THE FOUNDATION OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1603-1651
We have now to speak of the fifth line of shōguns, the Tokugawa at Edo,
who held administrative sway for 255 years from 1603 to the time of the
imperial restoration in 1868, a period which is not far removed from the
present; and during which the feudal organization of Japan attained its
most perfect development.
The original name of the Tokugawa family was Matsudaira. They were of
the same blood as Nitta and Ashikaga and of the clan of Minamoto. From
the time of the Southern and Northern dynasties their forefathers,
generation after generation, espoused the cause opposed to the Ashikaga,
and consequently during the Muromachi shōgunate they were relegated to a
position of insignificance. Subsequently, they acquired large
territorial possessions and had their seat in Mikawa during eight
generations. But being surrounded by powerful enemies, they experienced
no little difficulty in maintaining themselves. When Iyeyasu was a mere
child, he was confined in various places as a surety for his family's
conduct. These experiences probably helped to sharpen his naturally
great abilities. At the age of seventeen he succeeded to the headship of
the family, and as he grew to manhood he gave proofs of magnanimity and
coolness, no less than of strategical skill. Gradually and astutely he
encroached upon the neighboring provinces, taking clever advantage of
the disordered state of the country, until finally he obtained
possession of all the provinces that had belonged to the Takeda and the
Imagawa and found himself the strongest chieftain in Tōkai-dō, lord of
the five provinces of Mikawa, Tōtōmi, Suruga, Kai, and Shinano. In 1590,
when Hideyoshi had overthrown the Hōjō at Odawara, all the eight
provinces of Kwantō--Sagami, Musashi, Izu, Kazusa, Shimōsa, Kōzuke,
Shimotsuke, and Hitachi--hitherto held by the Hōjō, were given to
Iyeyasu, the _taikō_ receiving in their stead the five provinces
previously possessed by Iyeyasu in Tōkai-dō; an exchange doubtless
suggested to the _taikō_ by the comparative propinquity of the latter
five provinces to Kyōto, and the advisability of relegating to a distant
part of the empire a chieftain of such commanding gifts as Iyeyasu
exhibited. Having come into possession of the eight provinces, Iyeyasu
made his headquarters at Edo (now Tōkyō). A castle had been built here
more than a century before by Ota Dōkan, a vassal of the Uyesugi, but it
was of insignificant dimensions, and the town which it overlooked was
touched on three sides by the Musashino plain, its southeastern front
being washed by the sea. The streets, where one and a half million
citizens now congregate, were then overgrown with reeds. So soon,
however, as Iyeyasu moved thither, he inaugurated extensive
improvements, leveling hills, filling marshes, digging great moats, and
building colossal parapets, until a site was fully prepared for a great
capital.
Iyeyasu, though of indomitable courage in war, was a man of gentle
methods. His keen perception showed him every aspect of an affair, and
his patience in unraveling difficulties never failed. So long as the
reins of administration remained in his hands, quiet obedience was
everywhere accorded to his sway. No one opposed him. As for Hideyoshi,
he soon appreciated the Tokugawa chief and treated him with all the
consideration due to his great gifts. Iyeyasu had large ambition. Coming
into possession of the Kwantō provinces, he sat down quietly to foster
his strength and bide his time, Hideyoshi, meanwhile, wasting his
resources in fruitless attacks upon Korea and thus impairing the
prosperity which his transcendent abilities had obtained for him.
Finally, before his foreign wars had reached any issue, he died,
bequeathing his power to his son, Hideyori, then a lad of only seven
years. The usual results of a minor's administration ensued. The
government fell into disorder. Once more the old rivalry sprang up among
the feudal chiefs, each struggling for supremacy. Above them all towered
Tokugawa Iyeyasu, for his influence was superior even to that of the
Toyotomi family.
[Illustration: CENTRAL JAPAN]
Gradually the various dissentient elements disposed themselves into two
great parties. The one, including Katō Kiyomasa, Fukushima Masanori,
Kuroda Nagamasa, Asano Yukinaga, and other notables, was under the
leadership of Iyeyasu, and the other, to which belonged Mōri Terumoto,
Uyesugi Kagekatsu, Ukita Hideiye, and forty-three other feudal chiefs,
hostile to the Tokugawa, was under the real leadership of Ishida
Mitsunari, a favorite of the late Hideyoshi, and under the nominal
leadership of the _taikō's_ son, Hideyori. The latter party had their
headquarters in the Ōsaka castle, and the struggle for mastery was
finally concluded in a great battle, fought on September 15, 1600.
Iyeyasu was the assailant. Marching westward at the head of an army of
80,000, he encountered Mitsunari's forces, numbering 130,000, on the
Sekigahara plain in Mino, the Ōsaka confederates having moved thus far
to the combat. Swords were crossed at eight in the morning, and the
battle waged with the utmost fierceness for six hours, the Ōsaka army
being ultimately defeated with a loss of 30,000. Mitsunari and Yukinaga
were among the slain, and tradition says that the whole plain was red
with gore. So decisive was this victory that other nobles who had
espoused the cause of Hideyori and were fighting for it in their own
districts now laid down their arms and hastened to come to terms with
the victor. Iyeyasu now set himself to consolidate his power.
Confiscating, wholly or in part, the estates of the chiefs who had
opposed him, he made ample grants to his own supporters. The
administrative power of the empire came wholly into his hands, and every
part of the country accepted his control. Three years later he was
nominated _sei-i-tai-shōgun_, and thenceforth, through many generations,
his family ruled in Edo.
[Illustration: THE PROCESSION OF FEUDAL LORDS]
But although the administrative supremacy had been acquired by the
Tokugawa, the _taikō's_ son and successor, Toyotomi Hideyori, still
resided at Ōsaka. Possessing a princely income of 650,000 _koku_ of
rice, ruler of three provinces, Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi, old enough
now to direct his own affairs, and enjoying the prestige of his renowned
father, he wielded a degree of influence which even Iyeyasu could not
afford to despise. Among Hideyori's adherents there were some who hoped
to see him restored to the position his father had occupied, and these,
plotting secretly to effect their purpose, found supporters among the
feudal chieftains, who, though they had made act of submission to the
Tokugawa, still remembered the benefits they had received from the late
Hideyoshi and were fain to succor his son. Thus Ōsaka remained a
constant menace to the Tokugawa, who, on their side, watched keenly for
some act on the part of the Toyotomi that might furnish a pretext for
their overthrow, whereas the adherents of the Toyotomi, bitterly jealous
of the Tokugawa supremacy and resenting every evidence of it, naturally
committed acts of tactlessness and contumacy.
Just at this time the Toyotomi family caused to be rebuilt a great image
of Buddha which stood in the temple of Hōkōji, in Kyōto. The work was
completed in 1614. A bell was cast to commemorate the event, and in its
superscription there appeared a phrase praying for the tranquillity of
the state. Two of the four characters forming this phrase happened to be
the ideograms spelling the name of Iyeyasu. The latter pretended to be
much offended at this. He declared that the obvious intention of the
affair was to invoke the curse of heaven on his head, and being strongly
supported in this view by the nobles who espoused his cause, he directed
that an inquiry of the strictest nature should be at once instituted in
Ōsaka. The Toyotomi family refusing to submit tamely to this indignity,
determined to appeal to the sword, and there flocked to Ōsaka from the
provinces some 60,000 _rōnin_ (unenrolled military men), who formed
themselves into a garrison for the defense of the castle. But the power
of Iyeyasu was too great for such a movement to develop large
proportions. Intelligence of the designs of the Toyotomi, so far from
enlisting the sympathy of the feudal chieftains, led them rather to
renew their professions of loyalty to Iyeyasu, and the latter, who had
anticipated this, ordered them to march to the conquest of Ōsaka. After
the castle had undergone a long siege, peace was temporarily restored,
only to be broken again in the following year, when rivalry led the
Ōsaka folks to once more declare war. On this occasion the number of
Toyotomi partisans who assembled at Ōsaka was twice as great as it had
been in the preceding year. They were all brave men, resolved to fight
to the death. But among such a variously composed host it was difficult
to secure unanimity of opinion or concert in action. Moreover, the moats
of the castle having been filled on the conclusion of peace the year
before, it had lost its old impregnability and become useless as a
defensive stronghold. Hence, the vast army marshaled under the Tokugawa
banners had little difficulty in taking it by assault.[1] Hideyori and
his mother, Yodogimi, threw themselves into the flames of the burning
castle, and Ōno Harunaga, together with the principal of those who had
counseled war, killed themselves out of respect to their lord. The
Toyotomi family was thus finally overthrown, and the power of the
Tokugawa completely established. Thenceforth the country entered upon a
long era of peace.
In the following year, 1616, Iyeyasu fell ill and died at the age of
seventy-five. He was interred at Kunōzan in Suruga, but his remains were
subsequently transferred to Nikkō in Shimotsuke, where, amid natural
scenery of the greatest beauty, a mausoleum of unexampled
magnificence was erected in his honor.
Hidetada, the second Tokugawa shōgun, devoted his energies to enforcing
and observing the laws and precepts of his father. Under him the
influence and prestige of the Tokugawa family increased greatly.
Further, the third shōgun, Iyemitsu, was a man of high courage and
magnanimous generosity. In his hands the organization of the government
was brought to a state of perfection. This system we shall now describe,
as it shows the feudalism of Japan at the height of its development.
During many centuries it had been customary for the military classes to
own estates and to govern the people residing on them according to
feudal methods. In the closing days of the Ashikaga many military
families of old standing were ruined, and, on the other hand, not a few
soldiers who followed the fortunes of Oda and Toyotomi became the
founders of new and opulent families. When the Tokugawa came into power
they divided the nobles into two classes. The _fudai_ class comprised
the barons who had espoused the Tokugawa cause from the time of the
latter's residence in Mikawa and Tōtōmi. The second were called
_tozama_, that is to say, those who did not give in their adherence
until after the decisive battle of Sekigahara of 1600. This distinction
was intended to define the intimacy existing between the Tokugawa and
the other military chiefs. For the rest, the estates of the nobles were
fixed according to their exploits at the battle of Sekigahara. In
consideration of the vital importance of preserving uninterrupted
communication with the capital, the estates of the barons were so
distributed that none of the _tozama_ class held sway along the line of
communications. Further, although the _fudai_ barons were chiefly of the
smaller order, they occupied the most important provinces, and were so
distributed that they could easily combine if necessary; whereas the
_tozama_ magnates, though ruling great territories, were separated from
each other by the _fudai_ barons, and were moreover remotely situated
from important centers of action. For example, Mayeda, the most puissant
among the _tozama_ nobles, had his territories extended over the three
provinces of Kaga, Noto, and Echizen, and his annual revenues aggregated
over a million _koku_ of rice, while his prestige and popularity were
very high. Hence, a number of _fudai_ barons were located in Echigo, to
act for the Tokugawa in case of emergency, and in Echizen also one of
the nobles most closely related to the Tokugawa was placed to block the
route of the Mayeda to Kyōto. A similar policy was adopted throughout
the empire, so that everywhere, at a given instant, the Tokugawa
partisans would find themselves in a majority. Places of vantage were
also occupied by the shōgun's adherents. Such was the case with
Nagasaki, the most important port of foreign trade; the Island of Sado,
where valuable gold and silver mines were worked; the shrine of
Daijin-gū at Yamada in Ise, the headquarters of Shintō worship, and so
forth. At other places the management of local affairs was entrusted to
nominees of the shōgunate, _gundai_ and _daikwan_, all of which
arrangements operated to prevent any effective union among the _tozama_
nobles.
In the opening years of the Tokugawa administration an uncompromising
policy was pursued. Even such a puissant _tozama_ noble as Fukushima
Masanori, and such a loyal feudatory as Honda Masazumi, who had assisted
in the first organization of the shōgunate, had their estates
confiscated by way of punishment for violations of the law, while
several other important nobles were deprived of their territories on the
ground of incompetence to govern them. The principle of succession was
enforced with especial strictness among the _samurai_. If a man died
without direct male issue his family was declared extinct, and were he a
noble, his estate reverted to the shōgunate. Subsequently the severity
of this system was modified and adoption began to be permitted, to the
great satisfaction of the feudal chiefs and the military class in
general. But in the early days the reins of administration were held so
unflinchingly that even consanguinity with the shōgun did not save from
condign punishment a nobleman who failed in respect for the law.
Degradations and removals from one province to another were frequent
forms of punishment for slight breaches of law.
The autonomy of each individual fief was complete within itself. The
feudal barons, whether large or small and whether their relations with
the shōgunate were close or remote enjoyed the privilege of governing
the districts under their control in whatever manner they pleased,
entirely independent of the administration in Edo. This applied to
financial, military, judicial, educational, industrial, and all other
matters, the central government reserving to itself only the right of
declaring war or concluding peace, of coining money and of repairing or
constructing roads. But while, on the one hand, this principle of
non-interference was strictly observed, any dangerous independence that
it might have developed was effectually obviated by another device,
namely, that of requiring the sojourn in Edo of every feudal baron at
fixed intervals and for a fixed period. This was one of the most
remarkable measures conceived by the Tokugawa. The policy itself had
been formulated in the time of Iyeyasu, but it did not come into
operation until 1635, under the third shōgun, Iyemitsu. Each feudal
chief was compelled to spend a part of every second year in Edo, the
dates of setting out from his province and of leaving Edo on his return
journey being fixed by the shōgunate. Nothing could have been simpler
than this device; nothing more efficacious in establishing and
preserving the Tokugawa sway. Probably no factor in the Tokugawa system
contributed more materially to the unprecedented duration of domestic
peace throughout two centuries and a half. It was not until 1862, a few
years before the fall of Edo, that this astute policy was allowed to
fall into abeyance. Further, during the first part of the Tokugawa
shōgunate the feudal barons were obliged to leave their sons in Edo as
pledges of their own good behavior. This custom was discontinued,
however, in the days of the fourth shōgun, though the rule that the
barons with their wives and children must reside for a given time in the
capital every second year was enforced up to within five years of the
restoration. One consequence of the rule was that the feudal lords built
mansions for themselves in Edo, some owning three, some as many as six,
of such city residences, their inmates varying from hundreds to
thousands. The effect thus produced upon the prosperity of the capital
may easily be conceived. It was also the custom under the Tokugawa
régime to prevent undue accumulation of wealth in the hands of
individuals by ordering conspicuously rich folks to carry out some great
public work at their own expense. In fact, no means were neglected to
prevent the feudal barons from developing inconvenient strength.
In addition to these rules, exact and rigidly enforced laws--called
_buke hatto_, or military statutes--were enacted for observance by
feudal chiefs and _samurai_ in general. The first body of such laws,
comprising thirteen articles, was promulgated in 1615. Subsequently, the
laws were repromulgated on the accession of each shōgun, sometimes with
modifications or additions. The principal provisions of these statutes
were: that attendance in Edo must be as punctual as possible; that no
new castles must be built; that repairs of old ones must not be
undertaken without special permission; that leagues must not be formed;
that marriages must not be contracted without due permission; that
garments must be worn and methods of conveyance employed such as suited
the rank of the wearer or traveler, and so forth; these vetoes being
supplemented by provisions for encouraging the pursuit of military and
literary professions, the practice of frugality and other virtues.
The position of the feudal lords was further lowered and that of the
shōgun made more secure when, with a consummate tact, Iyemitsu, the
third Tokugawa, annulled the formal distinction between the _tozama_ and
_fudai_ barons, and reduced the former to the level of the latter. On
his accession he summoned to the palace in Edo all the _tozama_ barons,
and addressed them as follows: "Our ancestor, having been originally of
the same rank with yourselves and enabled to pacify the country through
your assistance, was prompted by a sentiment of deference to refrain
from classing you with the _fudai_ barons. But I differ from my ancestor
in that I was born to the position which he acquired, and am under no
obligation to preserve any distinction. It is therefore my intention to
place you on the same footing as the _fudai_. Should this be displeasing
to any of you, an interval of three years will now be given you, during
which time you should consider the matter maturely in your own dominions
and come to a final decision." Then, adding that the creed of the
_samurai_ was to guard with weapons of war the things acquired by such
means, he presented to each of the barons a sword. This injunction, at
once so frank and so irresistible, evoked no dissent. The barons
acquiesced respectfully, but the greater _tozama_ never forgot the
position they once held, and their loyalty was often more formal than
sincere, until after 1860, when some of them turned open enemies of the
Tokugawa.
The Tokugawa's policy toward the imperial house and the civil nobility
at Kyōto was not less clever and effective than the control of the
_daimio_. Theoretically, the shōgun derived his powers primarily from
the emperor, and ruled his vassals under the authority delegated to him
by the sovereign. The Tokugawa showed deference to this theory by making
every effort to enhance the social position and enrich the temporal
domains of the emperor. But it was at the same time important for the
shōgun that the exercise of his executive power should not be
inconveniently hampered by interference on the part of the court. Hence,
in the same year that saw the promulgation of the military statutes,
1615, Iyeyasu compiled a law of seventeen articles destined chiefly for
observance by the court nobles, and entitled "_Kinchū Jomoku_," or
palace regulations. In this law we find provisions recapitulating orders
issued by the emperor in the Kwampei era, to the effect that men should
study the ancient poetry of Japan, that the prime minister, the minister
of the left, and the minister of the right should rank above the princes
of the blood; that the ranks held by _samurai_ should be considered
entirely distinct from those held by court nobles, and so forth. Men
said that this law was designed to augment the prestige of the imperial
house, but in reality it set limits to the exercise of the sovereign's
authority. The principal official of the shōgun's government, the
_shoshidai_, was stationed in Kyōto and intrusted with the duty of
supervising the imperial guards. Moreover, strict regulations were
enacted to control the journeys of the feudal nobles to and from Kyōto.
In a word, the policy of the shōgunate was to preserve the fullest
semblance of reverence for the sovereign, simultaneously with the
fullest administrative independence. The imperial court was organized in
Kyōto with all pomp and circumstance; it had its ministers, vice
ministers, and subordinate officials; it had its five principal, as well
as more than a hundred ordinary, court nobles; but as for the
sovereign's actual power, it did not extend beyond the direction of
matters relating to rank and etiquette, the classification of
shrine-keepers, priests, and priestesses, and professionals of various
kinds--functions of no material importance whatever. Alone the
_kwanryō_, the _densō_, and the _gisō_ exercised a certain measure of
authority in the shōgun's government. The control of affairs relating to
lands, to the army, to finance, and to everything included in the domain
of practical politics rested absolutely in the hands of the shōgun.
This state of affairs greatly mortified the Emperor Gominoö,[2] a
sovereign of much talent, who reigned during 1612-1630. He would fain
have effected some change in the system, but found himself helpless to
accomplish anything against the all-powerful Tokugawa. An additional
check to such designs was given by the marriage of Kazuko, daughter of
the second shōgun, Hidetada, to the emperor, the offspring of the union,
a daughter, subsequently coming to the throne as the Empress Myōshō.
This close relationship with the imperial family naturally increased the
prestige of the Tokugawa. Subsequently Gokōmyō, Gosai-in, and Reigen,
sons of the Emperor Gominoö, successively ascended the throne and
Gokōmyō cherished the design of achieving his father's ambition. But he
died without accomplishing anything and the times remained unfavorable
to the imperial aspirations until 1868.
With regard to the organization of the shōgun's government in Edo, the
cabinet, called _yōbeya_, held its sessions in the castle, and was
composed of the _tairō_, _rōjiu_, and _wakadoshiyori_. The _tairō_
corresponded with the prime minister (_daijō daijin_) of Kyōto; it was
an office sometimes actually filled, sometimes left without occupant.
The _rōjiu_ were five; their functions were the general direction of
administrative affairs, of the feudal barons and of the city of Kyōto.
The _wakadoshiyori_, also five in number, assisted in the administration
and supervised the _samurai_ directly connected with the shōgunate. The
posts in the cabinet were given invariably to _fudai_ nobles, the
_tozama_ barons being entirely excluded. Next in importance were the
offices of the three governors (_bugyō_), the senior and junior
supervisors (_metsuke_) and so forth. One of the three governors was
called the _jisha bugyō_, and was charged with the management of
temples, shrines, and Shintō and Buddhist priests. Another, the _machi
bugyō_, had control of municipal and mercantile matters in Edo; and the
third, the _kanjō bugyō_, had to do with all the lands in the direct
possession of the shōgunate. These three governors had judicial
functions also, being required to hear and determine all suits connected
with matters falling within their respective provinces. In addition to
duties of general supervision, the _metsuke_ were charged with the
superintendence of special classes, the _ōmetsuke_ being intrusted with
the function of keeping watch on the feudal barons and on officials
below the rank of _rōjiu_, in conjunction with the _rōjiu_; while the
_shōmetsuke_, similarly coöperating with the _wakadoshiyori_, had to
superintend the _samurai_ who were direct vassals of the shōgun, as well
as the _samurai_ in general. Attached to the above-mentioned principal
officials there was a duly-ordered staff of subordinates, the whole
constituting the organization of the general government. Posts inferior
to those of the three governors were generally filled by _hatamoto_
(bannerets). Turning to local officers, we find the _shoshidai_, or
governor, in Kyōto, entrusted with the supervision of the imperial
guards, and the _Ōsaka-jōdai,_ or lord warden of Ōsaka castle. These two
officials had general charge of affairs in the western provinces, in
addition to the duties of their special offices. They also were selected
from among the _fudai_ barons, and their post was usually a stepping
stone to the important position of _rōjiu_. Further, in Nijō of Kyōto
there was a _zaiban shihai_, or controller of the guards; in Ōsaka, a
_jōban shihai_, or controller of the castle guards, and in Shimpu, Kofu,
and so forth, there were _jōban shihai_, or _kinban shihai_, performing
functions similar to those of the Kyōto and Ōsaka _shihai_. Governors,
who were regarded as officials of great importance, _gundai_ (headmen)
of lands under the direct control of the shōgun, _daikwan_ and other
principal officers, were selected by the shōgun from among the _fudai_
barons and bannerets. In the city of Edo there were _machidoshiyori_,
or wardmasters, _nanushi_, or mayors, and so forth, while in provincial
towns there were five _nanushi_ who managed municipal affairs.
Turning to the foreign relations of Japan during this period, we find
that, after the invasion of Hideyoshi's army, which, like the Hundred
Years' War in France, devastated Korea from one end to the other, the
people of the peninsula regarded the Japanese with such aversion that
the relations between the two countries were virtually severed. It was
with great difficulty that Iyeyasu at last succeeded in convincing the
Koreans that the Japan of the Tokugawa differed essentially from the
Japan under Hideyoshi, and that the former's intentions were entirely
pacific. Finally the Koreans, having obtained tacit consent of China,
sent to Japan a letter from their king together with some presents, and
thenceforth, on each occasion of a change of shōgun, Korean envoys came
to offer their country's congratulations, the Tokugawa, on their side,
treating these delegates with all courtesy and consideration. In the
days of the Ashikaga family, it had been customary for the shōgun to
assume the title of king of Japan in his communications with other
sovereigns. The Tokugawa discontinued this, on the ground that it was an
infraction of the imperial dignity, and adopted instead the title
_taikun_, or great prince. The Sō family of Tsushima acted from
generation to generation as intermediaries between Japan and Korea. They
had a monopoly of the trade with the latter country, whither they
dispatched twenty vessels annually, the total value of the trade being
limited, however, to 18,000 _ryō_. But though Korea thus accepted
Japan's amicable overtures, China would not do so. Nevertheless, the
inhabitants of her southeastern parts came to Nagasaki in great numbers
for purposes of commerce, and many Japanese ships crossed to the
neighboring empire with the same object. These ships, called
_shuin-bune_, because of the vermilion-seal permits of the shōgun, were
owned by wealthy merchants residing in or near Kyōto, Sakai, and
Nagasaki.
The Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to establish commercial
intercourse with Japan, held a monopoly of the trade for some time, so
that the Dutch settlers in the Indies were excluded from competing with
them. Finally, however, in 1596, the Dutch managed to make their way to
Hirado in the province of Hizen, in order to arrange the preliminaries
of a commerce destined to continue for a long time. Among the persons
who arrived in the Dutch ships were a Dutchman named Jan Joost and an
Englishman, William Adams, the latter coming in the capacity of pilot.
These two foreigners had an interview with Iyeyasu, who, much pleased
with them, conceived the idea of trading with Western countries. Houses
and lands were given to the two strangers, and they resided in Edo, the
streets now known as Yayosugashi and Anjinchō being the places where
they are said to have lived. The Dutch, eager to monopolize the trade
with Japan, made another visit to Japan in a vessel of war, with a view
to expelling the Portuguese merchants. They brought with them an
autograph letter and presents from the King of Holland for the shōgun,
and solicited permission to carry on commerce, to which Iyeyasu readily
acceded. In 1612 the first Dutch merchantman arrived in Japanese waters
and was soon afterward followed by a British ship, the coming of the
latter being due to information furnished by William Adams to his
country with reference to the state of affairs in Japan. Iyeyasu placed
no obstacles in the way of British trade, but the relations between the
Dutch and the English at Hirado were so inharmonious that at one time
they were on the point of resorting to open hostilities. The Dutch
finally prevailed upon the shōgun to impose as many restrictions as
possible on the trade of the English, and the result was that although
the friction between the British and the Dutch was ostensibly removed,
the former, finding themselves unable to carry on business profitably,
finally took their departure. About this time great numbers of merchants
came to Japan from Annam, Siam, Luzon, and other places of the south, as
well as from the southern districts of China and from India, while on
the Japanese side wealthy traders of Kiushū traveled abroad to a great
extent for business purposes, and Iyeyasu himself went so far as to
dispatch people across the Pacific to New Spain in America in order to
open commercial relations. The Japanese at that era possessed very
strongly constructed vessels, measuring as much as 120 feet by 54, fully
rigged with three masts, having dark-red lacquered hulls and capable of
carrying a great number of passengers. In these ships were exported
copper, bronze utensils, lacquered articles, umbrellas, fans, screens,
sulphur, camphor, dyed textile fabrics, wheat flour, and so forth, and
on their return voyage they brought to Japan silk cocoons, silk fabrics,
woolen stuffs, sugar, drugs, incense, vermilion, quicksilver, glass,
coral, whalebone and so forth. This list of exports and imports
furnishes some clue to the industries and customs of the Japanese of
that era. Foreign trade flourished greatly, and a spirit of enterprise
prevailed throughout the country. Date Masamune, feudal chief of Sendai,
sent an envoy to Rome who came back eventually to Japan, having devoted
seven years to studying the state of affairs in Rome, where he was
received in audience by the Pope. Early in the seventeenth century one
Yamada Nagamasa (or Nizayemon), a native of Suruga, crossed to Siam, and
organizing a force with the Japanese settlers in that country--who had
already become sufficiently numerous to people a village, hence called
_Nippon-machi_--rendered material assistance to the king of the country,
twice quelling a rebellion that prevailed at the time. This same Yamada,
fighting always for Siam, led his troops against an invading army of
Spaniards and defeated them, an exploit regarded with the greatest
admiration at that era when the prestige of the Spanish arms was at its
height. The king rewarded Yamada by adopting him into the royal family
and giving him his own daughter in marriage, so that the Japanese
adventurer's name became widely renowned. Another example of the
adventurous spirit of the age was afforded by Hamada Yahei, who led a
considerable force to Formosa, to avenge the plunder of a Japanese ship
by the natives, and having overrun the island, brought back the son of
the chief as a hostage to Nagasaki.
Unfortunately, however, unexpected religious squabbles fatally
interrupted the course of the country's foreign trade. The Dutch
settlers made a discovery, real or pretended, that the Portuguese and
Spanish missionaries, leaguing themselves with the native Christians,
were plotting to overthrow the Japanese government. Many proofs of the
truth of this accusation were submitted to the shōgun by the Dutch, and
color was lent to the charge by evidence that the missionaries
themselves or their converts behaved with much intolerance and
arrogance. The Edo government was moved by these accusations and by the
doings of the missionaries to take active steps against them. Several of
the principal were put to death and the rest were expelled. Shortly
afterward an order was issued against the voyages of the _shuin-bune_
and it was further declared unlawful to construct ships of more than a
certain size, while, at the same time, the method of construction was so
modified that distant voyages became impossible. Travel to foreign
countries was also strictly interdicted, and as a necessary consequence
the arts of ship-building and navigation sensibly declined. It was at
this epoch, too, that the Christian rebellion of Shimabara occurred,
culminating in the battle of Amakusa in 1637-1638, which had a decisive
influence upon the foreign policy of the Tokugawa.
At the time of the first introduction of Christianity into Japan, it
spread very rapidly throughout the empire, receiving no check until the
arrogance and intolerance of the missionaries provoked the anger of
Hideyoshi and induced him to issue an edict forbidding the propagandism
of the foreign faith. This law, however, was not rigorously enforced,
and moreover official attention was shortly afterward diverted to the
war with Korea. When Iyeyasu came to power, as has been shown, he
expelled the foreign missionaries from Japan and deputed Buddhist
priests to reconvert the Japanese who had embraced the Christian creed,
the efforts of these priests being reinforced by an edict that all who
refused to abjure Christianity should be either exiled or put to death.
But it appeared that many of the Japanese Christians had adopted the new
faith with sincerity and devotion which neither teaching nor threats
could alter. In the provinces of Bungo and Hizen, in Kiushū, where even
the feudal barons themselves had become converts to the Western creed, a
great majority of the population was Christian, and from them issued the
forces of propagandism which made themselves felt elsewhere. Shimabara,
in Hizen, was especially regarded as the headquarters of the foreign
faith, and the shōgun accordingly nominated as feudal chief of that
place Matsukura Shigemasa, a bitter foe to Christianity. The latter
issued proclamations against the profession of the faith, and inflicted
most cruel punishments on its votaries. The people suffered in silence,
for Shigemasa's military following was so great that resistance was
hopeless.
On Shigemasa's death, his incapable and tyrannous son Shigetsugu
succeeded him, and popular discontent began to take a concrete form.
Gradually the plan of a combination for open resistance found advocates.
Among the generals on the defeated side in the battle of Sekigahara of
1600 had been one Konishi Yukinaga, an ardent believer in Christianity.
After the battle his principal retainers retired to the Island of
Amakusa off the coast of Hizen, among whom the most influential
constantly sought means to be revenged on the Tokugawa and to promote
the spread of Christianity. They found a youth named Masuda Shirō who to
remarkable graces of person added a mind of great craftiness, and they
presented him to the people in 1637, alleging that he was the heavenly
messenger of whom Francis Xavier had spoken twenty-five years previously
when leaving Japan, and who was destined to establish the supremacy of
the Christian faith. They also spread rumors that the shōgun had died in
Edo, and the people, much encouraged by these things, assembled in great
numbers and openly offered thanksgivings to heaven. The officials in
Shimabara endeavored to disperse this meeting and to arrest the leaders,
but in a contest which ensued the Christians were victorious. Now the
insurrection spread far and wide throughout Shimabara, Amakusa, and the
neighboring districts, until the insurgents under the command of Masuda
Shirō numbered over thirty thousand. At first the Edo government
regarded the rebels as a mere mob of peasants, and dispatched a petty
baron, Itakura Shigemasa, to restore order. But the latter's inability
to cope with the trouble having afforded a gauge of its true dimensions,
the commission was given to Matsudaira Nobutsuna, a powerful chief. The
insurgents fought with desperate resolution and inflicted numerous
defeats on the government's troops, Shigemasa himself falling in battle.
But the end came at last. In 1638, the stronghold of the rebels was
taken, and its defenders were either burned in the flames kindled by
their own hand or put to the sword.
This experience taught the government that the spread of Christianity
was attended by the gravest dangers to public tranquillity. Strict laws
were therefore enacted for its suppression. Foreigners who came to Japan
for the purpose of propagating the faith were refused admission, and
those who declined to depart despite the edicts were put to death.
Thenceforth Buddhism was adopted as the national religion, receiving the
allegiance of all classes, high and low. It is interesting to note that
the revival of Buddhist influence was not only simultaneous with the
downfall of Catholicism, but also due largely to an institution which
was now for the first time placed on a religious basis. The system of
taking a census at regular intervals, which was introduced by the Taikwa
reformers, had never been successfully practiced for a long period of
time, until the Tokugawa government made the extermination of
Catholicism an occasion for the restoration of the system. It was
ordered in 1716 that the census should be taken in each fief and the
results duly reported every six years. Births, deaths, and marriages
were registered in books kept by Buddhist priests, so that no Christian
should remain in society under the protection of law. The operation was
called, from its religious character, _shūmon-aratame_, or examination
of faith. This of course contributed materially to the influence of the
Buddhist church, for which the Tokugawa period was an era of marked
prosperity, the number of temples throughout the empire aggregating four
hundred thousand. Nevertheless, the government was careful to avoid a
return to the excesses of former days. The building of new temples was
forbidden, the lands assigned for the support of those already in
existence were rigidly defined, and the people were encouraged to study
Chinese literature, so that the corruption which disfigured the Buddhist
priesthood in earlier ages was, in great part, corrected.
Even more important than the revival of Buddhist influence was the
bearing of the Catholic extermination upon the almost total exclusion of
foreign trade from the shores of Japan. The entry of all foreign ships,
except those of China and Holland, into Japanese ports was peremptorily
forbidden. Neither the Chinese nor the Dutch entertained any idea of
religious propagandism, their sole purpose being commercial. The Dutch,
indeed, having shown a disposition to assist Japan in every way, enjoyed
great credit with the Edo government, as will be more fully set forth in
the next chapter. At first no restrictions were imposed on the
commercial transactions of the Chinese and the Dutch, but subsequently a
limit was set to the amount of trade and to the number of ships engaged,
and the prices at which imported articles must be offered for sale were
also determined officially. These restrictions were suggested by the
fact that the trade involved a heavy drain of the precious metals.
Indeed, the quantity of gold and silver exported from Japan during the
interval between the inauguration of foreign commerce and the imposition
of the above restriction was so large that Japan's resources were
seriously impaired. It was found necessary to strictly interdict the
shipping away of the precious metals, but there is strong reason to
doubt whether the interdict effected much, for foreigners, disregarding
the laws of Japan, contrived to carry on clandestine commerce in waters
beyond the purview of the government's officials.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Chronological and genealogical table of the Tokugawa
shōguns.
1. Iyeyasu, 1603.
|
+---------------------------+----------------------+
| | |
2. Hidetada, 1605. Yorinobu (founder of Yorifusa (founder of
| the Kishū house). the Mito house).
+-----------+ | |
| | |
3. Iyemitsu, 1624. Mitsusada. Nariakira (eighth in
| | descent from Yorifusa).
+------------+--------------+ +-------------+ |
| | | | |
4. Iyetsuna, Tsunashige. 5. Tsunayoshi, 8. Yoshimune, 15. Yoshinobu,
1651. | 1680. 1716. 1866.
| |
| +-----------+--------------+
| | |
6. Iyenobu, 1709. 9. Iyeshige, 1745. Munetada (founder of
| | the Hitotsubashi
| | family).
7. Iyesugu, 1713. 10. Iyeharu, 1761. |
Harunari.
|
+------------------------+
|
11. Iyenari, 1787.
|
+-------------------+-------------------+
| |
12. Iyeyoshi, 1837. Nariyoshi (head of the
| Kisuhū house).
| |
13. Iyesada, 1854. 14. Iyemochi, 1857.
[2] Table showing chronology and lineage of emperors.
107. Emperor Goyōzei, 1587-1612.
|
108. Emperor Gominoö, 1612-1630.
|
+------------------+------+----------+-------------+
| | | |
109. Empress 110. Emperor 111. Emperor 112. Emperor
Myōshō, Gokōmyō, Gosai-in, Reigen,
1630-1644. 1644-1655. 1655-1663. 1663-1687.
|
+--------------------------------+--------+
| |
113. Emperor Higashiyama, 1687-1710. Tadahito (ancestor of Prince
| Kan-in).
| |
114. Emperor Nakamikado, 1710-1736. Massahito.
| |
115. Emperor Sakuramachi, 1736-1747. 119. Emperor Kōkaku, 1780-1817.
| |
+-------+---------+ 120. Emperor Ninkō, 1817-1847.
| | |
116. Emperor 117. Emperor 121. Emperor Kōmei, 1847-1867.
Momozono, Gosakuramachi, |
1747-1763. 1763-1771. 122. The present Emperor
| (Mutsuhito).
118. Emperor Gomomozono, 1771-1780.