“RIGHT” AS A GESTURAL SIGN
“From every point of view, the overwhelming and portentous
character ascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why,
from Plato and Aristotle downwards, philosophers should have vied
with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular, and
in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand, seeing
that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the more
adorable things, and that the _things_ of worth are all concretes
and singulars. The only value of universal characters is that
they help us, by reasoning, to know new truths about individual
things.... In sum, therefore, the traditional universal-worship
can only be called a bit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophic
‘idol of the tribe.’” W. JAMES, “Principles of Psychology,” Vol. I,
Chap. XII, pp. 479-80.
There had been a murder in the Maritime Provinces, and two men,
a jurist and a layman, were discussing it. The murdered man, it
appeared, had from time to time missed some of his sheep, and one
day, upon hearing a shot fired, ran down into his pasture, and came
upon two boys, one of whom was carrying a gun, and the other a bag
whose contours plainly revealed that it contained the body of a
sheep. The farmer ordered the boys to follow him to town to give an
account of their misbehavior; and this they proceeded to do without
any show of resistance or word of objection. But suddenly, and
without any warning, the boy who carried the gun shot the farmer in
the back of the head, killing him instantly. The murderer was later
apprehended, and put into the county jail, awaiting trial.
“And would they hang a boy of seventeen in Canada?” asked the layman.
“Why not?” enquired the jurist, “They can hang anyone here who has
reached the age of discretion, and who knows the difference between
right and wrong.”
“And will you tell me,” parried the layman, “just what that age is,
and exactly what that difference is?”
The jurist eyed his inquisitor for a moment, and burst into a laugh.
“Only a fool would ask such a question!” he retorted, and turned away.
All of which goes to show that a man may be proficient in legal
technique, and yet be an ignoramus in ethics. Knowledge of the
meaning of the word “right” is both possible and profitable, and it
is hardly too much to suppose that such knowledge, when disseminated,
might even produce a salutary effect upon legal theory and legal
practice.
Anyone who endeavors to marshal the array of all the uses to
which the word “right” is put, will be astonished to find out how
extensive the list is. In point of the richness of its denotation
and connotation, this concept exceeds the term “good.” And while it
resembles that word in being used as a noun, a verb, an adjective,
and an adverb, it significantly differs from the term “good” in that
it is employed to refer principally to the relations and functions of
things, and hardly ever to objects of the physical environment.
No man’s span of perception is large enough, or his span of attention
long enough, to surround the complete array of the uses of the word
“right” unless this array be divided into classes. Such division
will presently appear. And I think it can be shown that no matter
how little in common some of the terms of this array seem, to a
casual observer, to possess, when they are thus grouped into classes,
they will be subtly linked together by adequate bonds. Let us then
introduce:
CLASS A
_The Word “Right” as a Term that is Descriptive of Certain
Mathematical Relationships and Physical Functions._[11]
The original signification of our concept was _straight_, a word, be
it noted, that is usually defined in the negative. (See Ex. 1, p.
76.) Why we have a negative definition for a word that seems to have
a positive meaning, especially to mathematicians and draughtsmen,
is not at first quite obvious. However, when this phenomenon is
duly examined from the point of view of the mechanics of man’s
locomotor apparatus, its secret is no longer hidden. All of the
movements naturally produced by the appendages of the body are
curvilinear: the arm being a lever, or radius vector, it always draws
arcs in space or on paper; so does the hand as a whole, and so do
the fingers. “Right” signifying _straight_, therefore, is defined
negatively simply because straight lines are alien to the physics and
mechanics of man’s original nature.
Where, then, did man get the notion of straightness, and what has
this first class of the uses of “right” to do with ethics? Man got
the notion of straightness, we surmise, from such things as freely
falling bodies, which give not only the idea of perpendicular, but
also and at the same time the ideas of _direct_ and _immediately_;
from the sunbeams which drew for him imaginary lines among the clouds
and through the foliage of the forest; from his need of taking the
shortest course across the fields in pursuit of wild animals for
the supply of his larder; and from his reminiscent ponderings of
the comparative merits of less and less curved and crooked arrows
used in the chase. Moreover, man walks with the greatest safety and
pursues his game with the greatest chances of success when his feet
go without hesitation on a level or straight surface. Under these
conditions he can attain his ends directly and immediately; as the
saying is, “Things will then come out all _right_.” Consequently,
even the straight line has ethical implications: the speed with
which some actions are performed and the time required to cover the
distance between man and his objective are very often the chief
considerations in the attainment of a good or the avoidance of an
evil thing.
And this brings us by a very slight transition to
Class B
_“Right” as Descriptive of the Method (or Object) by Which the
Desired End Can be Obtained._
Here the purpose involved, or the end sought, is neither praised
nor blamed. Nor have we indeed as yet reached any basis by which a
criterion of purposes and ends can be established. So far as we have
gone, “right” implies technique, and nothing more.
The members of this class are as follows:
13. The “right” information.
14. “Right” whale; the one to capture in order to get whalebone.
15. “Rub your sarsnet well, the _right_ way of the sarsnet.”
16. “Let it be a constant rule to scrub the boards the _right_
way of the grain, that is, lengthwise.”
17. “The ship ceased rolling and _righted_ herself.” (Compare
this signification with _perpendicular_, previously given.)
18. “Stand it _upright_, or it will fall.”
19. “Whose inhabitants were _right_ shooters (at an haires
breadth and faile not).”
20. “Swears he will shoot no more, but play with sparrows, And be
a boy _right_ out.”
21. “I am _right_ of mine old master’s humour for that.”
CLASS C
_“Right” as Descriptive of any Statement Which Reports the Facts;
of any Opinion or Judgment that is Correct; and of any Person Who
Judges, Thinks, or Acts in Accordance with the Facts or the Truth
about a Matter._[12]
It will be observed that the significations in this class are all
symptomatic of a slight change in the meaning of the concept “right.”
The emphasis here is upon true opinions and judgments in contrast to
false ones. Moreover, the range of behavior covered by Class C is
somewhat broader than that denoted by the two preceding classes. He
who now uses this word “right” becomes judicial, and makes statements
he is willing to defend. More than this we cannot say. We assume
many a time, no doubt, that the statements we call true are backed
by something not ourselves; and while in some cases nature’s laws
are in a sense “behind” our statements, yet unless this is the case,
there is nothing whatever to fall back upon. Thus, while a man may
demonstrate that dynamite is, as he says, truly explosive, yet in
cases of the equitable adjustment of social frictions, where both
parties pour out a tumult of exaggerations, no similar truth of
opinion is obtainable. It would therefore be illogical to assume
that we have reached any absolute criterion in passing from Class B
to Class C of “right.” He who uses this concept in this connection
has, indeed, ventured more than he who uses it only to imply the
preceding two classes, but he is not thereby gifted with superior
powers of discretion. All we can say is that he who undertakes to
make a judgment with all the available information before him is more
likely to be chosen as a referee again. He will at least have the
satisfaction of knowing that if he makes mistakes, they will probably
be some that he has never made before. And this way much of human
progress lies.
CLASS D
_“Right” as the Distinctive Epithet of the Hand Which is Normally
the Stronger._[13]
The use of our concept in this connection is firmly bound to its
use in the preceding classes. For it is no accident that in the
mechanistic process called evolution human aims and purposes have
come to be furthered and achieved principally through the power and
skill of the arm and hand. The “right” arm and hand point reasonably
_straight_, throw missiles in a fairly direct _manner_, and their
powerful shots bring down the quarry _immediately_. (Class A.)
These parts of the body are also among the most educible and skilful
in the technique requisite for bringing about a desired end. Their
action-patterns are indeed often the very method by which ambitions
are achieved. (Class B.) And when we have reached a judgment that
is deemed to be true or in accordance with the facts of the matter
(Class C.), it is our “right” hand that is ready to be motivated
in its defence. Even the art of writing, in the original sense of
cutting, tearing, or scratching to produce a record or a design, is
not at all distantly related to the functions of this part of the
body.
With this clearly understood, the transition is easy to make to
CLASS E
_Legal “Rights”; that is, Those Claims and Interests the
Establishment and Protection of Which May Be Secured by Force and
even Violence._[14]
As used in this connection, “right” is partially equivalent to
_might_, since our concept here connotes an organized force,—a
physical power,—which, under given conditions, can be employed for
the purpose of establishing claims and protecting interests. This
organized force is popularly referred to as “the Law,” especially
by those who indulge in back-yard altercations and cry out: “If you
do that again, I’ll have the Law on you!” And the ordinary man,
whose six or seven years of public schooling have implanted in him
the fixed habit of reifying all abstractions, understands the law
as equivalent to a transcendental force of some kind which makes
his threats effective. As befits the mental calibre of such a man,
the law frequently becomes synonymous with the functions of the
police, who are naïvely supposed to know when and how to protect
everybody’s legal rights. This is an error. Not only are the police
extremely ignorant persons, but they have scarcely any legal status
whatever. They are “the tolerated remnant of the autocratic power
which absolute monarchs once exercised over their subjects.” Law and
legal rights are functions of the courts, while the police are simply
unattached huskies hired to bring into court those who do not come
there of their own initiative. We must look elsewhere for the source
of the might which legal rights are said and felt to possess, namely,
in the origin and function of law itself.
Briefly stated, law originated as a means to protect men against
loss of property, against bodily harm, and against damage to their
personality through the actions of their fellows. It did not
originate as a means to prevent or repair the damage to life or
property caused by cloudbursts or lightning, or the loss of income
brought about by avalanches, laziness, or disease; it had only to do
with actions for which some man could be held responsible. Now the
actions which produce the loss of property, bodily harm, and damage
to personality are usually actions arising from, as well as leading
to, emotional disturbances. Theft, murder, and libel, for example,
are about the most potent stimuli to violent retaliation that can be
provided. Nevertheless, it is sound psychology that most emotions
quickly cool if the stimulus be withdrawn, that wrath has to be
nursed if it is to be kept warm, and that absence does not make the
heart grow fonder. Here is where the law performs its chief function.
For the law is simply an ingenious device to get a judgment on
the conflict of human interests which shall not be tinged with the
passions that provoked the conflict. And while legal procedure may
not always be fair, especially in the eyes of the loser, its methods
certify that it shall not be precipitous or rancorous in rendering a
decision. Legal rights, therefore, are not equivalent to the capacity
for revenge, but rather consist in the ability to get old quarrels
looked at by new and unbiased eyes. Herein consists much of the
prestige of the law, and since prestige has always been regarded as a
kind of power, men are not slow to employ it in the establishment of
their claims and the protection of their interests.
Law, however, is frequently misinterpreted when its function
is thought to be preventative of discord, rather than judicial
and equitable. Law is no guardian angel. No law can prevent the
unobserved Richard Roe from murdering the defenceless John Doe; nor
can it hinder the murderer (still unobserved) from altering Doe’s
will to his own material advantage; neither can it be guaranteed to
forestall the murderer from making the false plea that Doe was about
to assault his daughter. The law did not make man in its own image;
according to scripture it was God who did that. Law does not set
out to protect the careless or the poor in spirit. Its machinery is
normally put into operation only for those with enough initiative to
look out for their own interests. If a patentee knowingly allows
one infringement of his patent rights, he might as well donate his
invention to the public. The law does not hunt for trouble, or carry
on a bureau for the exchange of expressions of malcontent. It does
not even demand that a clearly known offender of society, and one
conscious of his offence, enter a plea of guilty. Actually, the
function of law is simply to preserve and to restore order and peace
in society, and not to define what that order and peace shall be.
Were ninety per cent of the people in the world suddenly to become
stubbornly devoted to thieving, the public peace would have to be
redefined in terms of their attitude toward property. Moreover, as
it is now, the law merely attempts to imitate the security which
is provided by “gentlemen’s agreements,” which security is largely
maintained without the help of the courts. For it is very plain that
millions keep the peace, while only a few hundreds know the law. Law,
then, may be fairly characterized as an impersonal referee, whose
business it is to persuade and oblige the disturbers of the social
equilibrium to employ the methods and standards of conduct which have
always marked free men.
With this by way of introduction, it is not difficult to understand
why “right” in the legal sense of the word is so closely related to
_might_. For the term “legal rights” refers not only to those claims
and interests which may be established and protected, but also and
rather to those which _have long been_ secured by force. In other
words, some of them have the advantage of the momentum of custom and
tradition. Now custom and tradition, whatever else they may be, are
certainly action-patterns which are generated and maintained by the
bodies of human beings. They are habits, both of overt action and
covert thought,—response processes of the neuro-muscular apparatus.
The tenacity of these habits, moreover, is due to the combined
action of two well-known physiological mechanisms,—the conditioned
reflex and the circular reflex. The conditioned reflex, which is
dependent upon the repetition of stimuli, is particularly prevalent
where day by day the same persons, the same kinds of property, and
the same predicaments of living are met with; and so we may say
that customs and traditions (and with them the inevitable claims
and interests) are created by the environment as much as by the
organism. The circular reflex, or proprio-ceptive reinforcement of
any action-tendency, governs much of our behavior, even though we
little suspect it. It underlies occupational postures, idiosyncracies
of gait and of facial expression, and indeed, without circular
reflexes we should not have either tenacity of purpose or the ability
to hold a grudge. Its function in the establishment and maintenance
of those action-patterns on which tradition depends is of paramount
importance. And since these two reflexes are largely responsible for
the difficulty with which habits of action and thought are broken,
the support which they give to maintaining the tradition of legal
rights is hardly to be overestimated. Thus, from the mechanistic
point of view, the homage which we give to legal rights is after all
simply equivalent to the expenditure of energy in our bodies for the
purpose of maintaining particular habits of action. Indeed, in those
who maintain the public peace, all the energy which goes into actions
which promote the order of society is literally spent to uphold legal
rights of one sort or another. It is this energy, this physical
power, which we referred to recently when we said that “right” is
partially equivalent to _might_.
And yet, in spite of the apparently great amount of muscle power
that is, so to speak, behind all legal rights, from the logical
point of view, the use and effectiveness of this power is altogether
contingent upon the exact nature of the claim and interest which
one desires to be secured. The logical statement of the situation
here involved would take the form of a hypothetical proposition,
namely, _If_ the claim or interest is of a certain kind, _then and
then only_ may it be established and protected. And while this might
seem at first to indicate that legal rights were seriously lacking
in point of authority, yet this is not the case, for the strongest
possible assertions that can be made are always couched in the form
of hypothetical propositions. As Couterat states in his “Algebra of
Logic,” “Every proposition which implies another is stronger than the
latter, and the latter is weaker than the one which implies it.” The
blunt categorical proposition is far less powerful, since by itself
it implies nothing whatever, whereas hypotheticals leave no doubt as
to the necessary consequences. All the laws of nature, which, by the
way, cannot be broken, are stated in hypothetical form. Moreover,
since it is the antecedent, and not the consequent, of a hypothetical
proposition which gives it strength, it is easy to see that any
particular claim and interest is rendered all the more likely of
being established and protected _if_ similar claims and interests
have long been recognized in the law as valid. In practice we find
this to be the case: the common law which is the oldest code is also
the one to which new claims to legal right are invariably referred.
Having looked at the picture of legal rights from one angle, let us
now look at it from another. While in strict logic the statement of
these rights in the form of a hypothetical imperative gives them an
undeniable strength, it must now be admitted that from the pragmatic
point of view it signifies at times a discouraging weakness. For it
has often been the case that the establishment of claims and the
protection of interests has in practice depended upon such vexatious
variables as the pet theories of experts (e. g., alienists), the
hunger, fatigue, and stubbornness of jurymen, the internal secretions
of judges, a crowded or empty condition of the jails, current
sociological theory, and even such astonishing things as one’s
affiliation with secret societies, or one’s political “pulls,” not to
mention, except by a passing remark, the determination of a litigant
to carry his case to the higher courts clear beyond the ability of
his antagonist’s purse to follow him there. So that if we ask whether
some particular claim or interest can and will be established or
protected, the real answer in a large number of border-line cases is,
“Nobody knows.” Justice, who carries in her hand a balance whereby
to weigh the evidence fairly, has also her eyes blindfolded against
seeing what manner of weights are put into either pan. This defect of
law, however, is not to be wondered at when we remember that legal
theory cannot anticipate all of the innumerable claims and interests
which either honest or knavish persons are likely to support as
valid. If the theory of law had been as complicated as human society
has become, it could not have accomplished the half of what it has
already achieved.
From all this it can be seen that the assertion of a legal right
is not always equivalent to its substantiation. Times change,
bringing with them new faces and other minds, new problems and new
interpretations. Nor, for that matter, are all commonly accepted
rights under the law equally to be supported by physical force.
Strictly speaking, only those rights which imply a correlative duty
are truly legal rights. Reciprocity of action is essential. For
example, if Baker has a legally recognized or substantiated right to
do, receive, or enjoy something, it is the duty of Atkins and others
not to infringe or nullify that right. Mark also, that both duty and
right here imply that physical force may be directed against some
specified person, or against all persons generally in case of need,
in order to establish the claim and protect the interest involved.
However, as may be already suspected, not everything that is legally
sanctioned or which enters into legal machinery has the same force
behind it as in the case we have just cited. The right of ownership,
for example, which to the layman seems to be a unit right, involves
five distinct things, as follows: (1) the _jus disponendi_, or right
to give away, (2) the _jus utendi_, or right to use, (3) the _jus
abutendi_, or the right to abuse, (4) the _jus prohibendi_, the right
to keep others away, and (5) the _jus possidendi_, or the right to
recover the property. But only one of these is, strictly speaking, a
right in the sense that it involves a correlative duty, namely, the
_jus prohibendi_. For the _jus disponendi_ is simply a power, and not
a right at all: and the _jus utendi_ is wholly negative in the legal
sense, implying non-interference in the exercise of a natural power;
whereas the _jus abutendi_ is a liberty (neither a right nor a power)
whose exercise is nominally unrestricted: while the _jus possidendi_
is simply the legal capacity to get back that which one is said to
own.
This ends our account of legal rights. We now pass to the
consideration of the other uses of this most comprehensive ethical
concept. Somewhat by way of contrast to that which has just
preceded, let us at once consider
CLASS F,
under which are comprised what are popularly known as “moral”
_rights_.[15]
A casual glance at the appended list of the members of this class
might lead one to consider them simply as a continuation of legal
rights, but this is by no means the case. Albeit moral rights are
identical with legal rights in so far as they imply a multitude
of human claims and interests, they are nevertheless emphatically
different from them on a much more important point. Moral rights lack
all implications of an organized physical force to compel their
recognition. The only compulsions that can be said to assist in the
establishment of the claims and the protection of the interests
comprised under the scope of moral rights are the approval and
disapproval of the group which undertakes to recognize and support
them. In fine, these compulsions amount to the force of public
opinion. And while this force is at times provocative of changes
in the method or content of the law which may later be recognized
as good, on the whole, public opinion is usually so unspecific and
inconstant as to be wholly negligible as a power to enforce any
demands. Certainly no jurist regards moral right as obligatory.
On still another count moral rights show a serious defect. For when
we say that the enforcement of the claims and interests comprised
within the scope of moral rights depends upon the approval of the
group, it must not be supposed that the actions of any group and the
actions which it approves are necessarily one and the same. This
is a sour paradox, but its appropriateness cannot be successfully
denied. The standard of conduct which any group subscribes to under
pressure, either in writing, or before an audience, is singularly
different from the behavior of the group under easier circumstances.
Moreover, it is the exception, and not the rule, for those who
dominate a group,—whether such masters be parents, political bosses,
or any other form of lordling,—to hold their charges to a stricter
accountability than they themselves, removed from correlative
restraints, recognize as imperative. Doubtless, in the execution of
the law, many a time privileges are granted to people of wealth and
prestige which are denied to the humbler petitioners at the bar; but
the difference between legal and moral practice is significantly
this: that in legal practice evasions are no integral part of the
machinery. This does not amount to a condemnation of moral rights:
it is merely holding up the mirror to man, in order that he may see
himself clearly. All in all, consistency may be as impracticable as
it has been unsought for in the daily affairs of men.
However, when we consider the unusual claims made in behalf of moral
rights, there are valid exceptions to be taken to them. For while in
the strict legal sense, moral right is impotent, yet according to
the expressed opinion of the untutored majority, moral right is far
mightier than legal right. Let us see why this is so.
In the first place, not all human claims and interests are or can be
protected by law. It is not the purpose of law to be rigid. However
many statutes, for example, are enacted year by year, the interests
they are supposed to protect increase too rapidly to be covered by
such statutes. Moreover, as in the case with the right of ownership,
many powers and privileges are granted, the exact enjoyment or
exercise of which no law could either predict or circumscribe. Hence
there always remains a residue of interest that is not comprised
within the scope of matured legal tradition. But it is just these
newer interests for which some persons demand most emphatically
the right to be satisfied. We live not in the past, but on the
foremost edge of time, and we are prone to demand as much support
for our youngest claims as for those which have a thousand years of
legal recognition behind them. Now, undoubtedly, many claims are
insufficiently recognized by law. When, however, in the pause before
this recognition is secured, people begin to claim for such interests
a “superior” moral right to be satisfied, and in comparison to that
“superior” right assert that legal rights are merely unfounded
prejudices, the charge of inconsistency can be leveled directly
against them. Ignorance of the function and scope of the law is
no excuse for holding it up to ridicule. Indeed, it is not at all
certain that the law could include the satisfaction of every human
claim and interest whatever without becoming itself destroyed by this
inclusion.
In the second place, there are some persons in whom the law’s
delays, as well as their experience with the _un_evenhandedness of
justice, has provoked a deep-seated prejudice against particular
lawyers and jurists, which prejudice, by means of the fallacy of
composition, they readily transmute into a scorn for whatever is
expressly denominated as legal. Under such conditions the penchant
for moral rights may be often nothing but the product of a mind that
has become malcontent with things as they are; with the result that
solace is sought in the fiction of a set of moral rights which are
regarded as possessing a “higher” or final authority. From such a
person come Examples Nos. 59 and 76, recently cited. Two comments
can be made upon such a case as this. The first of these is that it
is quite certain that no man who has become so pessimistic will see
his way clear to the solution of the problem that has given him so
much tragic concern. As Spinoza says, “The will and the intellect are
one and the same,” but as Spinoza also hinted, the intellect and the
emotions are not. Moreover, such malcontentedness is relatively easy
to annul: let anyone who curses the law begin to make use of it to
his advantage, and his “suppressed complex,” as the Freudians would
say, rapidly evaporates.
A third and final reason why moral rights and the so-called moral
law are sometimes regarded as superior to all things legal is that
among so many persons the curious conviction obtains that they are
individually the pets of Providence, and that consequently whether
they stir themselves or not, become sagacious or remain meek as
lambs, their affairs will be satisfactorily adjusted without their
exertions. Under such illusions many persons take refuge throughout
their lives, forgetting curiously enough that the order of nature has
not supplied them with benevolent guardians, tutors, and managers.
The result is that to such people right is synonymous merely with
what _ought to be_, rather than with even a small part of what
already is. But when they thus employ the term right, it is debased.
One often hears such people say with regard to a catastrophe: “Oh,
well, I suppose we shall have to make the best of it,”—a remark
that is rarely prophetic of anything more than continued brooding.
If it prophesied the accumulation of technique for a continuous,
constructive effort, their moral rights would not be so bereft of
reality.
CLASS G
Here the word “right” signifies certain unspecified and unrestricted
liberties and privileges sanctioned in the manner of customs, the
only authority behind which is the threat of social ostracism should
they be disregarded.[16] As will be observed at once, some of the
members of this class might, if one prefers, be included in some of
the other classes of “right.”
CLASS H
That which is most convenient, desirable, or favorable; conforming
to one’s wish or desire; to be preferred; fortunate; lucky, etc.[17]
Some of these examples, like those in the preceding class, may in
the eyes of some judges be more appropriately classified in another
place. If so, let the change be made. There is undoubtedly an echo
of Class B and of Class F in several instances. But a more important
item seems to be that here are unmistakable hints of an adverbial or
expletive signification for our concept. This hint is fully carried
out in the final division,
CLASS I
in which the term “right” signifies “very,” “in a great degree,”
as in certain titles: (111) “_Right_ reverend,” (112) “_Right_
honorable,” as well as in the expressions: (113) “_Right_ truly
may it be said,” and (114) “The word ‘cootie’ is _right_ old
Scottish.” However, as this use of the concept _right_ is often to
be interpreted as signifying “justly entitled to the name of,” or
“having the true character of,” Class I may be regarded as a footnote
to Classes C and G.
This completes our search for the significations of the word
“_right_.” Nevertheless, all this is merely a preliminary step toward
the main business of our investigation, namely, the discovery of the
action-patterns which are implied by these nine classes we have just
delimited. We have seen that these classes are all subtly connected,
and this leads us to hope that some greatest common denominator will
be found that will factor into all of them. It is also apparent that
as we pass from Class A to Class E, we reach a climax, after which
we decline; that up to the climax there is order and dignity, and
that from Class F onwards our array consists mostly of scraps and
debris. Our problem, then, is to exhibit not only the motor attitude
which each class implies, but also the procession of such attitudes
throughout the whole nine classes. For only by so doing shall we be
able to comprehend the meaning of this important ethical concept.
_The Meaning of the Word “Right”_
1. As deduced from Class A. It will be recalled that this class
signifies _straight_ (not curved or crooked in any way), _direct_
(by the shortest course), and _immediately_ (in the quickest time).
These words, moreover, refer not only to events in nature, but
also and more particularly, to human activities. It has also been
pointed out that when a man can proceed in a straight line toward his
objective, he will proceed directly, and arrive there in the quickest
possible time. Such behavior is, within the limits hitherto defined,
described as _right_. Now what does all this involve in the way of
action-patterns? It involves, first, perception of the goal, second,
ability to keep the goal in mind, and third, energy sufficient to
attain it. According to Max Meyer, one of the instincts manifested
by a hungry organism is “to proceed forward in a straight line” (!)
And whether this be truly instinctive or not, the example illustrates
our point very nicely. For any organism vexed with hunger of any
sort whatsoever (and there are, according to the poets, many kinds),
will do “right” in following Max Meyer’s advice. The action-pattern
implied in all this is not difficult to determine. It is the
coordination of motor activities requisite for the movement of the
whole body speedily through space, unwaveringly toward its objective.
The complete analysis of the mechanisms by which such behavior is
accomplished would be both too difficult and too exhaustive to be
undertaken here. We may, however, point out some few of the salient
factors involved. It has been shown that, so far as Class A is
concerned, to do _right_ is to proceed directly and immediately,
and along a straight line, if possible, to the desired object. Such
behavior requires both strength and skill; from which it also follows
that a feeble, untrained body will be unable to do “right” in a great
many cases, simply because it cannot reach its goal in the face of
obstacles. This is our common observation. Before a baby learns to
walk, it cannot proceed directly or immediately across a floor.
Neither can an exhausted man, unable to use the sun for a compass,
find his way to safety out of a tropical forest. For a person in his
predicament, things are not likely to come out “right.” Furthermore,
in a great many cases of the same sort, skill and strength are _both_
required; neither one alone is sufficient to attain the desired end.
Let now the psychologist tell the story of how the attainment of
skill depends upon a standard equipment of sense organs, a sound and
complete brain, and muscles from which sensory stimuli elicit precise
responses. Let also the physiologist relate here how bodily vigor
likewise depends upon the interrelation of internal functions: how
the heart, lungs, brain, muscles, thyroid, liver, and adrenals all
work together to make any effort successful and complete. When this
has been said, the meaning of the word “right” as defined in Class A
will have been more fully revealed.
2. As deduced from Class B. Here the word “right” is used to describe
the method or object by which any desire may be realized. The
requirements for membership in this class appear at first to be less
rigid than was the case with Class A. The speed of motion that was
stressed in the former class is inessential here, as well as the
necessity of proceeding by the shortest course. Here also a beefy
body is not as imperative as are skill and sagacity. But let us not
make a favorite of either class before we have heard the whole story.
And first let us ask, what is the typical action-pattern implied
by Class B? The answer is not difficult to give. There is a phrase,
“selective excitability,” which psychologists have long applied to
the situation where a sensori-motor mechanism is attuned by practice
to respond to one specific stimulus, and to be entirely unresponsive
to others. We exhibit this selective excitability every time we take
“our” hat from the crowded coat-room, choose “our” favorite cigar
from a case full of attractive Havanas, or fumble thoughtfully in
“our” pocket for a cent to give to the crouching beggar. In every
such case, we are said to employ the “right” object and perform the
“right” action. Actions of this sort involve choice, which as we have
already hinted (See footnote, p. 32, Chap. II.), involves the use of
one member of a pair of antagonistic muscles. Consequently, we may
describe the action-pattern underlying the use of “right” in Class
B as any sort of behavior which involves selective excitability and
selective activity. So that whatever Class B lacks in generality as
compared with Class A, is compensated for by an increase in precision
and, what is equally important, by an _economy_ of human energy in
the pursuit of the desired object. The importance of this last factor
has already been sufficiently hinted at in the quotation that appears
on the title-page of this book.
3. As deduced from Class C. The change from Class A to Class B
involved an increase in what is known as intelligence, that is, the
ability to solve new problems. The change to Class C may be regarded
as involving a continued advance of the same general character. But
this change involves something more. For, as we have already stated,
“right” now becomes “descriptive of any statement which reports the
facts: of any opinion or judgment that is correct: and of any person
who judges, thinks, or acts in accordance with the facts or truth
of a matter.” Two changes in emphasis are consequently to be noted
here. First, the word “right” is applied to utterances rather than to
deeds alone; and second, a metonomy is introduced in the application
of our concept to persons who make correct statements. This shift
of emphasis from an action to the description of it, and from the
description to the describer need not cause us any difficulty, even
though it envisages for us a million years of the education of the
human race.
The success of our search for the meaning of our concept is here
dependent upon the function of speech to imply and predict action,—a
function which we have already commented upon in our second chapter.
Words, like thoughts, are either reminiscent of overt action, or
else they assist in preparing us for it. When, then, a man uses the
word “right” to commend either statements or persons, it is the same
as if he were to say: “Either there were, or there are, or there
may be, objects and events as you describe, and I think as you do
about them.” The action-pattern here implicated is plainly that of
_belief_. It involves a lowered threshold with respect to the person
or statement called “right,” and a correspondingly higher threshold
toward those persons or statements which contradict what is accepted.
And as was the case with Class B, this action-pattern involves the
use of one of the halves of a system of antagonistic muscles, since
the “emphasis here is upon true opinions and judgments in contrast
to false ones.” This, however, is not all that can be said upon this
point. For every case of belief is a case of constitutional readiness
so to respond. And while we do not exactly know how the body provides
such predeterminations, if the theory of action-patterns is sound,
the conjecture is not unfounded that belief is a function of chronic
postures maintained in the muscles of the voluntary system.
Evidences in favor of this conjecture are readily supplied from
our everyday scrutiny of the faces of our fellow-men. The beggar’s
hand is actually a different hand than the hand of the donor; as
he sits on the sidewalk, his predetermination to receive alms is
patent in the chronic posture of even his palm and fingers. The
courtesan not only manifests her willingness to exchange smiles by
the chronic postures in her eyelids and mouth, but with a fitness
that a De Maupassant might celebrate, she also acquires a carriage
that betokens her particular vocation. Contrariwise, the generous,
affable man gives evidence that his traits are at least muscle-deep;
while every actor will confess that if he gets into the adequate
posture, the character he is depicting is automatically portrayed.
Those who pray also confess that there are certain bodily attitudes
which hinder, and others which assist, the flow of sentiment which
they desire. Photographic evidences such as these, however, are not
the only proofs we possess of postural predeterminations of action
and thought, for it is sound physiology that in the multifariously
complex musculature of the body, there are unnoticed postural
tensions being generated and maintained all the while. And since,
according to the all-or-none principle of nervous and muscular
activity, every motor tendency is a truly positive physiological
event, whenever we manifest belief, some part of the body is
preparing to execute a movement appropriate to the assertion implied.
Indeed, we may safely postulate that a large portion of what we call
our individuality is a function of those chronic postures which
our habits have hitherto established in our motor mechanism,—which
postures ever thereafter determine what we shall do, say, and believe.
4. As deduced from Class D. Here the word “right” is used to signify
“the hand which is normally the stronger,” whence, by association,
it refers to a variety of related things, as hitherto indicated. We
have previously noted that the concept “right” is a term we often use
when the attainment of a purpose is under consideration, and here we
again see the same motif displayed. Everybody knows that the “right”
hand is important in the acquisition of skill of all sorts, and in
getting in touch with the things we call “good.” Evidences of the
paramount usefulness of the “right” hand to carry out overt actions
are ubiquitous. Moreover, levers, pliers, and a hundred other tools
are simply extensions of its functions and magnifications of its
powers. What, then, are the action-patterns suggested by this use
of our concept? The answer is extremely simple. The action-patterns
we seek are the innumerable activities of the _right_ hand itself.
For, as we have previously shown, even to think of the hand involves
neuro-muscular activity in it. What the right hand _does_, is what
the concept “right,” as applied to the hand, _means_. And if, for any
reason, the “right” hand is incapacitated or missing, some other part
of the body executes the appropriate gesture or manœuvre.
5. As deduced from Class E. The transition from Class D to Class E
is made on the basis of a common element that is shared by both. We
have just seen that the “right” hand is the stronger and the more
adroit, and that consequently it is the one more adequately equipped
to turn our wishes into wills. No logician, then, is required to
convince us that legal “right,” in the sense of being equivalent
to might, connotes the same sort of strength and force as are
involved in the grasp and tug of the hand. Were the policeman the
pure embodiment of legal “rights,” the action-patterns implied by
Class E would be easy to determine, since they would be simply the
total behavior of that functionary while on his beat. The problem
before us is, to be sure, not quite so easy of solution as reference
to the policeman would make it, but nevertheless, our previous
discussion of legal “right” has hinted just what that solution is to
be. For legal “rights” are one and all concerned with the security
of whatever things a man calls _his_, together with the adjustment
of conflicting claims regarding them. To enumerate in detail all
the action-patterns here implied would be equivalent to making an
inventory of all the deeds that had ever been performed to preserve
property, life, and personality, and to maintain and restore peace
and order in society. Let the historian open his books and show us
the panorama of these achievements. And while we should see upon many
of his pages portrayals of torpid conservatism, ruthless domineering,
and magnificent cunning, we should also behold examples of that
impersonal referee of whom we have already spoken, whose business it
is to persuade and oblige the disturbers of the social equilibrium to
employ the methods and standards of conduct which have always marked
free men. He who would clearly comprehend such a panorama must needs
give it more than a fugitive glance; for as it required time to be
created, so does it require time in which to be appreciated.
6. As deduced from Class F. Moral “rights” are all those unsecured
claims and inexactly specified interests whose only protection
is the approval and disapproval of the community, reinforced at
times by an appeal to a super-human protagonist. A comparison
between the motor-attitudes implied by Class E and Class F reveals
several important differences. Juristic thinking, which we may for
convenience characterize as the attitude implied by Class E, is on
the whole logically coherent; moralistic thinking, on the contrary,
commits every known logical fallacy. Again, juristic thinking is
content to regard human problems capable of solution at the hands of
human beings, and to consider that the verdicts of unruffled men and
of men expert in their lines is final; while moralistic thinking is
ever prone to employ methods which, on account of their provincialism
and importunity, do not stand analysis at the hands of unbiased
investigators. Finally, the “higher judge” which moralists assert
stands behind the claims they make, is simply a misinterpretation of
the meaning of long unrelieved tensions which have accumulated in
their skeletal muscles. For while we do not declare that all claims
unsecured by law are ethically invalid, we do nevertheless assert
that the typical moralist’s attitude toward all such unsecured claims
is not one that is suited to bridge the gap between our liquid matter
and its good. Nevertheless, we may say without equivocation that
behind every declaration of moral rights there is an anxiety lest
some dependable good be lost, and this motor attitude we conceive to
be the greatest common divisor of all the significations included
under Class F.
7. As deduced from Class G. Although this class resembles the
preceding one in that it refers to customs whose maintenance depends
upon the approval and disapproval of the group, Class G lacks all
of the fiercely Stoical and Puritanical elements found in Class
F, just as it lacks the logical rigor pertaining to Class E. The
action-patterns implied by this present class are rather those of a
courteous gentleman, who persuades whenever he can by a gesture, but
who does not try twice to persuade those who will not yield to that
kind of a suggestion.
8. As deduced from Class H. Since “right” here signifies that which
is convenient, desirable, favorable, etc., the action-patterns which
it implies are practically identical with those of the first three
classes of “good.” Certainly every example previously cited under
this class points to an outgoing reaction.
9. As deduced from Class I. The adverbial use of our concept here
implies merely a gesture of positive emphasis that may be added to
any other action-pattern.
Having previously sorted the manifold significations of the word
“right” among these nine classes, and having subsequently shown
what the organism was doing when it employed this word with respect
to each of these classes, it now remains to discover whether any
one action-tendency is commonly hinted by each and all of these
nine classes. If such a common tendency can be discovered, the
word “right” may then indeed be said to possess all these various
significations indicated in our array; otherwise, we shall err in
considering it to be one and the same word in all the examples
previously cited. In attempting to discover and certify such a common
tendency, moreover, we shall employ the same method suggested for
the summarizing of the meanings of the word “good.” We recognize
that in the title by which each class of “right” is denoted, there
is no presumption that such a title does more than indicate the
general trend of that class; logically, the titles merely imply the
greatest common divisors of the many phrases included in the classes.
So that when we now attempt to define the common tendency in all
the action-patterns we have just deduced from these nine classes,
we are to consider only their similarities, while discarding their
differences. There is nothing novel in this method; it is simply the
way in which all concepts have been unconsciously derived.
Such a common tendency is not difficult to discover. Each class
as we defined it in behavioristic terms turned out to imply an
action-tendency that played an important part in the behavior of
human beings while in the pursuit of the objects they desire, or
in the attainment of their ends, however variously conceived or
projected. Let us, then, bring the whole matter to a focus by saying
that _whenever we describe a behavior situation in which the
dominant feature is the controlling and directing of human energies,
the employment of technique to further man’s purposes, or the
attaining of any good whatsoever, the critical word is “right._” This
is, indeed, what our concept, as we have analysed it, finally _means_.
Further than this a strictly scientific ethics does not go, and,
moreover, further than this no intellectually honest man will go.
Right simply means what people use the word to signify,—employing
it either as a gesture to point out some object or relationship in
the environment, or else as an index of what sort of behavior may
be expected of them in the future. Accordingly, all insistence on a
“higher and immutable right” as _the one real_ meaning of the term
is either a sign of mal-observation or of logorrhea. And if anyone
still insists on knowing how one determines what is _right_, we refer
such a person to our array of 114 terms, where in each case the basis
for such determination can be inferred. But if such a person still
demands an ultimate and irrefutable criterion, the only thing left
for him to do is to attempt to be God; but it is suggested in advance
that the role of deity might, under the circumstances, be even more
difficult to play than the more familiar rôle of man.
FOOTNOTES:
[11] Class A is divided into the following sub-classes:
I. Straight.
1. That which is not bent, curved, or crooked in any way; for
example, a _straight_ line.
2. That which is formed by, or with reference to, a line drawn
to another line or surface by the shortest course (i. e., a
perpendicular), as, for example, _right_ line, _right_ angle,
_right_ ascension, etc.
3. Used to describe solid figures having the ends or base at an
angle of 90 degrees with the axis, e. g., _right_ solid, _right_
sphere, _right_ cone, _right_ helicoid, etc.
4. _Right_ circle; in the stereographic projection, a circle
represented by a straight line.
5. _Right_ line pen; one that is adapted especially for ruling
lines.
II. Direct.
6. The shortest course; that which keeps one and the same
direction throughout.
7. That which goes straight to its destination. Compare: “Right
across the track.”
III. Immediately. (Compare “directly.”)
8. Suddenly, at once; e. g., “He went _right_ home.” “_Right_ up
the mountain.” “Let thine eyes look _right_ on.” “He went _right_
off.”
9. _Right_ away, _right_ here, _right_ now, _right_ down (Cf.
downright). “These strata falling, the whole tract sinks down ‘to
rights’ in the abyss.”
IV. Idiomatic uses derived from the foregoing.
10. In hunting, the scent or track of the game. “The dogs have
got the _right_.”
11. “_Right_ the helm,” that is, put it in line with the keel.
12. “_Right_ aft,” that is, in direct line with the axis and
stern of the ship.
[12]
This class includes:
22. “You say not _right_, old man.”
23. “A _right_ description of our sport, my Lord.”
24. “There hath been a terrible to-do, I could not possibly learn
the very _right_ of it.”
25. “You are certainly in the _right_.”
26. “To put the saddle on the _right_ horse.” (That is, to impute
blame where it is deserved.)
27. “The clock that stands still points _right_ twice in the four
and twenty hours; while others may keep going continually and be
continually going wrong.”
28. “A fool must now and then be _right_ by chance.”
29. “And this wise world of ours is mainly _right_.”
30. “Some praise at morning what they blame at night,
But always think the last opinion _right_.”
Idiomatic and archaic uses, signifying _true_, _real_, _actual_,
_genuine_, _correct_.
31. “If they be not _right_ Granado silk.”
32. “A pound of ointment of _right_ spikenard.”
33. “A _right_ pipe of Trinidad.”
34. “My _ryghte_ doghter, tresoure of myn herte.”
35. “The Poet is indeed the _right_ Popular Philosopher, whereof
Esops tales giue good proofe.”
36. “Be sure you’re _right_, then go ahead.”
37. _Right!_ _Right_-O! _Right_ you are! (Slang.)
[13] This class includes:
38. That side of the body which is on the east when the face is
toward the north, its limbs, their clothing, etc., as, for example,
_right_ arm, cheek, leg, ear, coat-sleeve, and so on.
39. Motions in the direction implied in the preceding example: “Go
to the _right_.” “_Right_ about.”
40. Anything, usually one member of a pair, shaped or otherwise
adapted for a _right_-hand position or use, e. g., gloves, shoes,
etc.
41. A _right_-side tool. A _right_-hand thread on a machine screw.
42. _Right_ camphor; “The camphor produced from the Lauraceae which
gives a _right_ polarization to light.
43. _Right_ bower; in euchre the knave of trumps, which is the
highest card next to the joker. This card has a place in our study
of “right” if for no other reason than that it signifies power of
achievement in that player who finds it in his hand.
44. The _right_ hand of fellowship. This expression denotes a
custom of very ancient origin, practised in treaties by the
Persians and Parthians, not only as an inviolable pledge of
fidelity (“In union there is strength.”), but also as a proof that
no club or other weapon was concealed in the hand.
45. In the politics of continental Europe,—that party which
occupies the position to the _right_ of the president in the
legislative assembly.
46. By metonomy (conditioned reflex) the conservative political
party.
47. By selective association, the party or party principles which
one approves.
[14] As a partial list of the significations included in this class,
may be cited:
48. In the legal sense, that which justly accrues or falls to
anyone, that which one may properly claim, one’s due, e. g.,
territory, estate, dominion.
49. Particular cases of the preceding: _Right_ of eminent domain,
Constitutional _rights_, Corporeal _rights_, Inchoate _right_ of
dower, Innominate _rights_, etc.
50. Idiomatic expressions: “To be in the _right_,” “To have the
_right_,” “With _right_,” “By _right_ or _rights_,” “Of _right_,”
“To have due _right_,” etc.
51. Joint _rights_; a title or claim to something properly
possessed by two or more persons.
52. A document substantiating a legally recognized claim or title.
53. Legally just or equitable treatment.
54. “_Right_ drawn sword,” drawn in a just cause.
55. The person, party, or cause which is sustained in a
controversy. (Compare Ex. 47, Class D.)
56. To do one _right_; to do one justice.
57. “_Right_ money”; money paid as the condition or consideration
of acquiring a “right” to the purchase of land.
58. The title or claim to the enjoyment of privileges or
indemnities. (A relatively unemphatic use of the term “legal
_right_.”)
[15] The significations included in this class are numerous and
various. As follows:
59. “In conformity with the moral law; permitted by the principle
which ought to regulate conduct; in accordance with truth, justice,
duty, or the will of God; ethically good, equitable, just.”
60. “A poor man has no [legal] right to relief, but it is [morally]
right that he should have it. A rich man has a [legal] right to
destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be
[morally] right.”
61. “Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that
which is done well we term right.”
62. “Cousin of Hereford, as thy cause is right, So be thy fortune
in this royal fight.”
63. “He Who now is Sovran can dispose and bid What shall be right.”
64. “That which is consonant with equity, or the light of nature;
that which is morally just or due.”
65. “Right conduct; a just and good act, or course of action;
anything which justly may or should be done.”
66. “Wrest once the law to your authority; To do a great right, do
a little wrong.”
67. “Too fond of the right to do the expedient.”
68. “With firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right.”
69. _The_ right; the cause of truth and justice.
70. That which is proper for or incumbent on one to do: one’s duty.
(Obsolete.)
71. The standard of permitted and forbidden action within a certain
sphere. (Obsolete.)
72. “Obedience to or harmony with the rules of morality, justice,
truth, and propriety.”
73. “Acting in accordance with the highest moral standard; free
from guilt or blame.”
74. “A God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is his
name.”
75. “I have made him just and right, Sufficient to have stood,
though free to fall.”
76. “Right reason: that which recommends itself to enlightened
intelligence: some inward intimation for which great respect is
felt and which is supposed to be common to the mass of mankind.”
77. To be in the right; “to have justice, fact, or reason upon
one’s side.”
78. In prepositional phrases, with, by, of right; properly, with
reason, justice, etc.
79. To have a right. To have reason or cause; hence, to come near,
have a narrow escape from (_sic!_); e. g., “I’d a good right to be
run over by the train this morning.” (Colloquial.)
80. “Divine right of kings.”
81. “Right way; the way of moral excellence or spiritual
salvation.” “But you are a presbyterian...?” “I am, sir; praised be
the light that shewed me the right way!”
82. Of persons and dispositions; disposed to do what is just.
83. Of belief; orthodox, true. That which ought to be accepted or
followed.
84. To do justice to; to relieve from distress; to vindicate; often
used reflexively.
“So just is God, to right the innocent.”
85. To do right; to act according to the “law or will of God.”
86. To feel right toward a person; to be either kind, or
sympathetic, or to cooperate with him.
[16] We cite here:
87. “The first place is yours, Timothy, in _right_ of your gray
hairs.”
88. “I have a perfect _right_ to grieve over him.”
89. “She has a _right_ to be admired, for she is beautiful.”
90. “Not only is she a peeress, but she has fourteen thousand a
year in her own _right_.”
91. “Put your bonnet to the _right_ use; ’tis for the head.”
92. “Why do you twist words out of their _right_ use?”
93. “Mr. _Right_” “Mrs. _Right_,” the destined husband or wife.
94. “That part of the quarry given to the hounds as their share or
due.”
95. “A stag’s full complement of antlers, consisting of the brow,
the bay, and the tray.”
96. “To do one _right_” to pledge one in a toast. (Compare: “_faire
raison à_.”)
97. “The _right_ word is always a power, and communicates its
definiteness to our actions.”
[17] For example:
98. “I should have been a woman by _right_.”
99. “The lady has been disappointed on the _right_ side.”
100. “If he should offer to choose, and choose the _right_ casket,
you should refuse to perform your father’s will....”
101. Idiomatic colloquial phrases expressing satisfaction or
approval: as “Your conduct and dress are all _right_.” “He has done
it all _right_.” “Are you ready? All _right_, go ahead.”
102. To set _right_; to adjust or correct something out of order.
“Your mother’s hand shall _right_ your mother’s wrong.”
103. In a satisfactory or proper state or order: “It’s a snug
little island, a _right_ little, tight little island.”
104. Skilfully performed, correctly done: “The sum is not _right_.”
“The drawing is not _right_.” “Nothing goes _right_.”
105. “To _rights_,” properly, fittingly, as, for example, “She put
the room to _rights_.”
106. “I put him _right_ on the matter,” that is, corrected or
directed him, or both.
107. The safe, advantageous, appropriate, or desirable side of
anything, as, “A widow on the _right_ side of thirty.”
108. Fitting, proper, appropriate, exactly according to what is
required or suitable, as, “Things of the _right_ size.”
109. The outward, front, or most finished surface of anything, as,
“The _right_ side of a piece of cloth.”
110. In good health or spirits, sound, comfortable, or sane, as:
“An old uncle of mine who isn’t exactly _right_.”
“He is not in his _right_ mind; he is talking nonsense and is
stark mad.”
“The heart’s aye the part aye
That makes us _right_ or wrang.”
“‘Oh,’ said Mr. Winkle the elder, ‘I hope you are well, sir.’
‘_Right_ as a trivet, sir,’ replied Bob Sawyer.”