THE KAMAKURA GOVERNMENT. 1186-1339
The Taira had fallen, and Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, one of the greatest
statesmen Japan has produced, had established his headquarters at
Kamakura, near the present Tōkyō. The influence of his clan had for
generations been implanted in the eastern provinces, where the robust
militarism stood in great contrast with the effeminate atmosphere of
Kyōto.
The rule of Kamakura, so far as the feudal forces of the east were
concerned, was now almost complete, but Yoritomo aspired to the supreme
military power of the whole empire. Here in this connection must be
related the tragic story of his half-brother Yoshitsune, perhaps the
most gallant and most beloved hero in the memory of the children of
Japan. He was a mere babe when after the Heiji insurrection, he was
captured with his mother by the Taira soldiers. He would have been
killed by order of Kiyomori, had it not been for the intercession of the
latter's mother and for the beauty of the young mother of Yoshitsune.
For the sake of the lives of her sons, the latter became the concubine
of Kiyomori, whom she did not love. The pathetic story still excites
feeling in the heart of Japanese womanhood. Yoshitsune was assigned to a
priestly career, but he proved unruly and fond of the arts of the
_samurai_. Tradition ascribes to the child many a superhuman act of
valor and military skill. At length he ran away to the northern province
of Mutsu, where he was kindly received by the great local chieftain
Fujiwara-no-Hidehira. Yoshitsune grew to be a man of commanding genius,
and his personal charm attracted to him many loyal _samurai_, the
romantic careers of several of whom are still remembered. When Yoritomo
rose in 1180 at the mandate of the late Prince Mochihito, Yoshitsune's
opportunity came. After the former had routed the first large detachment
of the Taira forces, a young man with a large head but of small stature
was announced to him, and Yoritomo at once recognized his long
forgotten brother Yoshitsune, whose coming, he said, was to him more
reassuring than the addition of a million warriors.
Henceforth Yoritomo's brilliant victories were largely owing to the
generalship of his brother. But no sooner had the latter destroyed the
remnants of the Minamoto's enemy than his own safety was endangered by
his very success, for Yoritomo grew jealous of his great renown and
popularity. As Yoshitsune escorted the captive chief of the Taira clan,
Munemori, to Kamakura, he not only received no recognition for his
achievements, but also was refused admission to the presence of his
brother. There were not lacking men around the latter to contrive the
downfall of the great general. Shortly afterward Yoritomo sent to Kyōto
a man of proved valor and strength, Tosabō Shōshun, with orders to
destroy Yoshitsune, but Tosabō himself fell under Yoshitsune's sword in
the attempt. Thereafter Yukiiye, Yoshitsune's uncle, induced the
ex-emperor to authorize them to put down Yoritomo. But Yoritomo
addressed himself to the ex-emperor with such persuasion that an
imperial mandate was issued to all the provincial authorities ordering
them to arrest Yoshitsune and Yukiiye. Yoritomo thereupon dispatched
Hōjō Tokimasa to Kyōto to quell the partisans and restore order in the
capital. Yukiiye was subsequently killed in the province of Izumi, but
Yoshitsune escaped to his friend Fujiwara-no-Hidehira in Mutsu. The
latter, however, died soon afterward, and was succeeded by his son
Yasuhira, who received from Yoritomo orders to kill the fugitive. So
great and far-reaching was the authority of the Minamoto chief at that
time that Yasuhira had no choice but to comply with the mandate. He
caused Yoshitsune to be put to death, and sent his head to Kamakura.
Tradition has, however, been reluctant to admit so ignominious an end to
the hero, who, it says, effected his escape to the island of Ezo
(Hokkaido) and thence to the continent, where he became a great prince
over nomadic tribes. Nor did Yasuhira's treachery bring fortune upon
himself, for Yoritomo, already desirous to bring Mutsu under his direct
rule, pretended to believe that Yasuhira had been unduly slow in
destroying his rebellious brother, and, in 1189, led in person a large
army, which succeeded in a brief time in killing Yasuhira and subduing
the great provinces of Mutsu and Dewa.
In the next year, Yoritomo repaired to Kyōto and had his first audience
of the emperor and the ex-emperor.[1] The latter treated him with great
consideration, and after the lapse of a year conferred upon him the
title of _sei-i-tai-shōgun_, or generalissimo, which has since been the
customary title of the feudal overlord of Japan.
Let us here describe the feudal government organized by Yoritomo at
Kamakura--the first attempt of like kind in the history of Japan--and
observe how different it was from the elaborate system of the
centralized government which was first organized in 645 and later
transferred to Kyōto. One of the first steps taken by the Minamoto chief
to consolidate his power was to establish the relation of lord and
vassal between himself and the great local magnates of the eastern
provinces who had espoused his cause, and to secure their allegiance by
confirming them in the possession of their estates. For the better
organization of his military forces he created an office called
_samurai-dokoro_, a species of headquarter staff department, which was
presided over by Wada Yoshimori in the capacity of _bettō_. Thus all the
military men throughout the east were brought completely under his sway.
Later he created a department of public archives (_kumonjo_), and made
Ōye Hiromoto its minister, and Nakahara Chikayoshi its vice-minister,
both of whom were originally civilians at Kyōto. It was owing to
Yoritomo's sagacity that they had been induced to enter the service of
the military government at Kamakura. By this department the
administration of civil affairs was chiefly conducted, as was the
administration of military affairs by the staff department
(_samurai-dokoro_). A department of justice (_monchū-jo_) was also
organized with Miyoshi Yasunobu, another civilian, at its head, its
functions being the hearing of all civil suits, and the management of
matters relating to civil law.
Thenceforward down to the days of the Ashikaga, the descendants of the
three statesmen from Kyōto continued to direct the administration of
affairs at Kamakura. By 1184, the organization of Yoritomo's central
government (_bakufu_) was complete, but the local administration had
still to be elaborated. Advantage was taken of the general disorder that
still existed throughout the land, owing to the disturbance caused by
the remnants of the Taira party and by the followers of Yukiiye and
Yoshitsune. On the advice of Ōye Hiromoto, Yoritomo made such strong
representations to the ex-emperor that the latter sanctioned the
appointment of high constables (_shugo_) in the various provinces and
superintendents (_jitō_) of the great estates, the whole being under the
control of the shōgun himself. By the energy of these officials numbers
of the insurgents were arrested in different localities, and order was
everywhere restored. Furthermore, an edict was issued requiring that all
cultivators of land throughout the empire should without distinction
contribute to the military exchequer a tax at the rate of five _shō_
(.256 bushels) of grain per _tan_ (one-fourth of an acre). Thenceforth
the power of the former provincial governors and headmen gradually
declined, and the authority of the newly appointed high constables and
superintendents increased proportionally. The shōgun, of course, took
care that the occupants of the new offices should be chosen from among
his own relatives and partisans, so that his sway was eventually
consolidated everywhere, and the control of the empire virtually passed
into his hands.
Yoritomo died in 1200 at the age of fifty-three, his eldest son,
Yoriiye, succeeding to the title of generalissimo. But Yoriiye being
only eighteen years of age, and having given no evidence of ability, his
mother, Masako, commissioned her own father Hōjō Tokimasa, together with
twelve councilors, to assume the direction of the government at
Kamakura. From this time began the dark age of Kamakura, in which
unbridled ambition ignored all restraints of propriety. When the young
Yoriiye fell ill in 1203, his mother, acting in concert with Tokimasa,
planned to relieve him of his office of generalissimo, and to appoint
his son Ichihata to be lord and governor general of the twenty-eight
eastern provinces forming Kwantō, and his young brother
Chihata--afterward called Sanetomo--to be lord of the thirty-eight
western provinces forming Kwansei. This plot so incensed Yoriiye that
the latter, with his wife's father, Hiki Yoshikazu, planned means to
exterminate the Hōjō family. Tokimasa frustrated the design by having
Yoshikazu assassinated, and then attacking and slaying all his blood
relations together with Ichihata. Yoriiye he afterward shut up in a
temple, and ultimately caused him to be put to death. Sanetomo,
Yoriiye's younger brother, succeeded him, but exercised no
administrative authority, the Hōjō holding everything in their own
grasp. The shōgun consequently devoted himself to literature rather than
to military exercises. Moreover, foreseeing that fortune would not long
continue to smile upon the Minamoto family, he thought to obtain a high
position in the central government, and add luster to the family's
renown while there was yet time. Hence he was promoted to the post of
chief councilor of state (_dainagon_), in conjunction with that of
commander in chief of the guards of the left, his official rank being
raised to the first of the second class. Shortly afterward he became
lord keeper of the privy seal and then minister of the right. But in
1219, on the occasion of worshiping at a shrine in Kamakura, he was
stabbed to death by Kugyō, a son of Yoriiye. This event terminated the
descendants of the Minamoto family in the direct line. A brief interval
of thirty-five years, or three generations,[2] from the time when
Yoritomo had risen to the head of the government, sufficed to complete
the supremacy of the great clan, the first shōgun of which had so
systematically pruned off the useful members of its own branch.
The Minamoto were followed by the Hōjō as feudal rulers. The Hōjō family
was of Taira origin, its founder being Taira-no-Sadamori. The name Hōjō
was derived from the fact that the family's headquarters were at Hōjō in
Izu. During the period of Yoritomo's exile in Izu, he experienced
generous and hospitable treatment at the hands of Hōjō Tokimasa, whose
daughter he married. All during Yoritomo's campaigns and subsequent
administration at Kamakura, Tokimasa, though of the Taira family, proved
a loyal and indispensable counselor. Under Yoriije, being the
grandfather on the mother's side, he naturally enjoyed the widest
popularity and wielded the greatest power of all the military nobles of
the time. As has been seen, the Hōjō did not even hesitate to
assassinate the shōgun in order to further their personal interests.
Tokimasa allowed himself to be controlled by the counsels of his wife.
At her slanderous instance he brought about the overthrow of a great
territorial noble, Hatakeyama, and by her advice he conceived the
project of elevating to the shōgunate his younger daughter's husband,
Hiraga Tomomasa. The third shōgun, Sanetomo, then a mere youth, was an
inmate of Tokimasa's house at the time of this plot. His mother, Masako,
learning what was on foot, caused him to be removed to the house of her
brother Yoshitoki, with the assistance of the military vassals of the
Minamoto, and succeeded not only in having Tokimasa and his intriguing
wife sent back to Hōjō, but also in compassing the death of Tomomasa in
Kyōto. These events transferred the territorial and military ascendancy
among the Kamakura nobility to the Wada family, whom therefore
Yoshitoki, the Hōjō chief in Kamakura, formed the design of destroying.
In pursuance of that scheme, he prompted Kugyō to assassinate Sanetomo,
the last of the Minamoto family. Then Fujiwara-no-Yoritsune, a relative
of Yoritomo, was summoned from Kyōto to assume the nominal office of
shōgun, Masako, the widow of Yoritomo, exercising the controlling power
and Yoshitoki holding the office of regent (_shikken_, an office
virtually corresponding with the _sesshō_ of the central government); in
which capacity he administered all the affairs of the _bakufu_ in the
name of the young shōgun. Yoshitoki was thus a _shōgun_ with the name of
a _shikken_.
It was about this time that the civil government of Kyōto rose under the
leadership of the ex-Emperor Gotoba in an attempt to overthrow the
feudal administration. Ever since the time of Yoritomo, Gotoba had
cherished the hope of recovering the control of administrative affairs,
and with that object had stationed military men of his own choosing in
the west, in addition to those already stationed in the north,
conferring on their leaders swords forged by his own hands, and
otherwise sparing no pains to organize a strong military following. So
long, however, as Yoritomo lived, Gotoba's designs could not be
realized. But when Sanetomo, the third shōgun of Yoritomo's line, fell
under the sword of Kugyō, the ex-emperor thought that he descried an
opportunity to attain his purpose. But Hōjō Yoshitoki set up a Fujiwara
as a nominal shōgun, and himself exercised the administrative authority
in a markedly arrogant and arbitrary manner. Gotoba then selected a
vassal of Kamakura, without consulting the Hōjō, as warden of the
western marches, and allowed him to reside in Kyōto. Yoshitoki forthwith
confiscated all the lands belonging to the warden. Thereupon an imperial
mandate was issued, directing that the estates should be restored, to
which Yoshitoki paid no attention. A further instance of contumacy
occurred in connection with an estate which the ex-emperor had conferred
on one of his favorite mistresses.
Stung by these insults, Gotoba finally resolved to overthrow the
Kamakura government. In this design he was strongly supported by another
ex-emperor, Juntoku, who had just abdicated in favor of his son, Chūkyō.
The third of the three ex-emperors of the time, Tsuchimikado, opposed
the project of the other two, urging that its execution was still
premature. Gotoba could count upon the support of seventeen hundred
warriors, so in 1221 an imperial mandate circulated through all the
provinces of the empire ordering the destruction of the Hōjō family. It
was specially addressed to the powerful lord, Miura Yoshimura. But,
instead of obeying, he conveyed secret information of the fact to
Yoshitoki, who in turn informed Masako, the widow of Yoritomo. She
thereupon summoned all the military leaders of the surrounding
provinces, and having reminded them of the possessions and ranks
bestowed by the Minamoto chief on the _samurai_ of Kwantō, said that an
occasion had now arisen to repay her deceased husband's favors. The
result was that none of these captains espoused the sovereign's cause in
the struggle that ensued. Meanwhile, Yoshitoki took counsel of his
generals as to a plan of campaign, and finally adopted the proposal of
Ōye Hiromoto that the bulk of the forces at the disposal of the Hōjō
should march against Kyōto, under the command of Hōjō Yasutoki and Hōjō
Tokifusa, by the three trunk routes, the Tōkaidō, the Tōsandō, and the
Hokurikudō. On receipt of this intelligence in Kyōto, the imperial
troops were divided into two bodies under Hideyasu and Taneyoshi, and
moved northward to meet the invaders in the Owari and Mino provinces.
But the defending forces suffered defeat, and were driven back, so that
Yasutoki and Tokifusa were able to enter Kyōto at the head of a large
army. They forced the reigning sovereign to abdicate in favor of
Gohorikawa, and they banished the three ex-emperors, Gotoba to the
province of Oki, Juntoku to Sado Island, and Tsuchimikado to Tosa.
Gotoba's son was also sent into exile. A number of court nobles who had
assisted and promoted the attack upon the Kamakura government were put
to death. Three thousand estates belonging to these nobles and to the
_samurai_ who had espoused the imperial cause were confiscated and
divided among the Hōjō followers. Yoshitoki then stationed Yasutoki and
Tokifusa at Rokuhara to preserve peace in Kyōto. Even in the days of
Yoritomo, affairs of state had been administered in consultation with
the court nobles and the Fujiwara ministers, but the Hōjō recognized no
such obligation. So the imperial uprising not only proved a failure, but
also served to increase immensely the power of the feudal government.
The Hōjō were aware that, great as was their influence, it had been
acquired by questionable means, and that their position could be
maintained only by their good government. For this reason, the Hōjō
administration before the days of its decline has come down to posterity
as a model of feudal rule. Yasutoki, who succeeded Yoshitoki as regent,
devoted himself zealously to political affairs, treated the agricultural
classes with much consideration, and sought earnestly to win the love of
the people. He treated his relatives with uniform kindness, and those
under his sway with condescension, never abandoning himself to
passionate impulses nor ever employing his power wantonly. He framed a
law of fifty-one articles setting forth the principles of administration
and supplying regulations to guide the discharge of official functions.
Ruling wisely and living uprightly, he died lamented by people of all
classes. He was succeeded by his grandson, Tsunetoki, and the latter by
his younger brother, Tokiyori. This last, like his grandfather,
practiced economy in his administration and showed much consideration
for the farming classes.
No one of the Hōjō family,[3] however, did more service to the nation
than the son of Tokiyori, Tokimune, who saved the country from the
Mongol conquest. This deserves our special note.
In Mongolia, on the northeast of China, there appeared a conqueror of
world-wide fame, Temujin, the great Genghis Khan. Against his armies the
Tatar kings were unable to hold their ground, and ultimately the wave of
Mongol conquest flowed into the dominions of the Sung sovereign in the
south of China. Temujin's grandson, Kublai, possessed himself of a great
part of Korea, and having concerted measures for overthrowing the Sung
dynasty and bringing all China under Mongol rule, he conceived the
project of subjugating Japan also. His first step toward consummating
that design was to send envoys via Korea, who were instructed to
remonstrate with the Japanese sovereign for his indifferent attitude
toward the Mongol autocrat. But the Koreans dissuaded these envoys from
prosecuting their voyage. Two years later, in 1268, Kublai dispatched
another embassy to Dazaifu in Kiushū, with letters to the governor of
Dazaifu as well as to the Emperor of Japan, the ostensible object of the
communications being to establish amicable relations between the two
countries. From Dazaifu intelligence of the coming of the embassy and
the nature of its documents was forwarded to Kamakura, thence to be sent
in turn to the court in Kyōto. Considerable anxiety was caused by the
news, both in official and in civilian circles. The emperor laid before
the shrine of Daijingū an autographic supplication for the heavenly
protection of the empire, and caused prayers of a similar purport to be
said at all the shrines and temples throughout the realm. Careful
measures were also taken to guard the coasts, more particularly the
points of strategical importance in Hizen and Chikuzen.
A draft reply to Kublai's dispatch was prepared at the court in Kyōto,
and shown to Hōjō Tokimune, who, however, gave it as his opinion that
inasmuch as the communication from China lacked the forms of prescribed
courtesy, Japan's dignity precluded the sending of any answer. Orders
were therefore conveyed to Dazaifu for the immediate expulsion of the
Chinese envoys. In March of the following year Korean officials again
arrived in the island of Tsushima escorting Mongolian envoys, who asked
for a reply to the dispatch sent by their sovereign the preceding year.
These envoys became involved in quarrels with the people of Tsushima,
and finally took their departure, carrying away two of the latter as
prisoners. Five months later, Kublai caused these two men to be restored
to Japan, and made the act an occasion for addressing another dispatch
to the Japanese emperor. Again Japan refrained from making reply. After
an interval of two years, the khan sent in 1271 another ambassador, with
a train of a hundred followers, who landed at Imatsu in Chikuzen. The
ambassador's instructions were to present the dispatch of which he was
bearer either to the imperial court or to the shōgun in Kamakura. He did
not, however, intrust the original document to the Dazaifu officials,
but gave them a copy only. This was at once forwarded to Kamakura, being
from thence communicated to the court in Kyōto. On receiving it, the
_kwanryō_ took counsel of the other ministers of the crown and came to
the decision that no reply should be given.
By this time the people of Japan had acquired full knowledge of the
immense power wielded by Kublai Khan and of the vast conquests achieved
by him in succession to his grandfather Genghis. Hence there was no
little anxiety as to the outcome of these futile embassies. The emperor
ordered prayers to be offered up as before at the shrines and temples
throughout the empire. Kublai had now brought almost the whole of China
into subjection and established his dynasty of Yuan. He continued to
send embassy after embassy to Japan, and Japan on her side continued,
with equal persistence, to make no reply to messages which she construed
as national insults. Enraged by this indifference, the khan finally sent
against Japan a fleet of a hundred and fifty war vessels under the
command of Liu Fok-hêng, at the same time ordering Korea to reinforce
this expedition. The invaders arrived at Tsushima toward the end of
1274, where they killed the governor. Thence they passed to the island
of Iki and killed its acting high constable, and thereafter directed
their forces against Imatsu in Chikuzen. The military nobles of
Kiushū--Shōni, Ōtomo, Matsuura, Kikuchi and others--collected troops and
made a stand at Hakozaki. The Yuan invaders, armed with guns, caused
great havoc among the Japanese army, but the Chinese leader, Liu,
received a wound that compelled him to retire, and a heavy gale arising
destroyed numbers of the foreign war-vessels. The Korean general's ship
was wrecked and he himself drowned. Finally, the remnant of the invading
force escaped under cover of darkness. Once again after a few months
the Yuan sovereign sent another envoy, but he was sent up to Kamakura
and there put to death by Hōjō Tokimune.
Hōjō Sanemasa was now appointed to command at Dazaifu, and instructions
were issued for the vigilant guarding of all the coast line in the
south. Further, the imperial guards were temporarily withdrawn from
Kyōto, and drafted into a large army recruited from the east of the
empire and stationed at Dazaifu as well as at other important positions
along the coast. Sanemasa was given the command of this army, and other
members of the Hōjō family were dispatched to direct the military
preparations in Harima and Nagato. Further, the territorial nobles of
Kiushū received orders to construct fortifications along the coast, and
this work, being vigorously carried on, was completed in 1279. That year
the Chinese emperor again sent envoys, seeking to establish friendship
and intercourse. They landed at Hakata, but were put to death by order
of the shōgun's government. The Regent Tokimune, foreseeing the
consequences of these complications, dispatched large bodies of troops
from Kamakura to Kiushū, to repel the renewed attack inevitably pending
from the west. By this time the feudal society of Japan seems to have
been roused to its height of patriotism. It not only was determined to
resist the invasion of the world-conqueror, but even plans were made to
invade the continent and fight with the Khan on his own ground. The
latter, on his part, had now completed his conquest of China, and,
having attained the zenith of his power, resolved to gratify his
long-cherished desire, supplemented as it was by indignation at the
repeated slaughter of his ambassadors in Japan.
Accordingly in the middle of 1281, he assembled a force of 100,000
soldiers, whom, together with a contingent of 10,000 Koreans, he sent
against Japan under the command of Hwan Bunko. The invading army touched
at the island of Iki, and after a cruel massacre of its inhabitants,
resumed their voyage toward Dazaifu. Thither the Japanese troops flocked
from Kiushū, Chūgoku, and Shikoku to defend their country. Aided by the
fortresses that had been erected along the coast, they fought stoutly.
The Chinese, however, enjoyed the great advantage of possessing heavy
ordnance, with which they bombarded the forts and slaughtered such
multitudes of the Japanese soldiers that the latter were unable to meet
them in open contest. Organized tactics as much characterized the
invaders as personal valor and individual combat did the defending
warriors. Nevertheless, the latter continued to resist so obstinately,
that, although the contest waged for sixty days, the enemy could not
effect a landing. Meanwhile, a rumor reached Kyōto that the Yuan
invaders, having borne down all resistance in Kiushū, had pushed on to
Nagato, and were on the point of advancing against Kyōto itself, thence
to carry their arms into the Tōkai and Hokuriku districts.
The Emperor Gouda, deeply disquieted by these tidings, proceeded in
person to the shrine of Iwashimizu Hachimangū, god of war, to pray for
the safety of the country, and moreover dispatched an autographic
supplication to the shrine of Daijingū in Ise, vowing that he would
offer himself as a sacrifice to preserve the honor of his empire. But in
Kiushū the contest continued fiercely when, on the last day of the
seventh lunar month, a northwesterly storm swept down on the Chinese
fleet and wrecked a number of the ships with immense loss of life. Those
that survived the tempest, several thousands in number, took refuge in
the island of Takashima off the coast of Hizen, and there, under the
command of Chang Pak--Hwan having fled away in a vessel of exceptional
strength--set themselves to cut timber and build new ships to carry them
back to China. But Shōni Kagesuke, at the head of a body of the Kiushū
troops, followed and attacked the fugitives, killing several hundreds
and taking over a thousand prisoners, so that, in the end, only three
out of the hundred thousand Yuan invaders succeeded in escaping alive to
China. After this success the Kamakura government redoubled its efforts
to place the defenses of the country on a strong footing. It was not
till 1299 that the Chinese sovereign sent two Buddhist priests to Japan
with a peaceful message. The country had been in a state of continuous
defense, since the arrival of the first Mongol embassy thirty-one years
previously. Never before had the Japanese nation encountered a more
colossal struggle with a great conquering foe, nor had she since, till
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It is noteworthy that in
the former crisis it was the feudal forces which saved the land from
foreign conquest.
If by this great service the Hōjō placed all Japan under obligation to
them, it was also after this crisis that their power began to decline.
Great sums of money had been devoted during the thirty years to
maintaining constant religious services at the shrines and temples
throughout the empire. The expense incurred on that account is said to
have been greater even than the outlay in connection with military
affairs, which in itself must have been immense. Moreover, after the
invaders had been defeated and the danger averted, the rewards granted
to Buddhist priests and Shintō officials far exceeded in monetary value
the recompense given to the troops and their leaders. On the other hand,
the wardens and territorial nobles, on whom the duty of defending the
country had fallen, found the drain on their resources so heavy that
they began to murmur. Thus the popularity of the shōgunate at Kamakura
commenced to wane.
[Illustration: THE INVASION BY THE MONGOL TARTARS]
Tokimune was succeeded by his son Sadatoki, and then followed Morotoki
and Takatoki. During their regency the authority of the Hōjō rapidly
declined. Takatoki, being a man of indolent disposition, entrusted the
control of affairs wholly to one Nagasaki Takasuke, who was betrayed by
avarice into such abuses of power that men's hearts were altogether
estranged from the government. The fall of the Hōjō finally ensued in
1326, a century and a quarter after the first of those powerful rulers
had risen from the position of a rear-vassal to the most puissant office
in the land.
The circumstances of the downfall of the Kamakura government will be
related in the next chapter. In the meantime, we shall observe the
condition of society during the hundred and forty years of the rule of
the Minamoto and the Hōjō. In regard to the customs of the upper
classes, it is interesting to note that the elegance of the Kyōto nobles
and the severe simplicity of the Kamakura soldiers, now the one, then
the other, according to the varying circumstances, set the fashion of
the day. When the warrior element was in the ascendant, its manners and
customs were more or less taken as a model in Kyōto, while, on the other
hand, Kyōto sometimes impressed its own fashions upon the military. An
instance of the latter case is furnished by the story of the Taira
family, whose fighting men gradually fell under the charm of the court
life, and succumbed with comparative ease to the misfortunes that
afterward overtook them. Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, however, fixed his
headquarters at Kamakura and did not visit Kyōto except for very brief
intervals. His habits of life were frugal and simple; he encouraged the
_samurai_ to adopt a severe military regimen, and he set his face
resolutely against costly ostentation and enervating excesses.
But by the time of Sanetomo prolonged peace had produced its usual
effects: the austerity of military customs underwent relaxation even at
Kamakura, and refinement and luxury began to come into vogue. So, too,
in Kyōto, when the city passed under military rule after the Shōkiu
troubles and when the power of the civil nobles declined
correspondingly, the customs of the soldier class prevailed over those
of the courtiers. Speaking generally, however, it may be said that
Kamakura was the nursery of military customs and Kyōto the center of
courtly effeminacy. The warriors' ethics at Kamakura prescribed
frugality and simplicity, inculcated love of soldierly pursuits and
encouraged feelings of gratitude and loyalty in the relations between
lord and vassal. To such a pitch were these latter sentiments carried
that a vassal would choose rather to be estranged from his parents or
find himself opposed to his own brothers and sisters, than to show want
of fealty to his lord. Everything must be sacrificed in the cause of
one's lord, death and life alike being shared with him. The rules of
etiquette were strictly obeyed, and the provisions of the code of honor
carefully observed. Even when a _samurai_ went into battle, he did not
set himself to slaughter indiscriminately, but having first recounted
the achievements of his ancestors, crossed swords with his foe in a
leisurely and dignified manner. Were he guilty of any fault, it was
expected of him to die by his own hand before the disgrace of lawful
punishment could overtake him. The obligations of honor were absolutely
binding on him in all conjunctures.
After the Hōgen and Heiji insurrections, even Kyōto itself, the seat of
refinement and splendor, became like a deserted battlefield, and when
Minamoto-no-Yoritomo made Kamakura the headquarters of his military
government, the science of war absorbed men's attention so completely
that little or no heed was paid to literary pursuits. The Kyōto
University and the provincial schools decayed, and the knowledge of
Chinese classics became the monopoly of Buddhist priests, some of whom,
particularly of the Zen sect, had spent years of diligent study in
China. Anyone desirous of obtaining education had no recourse but to
place himself under the tuition of these priests. It was in this way
that the term _tera-koya_ (temple annex) came to be generally employed
all through the feudal ages to designate a private school. But despite
the people's neglect of Chinese studies, Chinese words and expressions
were largely in vogue among the higher classes, and Buddhist terms also
passed appreciably into the language of the time owing to the prosperous
and influential position occupied by that religion.
The written language being thus enriched by a multitude of phrases and
expressions which had received the indorsement of scholars, the
vocabulary and literature of the era exhibit marked evidences of change.
Not only the manner of expression, but also the taste of the people, had
undergone a decisive change since the close of the Hei-an epoch, and
this difference naturally manifested itself in the kind of literature
affected. Men no longer took pleasure in books treating of the lives and
adventures of beautiful women or the mental feats of renowned scholars.
Such studies seemed incongruous amid the clash of arms and under the
shadow of the sword and spear. Striking vicissitudes in martial careers,
the intrepid deaths or life-long separations of warriors, the rise and
fall of principalities--these were the themes of which the Kamakura
_samurai_ loved to read. Of the prose compositions expressive of this
sentiment, the most noted were the "_Hōgen_" and the "_Heiji
Monogatari_," stories, respectively of the insurrections of those eras;
and the "_Heike Monogatari_," the pathetic epic of the fate of the great
Taira clan, and the "_Gempei Seisuiki_," the stirring tale of the rise
and fall of the families of Taira and Minamoto. Other famous productions
of the period were the "_Hōjō-ki_," and the "_Shiki Monogatari_." In
these works one finds a skillful blending of graceful Japanese phrases,
strong Chinese expressions, and lofty Buddhist terms. At times the style
has all the ring of martial onset; at times, it is plaintive and moving;
now it abounds in graces of diction, and then its transitions from
passion to deliberation, from swift terseness to smooth tranquillity,
are full of force and sentiment. Between the emotional effect of such
writings and the gently flowing phraseology and uneventful paragraphs of
works like the "_Genji Monogatari_" of the preceding period, there is a
wide interval. Running through the pages of the "_Hōjō-ki_" the reader
also detects a current of discontent and disgust for the transient world
and its vanity that reflects the growing tendency of educated minds at
that epoch. So deeply had the Buddhistic pessimism entered the heart of
the people.
On the other hand, poetry in the Japanese style flourished uniformly in
Kyōto, unaffected by the vicissitudes of the times or the decline of the
imperial power. Collections of verses were made from time to time and
published by imperial direction, among which the "_Shin-Kokinshū_"
contains stanzas constructed with so great skill that it remained a
model for the poets of all subsequent generations. In Kamakura, also,
the Shōgun Sanetomo was an accomplished writer of Japanese poetry. The
grace and polish of his songs in the old-time style, as well as the
_verve_ and spirit of their sentiments, reflecting truly the mood of his
era, find no parallel in the poetry subsequent to the Nara epoch.
Indeed, owing to the great popularity of Japanese poetry in those days,
people began for the first time to study it under teachers. Thus there
came into vogue men who made a business of giving instruction in the art
of poetry, the profession being transmitted from generation to
generation in the same family. The result was that canons of style and
tricks of composition peculiar to special schools of teachers became
more or less binding upon students of those schools, inevitable injury
being done to originality and vigor. To these circumstances may be
attributed a gradual decline of real poetic ability.
Hardly less instructive is the change that overtook the nation's
greatest religion, Buddhism. It will be remembered that during the
Hei-an epoch, two Buddhist sects, the Tendai, founded by Saichō, and the
Shingon, by Kūkai, were incomparably the most influential, all others
being more or less in a state of decline. But toward the close of the
epoch, some priests, as already related, began to take more interest in
military affairs than in religious functions. Yoritomo, when he came
into power, interdicted the use of arms by priests, and encouraged them
to devote their attention entirely to literature. The prestige of the
Tendai and the Shingon suffered from these events, and as their
doctrines, being far too recondite and lofty to be comprehended by the
uninitiated, had never satisfied the bulk of the people, there began to
appear, during the Kamakura epoch, priests who taught a form of the
faith radically different from the others but eminently suited to the
spiritual tone of the new age. This was the Zen sect, introduced in its
various branches from China. It at once attracted men of simple and
robust habits by its remarkably vigorous and effective method of
enlightenment and the great practical value of the latter for the men of
the world in those days of continual fluctuations of fortune. Hōjō
Tokiyori and Tokimune, as well as many a great warrior, besides some
emperors, became ardent patrons of the sect, which consequently attained
prominent popularity among the military men at Kamakura, and developed
widespread influence. Its temples, Kenchō-ji and Engaku-ji, at Kamakura,
stood on an equal footing with the Kennin-ji and Tōfuku-ji of Kyōto.
While the Zen tenet so powerfully appealed to the military class, there
was another set of new sects, entirely original to Japan, which by their
brief formulæ and impressive ceremonies attracted large numbers of the
common people. Of these sects, three, namely, the Jōdo, founded by Genkū
(or Hōnen); Ikkō or Shin, founded by Shinran (or Hanyen), and Ji,
founded by Ippen, all used the same litany, while the fourth sect,
Hokke, or Nichiren, founded by Nichiren, used another. The founders all
met opposition from the exponents of the older sects, but spread their
teachings in the face of serious difficulties, until they won the hearts
of simple-minded folks whose minds had been in a state of constant
uncertainty under the violent changes of the time, and who were now
delighted to find, at last, doctrines which taught that an unmixed faith
in the saving power of a Buddha or a canon symbolized in a single word
of formula would bring them to a blissful calm in this present world.
Not less attractive were the beautiful harmony of the litanies and the
impressiveness of the paraphernalia of the temple of every new sect. It
appeared as if the spiritual needs of the age were at last answered, and
the new tenets spread themselves among the people like a fire in a
parched meadow.
In the domain of arts, the most remarkable industrial achievement of the
era was the progress made in tempering sword-blades. Gotoba, after he
had abdicated the scepter and become ex-emperor, freely indulged his
keen love for sword-blades. He engaged sword-smiths, whom he kept
perpetually tempering steel, and did not hesitate even to forge blades
with his own hands. Naturally this and the extensive demand for swords
at the time gave a great impulse to the industry. Much progress was also
made in the art of forging armor, helmets, bridle-bits, and the like.
Other arts were not, however, greatly encouraged by the military
administrators of Kamakura, who set their faces against luxury and
inculcated frugal fashions. Yet not a little progress was made in
ceramics, lacquer, and the carving of Buddhist images and other temple
furniture.
It is interesting to note that under the simple rule of the Kamakura
government the commerce and trade of this period made a tolerable
progress, in spite of frequent interruptions of the peace. At Kamakura,
where merchants from various parts of the empire assembled and made it
the commercial center of the country, there existed seven kinds of
markets in which articles were sold at small stores specially designed
and constructed. The custom of peddling merchandise also existed. For
business transacted at a distance, bills of exchange had already come
into vogue. While Sanetomo administered the shōgunate, an official limit
was fixed for the number of merchants conducting business in Kamakura.
This was the origin of hereditary privileges of trade. The prices for
the various staples of commerce were determined, according to the custom
of previous times. Thus in 1193 an imperial notification ordered that
rice should be sold at one thousand cash (one _kwammon_), or the tenth
of a _ryō_, that is to say nominally ten _sen_ according to present
denominations, but of course representing a much larger sum at that
time. Again, in 1253, firewood, charcoal, and other necessaries having
risen in price, Hōjō Tokiyori proclaimed the rate at which each must be
sold. Gold was at that time constantly mined in Mutsu, but did not serve
for coinage purposes, the common media of exchange being Chinese copper
and the iron cash of the Sung dynasty and similar Japanese coins of
earlier days. Grass-cloth was also sometimes used as a medium of
exchange, and prices were quoted in terms of it. Trade with China, under
the Sung dynasty, and with Korea--or Koma, as it was then called--was
carried on largely at Hakata in Chikuzen and Bonotsu in Satsuma, both in
Kiushū. Import duties upon foreign goods were levied at the various
ports of entry. The principal imports from China were raw silk, indigo,
Chinese ink, porcelain vessels, mats, and so forth, while the staple
exports from Japan were rice, other cereals, and timber. In 1254 Hōjō
Tokiyori limited the number of ships engaged in the China trade to five,
and ordered all except the licensed vessels to be destroyed. But the
trade continued as brisk as ever. Subsequently, however, during the
interval that separated the decline of the Sung dynasty from the
establishment of the Yuan, intercourse between Japan and the neighboring
empire underwent some diminution, and was suspended altogether for a
time after the Mongol invasion of Japan.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Table showing lineage and chronology of sovereigns.
[80. Emperor Takakura, 1169-1180.]
|
+-------------------+--------------------+
| | |
[81. Emperor Antoku, Gotakakura. 82. Emperor Gotoba,
1180-1186.] | 1186-1199.
| |
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
| | |
86. Emperor Gohorikawa, 84. Emperor Juntoku, 83. Emperor
1222-1233. 1211-1222. Tsuchimikado,
| | 1199-1211.
| | |
87. Emperor Shijō, 85. Emperor Chūkyō, 88. Emperor Gosaga,
1233-1243. 1222. 1243-1247.
|
+--------------------------------------+---+
| |
90. Emperor Kameyama, 89. Emperor Gofukakusa,
1266-1276. 1247-1266.
| |
91. Emperor Gouda, 1276-1288. |
| |
+-----+-----------------+ |
| | |
96. Emperor Godaigo, 94. Emperor Gonijō, 92. Emperor Fushimi,
1319-1339. 1301-1308. 1288-1299.
|
+---------------------------------------+
| |
95. Emperor Hanazono, 1308-1319. 93. Emperor Gofushimi, 1299-1301.
[2] Minamoto Yoritomo, 1184-1199; Minamoto Yoriiye, 1199-1203;
Minamoto Sanetomo, 1203-1219.
[3] The following is the list of the Hōjō regents (_shikken_).
Hōjō Tokimasa, father-in-law of Yoritomo, who died in 1215, did not
assume the title of regent.
Hōjō Yoshitoki, 1205-1224.
Hōjō Yasutoki, 1225-1242.
Hōjō Tsunetoki, 1243-1246.
Hōjō Tokiyori, 1246-1256.
Hōjō Tokimune, 1256-1284.
Hōjō Sadatoki, 1284-1300.
Hōjō Morotoki, 1300-1311.
Hōjō Takatoki, 1312-1326.