“On such occasions Dr. Goebbels stated that there was no longer
any objection to handing over crew members of crashed planes to
the wrath of the people.”
As you know, there has been a great deal of evidence about that before
this Tribunal. Did you in your propaganda speeches make any references
to this subject?
FRITZSCHE: No, I never advocated in my propaganda speeches that the
crews of aircraft which had been shot down should be killed. On the
other hand, I know that Dr. Goebbels, for reasons of intimidation,
ordered reports to be sent abroad already in the fall of 1944, reports
to the effect that, to quote an example, an Anglo-Saxon airplane which
had machine-gunned church-goers in the street on a Sunday had been shot
down and the members of the crew had been lynched by the people.
Actually this report had no factual basis; it hardly could have been
true, since it is quite improbable that an airplane is shot down at just
such a moment.
I know that Dr. Goebbels, through a circular letter addressed to the Gau
Propaganda Offices, asked that details of such incidents, if they
actually occurred, should be transmitted to him; but to my knowledge he
did not receive any factual details of this sort. That was also the time
in which he had an article on this subject written in Reich; I cannot
recall the title of this article at the moment. In any event, this
campaign, having died down in January or February, flared up again in
the days after the air attack on Dresden, and the following incident
occurred. Dr. Goebbels announced in the “11 o’clock morning conference,”
which has been mentioned quite frequently in this courtroom, that in the
Dresden attack 40,000 people had been killed. It was not known then that
the actual figure was a considerably higher one. Dr. Goebbels added that
in one way or another an end would now have to be put to this terror;
and Hitler was firmly determined to have English, American, and Russian
flyers shot in Dresden in numbers equal to the figure of Dresden
inhabitants who had lost their lives in this air attack. Then he turned
to me and asked me to prepare and announce this action. There followed
an incident: I jumped up and refused to do this. Dr. Goebbels broke off
the conference, asked me to come to his room, and there a very heated
discussion developed between us.
Finally I had persuaded him at least to the point where he promised me
to use his influence with Hitler himself, so that this plan would not be
carried through. I then spoke to Ambassador Rühle, the liaison man of
the Foreign Office and asked him to enlist the aid of his minister to
the same end. I also requested State Secretary Naumann to speak along
the same lines with Bormann, whose predominant influence was well known.
Following that, I had a discussion—under the existing regulations this
was not really permitted—with the representative of the protecting
power. In confidence, I gave him certain indications about the plan of
which I had heard and asked him whether he could suggest or supply me
with some argument or some means for countering this plan more
intensively.
He said he would attend to the matter with the utmost speed and he
called me up on the following morning. We had a second discussion, and
he told me that in the meantime a prospect for an exchange of prisoners
had been held out to him—that is, an exchange of German and English
prisoners—to comprise, I believe, 50,000 men.
I asked him to have this matter go through the normal diplomatic
channels, but to permit me to discuss this possibility of an exchange of
prisoners of war with Dr. Goebbels, Naumann, and Bormann. I did so, and
since just at that time the leaders were obviously especially interested
in returning prisoners of war who could perhaps still be used at the
front, this prospective offer...
THE PRESIDENT: How did you think that this possible exchange of
prisoners was going to affect the question of whether 40,000 English and
American, and Russian fliers would be killed as a reprisal?
FRITZSCHE: It appeared to me that at a time when we had the opportunity
of effecting an exchange of prisoners of war, all thought of an action
which was quite outside all human laws had to be repressed; that is, if
there was talk about an exchange of prisoners of war, the idea of a
gigantic shooting of prisoners had to be shunted into the background.
I conclude briefly. This plan was discussed. I told Dr. Goebbels about
it; and it was discussed in the evening with Hitler, according to
concurring reports which I had from two different sources. By some
strange accident the offer itself ran aground somewhere along the
bureaucratic channels many days after the settlement of this exciting
incident.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Can you hear now? I am asking you when you
heard about Hitler’s order, not with respect to these prisoners, but
with respect to the fliers who had landed? When did you first hear of
that? You said that in the fall Goebbels had sent abroad some propaganda
with respect to that order. Did you know about it then?
FRITZSCHE: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In the autumn of 1944 you knew about that
order?
FRITZSCHE: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you?
FRITZSCHE: I cannot say exactly, but in the autumn of 1944 I did not
know this order. I have to be extremely careful since I am under oath. I
believe I heard of the order only here in this courtroom, but that is
somewhat confused in my memory with the campaign of Dr. Goebbels which I
have just described. I cannot clearly...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Surely in that meeting in February that order
was discussed when they were discussing the killing of 40,000 prisoners,
was it not?
FRITZSCHE: No, on that occasion not at all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You had no doubt that Hitler wished to have
those prisoners killed, did you?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, at the time when Dr. Goebbels related the plan, I
believed that Hitler wished to carry through this action.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then the answer is “yes.” Now, you had no
doubt that Goebbels wanted them killed, did you?
FRITZSCHE: The 40,000 in Dresden?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
FRITZSCHE: In general, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I had no doubt that Goebbels also approved it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And which other of the leaders wished them
killed? It was apparently discussed a good deal; who else in the
Government was in favor of this policy?
FRITZSCHE: I cannot say with certainty whether Bormann was in favor of
it; he was the only other concerned. I do know, however, that Von
Ribbentrop, through Ambassador Rühle, made an attempt to dissuade Hitler
from this step. He opposed Hitler’s plan.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ribbentrop was working in this particular
problem of killing the prisoners? I am not clear about that. Did
Ribbentrop know about it?
FRITZSCHE: At that time I told Ambassador Rühle about this affair and
asked him to inform Ribbentrop and to enlist his aid. A day or two later
Rühle told me—we had frequent excited telephone conversations on this
matter—that Ribbentrop was...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not need the details. The answer is that
the Foreign Office knew, even if Ribbentrop may not have known
personally. Is that right?
FRITZSCHE: Ribbentrop was informed personally.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all I want to know.
FRITZSCHE: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know what attitude Bormann took in
this matter?
FRITZSCHE: According to the accounts that I heard, he at first supported
Hitler’s plan to shoot those 40,000; but afterwards, under the influence
of Goebbels and Naumann, he took the opposite view and co-operated in
dissuading Hitler from his intention.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they only consulted in the matter as far
as the commanders of the Wehrmacht were concerned?
FRITZSCHE: I know nothing about that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It is suggested that I should also ask you
this: Do you know what attitude Ribbentrop took on the shooting of these
prisoners?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. After Ambassador Rühle’s report to him, he used his
influence to prevent the execution of Hitler’s plan; in what way, I do
not know.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritz, do you wish to ask the defendant any question?
DR. FRITZ: No, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions arising out
of the questions that the Tribunal has asked?
GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, this brings me to the end of the evidence in
the case of the Defendant Fritzsche.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence all of the documents in your
two document books, each one of them?
DR. FRITZ: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they marked with exhibit numbers?
DR. FRITZ: Yes, I submitted all the originals.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Have you not got two Exhibits 1; Exhibit 1 in
one book and Exhibit 1 in the other book?
DR. FRITZ: No, there are no Fritzsche exhibits at all in my Document
Book 1, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh! I see. Very well. Well, that concludes the case of
Fritzsche?
DR. FRITZ: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, first of all I want to say that
I can also dispense with the witness Dr. Klöpfer, since he worked in
close contact with Bormann only after 1942, since he cannot testify on
most of the documents on which the Prosecution based its case, and since
he only directed the constitutional law department in the Party
Chancellery.
Mr. President, I want to begin my case by making a very brief basic
statement. The Defendant Bormann is absent; his associates, generally
speaking, are not at my disposal either. For that reason, I can only
attempt, on the basis of the documents presented by the Prosecution, to
submit some little evidence to prove that the defendant did not play the
large, legendary part which is now, after the collapse, attributed to
him. As a lawyer it has always been much against my will to build
something out of nothing; and I beg the High Tribunal to take this into
consideration when weighing my evidence, which must, therefore, be
extremely small in quantity. It is not negligence on my part that I
present so little, but it is the inability to find anything positive
from the available documents without the assistance of the defendant.
First of all, then, I come to the question of whether the case against
Bormann can be tried at all. I have offered evidence to show that it is
most likely that the Defendant Bormann died on 1 May 1945, during an
attempted escape from the Reich Chancellery. As my first witness who
could testify on this, I named the witness Else Krüger, and my
application for her was granted by the Tribunal. In my application of 26
June, I stated that I would waive the examining of this witness if the
High Tribunal would permit me to submit instead an affidavit containing
her testimony. I have not yet received an answer to this application;
but I presume, since I heard from Dr. Kempner that the Prosecution will
agree to this, that the High Tribunal also will not raise any objection.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought the application was withdrawn with reference to
the witness Krüger.
DR. BERGOLD: I stated that I would dispense with the witness provided
that I could submit her affidavit. There appears to be a
misunderstanding. The Prosecution informed me that it has no objection.
MR. DODD: We have said we had no objection, Mr. President, to the use of
the affidavit since he was waiving the calling of the witness.
DR. BERGOLD: I submit the affidavit as Document Number Bormann-12.
Then, I named three other witnesses who could testify that Bormann had
died. First, the witness Kempka, who for many years was Hitler’s
chauffeur and who was present when the attempted escape from the Reich
Chancellery failed. This witness is not here. According to information
which I have, he was interned at the camp at Freising in December 1945
in the hands of the American authorities; but unfortunately he has not
yet been produced.
I also named the witness Rattenhuber, who was also present when Bormann
died and who, according to the information which I have, is said to be
in the hands of the U.S.S.R.
The woman witness, Christians, who had been, granted me, could not be
located. She was interned in the camp at Oberursel; from there she was
given leave of which she took advantage to vanish. Apart from the
affidavit of the witness Krüger, therefore, I have no proof for my
statement that Bormann is dead. I regret very much indeed that I am not
in a position to present clear evidence on this point and that the
members of the Prosecution were not able to give me more support, for in
this way the formation of legends will be considerably strengthened.
Indeed, a sort of false Demetrius, false Martin Bormann, have already
made their appearance and are sending me letters which are signed Martin
Bormann but which cannot possibly have been written by him. I believe
that a service would have been rendered to the German nation, to the
Allies, and to the world generally if I had been in a position to
furnish this proof for which I had asked.