The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated
at Algeciras, and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the
agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of
course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the
Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down
under "encirclement," and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty
gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wächter, though otherwise
overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and
adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the
world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch.
This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the
more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three
weeks for a statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion
House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's
fall and before the Algeciras conference we could have obtained harbors
and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.
When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about
the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached
with France and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true,
as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves
with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any
attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given
up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an
attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of
that qualified and expert Councilor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, an
exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the
Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, which thus carried
out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the
above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old
points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled,
wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to
isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working
concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and
Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove
German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties--which would
finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question--to secure
the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a
co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance
against the danger of war.