order to that effect,” and especially he does not
know whether the Gauleiter in Munich gave such an order. The Gauleiter
was not competent to give an order of this kind and he does not believe
that a senior officer of the Luftwaffe would have been willing to carry
out such an order.
“Question 12: What do you know about the attitude of the Reich
Marshal and his Luftwaffe to enemy airmen who had been shot
down?
“Answer: Notwithstanding occasional expressions of displeasure,
the attitude of the Reich Marshal was always correct and
chivalrous, which was in line with the Air Force tradition which
he learned in the first World War and to which he frequently
referred.
“Of course, in his anxiety about the great difficulties of air
defense and pressed by the Führer, perhaps on occasion he used
harsh words. These words, however, were soon forgotten and I do
not know of a single case where the Reich Marshal followed up
these spontaneous utterances by incorrect or harsh measures or
orders against members of foreign air forces. The conduct of the
entire Luftwaffe was always correct and humane. To fight in a
chivalrous manner was a matter of honor with the German airmen.
To quote only a few examples of many: Although the enemy crews
shot at German airmen who were parachuting to earth, and these
practices were bitterly resented by our airmen and some...”
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Stahmer. Again, what you are now reading is all
comment; it is not statement of facts, it is comment and argument.
DR. STAHMER: Now Mr. President, he is coming to an example in which he
reports about those things.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, let us come to it.
DR. STAHMER: Yes. The sea rescue services of the Luftwaffe from the Bay
of Heligoland through the English Channel as far as Brest, in the Bay of
Biscay, in the Atlantic, and in the Mediterranean, was put into use for
the enemy in the same way as for the Germans. The rescue service fliers
and the rescue service boats made untiring efforts and showed exemplary
self-sacrifice in going to the rescue of friend and foe in distress.
Even when...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Stahmer, these were not particular instances.
These were not particular facts. They are just general statements which
are really comments and argument about the chivalry of the German Air
Force; that is all.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, by this he is trying to prove the chivalry
of the German Air Force.
THE PRESIDENT: But he does not prove it by making a general statement.
DR. STAHMER: No. Later on he comes—he will go on to say how many they
have rescued, how many of those were enemies and how many were their own
people. I believe these facts, Mr. President, are important when judging
the attitude of the Luftwaffe.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I said just now, if you will get down to
the facts, if you have got the numbers, well then, no doubt that will be
a matter of fact.
DR. STAHMER: Of the thousands who were rescued from the sea by the
German Luftwaffe Rescue Service the great majority belonged to the
enemy—members of enemy air crews, crews of enemy ships. Without being
able to give exact figures at the moment, I would estimate—according to
my memory I would say that the proportion of enemy rescued was from 70
to 80 percent. And he continues:
“If, when we went out to rescue our own people or to make
reconnaissance flights for them or were engaged on other work,
we saw that crews, also enemy crews, were in distress off the
enemy coast or beyond the range of our own rescue services, we
immediately signaled to the enemy and called upon him to go to
the rescue.”
Then there are several questions put by the Prosecution. The first
question is: “What had Kaltenbrunner to do with...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, it is for the Prosecution to read their
questions if they want to read them.
DR. STAHMER: I am not interested in these questions, Mr. President.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Prosecution do not want the questions read.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read them. Do you mean you want to put
them in—put them in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will put them in, but we do not want them
read.
THE PRESIDENT: Right.
DR. STAHMER: I have already stated that this is Exhibit Göring-55.
Then I have one more interrogatory, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you realize that the Tribunal proposes to
read all the evidence and therefore these interrogatories will be read
and considered even though they are not read now in open court. You have
offered them in evidence, so the Tribunal will be grateful if you will
cut short the reading of these affidavits and interrogatories as far as
possible.
DR. STAHMER: I shall proceed accordingly, Mr. President. Now, we turn to
the interrogatory of Hammerstein which I shall submit as Exhibit Number
Göring-52. Mr. President, this interrogatory is not at my disposal in
the original. I can only submit an attested copy. It has been submitted
to the Prosecution; it has been translated but it cannot be found at the
moment. But I assume I shall find the original very soon; I have advised
Sir David of this. The British Prosecution has already had it and this
document has been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the original has been mislaid or something.
DR. STAHMER: It has been mislaid, Mr. President, and I am unable to find
it at the moment. Anyhow, it has been submitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is no objection to this
affidavit. I have a copy in front of me. It is general in its terms and,
if I may say so, I thought it would serve its purpose admirably if Dr.
Stahmer put it in and the Tribunal consider it in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: The original will be submitted in the next few days. It is
an interrogatory of the Judge Advocate of the Air Force, Dr. Von
Hammerstein. For several years he was the Supreme Judge of the Air Force
and in that capacity he reported once a month to the Defendant Göring.
Thus he was in a position to judge the attitude of Göring as supreme
legal authority and he now describes in detail how seriously the
Defendant Göring took his duties as supreme legal authority.
He further describes how the Reich Marshal Göring reserved to himself
the right to decide the more important matters; how he took great care
in dealing with all matters, how he insisted that the soldiers under his
command must maintain strict discipline. He particularly saw to it that
the soldiers under his command were punished most severely if they
committed illegal acts against the civilian population and especially
against the civilian population in the occupied countries.
Then he further describes how Reich Marshal Göring demanded severe
punishment particularly when it was a question of violating the honor of
women and how in the many decrees he always insisted that due respect to
the honor of women was the first duty of a soldier; how in serious cases
of rape, he always demanded the death penalty, no matter what the
nationality of the woman was. In two cases, for instance, he rescinded
the sentences because they were too lenient and he confirmed the
sentence only after the death penalty had been pronounced.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, surely, what you have said, Dr. Stahmer, has given
us the substance of the affidavit. You said that this man was the Judge
Advocate for the Air Force and that the law with reference to offenses
in the Air Force was strictly carried out. I am sure that is all you
want to say in summarizing it.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President. What I wanted to bring out was that it
did not matter what the nationality of the woman involved was. In one
case against a Russian woman, he...
THE PRESIDENT: That is exactly what I have said, that the law was
strictly carried out. It is only an illustration of how the law was
strictly carried out.
DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President, I have given the substance. I
shall dispense with all further explanation and submit this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks that their time is being
wasted, and unless Counsel for the Defense can do what the Tribunal
desires them to do, which is to offer these affidavits and
interrogatories in evidence, giving the shortest possible summary or
description of the affidavits or interrogatories, the Tribunal will have
to order that the interrogatories and affidavits shall be simply offered
in evidence, and they will hear no comment whatever on them.
The time is approaching immediately when the defense counsel are going,
to make their speeches, and if there is anything in these affidavits or
interrogatories of real importance, they will have the opportunity then
of commenting upon it. And also, the Tribunal itself proposes to read
not only the oral evidence, but the documentary evidence in this case.
DR. STAHMER: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit this document
under Exhibit Number Göring-52.
THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop,
Dr. Horn, you have no affidavits or interrogatories to put in, have you,
that have been approved by the Tribunal?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I ask to be permitted to submit four affidavits
to the Tribunal.
We are concerned here with the affidavit of Legation Counsellor Dr.
Eberhardt von Thadden. Legation Counsellor Von Thadden was in the
Information Office Number 14 of the Foreign Office, which was a branch
which dealt with the Jewish problem and with the co-ordination of
anti-Semitic propaganda in foreign countries with other German agencies.
It was...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, have you applied for these documents?
DR. HORN: I applied to the General Secretary in writing and I asked that
these affidavits be accepted. This morning I received confirmation that
these affidavits had been given to the Prosecution and to the
Translation Division. Therefore, I beg to submit this document as
Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-319.
A further affidavit which I am submitting, and I have applied to the
General Secretary in writing for its acceptance, is the affidavit of Dr.
Werner Best, the former Reich plenipotentiary.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, but I was telling Dr. Horn that we
have not had copies of these yet; they have not reached us so far.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have before me a list of four affidavits,
Thadden, Best, Ribbentrop and Schulze, and it is stated that they are
not approved by the Tribunal. Therefore...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Dr. Horn mentioned them to me a day or
two ago and asked me whether I should object to their being translated,
and I said “no,” that I should not object to their being translated. Of
course, I have not had a chance to see them.
THE PRESIDENT: Would not the best course, as they have gone to the
Translation Division, be for them to be offered in evidence now, as I
understand Dr. Horn is intending to do, subject, of course, to any
question which may arise as to their admissibility?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you will just give us the numbers then.
DR. HORN: The affidavit signed by Best I should like to submit as
Exhibit Ribbentrop-320. I should like to give a brief explanation of the
reason for this affidavit.
In cross-examination, my client was confronted with Document 2375-PS.
This document is an affidavit of a colonel of the Police, Dr. Rudolf
Mildner. A passage from this affidavit which dealt with the handling of
the Jewish question in Denmark was quoted to my client. I examined this
document and have ascertained that two documents bear the Number
2375-PS. One document is a statement made by Dr. Mildner which was not
made under oath. This statement which was not made under oath contained
that passage which was put to my client in cross-examination. Under the
same number there is an affidavit which has been sworn and is also by
Dr. Mildner. The passage about the attitude of Ribbentrop to the Jewish
question is not contained in this affidavit.
For this reason, I have got Dr. Best, who had been instructed by
Ribbentrop to handle the Jewish question and, according to Dr. Mildner,
did do so, to give this affidavit, Document Number Ribbentrop-320, which
I am now submitting to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HORN: Apart from that my client was confronted in cross-examination
with a series of documents to which he could make only brief statements
as they were lengthy documents, most of which he had not seen before. I
should like to ask the Tribunal to permit me to submit a few brief
explanations on behalf of my client in the form of an affidavit, which I
shall call Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-321.
Then, I should like to be permitted to define my attitude on Document
TC-75. TC-75 represents a note sent by Ribbentrop to Hitler. This was
submitted by the Prosecution in a very abbreviated form. When I had this
document given to me in the original for the first time, the photo copy
tallied with the copy submitted by the Prosecution. When I had this same
document given to me a second time, I received a photostatic copy of
nine pages. In my final speech I should like to refer to this document.
Therefore, in order to save the Tribunal’s time I ask for permission to
submit this complete Document TC-75.