THE MEANING OF THE WORD “WRONG”
“The human mind is capable of having very many perceptions, and the
more capable, the greater the number of ways in which its body can
be disposed.” SPINOZA, “Ethics,” Part II, Prop. 14.
Lexicographers are wont to state that “wrong” is the opposite of
“right” in all of its principle senses, but as can be seen at a
glance from the appended array,[18] this statement cannot be taken
to imply that any such extensive list of significations as we
exhibited in our analysis of “right” can be reproduced here. Indeed,
in what respect “wrong” is the antonym of “right,” or, in other
words, how far this pair of terms illustrates the law of reciprocal
innervation, can be seen only from a detailed comparison of the two,
as follows:—
RIGHT WRONG
Class A.
The word “right” as
descriptive of certain
mathematical relationships
and physical functions.
Sub-class I.
“Straight,” (a word in
current usage) negated by “Crooked,” Ex. I,
(obsolete).
Sub-class II.
“Direct” No antonym
FOOTNOTES:
[18] As follows:
1. Crooked, twisted, or wry. (Obsolete)
2. Disordered, not properly adjusted, as in the expression: “I’ve
heerd my aunt say as she found out summat was _wrong_ wi’
Nancy as soon as the milk turned bingy.”
3. Incorrect, or uncorrected; that is, not according to
requirement, intention, purpose, or desire, as _wrong_ ideas,
_wrong_ courses, the _wrong_ font of type, etc.
4. Esthetically undesirable or unsuitable, as,—“You have put the
_wrong_ side of the cloth outermost.”
5. Erroneous or mistaken belief or assertion.
6. “In the _wrong_ box” (slang), in an awkward situation,
mistaken.
7. Perverse, wilfully mistaken or erroneous. (Cf. “evil.”)
8. Unjust action; violation of obligation or propriety; a tort.
9. Harm or “evil” inflicted; damage or detriment suffered; an
injury, mischief, or hurt; pain imparted or received.
10. To be “in the _wrong_”; to be mistaken, to act or think
incorrectly or unjustly.
11. “To have _wrong_”; to be mistaken; to act erroneously or
unjustly.
12. “To have _wrong_”; to suffer injury; e. g., “Cæsar has had
great _wrong_.”
13. “To put in the _wrong_”; to represent erroneously.
14. “To go _wrong_”; not to run smoothly, as of machinery.
15. “To go _wrong_”; to go astray from the intended direction.
16. “To go _wrong_”; to do “evil.”
17. To “_wrong_”; to treat unfairly, unjustly, or harmfully;
to oppress, offend, or injure.
18. “To _wrong_”; in an old nautical sense, to take the wind
from the sails of a ship which is sailing in line with another to
windward.
Sub-class III.
“Immediately” No antonym
Class B.
“Right” as descriptive of
the method (or object)
by which the desired end
can be obtained negated by Examples 3 and 5;
but only if we override
the objection that “right”
here usually refers to one
specific method or object,
while “wrong” can refer
to any one of a number
of unspecified things.
Class C.
“Right” as descriptive of
any statement that reports
the facts; of any
opinion or judgment that
is correct; and of any
person who judges,
thinks, or acts in accordance
with the facts or
the truth about a matter negated by Examples 3, 5, 7, 9,
10, and 11, except for the
difference just previously
mentioned, and omitting
examples 31-35 inclusive
on p. 80.
Class D.
“Right” as the distinctive
epithet of the hand
which is normally the
stronger No antonym
Class E.
Legal “rights”; those
claims and interests the
establishment and protection
of which may be secured
by force and even
violence negated only with respect to
some particular cases of
“right” by Examples 8,
9, and 17.
Class F.
Moral “rights” negated by Examples 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 13, 16, and 17; but
only in the same way that
moral “right” is incompatible
with legal “right.”
Class G.
Unspecified and unrestricted
liberties and
privileges negated restrictively by the single
example of No. 18.
Class H.
That which is most convenient,
desirable, or
favorable; conforming to
one’s wish or desire; to
be preferred, etc., negated by Examples 2, 4, 6, 9,
10, 12, 13, 14, and 15.
Class I.
“Right” signifying very,
in great degree No antonym
This comparison obviously reveals no basis for the statement that
“wrong” and “right” are complete antitheses to each other, at least
in the fine sense that _up_ is the opposite of _down_, _in_ of _out_,
or _east_ of _west_. So that, if we accept the word “right” as
descriptive of a behavior situation in which the dominant feature is
the controlling and directing of human energies, the employment of
technique to further man’s purposes, or the attainment of any “good”
whatsoever, the word “wrong” cannot,—either according to the detailed
list of its uses just presented, or according to the above scheme of
its logical relationship to “right,”—be said to be the true antonym
of that word. The law of reciprocal innervation does not, in its
integrity, apply here.
How then shall we explain the fact that people so habitually say
and feel that “wrong” is the opposite of “right,” if it cannot
be admitted that antagonistic muscles are always employed in the
thoughts and the acts to which these two words refer? Perhaps the
following interpretation will answer. Logicians are accustomed to
say that any universal proposition, any sweeping statement, such as,
“Every swan is white,” or “No aliens need apply,” is contradicted
by the admission that one single exception is to be allowed. But
obviously, such logical contradiction, such admission of a lone
but effective exception, is not equivalent to granting that “No
swans are white,” or that “Every alien is requested to apply.”
Nevertheless, the tradition among logicians is that with the granting
of one such exception, the sweeping statement originally made is
held to be untrue, and hence, false. In physiological terms (than
which there are none more fundamental), contradiction is for the
logician equivalent to a partial but effective inhibition of any
fully developed action-tendency. When Plato would say, “You may
all now come in to dinner,” but is deterred by seeing Diogenes
muddying his feet in order to tread the more scornfully on the
clean banquet floor, Plato’s action-pattern of wholesale, cordial
invitation is suddenly interrupted. And, _so far as Plato’s emotions
are concerned_, the need to make one important exception in his
invitation, is very much like having to turn the whole company out
of doors. This tendency for an emotional repugnance to blot out all
sense of proportion is clearly illustrated in certain oft-repeated
fables. The story of the involuntary guest who had not on a wedding
garment, of the ninety and nine sheep, and of the rich young man are
cases in point. Similar examples may be found in the behavior of any
household. The vexed hostess is heard complaining that one little
_faux pas_ on the part of her serving-girl “completely spoiled the
whole evening.” The sweet young thing whose lover arrives a quarter
of an hour later than his appointment accuses him of being elsewhere
enamoured to stay. The wife whose husband forgets only one of her
twenty birthdays since their marriage often finds it impossible to
overlook the single, unhabitual fault. It is not that such people
crave or dote on perfection; they do nothing of the sort: it is
only that their behavior mechanisms are unable to readjust quickly
to another stimulus than the one which they have expected, and this
failure to readjust releases energies by way of the viscera instead
of along other and more pacific pathways.
All this has an important bearing on the meaning of the word
“wrong.” We saw that this word has only 18 significations, as
compared with the 114 significations of “right.” We also saw that
it is only partially antagonistic to the concept to which it is
commonly opposed. And it has further been revealed that our customary
logic makes a single exception the grounds for an assumption of
contradiction. On the basis of these observations, then, we may
declare that “wrong” refers to some very special behavior situations
where human energies cannot be controlled and directed as desired,
where the employment of technique to further man’s purposes has been
hindered, and where “good” cannot be obtained. This, however, is not
equivalent to saying that “wrong” is the antonym, the unqualified
contradictory, of “right,” any more than red is the opposite of blue,
or coffee the opposite of tea.
_A Physiological Warrant for Ethical Optimism_
A question of considerable importance both in physiology and in
ethics arises when we ask why the concepts “right” and “good” have
so many more significations than do “wrong,” “evil,” and “bad.” We
have already emphasized the relation between speech and conduct
sufficiently to indicate that upon the answer to such a question
something essential for a technique in ethics depends. A word can
have a great number of significations only by its being employed in a
great variety of situations, and this means that very many different
specific responses are implicit in the use of our most comprehensive
concepts. Contrariwise, with a word of fewer significations, fewer
such responses are implied. Now we have already cited the fact that
“good” and “right” refer primarily to outgoing (extensor) reactions,
and that “wrong,” “evil,” and “bad” signify withdrawing (flexor)
reactions. Are we, then, summarily to conclude, without any further
knowledge of the body’s mechanisms, that since we seem to use our
extensor system in a more diversified manner than our flexor system,
the muscular equipment of the former is superior to that of the
latter?
If we do so conclude, we shall be in error. It is the opposite
that is nearer the truth. Both larger and stronger, and, on the
whole, more easily educated muscles exist in the flexor than in the
extensor system. The innumerable capacities of the half-closed
hand are representative of this superiority. Still more important,
however, is the fact that the flexor system is practically the
dominant system in the human body. The hinges of the knee, hip,
shoulder, elbow, wrist, and jaw are more often, more strongly, and
more readily closed maximally than they are expanded to the full.
Besides, occupational postures are almost universally crystallized
withdrawing responses. Where, then, shall we look for the answer to
our question?
We shall look directly at the behavior of the organism as a whole.
While it is admitted that flexor actions are stronger, more numerous,
and more universal than are extensor reactions, yet when we consider
how the flexor reactions dispose the body toward its environment,
we shall at once have light on this curious problem. For the effect
of such reactions is to cut off the body from a large part of the
environment, and consequently to reduce the possibility of effective
contact with it. Stooping, crouching, bowing the head, and lowering
the eye are significant examples of flexor responses which reduce
the span of perception, while every man knows that activities of
the opposite character allow a greater number of stimuli to come in
contact with his eyes and his ears. Consequently, even though flexor
actions will always be in the majority, extensor actions have the
advantage of providing the conditions under which a greater variety
of stimuli can be presented to the organism. This is the same as
saying that the open-minded person necessarily becomes discriminative
and exploratory, while the opposite type is left to stew in his own
juice. The flexor type of man is, indeed, in the end reduced to
contacts with his own body, while to the extensor type of man his
body is only one of the many sources of motivation, the rest being
in the external environment. It seems thus to be primarily due to
the very mechanics of the organism that the words “right” and “good”
have a greater variety of significations than have the words “bad,”
“evil,” and “wrong.”
One additional word, however, can still be said. As we have already
indicated, these three so-called negative ethical concepts are all
descriptive of behavior situations in which thwarting and inhibition
are dominant symptoms. Henceforth, however, thwarting and inhibition
will be understood as temporary interruptions of an outgoing reaction
which would have eventuated had the environment contained the
stimulus to which the organism was attuned to respond. As we say in
common speech, a desire is not satisfied by being denied, and from
our every-day experience we know that great aggravations produce as
much scheming as do our easiest successes. He who casts his eye over
the numerous significations of our two positive ethical concepts
will now realize where much of the adroitness and sagacity which
characterizes them originates.
In these two simple facts, namely, that extensor actions bring more
of the world of action within our range, and that even the thwarted
man imaginatively explores the environment to find substitute stimuli
to release his energy upon, we find the reason why man has more uses
for the words “right” and “good” than he has for the words “bad,”
“evil,” and “wrong.” And with this we achieve by a purely empirical
and anti-supernaturalistic method a physiological warrant for ethical
optimism. If anyone is looking for a “higher” truth, let him ponder
this one.