15. I have already summarized in the opening paragraphs of this dispatch
both the reasons which decided me to undertake the Cambrai operations
and the limitations to which these operations were subject.
In view of the strength of the German forces on the front of my attack
and the success with which secrecy was maintained during our
preparations, I had calculated that the enemy's prepared defenses would
be captured in the first rush. I had good hope that his resisting power
behind these defenses would then be so enfeebled for a period that we
should be able on the same day to establish ourselves quickly and
completely on the dominating Bourlon Ridge from Fontaine-notre-Dame to
Moeuvres and to secure our right flank along a line including the
Bonavis Ridge, Crèvecour, and Rumilly to Fontaine-notre-Dame. Even if
this did not prove possible within the first twenty-four hours, a second
day would be at our disposal before the enemy's reserves could begin to
arrive in any formidable numbers.
Meanwhile, with no wire and no prepared defenses to hamper them, it was
reasonable to hope that masses of cavalry would find it possible to pass
through, whose task would be thoroughly to disorganize the enemy's
systems of command and intercommunication in the whole area between the
Canal de l'Escaut, the River Sensée, and the Canal du Nord, as well as
to the east and northeast of Cambrai.
My intentions as regards subsequent exploitation were to push westward
and northwestward, taking the Hindenburg line in reverse from Moeuvres
to the River Scarpe, and capturing all the enemy's defenses and probably
most of his garrisons lying west of a line from Cambrai northward to the
Sensée, and south of that river and the Scarpe.
Time would have been required to enable us to develop and complete the
operation; but the prospects of gaining the necessary time, by the use
of cavalry in the manner outlined above, were in my opinion good enough
to justify the attempt to execute the plan. I am of opinion that on Nov.
20 and 21 we went very near to a success sufficiently complete to bring
the realization of our full program within our power.
The reasons for my decision to continue the fight after Nov. 21 have
already been explained. Though in the event no advantage was gained
thereby, I still consider that, as the problem presented itself at the
time, the more cautious course would have been difficult to justify. It
must be remembered that it was not a question of remaining where we
stood, but of abandoning tactical positions of value, gained with great
gallantry, the retention of which seemed not only to be within our
power, but likely even yet to lead to further success.
Whatever may be the final decision on this point, as well as on the
original decision to undertake the enterprise at all with the forces
available, the continuation of our efforts against Fontaine-notre-Dame
gave rise to severe fighting, in which our troops more than held their
own.