The marriage of the Princess Royal with the son of Frederick
Henry, Prince of Orange, on May 12, 1641, took place at an ominous
time. Ten days later Strafford was executed. There can be little
or no doubt, that the eagerness of the King and Queen for the
accomplishment of this union was due to the desire to secure the
goodwill of the Stadholder, and through him of the States, in
the troublous times which they saw before them. It fulfilled two
objects. It gave satisfaction to the Puritan party in England as
being a Protestant alliance, and it was accompanied by secret
assurances on the part of Frederick Henry of friendly support to the
King in his coming conflict with his subjects. These assurances,
we may well believe, were very guarded and strictly personal, for
no one knew better than the Stadholder the limitations of his
actual power. The following passage from a letter in the hand of
Sommelsdijk, written March 5 in the name of the envoys to Frederick
Henry, puts the matter very clearly:
'We have found so much frankness and affection on the part
of the King and Queen for the furtherance of the marriage,
that we have no fear in recommending your Highness to hasten
the departure of Monseigneur the Prince your son, as much
as possible, so as to put everything in security; for their
Majesties have resolved to push forward without allowing
themselves to be stopped by any machinations to the contrary
from whatever part they come, and whatever they write to you,
upon the good faith and confidence of Mr. de Heenvliet, remains
secret without anything of it escaping either here or there, for
fear lest the cognizance of it should come to the knowledge of
the Parliament.'[46]
[46] _Archives_, 2nd series, iii. 381.
William returned to Holland at the end of May alone, leaving
his child-bride for awhile in her parents' home. But the Grand
Remonstrance, the impeachment of the five members, and other
events now followed in rapid succession, and soon it was seen
that the issues which divided King and Parliament admitted of
no accommodation by peaceful means. Heenvliet, who was still in
England, became the trusted confidant of the distracted King and
Queen, and his letters to Frederick Henry at this time show how
anxious Charles was to avoid a civil war, if by any concessions
that did not utterly despoil him--'le dèpouiller tout-à-fait'--he
could come to terms with the Parliament. In private interviews
Henrietta Maria was urgent with Heenvliet to use his good offices,
and many times expressed the hope that should matters come to an
extremity 'the Prince would not allow the King to perish'. In reply
the Stadholder impressed upon their Majesties not to have recourse
to arms, for victory was uncertain. A reconciliation on whatever
terms could not but be to the profit and advantage of the King.
Unfortunately such advice was already too late to be of any avail
(February, 1642).
At the beginning of March Henrietta Maria accompanied the Princess
Royal to Holland. Her real object was to collect funds and to
secure, if possible, the active assistance of the Prince of Orange.
She was received with much distinction and magnificence, but her
thoughts were not upon the shows of state. Letter upon letter
passed from her to the Stadholder in his camp, begging him to help
her in procuring supplies of money, arms, men, and munitions of war
for her husband's service. She tried to borrow upon her jewels,
but the Jews would give her nothing without the guarantee of the
Prince. Lords Jermyn and Digby hurried backwards and forwards
upon her confidential missions, and she had many interviews with
Heenvliet, with whom she had become so intimate during his sojourn
in London. What a picture of the feverish state of anxiety to which
her troubles had brought the once gay and buoyant Henrietta Maria,
is contained in a report of one of her conversations with him sent
by Heenvliet to the Prince of Orange.
'I confess that this interview has troubled me not a little. The
Queen did not speak to me on the subject without trembling, and
she kept asking me so piteously, if there were not any hope that
by any means your Highness could be persuaded to assist her,
that I am still troubled at it.'
Frederick Henry did his very best to give all the help he could,
both in his private and official capacity. He allowed the English
officers serving in his army to return home and join the King's
forces, where their services were of great value. He gave the
guarantee she required for a loan upon the Crown jewels, he
advanced a considerable sum of money out of his private purse,
and he connived at arms and ammunition being secretly bought and
sent to England from Dutch ports; but he was unable to promise any
assistance from the States, nor indeed could he venture even to
suggest it. The bulk of the Dutch people in the opening stages of
the Civil War took the side of the Parliament, more especially
the Hollanders. The Prince's influence could still command the
support of a majority in the States-General, but he, like all
the Stadholders of his House, had constantly to struggle with
the opposition of the aristocratic burgher-regents of the towns
of Holland, who controlled the States of that dominant province.
Maurice had crushed by force in 1618 the attempt of Oldenbarneveldt
to claim for each province of the Union independent sovereign
rights, but the spirit of Oldenbarneveldt survived, and the
Hollanders, conscious of the power of the purse that they possessed,
were ready to thwart the plans and policy of the Stadholders, though
these were supported by the other provinces, and indeed did thwart
them by raising difficulties in the way of obtaining supplies.
Frederick Henry, during the first decade of his Stadholderate,
exercised a larger personal authority in the direction of the
affairs of the Republic than any of his predecessors or successors.
But during the last years of his life, prematurely worn out by
constant campaigning, he had continually to confront the bitter
opposition of the town corporations of Holland to that vigorous
prosecution of the war that he desired. The Prince of Orange then
was not his own master, and could not in face of the strong leanings
of a large part of the population, in Holland particularly, towards
the Parliamentary cause in the Civil War give effect to his own
inclination to lend the King active support in his efforts to
suppress rebellion by armed force.
Matters came to a crisis when, at the end of August, a special envoy
from the Parliament, Walter Strickland, appeared at the Hague with
instructions to protest against the dispatch of warlike stores to
the King from Dutch ports, and the permitting of officers in the
Dutch service to join his army. The Queen was highly indignant. The
English resident ambassador, Boswell, at her bidding immediately
presented himself before the States-General to protest and demand
that Strickland should not be received or acknowledged. To the
Prince she wrote, September 6, 1642, begging him to prevent such
an affront being offered to the King, 'for assuredly', to quote
her actual words, 'it would be so great, that he could never have
any friendship with these States after this; and, God be thanked,
he is not yet in such a state as to be despised.' But although the
majority of the States-General were ready to refuse Strickland
any audience, they were forced by the insistance of the States
of Holland to make a compromise. They would not admit him to
the assembly of the States-General, but they agreed to send two
deputies to confer with him. The result was, again by the pressure
of Holland, that the States-General declared for strict neutrality,
and forbade the export to either side in the Civil War of arms or
munitions of war. Despite this prohibition, by the connivance of
the Stadholder, friends of the royal cause contrived to dispatch
ammunition and other stores to Dunkirk, and from thence to ship it
to England. Strickland, having heard of this, ventured to make a
written complaint to the States-General of the Prince's conduct.
Frederick Henry thereupon declared that such an aspersion was an
insult to his person and demanded satisfaction. The States-General,
May 7, 1643, declared thereupon the accusation of Strickland to be
false, and broke off all relations with him.
Henrietta Maria had returned to England the previous February, never
ceasing to the end her tireless efforts on her husband's behalf.
Before leaving she had broached the project of a second alliance
between the families, that of the Prince of Wales with the eldest
daughter of the Stadholder. It was not a mere ephemeral project,
for the following year a certain Dr. Goff, who had been chaplain to
one of the English regiments in the Dutch service, was sent over
by the Queen, with a letter in which she says 'from me you will
only know that the King my lord has given me full and authentic
powers to negotiate and to conclude the marriage of my son the
Prince of Wales with Mademoiselle d'Orange.' With these powers Dr.
Goff was entrusted. In his instructions were contained the onerous
conditions, which must be the price paid for the honour of such
a match. The States were to break with France unless the latter
would consent to give armed assistance to the King, or in default
of this to make peace with Spain, one of the conditions of such a
peace being a promise of help to Charles. It is needless to say
that the proposal was not acceptable, for the simple reason that
Frederick Henry had no power to comply with the conditions, even if
he had wished. The negotiations, however, went on all through 1645,
although the desperate state of the King's affairs after the battle
of Naseby rendered any successful issue impossible. Louise of Nassau
became shortly afterwards the wife of the Great Elector.
In 1644 two envoys, William Boreel and Jan van Rheede, were sent to
England to attempt to mediate between the King and the Parliament.
Their instructions, containing fifty-seven articles, are dated
October 6, 1643, but they did not actually set out until January
15 following. They had interviews with Lord Denbigh, Sir Harry
Mildemay, and Sir William Strickland, representing the Parliament,
and afterwards, February 19, an audience with the King in the hall
of Christ Church at Oxford. During the whole of the year 1644 they
remained in England, and took part in the abortive negotiations
of Uxbridge, which came to an end February 22, 1645. It became
now evident to the ambassadors that they could do no further
good, more especially as the Parliament more and more showed a
disinclination to accept foreign mediation. After farewell audiences
they reached the Hague again, May 4, 1645, and made their report
to the States-General. It was unfavourable to the attitude of the
Parliament. On being informed of this by their representative,
Strickland, who was again at the Hague, the Parliament requested him
to appear before the States-General and offer a justification on
their behalf in reply to Boreel and Van Rheede. The States-General,
by the votes of Utrecht, Groningen, Zeeland, and Overyssel against
Holland, Gelderland, and Friesland, refused him admission, while at
the same time they permitted the King's resident, Boswell, to appear
in their assembly and address them. The Parliament on this had their
justification printed in English and Dutch, and secretly distributed
throughout the Provinces. It was eagerly read, the mass of the
people being in favour of what they regarded as the cause of civil
and religious freedom against despotic rule, especially as there
were many points of resemblance between the struggle in England and
their own long drawn out struggle against Spanish tyranny. This
marked division of opinion in the Netherlands effectually prevented
any further steps being taken to interfere in English affairs during
the two next years.
Events, however, had been moving fast during that interval. On March
14, 1647, Frederick Henry died. At the very end of his life he had
deserted the French alliance, of which he had so long been a strong
advocate, and had joined his great influence to that of the Province
of Holland in bringing about a separate peace with Spain. With the
increasing growth of the military strength of France, the project of
a division of the Spanish Netherlands with that power ceased to have
attractions for him. At the time of his death all the conditions
of peace with Spain had been practically settled, the terms being
virtually those dictated by the Dutch. By the treaty which was
actually signed at Munster, January 30, 1648, Spain, after eighty
years of strife, was at last compelled to recognize the independence
of the United Provinces, and all the conquests made by Frederick
Henry in Flanders, Brabant, and Limburg remained in the hands of
the Dutch, as prizes of war. At this proud moment in commerce, in
sea-borne trade, in finance, in colonial expansion and enterprise,
in arts and in letters, the Dutch Republic had reached the zenith of
its prosperity. The Civil War in England had paralysed the energies
of its chief rival upon the seas, and left the way clear for the
United Provinces to step into the very first rank of maritime powers.
Frederick Henry was succeeded in his posts and dignities by his son.
William II, Prince of Orange, had only reached his twenty-second
year at the time of his father's death, but he was full of talent
and energy, fired with ambition, eager to emulate the great deeds
of his ancestors, and, if possible, to excel them. His wife, Mary
of England, was still a girl. Haughty in manner, and exceedingly
tenacious of her royal rank, she preferred always to be styled
the Princess Royal, rather than Princess of Orange. The relations
between the youthful pair were, however, thoroughly sympathetic,
and William was ever ready to lend a helping hand to his English
relations and never made any secret of his zeal in their cause. His
hospitality to them was unbounded, and his purse open. First, the
Duke of York made his escape from England to Holland, April, 1648,
and he was followed by the Prince of Wales in July. As the Queen of
Bohemia was still residing at the Hague with her daughters, quite a
family party were assembled at the Court of William and Mary. The
Prince of Wales, who was courteously received by a deputation of the
States-General, found a loyal squadron assembled at Hellevoetsluys,
of which he assumed command. He also raised some troops for his
service in the islands of Borkum and Juist. There was at one time
danger of a collision in Dutch waters between the royal ships and
a Parliamentary squadron under the Earl of Warwick. The Parliament
dispatched an envoy, Dr. Doreslaar, a native of Enkhuysen, who had
settled in England and had become Professor of History at Cambridge,
to protest against the protection and assistance accorded to the
royalists. The States-General refused to grant him an audience.
Towards the close of the year, Walter Strickland was again sent to
the Hague, furnished with fresh credentials, to join Dr. Doreslaar
and demand in the name of the Parliament that the royal fleet should
not be furnished with arms and stores in Dutch harbours. He was
escorted by Lord Warwick, with a fleet of twenty-one ships. The
States-General took steps to prevent a hostile encounter between
the rival fleets, but could not be moved even to give a hearing to
the Parliament's request. The States of Holland, however, received
Doreslaar, and passed a resolution forbidding the royal ships and
stores to remain in the harbours of that province.
The news of the impending trial of Charles I for high-treason caused
consternation in the States, and especially in Orangist circles.
The Prince of Wales himself, who had now handed over the command of
his fleet to Prince Rupert and was residing with his brother-in-law
at the Hague, appeared in person before the States-General to
ask them to intercede for his father. All parties concurred in
granting his request, and it was unanimously resolved that an
extraordinary embassy should be sent to London, and in order to
strip it of any appearance of partisanship, the chosen envoy was
not an Orangist, but Adrian Pauw, lord of Heemstede, the veteran
leader of the Aristocratic-Hollander party. With him was associated
Albert Joachimi, who through the whole of the Civil War had
remained at his post, as resident ambassador in London. Besides his
credentials, Pauw carried with him letters for Fairfax, Cromwell,
and other Parliamentary leaders. The embassy was received with
courtesy Feb. 5/Jan. 26, 1649, and Pauw pressed for an immediate
audience. It was too late. On the following day the death sentence
was pronounced. The envoys now approached, Sunday, Feb. 7/Jan. 28,
Fairfax, Cromwell, and others privately, asking for a respite of
the sentence, but failed to get any definite answer. On the Monday
they were granted an audience at a special sitting of the House of
Commons, and in the name of the States-General, Pauw and Joachimi
read an address interceding for the King's life, and setting out
the reasons for the course for which they were pleading. A general
answer was given, that what they had said should be considered.
In reality the decision had already been taken for the public
execution of the King the next morning, Tuesday, Feb. 9/Jan. 30. The
ambassadors had their address translated from French into English,
and on seeing the preparations in Whitehall, again made an effort
to obtain an immediate audience, but they found the way barred by
troops, and knew that the object of their mission could no longer be
achieved.
Not till February 25/15 was an official answer given to Pauw and
Joachimi, in which, after thanking the States for their friendly
intentions, the Parliament declined to discuss the question of
the King's execution. But at the same time an earnest desire
was expressed for the establishment of a firm peace, a right
understanding and good correspondence between the governments of
the two countries, which had so many common interests. 'We shall',
they said, 'be ever ready not only to hear but to contribute with
them all good means and offices to fulfil such works as shall be
necessary for the general good of Christendom, as well as our
own.' There can be no doubt that Cromwell's influence may be seen
in this friendly overture. Cromwell had already given Pauw an
assurance in a private interview of his wish for the establishment
of close relations of friendship with the Dutch, and had spoken
of a proposal being made for giving the Netherlanders the same
commercial privileges in England as the inhabitants of the country.
Already there was floating before his eyes that idea, which he was
afterwards in a position to try and realize, of effecting such a
close union between the two republics as would make them into one
State.
In 1649 any thought of such a thing was a mere dream. The news of
the King's execution caused a wave of horror and indignation to
sweep over the Netherlands without distinction of class or party.
The States-General decided unanimously to offer their condolences to
the Prince of Wales and also to congratulate him on his accession.
The Orangists would have liked his full title to have been given to
him of King of Great Britain and Ireland, but the States of Holland
and Zeeland, who were the most interested in trade and shipping,
opposed this, as they were afraid of the resentment of the new
government in England. So it was agreed that he should be addressed
simply as King Charles II. To this title he had an undoubted
right, as he had been proclaimed king in Scotland on his father's
death. The States of Holland separately also sent a deputation to
him for the same purpose. The number of broadsheets and pamphlets
that issued from the press are a proof of how deeply moved the
whole country was at the tragic death of the English King. What
was most remarkable was the fact recorded by Clarendon[47] as to
the change of attitude among the preachers, who had hitherto been
strongly on the side of the Parliament. 'The body of the clergy',
he writes, 'in a Latin oration delivered by the chief preacher of
the Hague, lamented the misfortune in terms of as much asperity, and
detestation of the actors, as unworthy the name of Christians, as
could be expressed.' Nevertheless, in order to avoid an open breach
with the Commonwealth, as it was now styled, Joachimi was allowed to
remain, as the States' resident ambassador in London.
[47] _History of the Rebellion_, v. 418.
The English Council of State, on their part, determined to send
over once more Dr. Isaac Doreslaar to join Strickland at the Hague,
with instructions to propose to the States-General the knitting
together in closer relations of the common interests of the two
countries. He arrived May 9. Doreslaar was especially hateful to
the royalists, who were gathered at that time in large numbers in
the Dutch capital, as he had taken part in the King's trial, and
rumour had even designated him as the masked headsman. It was an
unhappy choice, which had serious consequences. Three days after his
arrival, Doreslaar, as he sat at table in his hotel, was attacked
by five or six men, and assassinated. The assassins, their work
accomplished, walked off undisturbed. The body was sent back to
England, and was honoured with a public interment in Westminster
Abbey. 'Though all who were engaged in this enterprise', writes
Clarendon, 'went quietly away, and so out of the town, insomuch
as no one of them was ever apprehended or called in question, yet
they kept not their own counsel so well (believing they had done
a very heroic act) but that it was generally known that they were
all Scottish men, and most of them servants or dependents upon the
Marquis of Montrose.'
The States of Holland, as soon as news reached them of what had
happened, made great efforts to track the murderers, but in vain,
and Joachimi was commissioned to express their horror at the act,
and to try and appease the Parliament. The Parliament, on their
side, did not feel themselves sufficiently secure to take decisive
action, and Strickland was instructed to approach the States-General
once more with offers of friendship. But the influence of the Prince
of Orange in the States-General was paramount, and Strickland
was refused an audience. On the other hand, despite Strickland's
protest, the Scottish envoy, Macdowell, sent by Charles II to
announce his accession to the throne of the northern kingdom, was
received by them. The English Council of State were unable to regard
this conduct in any other light than as a deliberate insult to them
and their representative. Strickland was recalled, and Joachimi was
informed that unless he was provided with fresh letters of credit
to the Republican Government within a fixed time he must leave the
land. Strickland left Holland, July 22, 1650. Joachimi received
orders to quit London, September 26. All this time the States of
Holland had been doing their utmost to effect an accommodation. The
trade interests of the province with England were so great that they
were most anxious to avoid a breach with the new Commonwealth. They
on their own authority received Strickland in a public audience, and
even ventured so far as to send a commissary, Gerard Schaep by name,
to London, January 22. This high-handed act of independence only had
the effect, however, of stiffening the backs of the States-General.
All the efforts of Holland to change their attitude towards England
failed.
The acute differences of view in regard to this particular line of
policy between the self-willed province and the Stadholder were
but the signs of a general estrangement; and the struggle for
predominance was destined to come to a head at the very time of
the return of Joachimi. The Prince of Orange had been altogether
opposed to the abandonment of the French alliance and the conclusion
of a separate treaty with Spain in 1648. The peace of Munster had
carried into effect the policy of the States of Holland, and William
II was determined, as soon as he got the reins of power firmly into
his hands, to reverse it. He entered into secret negotiations with
Mazarin for a renewal of a French alliance against Spain, with
the aim of conquering and partitioning the Spanish Netherlands.
Devotedly attached to the Stuart cause, it was his intention with
French help to try to overthrow the English Commonwealth and
establish Charles II on his father's throne. His generosity to his
wife's exiled relations was so great that he impoverished himself
and had to raise large loans on his estates. With ambitious schemes
of war and conquest filling his brain, he found himself speedily in
disagreement with the merchant burghers of the Province of Holland.
The chief interest of the Hollanders was peace, which would reduce
taxation and increase commerce. They had long grudged the heavy
charges of the war, and the Provincial States, as soon as peace was
concluded, clamoured for the disbanding of a large number of the
regiments, which, though they formed part of the federal army, were
in the pay of the Province of Holland. William, as Captain-General
of the Union, opposed this, and was supported by the States-General.
Into the details of this contest for supremacy it is needless
to enter here. It was to a certain extent a repetition of that
between Maurice and Oldenbarneveldt. Armed with the authority of
the States-General, William in the summer of 1650, at the head of a
strong body of troops, forced the States of Holland to submission.
In the previous year Charles, on his departure for Scotland, had
begged the support of the States-General, and had promised in return
to settle favourably the long-standing differences about Amboina and
Pulo Run in the East Indies, and other questions, but owing to the
opposition of Holland and Zeeland no active assistance was given.
The States-General, however, as a mark of sympathy and goodwill,
assembled in a body to bid him farewell. The royal cause had at
first prospered in Scotland, until September 13/3, 1650, when the
battle of Dunbar shattered Charles's fair prospects. But at this
very time his brother-in-law had just brought his contest with the
Province of Holland to a triumphant issue. William II was now in a
position to bring about that active intervention of the States in
alliance with France in support of the Stuart cause, and for the
expulsion of the Spaniards from the Southern Netherlands, on which
his heart was set. To the Prince of Orange therefore the eyes of
the English royalist party were turned, as their chief hope in the
hour when it seemed as if nothing could stem the tide of Cromwell's
victories. They were doomed to a terrible disappointment. William,
in the very midst of secret negotiations with France, suddenly fell
sick of the small-pox, and after a week's illness died, November
6, 1650. He was but twenty-four, and in him Charles II lost a
chivalrous and true-hearted friend. Eager for fame, gifted with
uncommon abilities, William, had he lived, was undoubtedly prepared
to have put his far-reaching plans into execution, and to have
risked much for the upholding of his kinsman's rights.
His decease brought about a revolution in the United Provinces. He
left no one of his family to take his place. His only child was
not born until a week after his death. The Province of Holland
straightway seized the opportunity to assert that predominance in
the Union for which it had been striving so long. Its leaders at
once took steps to call an extraordinary assembly, known as the
'Great Gathering', to take into consideration the state of the
Union, of religion, and military affairs. The Great Gathering met at
the Hague, January 18, 1651. The office of Stadholder was abolished,
in all the provinces but Friesland, as were also the posts of
Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union. The population and
the wealth of Holland gave henceforth to the States of that province
a position of supremacy in the federation, and, as in the days of
Oldenbarneveldt, all the threads of administration and the conduct
of foreign affairs passed during the Stadholderless period into the
hands of its chief functionary, the _Raad-Pensionaris_ or Grand
Pensionary.
This complete change in the system of government of the United
Provinces caused much satisfaction in London. The aristocratic
burgher oligarchy, who were now in power at the Hague, had
no special sympathy for Charles II. Indeed it was embittered
against him at this time, since Prince Rupert's ships from their
head-quarters in the Scilly Islands had been plundering Dutch
merchantmen in their passage up channel. The Parliament therefore
determined to send a special embassy to propose that close alliance
between the two neighbouring republics, almost amounting to a
political union, which Cromwell had already set before him as an
end to be aimed at for the mutual advantage of both States. The
States-General on their side had, on the proposal of the States of
Holland, determined, January 28, 1651, to recognize the English
Commonwealth as a free republic, and to receive its envoys, and
Joachimi again went to London to take up his old post as the
resident ambassador of the States.
The English ambassadors were Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland,
the latter of whom, as we have seen, had spent many years in Holland
without being able to obtain an audience with the States-General.
The Parliament were now determined that their representatives should
make their state entry into the Hague with a splendour befitting the
envoys of so mighty a power. They were accompanied by a suite of
some 250 persons in brilliant uniforms and liveries, and travelled
in twenty-five state coaches. On March 27, 1651, the solemn entry
took place. The ambassadors were, however, to pass through the
ordeal of an unpleasant experience. As the procession made its
way through the crowded streets, St. John and Strickland were
greeted with loud cries of 'Regicides', 'Executioners', 'Cromwell's
bastards', and other abusive epithets. No doubt there were many
royalist refugees in the Hague, but though these may have given
the lead to the mob, there can be little question of the general
hostility at this time of the masses of the people, even in Holland
itself, to the Parliament. It is a common mistake to suppose that
the Orangist was the aristocratic, the republican, or so-called
'States' party, the popular party in the United Provinces. The
States of Holland, which was the stronghold of the republican party,
was entirely in the hands of the close oligarchic corporations of
the chief towns of the province. In each town a few aristocratic
burgher families monopolized all offices and authority, the rest of
the townsmen had no votes or representation, and the country people
were ignored altogether. The great influence and executive powers
of the Stadholders of the house of Orange were therefore a check
upon the domination of these burgher oligarchies, and so by them
resented accordingly. On the other hand, the Princes of Orange were
loved and respected by the people, alike for their high qualities
and the great services they had rendered to the country, and there
was scarcely any time when they had not the enthusiastic support of
the great majority of those classes, the bulk of the population,
who were excluded from any share in the government of the State.
A knowledge of these facts is absolutely necessary to a right
understanding of what the 'Stadholderless' régime in the time of
John de Witt really meant.
The parliamentary ambassadors were really alarmed, remembering the
fate of Doreslaar, at this hostile reception. Neither they nor their
attendants dared to venture into the streets but in parties of five
or six and sword in hand; and everywhere they were followed by the
cry of 'Regicides'. On March 29, St. John and Strickland presented
their credentials before the 'Great Gathering', and in a long speech
expressed the desire of the English Government for the establishment
of good relations of enduring friendship between the two republics.
'It is the wish of the Parliament to conclude', they said, 'a
closer union of the two States, which would be for both more
advantageous than heretofore, since it would not be dependent upon
the life and will and private interests of a single individual.'
Six commissioners were appointed by the Assembly to discuss their
proposals, and a conference was opened on April 4. The grounds on
which the English proposed to the Netherlanders that 'a more strict
and intimate Alliance and Union bee entred into by them, whereby
there may bee a more intrinsecall and mutual interest of each other,
than hath hitherto beene for the good of both', were: (1) community
of religion, (2) community of political liberty, (3) community of
interest in freedom of trade and navigation. The Dutch, however,
showed themselves very wary. They had no intention of giving their
consent to any general propositions before informing themselves of
their precise meaning. There was considerable variety of opinion
in the different provinces and much indecision. On April 6, the
commissioners were only empowered to reply, that the States were
willing 'not only to renew the ancient friendship between the two
nations, but also to conclude a treaty for common interests'. This
response did not satisfy the English envoys, who rejoined that 'the
union for common interests' they had in view 'was one closer than at
any previous time'. These words required explanation, but it seemed
that they could only point to an alliance so intimate and binding
as to be another term for coalition. Such was indeed its meaning in
the minds of those who proposed it, and so the Dutch interpreted
it. To them, however, not unnaturally, the only idea suggested
by a coalition with the English Commonwealth was the loss by the
smaller republic of its independence, and its practical absorption
in the larger. Such an idea was simply unthinkable to men who had
just won the recognition of their independence after eighty years
of heroic struggle. The reply of the Assembly was not hurriedly
given. At last, on April 26, it came, and was so far unsatisfactory
that, while expressing their readiness for a closer union, the
reservation was made that it must be one 'in which both States could
better promote their interests for themselves and for the common
welfare'. St. John and Strickland now went a step further, and
gave a hint that if an offensive and defensive confederation such
as they had in mind could be accomplished, it would be accompanied
by many advantageous concessions to the Dutch. At this point the
negotiations came to an end. The Parliament did not believe that
in the present temper of the Dutch their proposals were likely
to be received in the spirit in which they were offered, and the
ambassadors were recalled. They and their attendants were constantly
insulted by Royalists and Orangists whenever they showed themselves
out of doors, and though the provincial authorities strictly forbade
such outrages on pain of severe penalties, and urged the citizens to
assist in the protection of the representatives of a foreign power,
they effected little. Some of the offenders were of high rank[48],
and they openly braved the threats of the magistracy and remained
unpunished. Earnest representations were now made to the English
Parliament on behalf of the States of Holland by their agent, Gerard
Schaep, who was still residing in London, that they would allow the
envoys of the Commonwealth to remain awhile longer and continue the
negotiations. The Parliament, however, would only consent to do
this on condition that full satisfaction be made to St. John and
Strickland for all that they had endured, and that the attacks upon
them should cease. The States of Holland promised to do this. Prince
Edward of the Palatine and other prominent offenders were summoned
before a court of justice, and warned; some of their servants were
punished. It was a sorry piece of business. But it was an index to
the real feeling of the populace that such a state of things should
have been possible in a town like the Hague.
[48] Among them Prince Edward, son of the Queen of Bohemia.
The negotiations were accordingly renewed by the presentation of
fresh proposals, May 10, by St. John and Strickland. There was
now no mention of coalition, only of an offensive and defensive
alliance, but there was an ominous addition: both States were
required to bind themselves severally not to permit the sojourn on
their soil of declared enemies of the other. This was especially
directed against the adherents of the Stuarts and the members of
the Orange and Palatinate families. The great desire of the party
now in power in the Netherlands was the maintenance of peace. The
Hollanders were willing to conclude a treaty extending their trade
privileges, but they were anxious not to be drawn into the war in
Scotland, and in face of the popular affection for the house of
Orange they dared not venture at the dictation of a foreign power
to treat the young prince and his mother harshly. They responded
therefore, after some delay, by counter proposals for the renewal
of the Treaty of 1496, the _Magnus Intercursus_, but revised in
favour of the Dutch to suit present-day conditions. Complete
freedom of trade, navigation, and fishery without pass, toll, or
other hindrances in each other's domains was what was aimed at.
No mention was made of the English proposal to banish from the
Netherlands those who gave help to the Stuart cause. With such
differences of view there was of course no prospect of any agreement
being reached. The English embassy accordingly left the Hague, July
31, 1651, and returned home.
The report made to Parliament created a bad impression in England,
and led to all the old complaints against the Dutch being raked
up once more: the massacre of Amboina, the seizure of Pulo Run
and other high-handed acts in the East Indies, their monopoly of
the fisheries on the British coasts, their attacks on the English
whalers off Spitzbergen, and their attempts to drive out English
trade from the Baltic, from Russia, and elsewhere. Then on the top
of this the shameful treatment to which the parliamentary envoys had
been persistently exposed was angrily recalled, the refusal of the
States-General for years to admit Strickland to an audience, the
murder of Doreslaar, and lastly the insults offered to the latest
embassy. All these things formed a formidable bill of indictment.
As the efforts of the Parliament to effect a close union between
the republics for their common interest had failed, it became the
clear duty of the English Government to take measures to protect the
national interests against unscrupulous rivals. There was no delay
in taking drastic action.
On October 9, 1651, the famous Navigation Act was passed, which
forbade the importation of foreign goods and products into English
harbours save in English bottoms, or those of the countries from
whence the goods and products came. A deadly blow was thus struck
at the Netherlanders, who had at that time almost a monopoly of the
most important branches of sea-borne trade and were the carriers of
the world. Scarcely less serious was the prohibition to foreigners
to fish in British waters. Every infringement of this edict would
be punished by the confiscation of the offending vessels. It has
already been seen in previous lectures of what vital importance
these fisheries were to the welfare of Holland.
The States-General now determined to make a serious effort to resume
the negotiations which had been broken off, and Jacob Cats, Gerard
Schaep, and Paulus van der Perre were sent on a special embassy
to England. They reached London, December 27. Their task was a
difficult one. They pressed for the revocation of the Navigation
Act and of the embargo upon fishing, and for the release of the
confiscated ships, and proposed that negotiations should again be
set on foot for the conclusion of a treaty based upon the _Magnus
Intercursus_. The news at this critical moment that the Dutch
were fitting out 150 new war vessels for the protection of free
navigation did not tend to smooth the way to an understanding. It
was regarded in England as a threat. The English now formulated
their demands. These were such as they must have known would never
be conceded. They required the payment of the arrears of toll due
for the fishing on the British coasts, the surrender of the Spice
Islands, the punishment of the survivors of those concerned in the
Amboina massacre, satisfaction for the murder of Doreslaar, and the
payment of the indemnities due for losses sustained by Englishmen at
the hands of the Dutch in various parts of the world. It is clear
that these demands were practically an ultimatum. The Netherlanders
were required to choose between coalition or humiliation, and in
case neither were accepted, war. Both sides were, however, averse
to taking the final step, and conferences and negotiations still
dragged on for some months, while strenuous preparations were at the
same time being made on both sides of the Channel for hostilities.
It was a dangerous situation, and was made wellnigh desperate by
a conflict which took place off Folkestone, May 19, 1652, between
the Dutch fleet under Tromp and an English squadron under Blake,
through a misunderstanding about the question of striking the flag.
This event excited public opinion in England to fever pitch, and
made war practically inevitable. The Dutch Government, however,
knew that they were not prepared for such a mighty conflict. The
peace party in Holland had insisted on the disbanding of a large
part of the land forces after the death of William, and the navy
had been neglected and was far from being as formidable as a few
years before. In all haste therefore the experienced Adrian Pauw,
now holding the important post of Grand Pensionary of Holland,
was sent over to London to join Cats, Schaep, and van Perre, and
endeavour even at the last moment to avoid a final breach between
the two nations. His efforts proved vain, for the English would not
give way in their demands for conditions too humiliating for the
Netherlanders to accept. The 'States' party in power had, in fact,
not a free hand, even had they been inclined to preserve peace at
the cost of submission to English dictation, for the Orangists
were delighted at the thought of trying conclusions with the hated
Commonwealth, and they had strong support throughout the country.
The fear of a revolution compelled the States-General to refuse
the only terms by which war could be avoided. The die was cast. The
Dutch ambassadors left England, June 30, and the struggle between
the two maritime powers for supremacy, which had been so frequently
imminent but so long delayed, at last began.