On Nov. 30 risks were accepted by us at some points in order to increase
our strength at others. Our fresh reserves had been thrown in on the
Bourlon front, where the enemy brought against us a total force of seven
divisions to three and failed. I do not consider that it would have been
justifiable on the indications to have allotted a smaller garrison to
this front.
Between Masnières and Vendhuille the enemy's superiority in infantry
over our divisions in line was in the proportion of about four to three,
and we were sufficiently provided with artillery. That his attack was
partially successful may tend to show that the garrison allotted to this
front was insufficient, either owing to want of numbers, lack of
training, or exhaustion from previous fighting.
Captured maps and orders have made it clear that the enemy aimed at far
more considerable results than were actually achieved by him. Three
convergent attacks were to be made on the salient formed by our advance;
two of them delivered approximately simultaneously about Gonnelieu and
Masnières, followed later by a still more powerful attack on the Bourlon
front. The objectives of these attacks extended to the high ground at
Beaucamp and Trescault, and the enemy's hope was to capture and destroy
the whole of the British forces in the Cambrai salient.
This bold and ambitious plan was foiled on the greater part of our front
by the splendid defense of the British divisions engaged; and, though
the defense broke down for a time in one area, the recovery made by the
weak forces still left and those within immediate reach is worthy of the
highest praise. Numberless instances of great gallantry, promptitude,
and skill were shown, some few which have been recounted.
I desire to acknowledge the skill and resource displayed by General Byng
throughout the Cambrai operations and to express my appreciation of the
manner in which they were conducted by him as well as by his staff and
the subordinate commanders.
In conclusion, I would point out that the sudden breaking through by our
troops of an immense system of defense has had a most inspiring moral
effect on the armies I command and must have a correspondingly
depressing influence upon the enemy. The great value of the tanks in the
offensive has been conclusively proved. In view of this experience, the
enemy may well hesitate to deplete any portion of his front, as he did
last Summer, in order to set free troops to concentrate for decisive
action at some other point.
I have the honor to be, my Lord, your obedient servant,
D. HAIG,
_Field Marshal, Commanding in Chief, British Armies in France_.