CHAPTER XXIII.

RUSSIA AND CHINA.

One cannot travel for four months through the two largest empires

in the world, without reflecting on the analogies and contrasts

which they mutually present, and trying to figure out the causes

which have been working such different results in each, since they

first became acquainted with one another. Analogies in the manners,

customs, and modes of thought of the two races are constantly

turning up; and their resemblance to the Chinese has become a

proverb among the Russians themselves.

Both empires were subjugated in the thirteenth century by the

Mongol-Tartar hordes under the descendants of Genghis; and

both succeeded in expelling the invaders from their respective

territories.

From that time the histories of Russia and China have been closely

interwoven; their frontiers have been gradually approaching each

other, as Russia extended her conquests eastward, and China

westward; and for the last two hundred years the advancing wave of

Russian aggression has impinged on the whole northern line of the

outlying deserts and wildernesses which own the sway of China.

The triumphal advance of the Russians over the aboriginal tribes

of Siberia was checked when it came in contact with the superior

civilisation and higher military organisation of the Chinese;

and, after a five years' war, China was in a position to impose

conditions on Russia, which was done by the treaty of Nerchinsk,

1689. But the Russian schemes have never been abandoned. With the

patience of the Asiatic, combined with the determination of the

European, Russia has contested the frontiers of China with slow

and fluctuating, but ultimately certain, success. Sometimes by

force of arms, sometimes by diplomatic craft, by every device that

cunning could suggest, Russia has made good her progress in Chinese

territory from point to point, until the last grand _coup_ of

General Ignatieff in 1860 crowned all her endeavours with success.

By making dexterous use of the victory of the Anglo-French troops

at Peking, he, with a stroke of the pen, transferred to Russia the

whole coast of Manchu-Tartary, from the mouth of the Amur river to

the frontier of Corea.

When China first encountered Russia in the debates about the

frontier, every advantage was on the side of the former. China was

in the position of a powerful, wealthy, populous, and civilised

nation, dealing with barbarians. If men were wanted, the warlike

Manchus were ready at call. If money was wanted, the resources

of China, with her vast producing population, were immeasurably

superior to those of Russia, and perhaps to any country in the world

at that time. The Chinese were acting on the defensive, and near

home. The government was vigorous and intelligent, and naturally

confident of its own superiority. The Russian people were, on the

other hand, ignorant, servile, and degraded. Their government was

not much better; and their military resources could only be drawn

from vast, thinly peopled, unproductive steppes.

Peter the Great infused new life into Russia by the energy of his

own character, and the judicious encouragement of foreigners, by

which means he tried to graft civilisation on his unpromising stock.

Amid his varied cares he did not forget his supposed interests in

the far east; but both he and his successors found China too hard

a nut to crack. The Manchu emperors had consolidated their power in

China, and from the days of Kanghi, who drove the Russians from the

districts they had occupied on the Amoor in 1688, till the early

part of the present century, China was strong and prosperous. The

Czars could do no more than send embassies, chiefly charged with

mercantile questions, to the "Khan of Khans," at Peking.

The Russian ambassadors were treated as suppliants at Peking; their

reception was such as was accorded to the missions from subject

states--in Chinese phrase, "tribute bearers."

But Russia was all the while making rapid strides in her own

internal progress; foreign inventions, and foreign enterprise, were

largely subsidised, and Russia became a great military power.

The passion for aggrandisement was strongly developed in Peter, in

Catherine II., and in Nicholas; but still Russia could only knock

at the gates of China by means of peaceful missions, and China

could still afford to be supercilious. But while Russia progressed,

China at the best was stationary; and, since the first English war

in 1839-41, the germ of decay which the effeminate luxury of the

Chinese court had implanted into the Manchu dynasty, born in a

hardier climate, has rapidly spread over the whole complex machine

of Chinese government.

The degenerate Manchu emperors, forgetting the wisdom of their

fathers, abandoned themselves to flatterers, discontinued the manly

sports to which their predecessors attached so much importance,

neglected the affairs of government, and wallowed in sensuality.

The last emperor, Hienfung, died almost in the prime of life of the

grossest debauchery. A wide-spread corruption was the natural result

of the demoralisation of the court, and injustice and oppression

pressed heavily on the people. Brigandage on a gigantic scale

appeared, and soon wasted the fairest provinces of China, running

riot for ten years almost unchecked by the imbeciles who ruled at

the capital and in the provinces. The whole fabric was ready to fall

to pieces, and only waited for some determined will to take the

reins out of the hands that were no longer able to hold them.

Up to the last, however, the self-blinded rulers of China refused to

believe in their vulnerability, until the fatal delusion was rudely

dissipated by the capture of Peking itself by the Anglo-French

forces in 1860.

The empire lay prostrate at the feet of her conquerors, whose

moderation in the hour of victory was the marvel of the vanquished.

But China's extremity was Russia's opportunity; and the subtlety of

Russian diplomacy was never exhibited to greater advantage than on

this occasion.

The Russian minister had affected warm friendship to the Chinese

government in its troubles, and volunteered indirect assistance to

it in the impending struggle with the foreigner. But the moment

he saw the Chinese government at its wits' end, he swooped down

on it with unscrupulous demands, which included the cession to

Russia of the whole sea-coast of Manchuria, and the large tract

of country from the Usuri and Amoor rivers to the Sea of Japan.

The Chinese were in no condition to demur, and to aid them in

coming to a conclusion, they were gently told that in the event of

non-compliance, the vengeance of the Czar would be more terrible

than the chastisement they were then smarting from. The treaty was

made, and Russia triumphed.

The substantial loss to China of the Manchurian forests was

inconsiderable; but the importance of the gain to Russia can hardly

be over-rated. Up to that time, Russia had possessed no harbours on

the Pacific that were not closed by ice for half the year. This

new accession of maritime territory gives to Russia many excellent

harbours, particularly towards its southern extremity, which are

open several months longer than the harbour of Nikolaefsk at the

mouth of the Amoor. The new harbours in Manchuria are moreover of

easier access, not only shortening the voyage from Europe or China

by some 600 or 700 miles, but affording great advantages over

Nikolaefsk in the simplicity of navigation.

The present helpless condition of China is in a great measure

owing to the contempt of military affairs which a long peace had

engendered. The Chinese people are eminently averse to fighting,

and consequently to all military matters. They have a proverb which

illustrates this:

"Haou tih pu ta ting;

Haou jin pu tso-ping."

Of good iron you don't make a nail;

Of a good man you don't make a soldier.

They are too intent on industrial pursuits to waste men, time,

or money in feeding armies. Hence they are at the mercy not only

of foreign armed powers, but of any band of native ruffians who

may organise a pillaging expedition. An enlightened and energetic

government, alive to the progress of other nations, would have

seen that an efficient standing army was not only compatible with

the prosperity of the country, but absolutely essential to its

existence; and would have made a military nation of the Chinese in

spite of their more peaceful proclivities.

But the government of China has for half a century been the reverse

of this. Blind and deluded, it has wrapped itself up in false

security, trusting to ancient prestige and adroitness in negotiation

to keep the wolf from the door, and has let the military element

slip through its fingers. The paper wall collapsed at the first

touch of the hostile foreigner. The government lost the respect

of its own people, and became more than ever a by-word among the

nations.

The ascendancy of Russia, on the other hand, is due directly

to her military organisation. Her frequent struggles in Europe

compelled her to look well to her armies; and the ambition of

universal dominion, deeply rooted in the Russian autocrats from

Peter downwards, and probably even long before Peter's time, was

a powerful stimulant to military enterprise. The constant wars of

aggression in Asia gave employment to large armies, wasted them, and

called for continual drafts of new troops. Everything combined to

make Russia a great military nation. The absolute despotism of the

Czars, allied to projects of vast ambition, was eminently favourable

to such a result. This very despotism and lust of conquest probably

grew up under the all-pervading influence of the Mongols. Genghis

bequeathed to his successors the sovereignty of the world, just as

Peter the Great did five centuries later. The Mongol khans taught

the Russian princes how to oppress the people. The extortion which

these vassals practised under the sanction of the dreaded Mongol

name, inured the rulers to tyranny, and the people to submission.

When the invaders were expelled, therefore, it was natural that the

arbitrary habits of the Russian princes should be retained. It was

also a natural reaction of ideas for the Russians, when their time

came, to turn the tables on their late conquerors. They had seen

Tartar hordes, moved by one strong will, overrun Asia, and rule a

large portion of Europe. Why should not emancipated Russia issue

forth from Europe and subjugate Asia? But whencesoever the idea of

the conquest of Asia had its origin, the history of Russia for the

last two centuries shows how persistently it has been followed up

through each successive reign, and how remarkably it has ruled the

policy of the Czars from Peter to Nicholas.

It was no small advantage to Russia, considered as an Asiatic

nation, and not the least barbarous among them, to live on the

confines of European civilisation. The Czars have been wise enough

to avail themselves of the advanced knowledge, and the energy to

apply it, which their European neighbours possessed. They cannot be

said to have civilised Russia by this fusion of foreign materials,

but they have certainly succeeded in making her a powerful nation.

It is not probable that the Russian government could ever have held

its head so high in the counsels of Europe without this extraneous

aid; and although they might, from their native resources, have

overcome the nomad tribes of the Asiatic steppes, they could hardly

have been in a position to dictate terms to China.

The Chinese government has had similar opportunities of using

foreign science, and mechanical and other inventions, though in a

less degree. But it has, till lately, despised and rejected them,

and has paid dearly for its mistake.

In one respect the two empires greatly resemble each other, and

that is in the general venality of their officials, high and low.

The fact is recognised, to a certain extent, by the governments,

and being probably considered irremediable, they seem to make the

best of it by placing men in responsible positions, with salaries

ludicrously inadequate to provide for the ordinary necessities of

life. This has proved one potent cause of the decline of China.

In Russia the vigour of the government has risen superior to the

evil. Official dishonesty may have done incalculable injury to the

prosperity of the country, but the will of the Czars makes its

voice heard to the remotest corner of their unwieldy empire. The

provincial officers have great latitude for defeating the ends

of justice and good government from sordid motives, and, in a

general way, the government will not scrutinise their conduct very

closely. But nothing is allowed to obstruct the execution of an

ukase from Petersburg, and the government is, on the whole, well

served. Everything in Russia has been made subservient to the glory

of the Czars and the military status of the country, and every

consideration is sacrificed to the furtherance of that one object.

It cannot be denied that the warlike and aggressive policy of

Russia has been productive of much good. The hidden wealth of

desert regions has been to some extent at least developed, and

highways of commerce have been opened up through forests peopled

with wild animals and their hunters. The plough has been driven

over old battle-fields, and populations have been settled where all

was desolation before. These, and such like, have been the good

results which may be considered as a set-off against the evils of

war. How different have been the issues of the infatuated "peace at

any price" policy of China, where fertile plains are being daily

converted into battle-fields!

These, however, are but some of the external or accidental

circumstances which have modified the characters of the two empires,

and variously influenced their destinies. The essential causes of

the progress of Russia and the decadence of China lie much deeper.

Some people would tell us that Russia is in the young, vigorous and

growing stage of its national life, just emerging from barbarism,

when every step must be towards improvement, because, from their

low starting point, deterioration would be impossible; while China,

on the contrary, has long since reached maturity, has outlived the

natural term of national existence; its industries, arts, learning,

social life, and all that constitutes civilisation, have reached a

point beyond which they cannot advance; that the zenith of its glory

has been passed; and that, in the natural course of things, the only

advance it can now make must be towards decay and dissolution.

But that theory of the decline of China does not hold good. The mass

of the people have not degenerated; they are as fresh and vigorous

as ever they were. It is the government only that has become old and

feeble; and a change of dynasty may yet restore to China the lustre

which legitimately belongs to so great a nation.

The indestructible vitality of Chinese institutions has preserved

the country unchanged through many revolutions. The high

civilisation of the people, and their earnestness in the pursuit of

peaceful industries, have enabled them to maintain their national

existence through more dynastic changes than, perhaps, any other

country or nation has experienced.

"La nation (chinoise)," says De Guignes, "s'est trouvée renfermée

dans des bornes naturelles et fortifiée, jusqu'à un certain point,

contre les étrangers. D'ailleurs ces étrangers ont toujours été

barbares; ainsi lorsque quelquefois ils ont été assez puissants

pour pénétrer dans la Chine et pour s'emparer de cet empire,

l'attachement inviolable des Chinois à leurs anciens usages a forcé

les vainqueurs d'adopter les lois des vaincus. L'empire a changé de

maîtres sans changer de lois. Lorsqu'un jour les Tartares, qui le

possèdent à présent, seront chassés par une famille chinoise, il n'y

aura que le nom de Tartare d'aboli; le gouvernement sera toujours le

même, et la nation se retrouvera dans l'état où elle était il y a

deux mille ans."[25]

[25] Hist. des Huns, tom. iii. p. 93.

The barbarian invaders had nothing to substitute for the

institutions of the Chinese, and they made no permanent impression

on the nation. So far from being able to grind down the people, the

result of their successive conquests has been rather to open up new

fields of enterprise to the industrious Chinese, who have gradually

appropriated to themselves the territories of their conquerors.

Thus the Manchu Tartars have been edged back into the forests by

the energetic Chinese colonists, have lost their influence, become

absorbed in many parts of their country, and are now almost extinct

as a nation.

The unprecedentedly long existence of the Chinese nation, of their

language and literature, their laws and their philosophy, has

naturally produced in the people a high veneration for antiquity.

Their geographical position isolated them from all the rest of the

world, excepting the rude nomads of Tartary. So, for many ages, they

saw no people equal to themselves in education and intelligence,

and no laws like their own. They were constrained to despise the

barbarism, even while they feared the power, of their neighbours

or their enemies. Their intercourse with the Romans was not

sufficiently close to give them much idea of the culture of that

people, and they judged of mankind at large by their experience

of the Tartars. It was therefore in the nature of things that an

overweening self-satisfaction should spring up among them, which

would ripen into arrogance. They came to think themselves _the_

nation, the "middle kingdom," the centre of the world, and to look

upon all foreign races as "outer barbarians." Whatever _we_ may

think of this national conceit now, there can be no question that,

up to a recent period, the Chinese were justified in their high

opinion of themselves, and their contempt for all other races,

languages and laws.

It is necessary to keep this in view, in order rightly to appreciate

the character of the Chinese. They are very generally supposed to

be so proud and bigoted that they cling with blind affection to the

traditions of the past, insensible to excellence of any kind that is

new, or of extraneous origin. But this notion of their character is

wide of the truth. As their own greatness comes from ancient times,

and they have passed the culminating point of their civilisation,

so their reason dictates to them reverence for the past, just as

their experience has taught them to despise everything external.

The intercourse between the Chinese and the civilised nations of

Europe has, in the first instance, brought out the weak side of

the Chinese character into prominent relief, and held it up to the

derision of the world; but as that intercourse has become more

intimate and thorough, it has afforded a rational explanation of

some apparently anomalous traits of character, and has produced

among those of the Chinese who have come within its influence,

modifications in their views of relative superiority. Ideas that

have grown with the growth of a people, through many ages, are not

likely to be eradicated in a day; but, if founded on reason, they

will yield to reason, when it has shown them to be erroneous; and

the adoption of new ideas is likely to be permanent in proportion to

the slow and gradual nature of the transition.

The Chinese first encountered modern Europeans in small numbers, and

in the outposts of their empire. They naturally applied to these

visitors the rules whereby they had from time immemorial been taught

to manage strangers or barbarians. The Western adventurers who

repaired to the shores of China were actuated by purely utilitarian

motives; and to promote their own objects they were not above

pandering to the arrogance of the Chinese. Had their policy been

different, indeed, they had but slight opportunities of exhibiting

their superiority in culture and civilisation; and their numbers

were too insignificant to have made any marked impression. The

result of the earlier intercourse between Europeans and Chinese

was, therefore, rather to confirm than destroy the self-esteem of

the latter, who continued to regard the new tribe as belonging to

the category of barbarians. The East India Company did its share in

perpetuating the Chinese conceit, by submitting to every indignity

that was offered to it for the sake of trade. The natural tendency

of this course of action, so soon as the controlling power of the

company was removed, was to bring on quarrels, the history of which

everyone knows. In these wars, which succeeded each other between

1839 and 1860, the superiority of European civilisation asserted

itself in China; the government was first compelled to acknowledge

the power of the foreigner, and it is now learning something of

the moral qualities of nations whom it had affected to regard as

beasts.[26] For the first time in their history, the Chinese came

into contact with a people superior to themselves. No precedent

could be found to guide them in the great emergency, and hence the

aggression of Europeans inevitably entailed disaster on China, which

experience alone could have enabled them to avoid. The ascendancy

of Europeans in China is now a fact accomplished and irrevocable,

accepted by the natives themselves, and therefore destined to

work important changes on the condition of the people and their

government.

[26] soo-tung-po (a celebrated chinese classic author), says, "the e

and the teih" (the former term being used to designate foreigners),

"are like the brute creation, and cannot be governed by the same

rules of government as those of the central nation. if liberal

rules of government were applied to them, it would infallibly give

rise to rebellious confusion. the ancient kings knew this well, and

therefore ruled them without laws (or by misrule). this is therefore

the most judicious mode of governing them."--_amherst's voyage;

lindsay's report._

The people have been quick to appreciate the advantages which

foreign appliances offered to them in the conduct of their business.

For many years their merchants have been employing European vessels

in the coasting trade, induced by economy, despatch, and the

facilities for insurance thus secured. The extension of sea-board

opened to foreign enterprise by Lord Elgin's treaty, and the free

navigation of the great river Yangtsze-Kiang, have attracted a

large fleet of steamers to the coast and rivers of China. These

are chiefly employed, and in many instances owned, by natives. In

everything the Chinese have exhibited a remarkable freedom from

prejudice. They are much too practical to allow any freak of fancy

to influence them in matters in which they have a tangible interest.

The Chinese government also has shown, in the most emphatic manner,

the high value it sets on European aid, both in civil and military

affairs. The alacrity with which it has adopted the modern engines

of war at the dictation of foreigners in whom it had confidence,

proves conclusively that the conservative government of China

is not so wedded to its own traditions as to reject innovations

indiscriminately. It may be slow in coming to a conclusion, and is

naturally jealous of any reform which is imperfectly understood.

But it only wants convincing evidence of the utility of any

measure that may be suggested to ensure its adoption. And on those

occasions when the government may appear most reluctant to leave

the beaten track, there may be other motives for this besides

mere obstinacy. Its prestige is in peril; indeed, may be said to

be already to a great extent lost. The wholesale introduction of

foreign improvements would place the government at the mercy of its

foreign _employés_, and its existence as an active and responsible

power would be virtually destroyed. The attempt to amalgamate

foreign ideas of progress with ancient precedent and stagnation is

at best a hazardous experiment, if any value is to be attached to

the preservation of the integrity of the government. Great allowance

must therefore be made for the difficult position in which Chinese

statesmen find themselves. Reforms they know to be necessary; but

their duty is so to temper them that they may be adopted with the

least possible shock to indigenous institutions. And, even if they

foresee the ultimate collapse of these institutions, still their

prudence would lead them so to restrain the influx of new ideas,

that changes might not be too sudden or sweeping.

The Chinese nation is at present in a crisis of its history,

in which it is peculiarly susceptible of external influences;

and as its foreign relations become more and more consolidated,

these influences are brought to bear from various quarters and in

constantly increasing force. Great Britain having by far the largest

stake in the country, and the largest share of the responsibility

attaching to the necessary interference in its affairs, the state

and prospects of China demand from us a little more attention than

is usually bestowed upon them; for the destiny of that great empire,

and our own future interests, will be to some extent moulded by our

present policy.

The problem that is now being worked out in that country is one

of which history affords no clue to the solution. The nation has

been convulsed for fourteen years by a great insurrection. That is

nothing new to the Chinese; but the conditions are vastly altered.

According to precedent, some powerful Tartar or Chinese prince would

have appeared to aid the government in quelling the rebellion, and

then seat himself on the throne. Or the empire might have been

dismembered between two independent dynasties. Some such solution

may still be found, though it is not easy to see whence the movement

is to come. Were the other European powers out of the way, Russia

would be almost in a position to grasp at the sovereignty of China.

Had the crisis occurred a hundred years ago, and our interest in

the country been as great as it is now, China might have become a

second India. But none of these contingencies is now feasible. The

integrity of China, and the independence of its government, are

sufficiently hedged round by the jealousies of rival powers.

The cause of the insurrection, and the great difficulty in the way

of a settlement of Chinese affairs, and of the re-establishment of

order, lie in the utter prostration of the Imperial government.

This circumstance, which would have been the strength of the

insurrectionary party had they possessed the elements of cohesion or

administrative capacity, tends only to prolong the weary struggle.

The rebels have forfeited the respect of all classes, except the

most profligate, or the most ignorant. Their dynastic ambition has

been made a convenient battle-cry to cover their crimes. They have

no policy but devastation, and have neither the disposition nor the

ability to govern. Even if they succeeded in crushing the existing

government, they would still have to be subjugated in their turn

by some other power, before tranquillity could be restored to the

country.

The Imperial government has been at last awakened to the importance

of quelling the rebellion, which for many years was only trifled

with. The division of authority in the provinces prevented that

combined action which alone could have met the exigencies of

the situation. It was considered a great success, if a body of

insurgents was merely chased out of one province into another. The

efforts of the Imperial government were, and are still, constantly

nullified by the private interests of the provincial authorities.

That is one of the greatest abuses that their peculiar system of

government is liable to. The armies that are levied from time to

time to defend the provinces are mere local bands, under the control

of the governor or his deputies, over whose acts the Imperial

government has little or no check. If left entirely to itself, it is

doubtful whether the present government would ever have been able to

make head against the rebellion at all. What has been accomplished

towards that end has been mainly due to the moral support of foreign

powers, and the active services of European military officers. The

necessity of centralising the government more and more has been

made obvious to the Prince Regent. That is one of the reforms

most urgently needed to secure efficiency and economy in the

administration. The old system worked well enough in quiet times,

and as long as there was no disturbing element. But the extension

of foreign influence along the coast, and in the interior of the

country, is constantly stirring up questions of Imperial interest,

the inevitable result of which is to sink local customs, and to

place foreign relations at all the ports on one level. The embassies

at Peking have helped to bring all local and provincial questions

home to the Imperial government in a more direct manner than ever

was done before. The British minister, deeply impressed with the

advantages that must result to China from the centralisation of

the government, has striven by all legitimate means to promote

it. He has only been partially successful, it is true, and in his

despatches of June last he betrays disappointment at the result of

his efforts. But still a good deal has been done, and every day's

experience must teach the government the necessity of strengthening

its own authority, and of exercising a more direct and active

control over the provincial governors than heretofore.

The attitude of France and England towards the belligerents in

China is anomalous. Their principle at first was strict neutrality,

but the rapid extension of commercial intercourse has rendered

this course impracticable. The Imperial government has been tamed

into granting us a treaty advantageous to us, but much more so

to China herself. By this treaty several new ports of trade were

opened on the coast; access to Peking, and the residence of foreign

ministers there, were secured. But above all, the Yang-tsze-Kiang

was thrown open to foreign trade and navigation. That noble river

had been closed to commerce for about eight years. The rebellion

had devastated the country on both sides; the cities on its banks

were in ruins, and their populations dispersed or destroyed. From a

point five hundred miles from the sea, downwards, to Chin-Kiangfoo,

scarcely a sail was seen on that vast expanse of water. Such was

the state of things in 1861, when the navigation was opened to

foreigners. Now the muddy waters are ploughed by a large fleet of

steamers; the greatest activity prevails everywhere; cities are

being rapidly rebuilt, and populations are returning. The products

of the interior are freely interchanged with those of the sea-board,

and a new life has been imparted to great tracts of country. The

lion's share of this new trade has as usual fallen to the natives.

It is they who chiefly supply cargoes for the foreign steamers, and

native trading craft everywhere crowd the river.

These events brought us into contact with the rebels, who held,

and still hold, Nanking as their head-quarters. From that point

they commanded the river on both sides, and it became necessary

that the British authorities should make arrangements for the

protection of commerce. Amicable relations with them were attempted

to be established, but, as was natural, it soon appeared that

our interests clashed with the assumed rights of the insurgents,

and that our close alliance with the Imperial government was

incompatible with similar relations with its enemies. But the

programme which the Taepings announced touched us more nearly than

that. The conquests which they proposed to themselves included some

of the very ports which were then being opened on the river, an

event which would have nipped the root of that new development of

trade.

Our interest in China, as politicians are constantly telling us,

is purely commercial. But peace is essential to the prosperity

of commerce, and the present state of confusion and civil war is

inimical to it.

Early in 1862 the rebels menaced Shanghae in great force, drawing

a cordon of forts round the city, and cutting off the supplies

from the interior. Provisions rose to famine prices, and the vast

population of the city and suburbs was forced to undergo a siege.

Some years before that time circumstances had compelled the British

government to undertake the protection of the treaty-ports, and more

especially Shanghae, as being the most important of them, and the

most open to attack from the rebels, who held the whole country in

rear of it. But, in 1862, it became imperative to do more than that.

The little garrison placed there for the defence of the city, might

be kept under arms for months, or even years, ready to repel an

attack when the invaders should come within range of the city walls;

the population would live in a chronic state of panic, many of them

would leave (as they did); trade would be paralysed; the city and

foreign settlement would be a mere fortified camp, cut off from all

communication with the interior of the country.

In this crisis Sir James Hope, then naval commander-in-chief, came

to the front. That officer was well acquainted with the character of

the Taepings; he had had a great deal of communication with them,

and had tried every means in his power to induce them to change

their manners, so as to secure the respect of their countrymen and

of foreigners. He had also repeatedly warned them of the disastrous

consequences which would follow any demonstration on their part

against the consular ports, Shanghae in particular.

The state of affairs in Shanghae, in the beginning of 1862, made

it clear to Sir James Hope that the effective protection of the

city involved the necessity of such aggressive operations as would

clear the country in the immediate vicinity. Without waiting for

instructions, therefore, he assumed the responsibility of immediate

action, and commenced a campaign against the Taeping strongholds,

which extended over a space of nine months, and ended in the

dispersion of these marauders from that portion of country included

in a radius of thirty miles from Shanghae.

This is a practical illustration of what the policy of the British

government has been, and how it has from time to time submitted to

circumstances. At first we have the theoretical principle of strict

neutrality broadly asserted; then we are compelled to violate that

principle in our own defence; an emergency arises in which the

officers on the spot have to choose the alternative of an armed

protection of British property, necessarily including a portion

of the territories of the Imperial government, or the abandonment

of British interests to destruction. Our own government confirms

the decision of its officers--hence, first the ports themselves,

and then the arbitrary thirty-mile radius are placed under foreign

protection. At such a distance from the scene of operations,

amid such rapid changes in the posture of affairs, and with such

important interests at stake, it would be impossible for Downing

Street to frame a code of instructions for officers in China which

would apply to all possible contingencies, and impolitic to frame

them on the pattern of the laws of the Medes and Persians. The

abstract principle of non-intervention is very excellent in itself,

but to adhere to it when our own material interests are directly

assailed, would be pure infatuation. Expediency and self-interest

must, after all, be our rule in China as elsewhere.

Our government at home, and its officers abroad, have always had a

dread of complications in China, but much as they have studied to

steer clear of them, they have step by step been sucked in, and the

end is not yet.

The disturbances that have ruined so many of the richest districts

in China are incompatible with the free course of trade. We have,

therefore, a direct interest in the restoration of peace. The

present government of China is on friendly, and even confidential,

terms with us; it has shown great readiness to cement still closer

our mutual relations. It is, moreover, such as it is, and with all

its rottenness, the representative of order, and the rallying point

for whatever remains of patriotism in the country.

The insurgents, on the other hand, are hopelessly given up to their

propensities for desolation. If, therefore, peace is to be restored

to China at all, within the present generation, it can only be

by the subjugation of the insurgents, and the ascendancy of the

Imperial government. With this view Admiral Hope first supported

the American, Ward, a soldier of fortune, but a man of energy and

genius, who disciplined and led a Chinese force in the service of

the Imperial government. Following up the same line of policy,

men and material were subsequently lent to the force, and, after

Ward's death, a great number of her Majesty's officers and men were

permitted to join it, and the little army was placed under the

command of Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Gordon of the Engineers.

Under that officer the force grew to be a formidable power. Its

career during the twelve months or so of Gordon's command was, with

one or two exceptions, a series of brilliant successes.

It can no longer be said that the Chinese do not make good soldiers.

Under leaders in whom they have confidence, they exhibit the highest

military qualities. Gordon was, perhaps, the first who taught

Chinese troops to overcome a repulse.

The result of Gordon's campaign has been to recover from the rebels

the whole of the province of Keangsoo, between the Grand Canal and

the sea. He has cut the Taeping rebellion in halves. The capture of

Soochow, last December, gave him the command of the Grand Canal, and

enabled him to interrupt communications thereby between the rebel

garrisons of Nanking and Hangchow. Leaving the latter point to be

acted on by the Franco-Chinese, who had Ningpo for their base,

Gordon followed the Grand Canal towards Nanking, and captured all

the cities that lay between. Nanking itself would probably have

fallen an easy prey to him, but at that juncture he was compelled

to resign his commission in the Chinese army. The service was,

from the first, distasteful to him, from the position he occupied

in relation to the Chinese officers with whom he had to act. The

treachery perpetrated by the foo-tai, or governor of the province,

at the capture of Soochow, in putting to death the rebel chiefs

who had surrendered to Gordon, disgusted him; and, failing to

obtain satisfaction from the government for this outrage on his own

good faith, he determined to quit the service. The Queen's order

in council which permitted him to serve the Emperor of China was

withdrawn, and the "ever victorious" army has been disbanded, with

what consequences the future will disclose.

It will be always a difficult thing for an officer with a high

sense of honour, and with proper self-respect, to serve the Chinese

government on its own terms, though it would be comparatively easy

for a military adventurer, who is less particular, to build up his

own fortunes in such a career. The system of management which places

the forces of the empire under the control of local authorities,

whose interests are frequently antagonistic to those of the nation

and the Imperial government, precludes foreign officers from

attaining their proper position. They are liable to be called upon

to participate in proceedings of which their humanity disapproves.

They have to listen to the constant complaints of disaffected troops

in arrears of pay. They never can calculate with certainty on next

month's supplies, and their men are always on the verge of mutiny.

The disbursements for troops are provided out of the provincial

treasuries, and hence the provincial authorities have a direct

interest in levying as small a number of men as possible, and in

doling out their pay in such measure only as may suffice to prevent

a general rising. The scheme of supplying the Chinese government

with a steam fleet failed for this, among other reasons, that

Captain Osborn declined to serve under any mere provincial authority.

Whether the Chinese government will now of itself be able to give

the _coup-de-grace_ to the Taepings, or whether, through the

incapacity and venality of local officials, anarchy will again

distress the newly-conquered districts, is a question of serious

import both to them and to us. The policy to be pursued by the

British government in China, in any emergency that may arise, will

demand honest consideration. It has been too much the fashion of

political agitators to treat the subject flippantly, and to make

the "China question" a parliamentary shuttle-cock. The general

indifference to the subject which prevails in and out of Parliament,

affords ample scope for misrepresentation, and some of the men to

whom the country looks for sound views are often guilty of hiding

their light under a bushel.

To go no further back than the last debate on China, as reported in

the "Times," June 1st, 1864, we there find ample illustration of the

fallacious arguments advanced by a certain class of politicians when

dealing with this subject. Mr. Bright is very solicitous to clear

his friends, who had preceded him in the debate, from the imputation

of party motives, that their statements may carry the more weight.

The disclaimer will naturally apply _à fortiori_ to himself. But

"_qui s'excuse s'accuse_." How does Mr. Bright treat those who

ventured to express opinions at variance with his own? An honourable

member, desirous of obtaining light on the question, sought for

it in the prosaic region of fact. Applying to the most authentic

sources within his reach, he had collected opinions from a number

of persons who had a practical knowledge of the country. These

various opinions were remarkably concurrent, but they did not suit

Mr. Bright's argument. He therefore considers them "uninteresting,"

and accounts for their unanimity by insinuating that the honourable

member had concocted them all himself!

The ponderous speech of Mr. Cobden is as remarkable for what it

omits as for what it contains. His object seemed to be to show,

first, that our commerce in China was not worth protecting at all;

and, secondly, that he had an infallible scheme of his own which

would secure the ends that the policy of the government had failed

in attaining. The facts he adduces in support of his argument are

judiciously selected; the inferences he draws from them are framed

to suit his foregone conclusions, but have no kind of reference to

the relation between one fact and another. Causes and effects are

blended in a fantastic medley, well calculated to throw dust in

the eyes of the unwary, but fatal to the elucidation of truth. Mr.

Cobden excludes from his view of the China trade the most important

part of it, selecting the smallest item--the direct exports from

this country--as a criterion of our commercial progress in China.

His deductions from such a partial view of facts must necessarily

be worthless. But, even on the narrow ground he has chosen, his

conclusions are all forced. He avoids saying so in plain language,

but the only inference that can be drawn from his line of argument,

is that the successive re-actions that have occurred in the

advancement of our export trade to China have been the result of our

war policy there, and of the closer intimacy of our political and

social relations with that country. If Mr. Cobden means anything, he

means that. Now what do the facts say, even as Mr. Cobden himself

has stated them?

After the peace of 1842, our exports increased steadily up to 1845,

in which year they doubled the value of 1835, the year that followed

the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly. For ten years,

after 1845, the value of our exports fell to a lower level. Yet

during that time we were at peace with China. A marked falling off

occurred in 1854, but that was caused by the prostration of trade

consequent on the outbreak of the Taeping rebellion, a circumstance

wholly overlooked by Mr. Cobden. The wars of 1856-60 were followed

by an unprecedented increase in our exports in 1859, 1860 and 1861.

Mr. Cobden is perfectly right in saying that the trade of these

years was vastly overdone, and a recoil was inevitable. But even

in the two following years, when the re-action was operating in

full force, the export returns showed a vast increase beyond the

highest point reached in 1845, or in any year previous to 1859. At

this point, Mr. Cobden, probably discovering that he had _proved

too much_, shifts his ground to the single article--cotton. If, as

the member for Portsmouth said, Mr. Cobden considers Manchester as

the centre of the world, the cotton test is probably to his mind

the most infallible. The exports of cotton goods to China fell from

243,000,000 yards in 1861, to 80,000,000 yards in 1862; and to

46,000,000 yards in 1863. "That," says Mr. Cobden, "is the character

of the business you are transacting in China."

A word from Mr. Cobden would have explained the diminution of the

export of cotton goods on an hypothesis, not at all involving the

general decadence of our trade with China. The cotton famine had

raised the value of the raw material to two shillings per pound, and

the enhanced price which the manufactured goods cost to the Chinese

naturally diminished consumption. Again, the Chinese happened, at

the beginning of the cotton famine, to be over supplied with cheaper

and better goods, and old stocks had to be used up before a response

to the exorbitant prices paid in Manchester or an active resumption

of business could be looked for.

While surveying our relations with China from the "cotton" point

of view, Mr. Cobden might have had the candour to acknowledge the

handsome contributions of the raw material which Lancashire has

received _from_ China during the last three years.

Sir Frederick Bruce is a better authority than Mr. Cobden on

Chinese affairs, and he says, in a report to the Foreign Office,

dated Peking, June 7th, and published in the "Times," September

7th, 1864, "The import trade has increased from 41,000,000 taels

(about 13,000,000_l._) in 1860 (the last year before the opening of

the Yang-tsze and the northern ports), to 81,000,000 taels (about

27,000,000_l._), in 1863. The increase is due in a great measure to

the large and increasing trade from the ports on the Yang-tsze in

Chinese produce of all descriptions."

The vastly increasing trade in imports into this country from

China, compared with which the exports are a bagatelle, Mr. Cobden

passes over as having no bearing on the question. The opium revenue

to the Indian government is also overlooked. The large shipping

interest engaged in the China trade goes for nothing in Mr. Cobden's

estimate, but it is nevertheless of great importance to the country,

even though the vessels are not all owned in Lancashire, and do not

all carry cotton. The amount of capital that British ship-owners

find employment for in connection with China, is not limited to

the large fleet of vessels engaged in the direct trade with this

country, but is spread all over the coast and rivers of China. In

the dispatch above quoted, Sir F. Bruce states that the entries of

foreign shipping in China have increased from 293,568 tons, in 1860,

to 996,890 tons in 1863.

The interest which British merchants, and through them the nation

at large, possess in the prosperity of China is widely ramified.

They are closely involved in the local and coasting trade; large

amounts of British capital are sunk in fixed property of various

kinds at all the open ports; and such investments are increasing

at a rapid rate. These things lie under the surface, and are not

generally considered in estimates that are formed in this country

of the actual stake Great Britain has in China. But they are none

the less real on that account. Theorists may say what they will, but

our establishment on the territory of China is a great and important

fact; and whether the process which led to it was theoretically

correct or not, it will be impossible to undo it.

Not only are we fixed in China ourselves, but large native

populations at the treaty parts have thrown in their fortunes with

ours, to abandon whom would bring calamities on the Chinese for

which it would baffle Mr. Cobden to find a remedy.

To reverse our progress is, however, the policy or the hobby of Mr.

Cobden. He would not only undo what has been done, but he would urge

the Government on to a new career of conquest in China, without even

a pretext for war. He would seize two more islands on the coast in

order to make free ports which would draw trade away from those

now established. "Get two other small islands ... merely establish

them as free ports; I don't ask you to do more." Mr. Cobden does

not commit himself to say how the islands are to be acquired,

but he knows very well there is but one way of acquiring them.

And supposing we took possession of two islands, how many would

France take? and if England were to lead the way in such schemes of

aggrandisement, would the ambition of France stop short at islands?

Many high-handed proceedings have been laid to the charge of this

country, but this scheme of spoliation would surpass everything

else of the kind. Mr. Cobden would probably suggest purchasing the

islands, which would be, at least, a civil way of putting it.

But the whole scheme is so purely utopian that one marvels that a

practical thinker could have shown such contempt for his audience

as to propound it. Hong-Kong is the model on which Mr. Cobden would

shape his new colonies; very flattering to Hong-Kong, perhaps,

but betraying an incredible forgetfulness of the whole history

of that colony. The "London and China Telegraph," of 13th June

last, in commenting on Mr. Cobden's speech, shows clearly that

the advancement of Hong-Kong as a port of trade was due to purely

adventitious circumstances; and that for many years, when it rested

on its own merits for success, it was an absolute failure, and a

constant expense to the country. If Mr. Cobden aspires to be a

second Stamford Raffles, he is beginning at the wrong end. Our

policy in China will be more safely left to the chapter of accidents

than to visionaries. We have hard facts to deal with, and not

phantoms of a lively imagination.

The suppression of the Taeping rebellion cannot fail to produce

remarkable effects on the condition of the Chinese people. They are

ripe for great changes, not in the government or social institutions

(the first is of little or no importance to the people, and the

second are stereotyped), but in their relation to the progress of

the world. Amid all political convulsions the people have remained

unchanged, and that mainly because they are a non-political people.

They are indifferent to affairs of state, but intent on their own

business. Yet they have the faculty of self-government developed in

an eminent degree. They are quiet, orderly, and industrious; averse

to agitation of any kind, and ready to endure great sacrifices for

the sake of peace. Such a people are easily governed, and their

instinct of self-government is one important element in their

longevity as a nation; it has enabled successive dynasties, often

weak and vacillating, arbitrary and corrupt, to control three

hundred millions of people. This constitutes the elasticity by which

they regain lost ground after any temporary disturbance. Let the

present reign of brigandage be destroyed, and the people will soon

rise again; like pent-up waters they will flow into their former

channels, and in a few years scarcely a trace of desolation would be

left.

In this prediction we have the experience of various episodes, even

of the present rebellion, to guide us. The rapidity with which the

city of Shanghae was re-built, after its destruction during the

rebel occupation of 1853-5, was astonishing. Other cities have been

re-built and re-peopled with equal rapidity. Han-Kow, on the great

river, has been several times sacked and destroyed by the rebels,

and in a short time after each visitation it was worth plundering

again. The important city of Soo-chow, captured from the rebels

last December, is reported in June following to be showing signs

of commercial life, although the surrounding country was still the

theatre of war.

The Chinese people have, however, little cause for confidence in

the efficiency or the stability of their own government; they have

on the other hand implicit faith in foreigners. It is obvious,

therefore, that any guarantee from Western powers that peace should

be maintained in the districts once recovered from the rebels, would

stimulate the commercial and industrial energies of the people, and

materially contribute to the renewed prosperity of the country.

The prosperity of China is, then, intimately interwoven with our

own, for vast fields of enterprise would now be opened out to

Europeans which have heretofore been closed. Its resources have

been developed to the utmost, perhaps, that a fossil civilisation,

unaided by modern invention, is capable of. The Chinese have been

ahead of the world from time immemorial in agriculture, commercial

economy, manufactures, and all industries; in short, in everything

that constitutes material wealth; but now in these later days the

world has in some things got a little ahead, and is waiting to

impart its new accomplishments to them. The vast mineral wealth

of the country has been but partially taken advantage of. Its

coal, iron, gold, and silver have hitherto been worked by the most

primitive and inadequate machinery. But we are prepared to teach the

natives how to economise their forces, and to make the most of the

natural resources of their country; and they are being prepared to

receive the lesson.

The avidity with which the Chinese have grasped at the advantages

offered to them by the steamers that now ply on the coast, and on

the great river, is an earnest of their readiness to appreciate

any other western inventions that are commended by their practical

utility. The favourable introduction of steam on the Chinese

rivers, and the popularity with which their earlier career was

attended, were indeed due to fortuitous circumstances. On the

Yangtsze Kiang steamers had not to compete with an old-established

native trade--that had been for many years dead--but they reopened

a commercial route that had been closed, and, at the time, they

offered the only feasible means of navigating the great river.

Under different conditions they would have had to work their way

slowly into the favour of the Chinese; but now, having established

a foothold, they will certainly maintain the position they have

assumed, and the Chinese would be sorry to return to their former

_régime_, under which they could hardly hope to accomplish in a

month what is now easily performed in three or four days.[27]

[27] "Owing to the violence of the winds, and the rapidity of the

current in certain places, the application of steam to navigation

was required before the Yangtsze could be made available as a

highway for transport. The decks of the steamers are now crowded

with Chinese passengers, and their holds are filled with produce

destined, not for foreign export, but for Chinese consumption. The

practical advantages of foreign inventions are thus brought home to

masses of the population in the very centre of China, and they can

now avail themselves of the natural outlet for the productions of

those rich internal provinces, instead of being driven to the slow

and circuitous method of artificial water communication, and exposed

to the exactions of the officials of the different provinces they

had to pass through."--SIR F. BRUCE.

There is still great room for the extension of steam traffic in

the interior of China, and great need of it. For the present,

however, foreigners are limited by the provisions of the existing

treaties, to the ports formally opened by those treaties. Steamers

may penetrate as far up the great river as Hankow, 600 miles from

the sea; but the upper Yangtsze, which is navigable by steamers

for 500 miles above that, must still be left to the monopoly of

uncouth barges, which are slowly tracked up-stream by men who labour

like beasts of burden. The navigation of the Poyang and Tung-ting

lakes which communicate with the Yang-tsze; the Peiho river between

Tientsin and Tungchow; the western river from Canton to the province

of Kwangsi, and many other water routes--all practicable for

properly constructed vessels--are equally excluded from foreign

enterprise. The native traders on these routes are deprived of the

aid which steam has afforded them in other quarters, and that by

a decision of their government which, from a cosmopolitan point

of view, is arbitrary and unjust. Inexperience may excuse the

Chinese government for this narrow and pernicious jealousy, but

what shall we say of European diplomatists who, in full view of the

advantages which, as the past has shown, must accrue to natives and

foreigners alike from the spread of foreign intercourse in China,

would diminish "the points of contact" from a nervous, and not very

rational, apprehension of possible complications?

Much has been said of the ruffianism that our newly established

commerce on the Yangtsze Kiang has let loose on the great river. It

cannot be denied; but it would be singular indeed if, with a weak

government, a deplorably inefficient executive, and a timid people,

outrages should not be committed. In every community there must be

lawless characters whom physical force, or the dread of it, alone

can restrain from criminal acts. Under existing circumstances in

China, it is the duty of each foreign state to control its own

subjects; but it is manifestly unfair to circumscribe the legitimate

privileges of a whole community, in order to punish a few unworthy

members of it. Such a policy can only be dictated by indolence in

seeking out and punishing offenders. But the instances on record of

piracy and other crimes on the Yangtsze Kiang, although authentic,

are apt to engender exaggerated views of their relative importance.

They are made unduly conspicuous by rhetoricians, who, on the other

hand, ignore the smooth under-current of affairs which is silently

conveying blessings to many thousands of people. These occasional

outrages are, after all, mere excrescences on a system that, in an

essential manner, ministers to the well-being of whole populations

who would otherwise be in penury. At the worst, the good vastly

outbalances the evil; and, to take the lowest view of the matter,

it were better even that the lawless proceedings of a few rowdies

should go on unchecked, rather than that the remedy for them should

be found in the curtailment of a trade of such great promise. It

must never be forgotten that it is the natives of China who derive

the chief benefit from foreign commercial intercourse; and that,

while arbitrary restrictions on the plain meaning of treaties,

by which it has been sought to limit the application of their

provisions, are unjust to foreigners, the refusal to extend foreign

intercourse is an injustice of which the Chinese people have a right

to complain.

The unexampled success of steamers in China, within the three past

years, has paved the way for a similar result for railways. The

Chinese, having satisfied themselves of the advantages that accrue

to them from the former, will be perfectly ready to avail themselves

of the latter. They are not naturally given to travel, that is,

they travel for profit and not for pleasure. But the facilities for

locomotion which steamers now afford them have created a large and

increasing passenger traffic. The steamers on the coast and on the

rivers are usually crowded with Chinese passengers, who seek very

moderate accommodation, and therefore can be carried economically.

The shortening of a month's journey to one of a few days has induced

many thousands to travel who did not think of it before. It is,

therefore, a fair inference that the greater economy of time which

railways would secure would enable millions to travel who are at

present excluded from it. The mere monopolising by railways of the

revenues of the present passage-boats, and other means of passenger

communication, in certain districts, would be but a trifle compared

with the new traffic which railways would create for themselves in

such a populous and eminently commercial country.

And, perhaps, no other country of equal area presents fewer natural

obstacles to the construction of long lines of railway. This has

been shown by the investigations of Sir Macdonald Stephenson, who

has lately published a full report on the subject. The labour, and

many of the materials, are to be found in the localities where they

would be wanted.

It may safely be assumed, also, that in no other country would

railway investments be more remunerative, if organised on a uniform

and comprehensive plan, such as that proposed by Sir M. Stephenson.

The most populous parts of China are alluvial plains, either fed by

great navigable rivers, or intersected in all directions by networks

of canals. With regard to the great water routes, which are open

to large vessels, it is very problematical whether railways could

supersede, or even compete with, navigation in the carrying of bulky

goods. It could not be expected, for example, that on the proposed

line from Hankow to Shanghae, following the course of the great

river for 650 miles, goods should be conveyed as economically as in

steamers that can navigate the river easily, carrying 2000 tons of

cargo.

But in those parts of the plain where very small craft only can be

used, a railway may easily supersede the present means of transport.

The saving of time would, perhaps, in all cases attract the

passenger traffic to the railways, and that alone would probably be

amply sufficient to support them remuneratively.

There are many large tracts of country in China less thickly peopled

than the rich plains, and which do not possess the same facilities

of water communication. In the north the traffic is conducted by

means of caravans, necessarily slow and expensive; and in some parts

of central China, goods are transported on men's backs. In such

regions railways would not only be highly remunerative, but would be

an inestimable boon in opening up those parts of the country which,

being less favoured by nature, have been kept far behind in wealth

and prosperity. To compensate for these natural disadvantages of

the north, the Grand Canal was cut to connect the city of Hang-chow

with Peking. That stupendous work required constant repairs to

maintain its efficiency, and a considerable annual outlay of money.

In the disorders of the last ten years the necessary funds for this

purpose have either not been raised, or have been misappropriated,

and the Grand Canal has consequently gone to ruin. The importance

which has been attached to this great line of communication by

successive dynasties for 900 years, point to the track of the canal

as favourable for a line of railway. Of all the branches of Sir M.

Stephenson's scheme this is the most obviously desirable. A railway

that would restore, and vastly increase the old traffic on the

Grand Canal, would do for the forty populous cities it would touch

at, what steam navigation has done for the marts on the banks of

the great river. Although Peking and the commercial cities of North

China are accessible by sea for eight months in the year, and in

the direct communication between them and the southern coast ports,

there is less urgent need of improvement, yet the time now occupied

in travelling from Peking to its nearest shipping port is as great

as the whole journey to Nanking or Shanghae by railway would take.

The benefits which the railway would bring to the inland cities,

more remote from the sea or from navigable rivers than Peking, would

be incalculable.

In the correspondence published by Sir M. Stephenson, to show the

prospective results of the introduction of railways into China,

rather too much stress has been laid on their bearing on foreign

trade, and especially on the transport of tea from the interior

to the shipping ports. There is nothing in the saving of a few

hundred miles of a long sea voyage to compensate for the cost of

transporting goods by railway. And the conveyance of tea would be a

more insignificant item in the whole traffic of railways than it has

already become in that of the steamers that trade in the heart of

the tea districts.

The whole question of the foreign trade of China may be put on one

side so far as the railway scheme is concerned. The success of

railways, and the need of them, rest on a much broader and surer

basis. The internal trade of China; the interchange of the products

of the diverse climates and soils that are included in the limits

of the empire itself--is what really gives life and activity to the

people. It is to that source alone that the promoters of railways

ought to look for a guarantee of their success. The whole foreign

trade in tea does not probably exceed one tenth of the native; and

yet tea forms but a small proportion of the inland trade of China.

In the consideration of the railway question, therefore, the more

such irrelevant matter is kept out of account, the more likely

are sound general conclusions to be arrived at. The lines to be

established should be determined solely with a view to supplying

the wants of the Chinese in the broadest sense. But if a desire to

benefit this or that port, or this or that party, be permitted to

influence the direction of the undertaking, it will probably be at

the expense of its ultimate success.

The political advantages that would flow from the use of railways

would be no less important than the commercial. It would bring the

distant provinces within reach of the government, and enable it more

effectually to centralise its authority, without which it is no

longer possible to govern China well.

Peking is in the worst situation that could have been selected for

the seat of government; that is, from a Chinese point of view.

It was convenient as a citadel for the Tartars while they were

consolidating their power, as its vicinity to their native wilds

kept open for them an easy retreat in the event of revolution.

And, while their vigour remained fresh, the enfeebling influence

of distance from the provinces was neutralised by the energy of

the executive. But in the process of degeneracy which the Manchu

dynasty, like its predecessors, has undergone, the remoteness of

the capital has been a fertile cause of misrule, corruption, and

distress in the provinces. The natural capital of China is Nanking

or Hang-chow, or some other easily accessible point in the central

provinces.

The railway scheme, by connecting all parts of the empire in rapid

daily communication, would bring the government face to face with

its officers; local abuses would be exposed, if not corrected, and

imperial and national interests would cease to be at the mercy of

corrupt, mendacious, and treacherous provincial authorities. Nothing

would so surely save the existing government from the annihilation

which threatens it; restore order throughout the country; and

promote the well-being of all classes.

The local famines and inundations to which China has in all ages

been liable, and which, from the absence of proper communications,

have occasionally entailed great suffering on the people, would,

under the reign of railways, lose their horrors. The brigandage

with which the government keeps up a desultory and unsatisfactory

struggle over an area too wide for rapid or decisive results,

would die a natural death, were railways in operation. Their moral

effect alone would do much to keep down local risings, and the

facility they would afford for the transport of troops would enable

the government to act with promptitude at the point required; and

instead of keeping up half-disciplined, disaffected, and idle

hordes, often worse than useless, and yet very expensive, a small,

compact, well-equipped force, with the power of motion which

railways would supply, would do the work better, and at a mere

fraction of the expense.

Railways would be very popular with the Chinese people, whose

readiness to support them is proved by their capitalists offering to

invest in shares. But will the consent of the Imperial government

be granted to the project? Without its co-operation nothing can

be done; and this therefore is the question which will have to be

primarily decided.

In the first place there is the _vis inertiæ_--the aversion to

innovation--to be got over. That can be accomplished if the

government can be convinced of the advantage of the proposed scheme.

Then, on the other hand, the representatives of foreign powers at

the court of Peking may, from national jealousy, influence the

government against any reform emanating from Great Britain. But

the determination of the Chinese government will depend most of

all on the view which the British minister or _chargé d'affaires_

may happen to take of it; and he may meet the projectors with

active or lukewarm support, or with positive opposition. The

conciliatory and upright spirit which has ruled Sir Frederick

Bruce's intercourse with the Chinese government has inspired it with

unlimited confidence in the British minister, whose counsels have in

consequence acquired great weight in Peking. It is earnestly to be

hoped that his successor will avail himself of the good impressions

Sir Frederick leaves behind him to promote with all assiduity those

reforms and improvements which, while subserving the best interests

of China, will also redound to the honour and the profit of our own

country.

It is the duty of our ministers to maintain the legitimate influence

of this country in China. Our actual interest in that empire greatly

outweighs that of any other people; but we are in some danger of

losing our prestige, and allowing other powers to rival us. We

failed in the telegraphic scheme through Mongolia, but the Russians

will certainly accomplish it. The Lay-Osborn fleet failed, but the

French and the Americans will supply its place. We have withdrawn

British officers from the Chinese service; but the French and

Americans remain. Railways will, some day, be established in China;

the people are as ripe for their introduction now as they ever will

be; if we miss the opportunity, some other nation will seize it,

and, with or without us, China will have railways.

The electric telegraph would of course accompany railways, if,

indeed, it does not precede them. I am not prepared to speak of

the adaptability of the Chinese hieroglyphics to telegraphy, but

the Chinese people and government have a keen appreciation of the

importance of the rapid transmission of intelligence. This is shown

by the admirable system of government expresses, and the extent

to which carrier-pigeons have been used to influence the exchange

markets of China. The vast area of the Chinese empire would render

telegraphic communication more than ordinarily acceptable, and, in

the present age of the world, even necessary.

It needs no great stretch of imagination to predict that the free

use of machinery in China will yet do much to enrich the nation, and

to ameliorate the condition of the poorer classes. Many parts of the

country are suffering from overpopulation. Their economy in food,

clothing, and housing, together with the great fertility of the soil

in such districts as the plains of Che-kiang and Keang-soo, enable

an incredibly large population to find a subsistence there. But 800

persons on the square mile is too much, even for the richest part of

China, to support efficiently. A large proportion of these people

is consequently underfed, poorly clad, and miserably lodged; they

suffer the penalties of civilised life without its comforts, and

their physical and mental development are seriously impaired. The

Chinese do not possess within themselves any remedy for this state

of things; economy of their means and moderation in their desires

have already been cultivated to perfection. Their manual industry is

unexampled, and leaves no room for improvement. Their diligence in

taxing the resources of their soil cannot be exceeded. The surplus

population might certainly find an outlet in foreign lands, but the

Chinese people as a whole are singularly averse to emigration.

The greatest boon that could be conferred on these people, and

the only feasible means of raising many thousands of them from

the lowest depths of poverty, would be the introduction of new

industries which would give them profitable employment, which at

present they are excluded from. A promising field is open for this.

The perseverance of the Chinese is proverbial, and the perfection

they have attained in making the most out of the means at their

disposal has been the admiration of the whole world. But they are

still strangers to the modern mechanical appliances of Europe and

America for economising human labour. Compared therefore with the

attainments of western nations, the material resources of China are

wasted. The division of labour, as practised in the agricultural

districts of China, is diametrically opposed to the principle

advanced by Adam Smith. Each family grows, spins, weaves, and wears

its own cotton; and so with many other products. This system has the

advantage of keeping the people employed all the year round, and

there may no doubt be a great deal to be said in its favour.

But to what purpose--with what results--is all this labour spent?

The practical answer to this is, that it has happened that England

has imported raw cotton from China, manufactured it, returned it

to China two years afterwards, and sold the cotton cloth cheaper

than the article could be produced by domestic labour on the spot

where it is grown. It is, of course, to a small extent only, that

England can compete in manufactured cotton with the native product

of China. But that it should be possible at all, first to buy the

raw material at such an enhanced price over the cost to the natives

as will induce them to part with it, then to send it 15,000 miles

across the sea, and the same distance back again, and spite of the

enormous expenses incurred in the operation, still to supply the

manufactured article at a lower cost than the natives produce it at,

proves that a vast amount of labour is misapplied in this branch of

Chinese industry. And yet their manufacture of cotton has, perhaps,

been brought to a higher state of efficiency than any other.

Their coal and iron are worked in the most primitive manner. Both

articles are supplied from abroad, although existing in great

abundance in the country. The native coal that is sold in the

markets of China costs from thirty to forty shillings per ton, and

is so poor in quality that English coal is more economical at double

the price. By proper appliances, and a better system of working,

the quality of Chinese coal might be greatly improved, and the cost

diminished.

It would be endless to enumerate the various departments in which

steam and machinery might be advantageously applied in China.

Sugar and paper may be mentioned, as also the various oils used by

the Chinese, all produced and consumed in the country in enormous

quantities, and all susceptible of great improvement both in the

cost and quality of the preparations.

In everything that constitutes the wealth of the country we see

the same disproportion between the power expended, and the results

obtained, as has been instanced in the case of cotton. The waste of

human labour is multiplied by the vast and varied products of the

country; and the field offered for the expansion of new enterprises

is commensurate with the size and population of the Chinese empire.

The introduction of machinery into the interior of the country, and

its application to the manufactures that now employ the people, will

only be secured by a slow and gradual process. Great opposition

would be met with, particularly at the outset; for, though we may

claim for the Chinese a freedom from prejudice equal to any other

people, it would be absurd to expect of them more enlightenment than

our own countrymen have shown, when put to the test by innovations

which threatened to supersede manual labour. The Chinese will be

convinced, as usual, by results. When they find the materials of

wealth which they now possess multiplied to them by the cheapness

of the necessaries of life, they will not be slow in following

up the idea. The elevation of the poorer classes, when profitable

occupation is supplied to them, will create new wants, while it

provides the means of gratifying them. The benefits accruing to

China will naturally react on this country precisely to that extent

to which a commercial nation must always profit by the increasing

wealth of its customers.

In small matters also, the social condition of the Chinese people

is in a fair way of being improved by their contact with restless

and progressive foreigners. Gas, which is now being introduced into

Hong-Kong and Shanghae--a simple thing in itself--may nevertheless

do something towards elevating the Chinese, and preparing them for

more important advances. The erection of water-works, for the supply

of the large cities, would be a boon of no ordinary value to those

populations who live on the alluvial plains. The impure water, drawn

from turbid rivers and canals which are the receptacles of filth,

is a fertile cause of disease in many localities. These communities

might be supplied with pure filtered water at a lower cost than is

at present paid for the mere carriage of the unwholesome compound

now obtained from sources as putrid as the Thames. One successful

experiment would probably demonstrate the necessity of extending

water-works to most of the populous cities in the empire.[28]

[28] Shanghae, from its situation and over-crowded population, is

one of the greatest sufferers from the want of pure water; and

there cannot be a doubt that this circumstance has contributed, in

no slight degree, to the sickliness that has prevailed there for

several years past, as the increase in the population tends more and

more to the defilement of the river,--the only source whence water

is obtained. The question of water-supply for that settlement having

been submitted to practical and experienced engineers in London,

the result of their calculations is, that a system of water-works,

with reservoirs beyond the influence of sewage, would provide each

household with an unlimited supply of pure, filtered water, at about

one-fourth of the expense which is at present incurred in merely

carrying water from the river to the houses. Messrs. Simpson and

Giles have further demonstrated that, at the proposed rate of one

shilling per 1,000 gallons, a large return would be secured on the

capital necessary to be invested in the works. We may therefore hope

that at no distant day the inhabitants of Shanghae, at least, will

enjoy this great blessing.

Nor is the influence of European intercourse with China limited in

its scope to the mere commercial, manufacturing, and other material

pursuits of the people. Their notions of good government must be

inevitably modified by it, and no one can estimate the extent to

which a few Europeans, by their superior force of character, may

impress the huge multitudes of China. Circumstances have rendered

Shanghae the great focus from which these external influences

are brought to bear on the natives. The distracted state of the

surrounding country first brought numbers of fugitives, both

rich and poor, to seek shelter under the ægis of foreign flags,

until an enormous population has accumulated on the ground set

apart for the residence of foreigners. The kind of small republic

which the Europeans set up for their own protection, and for the

due regulation of the natives who crowded into the settlement,

became popular with the Chinese; its functions became more and

more important; and accessions of power were from time to time

added to it, but always inadequate to the efficient discharge of

its constantly increasing duties. The Chinese like the municipal

administration of Shanghae, because, although heavily taxed, they at

least know how the revenue is applied, and they enjoy more or less

personal protection, and immunity from extortion. The system has

worked with more harmony than could have been expected, considering

that it to a certain extent rivals the provincial government. It

has at any rate taken deep root, and may possibly be the precursor

of similar growths at other commercial towns. In any disruption of

the Chinese power that may result from the present disorganised

condition of the empire, these anomalous foreign "settlements" will

certainly play an important part. The weakness of the government of

the country and the disorders which accompany it, while impairing

the prosperity of the settlements as commercial _emporia_, tend to

strengthen their political influence. The prestige which naturally

accompanies a European residence, and the guarantee of security to

life and property, with or without armed protection, which it holds

out to the Chinese people, render these consular ports asylums of

authority in times of anarchy, and will naturally maintain them as

commercial centres when the government of the country has crumbled

away. In them a nucleus of power will be preserved, which will

facilitate the reconstruction of a government, should the present

one be broken up, and in this way these commercial settlements may

yet prove of essential service to the Chinese nation. They may

possibly grow into free, independent republics, an issue which the

leading journal has more than once predicted. In an article of June

2, 1864, the "Times" says:--"The free cities we hope to see are

those which grow of their own accord, and which arise out of the

circumstances of an abundant commerce and an unsettled country. If

the nations of Europe would agree to stand aloof, we should very

soon see little commercial republics intrenching themselves and

extending themselves upon the shores of China; just such cities as

arose upon the coast of Africa, and in later history upon the coasts

of Italy, when similar dangers compelled traders to draw together

for defence and self-government. We believe that our cheapest and

our best policy is not to establish, but to favour the growth of

such communities as may develop themselves into free cities. Nor

can we expect that this development will be the work of a day, or

that so great a ruin as that which is mouldering over the heads

of one-third of the human race can fall, and be reformed into

modern habitations, without many clouds of dust and some terrible

catastrophes."

Should such be the destiny of these trading ports, no class will

have more cause for satisfaction than the body of Chinese who may

reside in them, who regard with pleasure every advance of foreign

influence, and would be glad to live in peace under any power strong

enough to maintain it.

POSTSCRIPT.

Events have progressed rapidly in China since the foregoing chapter

was written. Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, after resigning his

commission in the Chinese army for the reasons I have mentioned,

apparently considered that it would be too hazardous at such a

juncture to leave the Government entirely to its own devices. He

accordingly remained, with the approval of Major-General Brown, to

instruct and advise them, and he has had the satisfaction to witness

the crowning success of all his labours, in the fall of Nanking, and

the extinction of the Taeping rebellion.

The two provinces of Che-Kiang and Keang-soo--the richest and most

populous in China--are now freed from rebels, and have had peace

and order once more restored to them. It may require some little

time entirely to reassure the populations of these provinces of

the security of life and property in districts that have so long

languished under the devastating effects of civil war; but there

is now every reason to suppose that the reign of anarchy has been

banished for many years to come, and that the pacified region will

soon enjoy the prosperity which its natural advantages must bring,

enhanced, as it must inevitably be, by the extended intercourse with

foreigners which has not yet had an opportunity of bearing its full

fruit.

This success of the Imperial arms has naturally resulted from the

acceptance of foreign Ministers at the Court of Peking, and the

introduction of China into the family of nations, which is the great

triumph of the policy inaugurated by Lord Palmerston twenty-four

years ago, and steadfastly followed up by that statesman through

good and evil report.

Whether the scattered remnants of the Taepings will again become

formidable from their concentration in the province of Kiang-si,

beyond the reach of the immediate foreign aid which has led to

their dispersion, will depend very much on the vigour of the

Imperial Government at Peking. If it realises the gravity of the

position, and the truth of the maxim that prevention is better than

cure, it will adopt timely and energetic measures to anticipate a

reorganisation of the Taepings.

But, however that may be, it is pretty certain that if the

provisions of the Treaty were carried out in the broad sense

evidently contemplated by the framers of it; if the Poyang lake and

the rivers which communicate with it were freely opened to foreign

trade; if Europeans were permitted to reside at the commercial

marts of Kiang-si, their moral weight alone, especially after the

campaign just concluded in Keang-soo and Che-Kiang, would go far to

prevent any further demonstration of the rebels in that quarter.

The authorities at Peking may yet find cause to regret that their

suspicion of friendly foreigners has deprived them of such important

auxiliaries at many of their most vulnerable points.

_October 27._

[Illustration: THE WATER COMMUNICATION OF NORTHERN ASIA, BETWEEN

KIAKHTA & THE URAL MOUN^{T.S}

_London. John Murray Albemarle Street._

_Stanford's Geographical Estab^t London_]

* * * * *

Transcriber's note:

Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note.

Irregularities and inconsistencies (such as hyphenation) in the text

have been retained as printed.

The illustrations have been moved so that they do not break up

paragraphs, thus the page number of the illustration might not match

the page number in the List of Illustrations.

Missing page numbers are page numbers that were not shown in the

original text.

The cover for the eBook version of this book was created by the

transcriber and is placed in the public domain.

Page 30: "which leads them to make great sacrifices when required

to do honour to the manes of their ancestors" ... "manes" has been

changed to "names".