The attempt of the German workingmen last Winter to force a genuine
peace movement by means of a general strike was promptly suppressed by
the Government, which proclaimed a state of siege and threatened to
force the strikers into military service. The underlying causes of this
failure were explained in an instructive article in the Arbeiter
Zeitung, the leading Austrian labor organ, from which the following is
taken:
The most important reason is undoubtedly the lack of unity among
the German working classes. Even in Berlin the strike was not
general; in many factories only part of the men went out, while
the rest continued their work. In many cities, such as Munich,
the workmen divided according to party; the Independent
Socialists struck, members of the old party went on with their
work. The most important industrial districts were only slightly
affected. On the Rhine, in Westphalia, in Upper Silesia, even in
Saxony, where lie the chief fortresses of independent socialism,
only a small section struck. And even where they struck there
was no kind of uniform action; in many towns, like Nürnberg, for
instance, only a demonstrative strike of limited duration was
decided upon, while elsewhere the intention was to hold out
until the demands were obtained. In Berlin the pressmen struck,
but not the compositors; one newspaper could appear, another
not.
It was always the weakness of German Social Democracy that it
had least influence on the very sections of the working class
whose strike would involve the greatest economic danger. The
railway men now take the first place in the movement in England,
America, France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and now in Russia,
too; only in Germany have they always stood outside the ranks of
the class-conscious workmen. Of the miners and iron founders,
too, only part is Socialist; a very considerable part follows
the Centre and the Polish Nationalists. These facts explain the
weakness of the movement, and also the energy of the Prussian
authorities. The German Government would have hesitated to take
violent measures if it had had reason to fear that such measures
would provoke an extension of the movement to the railways,
mines, and foundries. _The weakness of the movement is not a
result of the energy of the authorities; on the contrary, only
its weakness made that energy possible._
How is it, then, that the German working classes, after three
and a half years of unheard-of sacrifice and deprivation, are
not capable of carrying through a struggle for peace with the
same unanimity and clearness of aim as in many former struggles?
This is, at least, partially due to the unfortunate development
of German Social Democracy during the war. It has united with
the Centre and the Liberals in the Reichstag bloc. It has thus
scored various successes--the inclusion of progressive
parliamentarians in the Government; the Reichstag resolution in
favor of peace by understanding; the Reform bill in the Prussian
Parliament. But this policy, which made Social Democracy the
ally of bourgeois parties and the support of the Government, was
fiercely attacked by the Opposition, which finally constituted
itself as a separate party. * * * The bloc policy and action of
the masses are mutually exclusive policies; those who themselves
belong in the Reichstag to the majority which supports the
Government cannot create the atmosphere in which alone a united
action of the masses is possible. Nor, indeed, was that the
intention of the German Social Democratic majority; _the
mass-strike came without any act on its part and against its
will_. When the strike was there, the leaders (of the majority)
none the less placed themselves at its head; but the masses,
having been educated for three and a half years to trust the
Government's intentions, were naturally not willing to make
heavy sacrifices in a struggle against this very Government.
In other democratic lands such a situation can hardly arise.
There the parliamentary majority decides the policy of the
Government, and if the Socialists form part of that majority,
they can effectively influence policy, and so there can be no
idea of the working classes having to conduct a political
mass-strike against this Government. In Germany it is different.
Here the voting of the imperial budget and of the war credits is
not much more than a theoretical confession of faith in the
Fatherland; to belong to the Reichstag majority is not a
guarantee of real political power. A few Generals, a few
influential bank directors and big manufacturers can, under
given circumstances, influence policy more effectually than the
whole Reichstag majority. Thus, indeed, it can happen that the
Government's policy seems very little influenced by socialism,
though this latter supports the Government; that, consequently,
a considerable part of the working classes decides upon a
political strike against the Government which for three and a
half years has enjoyed the support of the majority of working
class Deputies in the Reichstag. And only thus can we explain
the strange spectacle, inexplicable to any other country, that a
Government in whose formation Social Democracy has had a share,
and which at every division is supported by the Socialists,
knows no other means of meeting a strike save by forbidding
meetings, introducing a state of siege and militarizing! The
bloc policy is dangerous everywhere; but these dangers are
incomparably greater in the classic land of Government by
authority (Obrigkeitsregierung) than in the democratic
countries. The unedifying picture which German Social Democracy
presents today is at bottom the result of German sham democracy,
of the poverty and backwardness of German political life.
But, in spite of all, we hope that even the German strike will
not have an unfavorable effect on future development. Many a
struggle which had to end without tangible success has, later
on, proved fruitful after all! So it will be this time. The
German Government did not have to give the workmen any definite
assurances; but it had learned that every extension of the war
provokes the gravest social dangers; and if this time it still
found it easy to dispose of the strike, because a large section
of the working classes still trusts in it, all its force
(Machtmittel) would avail it nothing, if the whole German
working class once acquired the conviction that the Government
is prolonging the war for the sake of Pan-German lust of
conquest.
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