Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our
peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we
knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a
state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian
colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: "The French had
begun to forget la révanche. You have regularly reminded them of it by
tramping on their toes." After we had declined Delcassé's offer to come
to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we
had no political interest there--an attitude which agreed with
Bismarckian political conditions--we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a
Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the
protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both
manifestations concluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a
retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world war. The pitiable
conference of Algeciras could alter nothing, and still less cause
Delcassé's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and
Russo-British rapprochement. In face of "the German peril" all other
considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another
Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in
1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.