JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE

Today, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we

cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French,

Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the

overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromised peace only upon

the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession

of which in any case signifies for us a burden and weakness and the

peril of new wars. Consequently, everything should be avoided which

hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might

perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise--the British

Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our

Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with

Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens--to say nothing of

the mad submarine war scheme.

Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in

Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the

Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and

Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake

and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.

Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the

future, from imperialism, from world policy. Central Europe is

mediaevalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a cul de sac, and not a road into the

open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German

people.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other

State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound

to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of

Continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic

policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance

as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at

pleasure into the East.

Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918 Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2 · 第 379 / 400 题