'It is not our business to stir up again the affair of the
Downs. If we were to press for an answer, it could be none other
than condemnation after so much noise and menaces; silence
then must suffice us, as a kind of answer, in place of an open
approval, which neither the state of the time or of men's minds
permits one to hope.'
Sommelsdijk had judged rightly that his mission, so far as the
matter of the Downs was concerned, had achieved all the success that
was necessary.
The truth is that Charles, though his pride had been so deeply
hurt by the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the presence of
an English squadron close to the English shore, was secretly
displeased with the Spaniards for having, so to speak, forced his
hands in the matter. It was generally assumed at the time, and the
statement has frequently been made in histories since, that Charles
was aware of the intention of the Spanish admiral to make use of the
anchorage at the Downs, should it be necessary for him to seek a
place of refuge either from storms or hostile attacks, and that he
had previously given permission for him to do so before the fleet
left the Spanish harbours. This was not the case. A dispatch[44]
from the Secretary of State, Windebank, to Sir Arthur Hopton, the
English ambassador at Madrid, dated September 29 (o.s.), that is
nearly three weeks after the arrival of Oquendo at the Downs, is
conclusive testimony to the contrary. It runs as follows:--
'Your lordship's dispatch of the 3/13 September gives account
of a message delivered to you by the Secretary of the Council
of War in the King's [Philip IV] name, that he was resolved to
put his great fleet to sea for the transportation of his forces
to Dunkirk, with intention to chastise the insolences of the
French and Hollanders; and thereupon desired his Majesty to
afford the fleet a good passage in his seas and accommodations
in his harbours, with supplies of the necessary commodities, if
it should happen to put into any of them. These letters though
they came in extraordinary diligence, yet they arrived not until
the fleet had been here in the Downs some days. Now that so
great a force of near seventy vessels should put into any of his
Majesty's ports, with such numbers of men of war, without his
Majesty's leave at all, or so much as his knowledge until they
were actually in the ports, besides the neglect and disrespect,
is beyond the articles of the peace, and gives occasion enough
of jealousy, and would no question be taken highly by them, had
his Majesty done the like within their dominions. I am sure
it has cast his Majesty into some difficulties and jealousies
with the French and Hollanders, and what prejudice it may bring
upon his treaties with them is much to be apprehended. It is
very true that Don Alonso [the Spanish ambassador, de Cardenas]
gave some intimation when his Majesty was in the North that
some vessels were preparing in Spain for the transportation
of forces into Flanders, and desired his Majesty would not
take apprehension at it, but that they might have a friendly
reception and treatment in his ports, as occasion should be
presented. But he spoke not of so great a number nor such a
strength; and it was to be presumed he had meant no other than
those English merchant ships that first transported the 1,400
or 1,500 soldiers, and were intercepted and visited by the
Hollanders.... When the fleet was come in, notwithstanding they
were in distress, having been shrewdly torn and beaten by only
seventeen of the Holland ships in their first encounter (a
shameful thing, considering the number of the Spanish ships and
their vastness, and their ostentation before to chastise both
the French and the Hollanders), they refused to do the usual
duties by striking to the King's ships; insomuch as Sir John
Pennington, our Vice-Admiral, was enforced to threaten to shoot
them, if they did it not, and then, after some dispute and much
unwillingness, it was yielded to.'
[44] _Clarendon State Papers_, ii. 71.
Nothing can be more clear from this whole statement of the situation
than the two facts that the Spaniards were not expected, and that
they were unwelcome guests.
Why then, it may well be asked, did Charles endure their presence
so long in English waters, when it was known that the Dutch were
collecting a great fleet in the offing? or why, having endured,
did he not take steps to secure his guests from attack by a plain
declaration that any breach of neutrality would be treated as a
declaration of war and would be resisted by the English admiral?
It was because he hoped to be paid for his protection. 'It must be
money that must carry the business', wrote Windebank to Hopton.
Charles in fact asked for £150,000 sterling, of which £50,000 was
to be paid at once; and the Cardinal Infant was busily engaged in
obtaining the required sum from the Antwerp money-lenders, when
the blow fell and there ceased to be any longer a Spanish fleet
to protect. As a striking instance, however, of the diplomatic
double-dealing of the times, and one peculiarly characteristic of
Stuart policy, it may be mentioned that a dispatch of the French
ambassador, Bellievre, dated October 9, testifies to the fact that
the Queen was at this very time in the name of the King promising
the French Government that, if they would consent to the Palatine
prince assuming command of the late Duke Bernhard's army, 'le roi
feroit tout ce que nous et les Hollandois pourrons souhaiter en
leur faveur contre la flotte d'Espagne, sans néanmoins se déclarer
ennemi, en sorte toutefois que les Hollandois auroient lieu
d'entreprendre et de faire tout ce que bon leur sembleroit.'[45]
Hence the explanation of Pennington's inactivity. Charles was in
reality far more angry that Tromp had marred his prospects of
striking a good bargain with one or other of the belligerents than
at his venturing to infringe a neutrality which was actually in
the market. He had not reckoned on the Dutch being able to put so
formidable a fleet to sea in so short a time, or bold enough to
strike home with such tremendous energy and effect.
[45] Ranke, _Englische Geschichte_, ii. 362.
Charles, however, should not be altogether blamed for not pursuing
at this crisis of his reign a firmer and more consistent policy.
Scotland was in rebellion, and he had no funds to raise an army
strong enough to restore order. He was face to face with seething
disaffection in England. In April, 1640, he found himself compelled,
after an interval of ten years, to summon a Parliament in the hopes
of obtaining a grant of supplies. Supplies were refused until
grievances were amended, and the Short Parliament, as it was called,
was dissolved after sitting three weeks. The Long Parliament was to
meet in November. It is no wonder that in such circumstances the
King became a pure opportunist in his conduct of foreign policy. His
domestic troubles and his financial bankruptcy made it exceedingly
difficult for him to steer a straightforward course. The bitter pill
of the battle of the Downs had to be swallowed, however disagreeable
it might be. It was an accomplished fact, the results of which could
not be undone save by war against France and the States, which
was in 1640 absolutely impossible. His high pretensions to the
sovereignty of the seas, and his claims to demand licences for the
fisheries could no longer be insisted upon, his whole interest and
attention henceforward were concentrated on the struggle with his
own subjects and the maintenance of his sovereign rights within his
own Kingdoms.
The proposal therefore for a marriage between the young prince
William of Nassau and one of the English princesses was not
unwelcome. The Princes of Orange were not of royal rank, but they
filled a position of so much dignity and influence in the United
Provinces, that it was felt that a union between the families might
be advantageous to Charles in securing to him the goodwill of the
Dutch in the dangers and difficulties which were thickening round
his throne. William was only fifteen years of age, and at first the
hand of the younger princess Elizabeth was proposed, that of the
Princess Royal being assigned to a Spanish Infant. But Elizabeth was
only five years old, the prospect of a Spanish match fell through,
and at last in February, 1641, it was arranged that Mary the
Princess Royal should be the bride.
The greater part of one of the volumes of the archives of the House
of Orange-Nassau, edited by Groen van Prinsterer, is filled with
the negotiations concerning this marriage, and the study of the
endless notes and dispatches on the subject is replete with interest
both for the student of the manners of the times, and because
they contain many passages giving lifelike and charming touches
concerning the Court of Charles I and Henrietta Maria, and their
intimate domestic life. Here it is not possible to treat the subject
in greater detail.
The proposed marriage was very popular in England, whose people saw
in it the definite adhesion of the King, after many tergiversations,
to the Protestant cause. On May 2, Prince William disembarked
at Gravesend and proceeded to London in great state to meet his
_fiancée_. He was convoyed from Holland by a strong squadron under
the command of Admiral Tromp; and was accompanied by the special
envoys, Brederode, Aerssen van Sommelsdijk, Heenvliet, and the
resident ambassador, Joachimi. In their report to the Stadholder of
the reception (May 2, 1641), the envoys write:
'We had to pass through so many people, it was almost impossible
to reach the Court, except for the good order which was kept
from street to street. Your Highness could not imagine with
what blessings and acclamations his Highness was received, and
we would venture to say that not for a century has a reception
taken place in which great and small have testified so much joy
and satisfaction.'
It was to be the last glimmer of brightness in the life of Charles
and Henrietta Maria. The boy and girl, aged respectively fifteen
and ten years, were married in state on May 12, 1641, in the chapel
at Whitehall--a marriage destined to sorrow, but which was to have
such important results upon the future relations of England and the
United Provinces. Nine years later William was suddenly cut off by
an attack of small-pox in the midst of a promising career. A week
after his death Mary gave birth to a son, who was to be famous in
history as William III, Prince of Orange and King of England.