6. It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they were. The
positions captured by us north of Flesquières were completely commanded
by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless this ridge were gained it would be
impossible to hold them, except at excessive cost. If I decided not to
go on a withdrawal to the Flesquières Ridge would be necessary, and
would have to be carried out at once.
On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an intention to
withdraw. Craters had been formed at road junctions, and troops could be
seen ready to move east. The possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable
our troops to obtain observation over the ground to the north, which
sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy's defensive lines
south of the Scarpe and Sensée Rivers would thereby be turned, his
communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his
positions in this sector jeopardized. In short, so great was the
importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause
the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defense
systems for a considerable distance to the north of it.
The successive days of constant marching and fighting had placed a very
severe strain upon the endurance of the troops, and, before a further
advance could be undertaken, some time would have to be spent in resting
and relieving them. This need for delay was regrettable, as the enemy's
forces were increasing, and fresh German divisions were known to be
arriving, but, with the limited number of troops at my command, it was
unavoidable.
It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile reinforcements coming
up at this stage could at first be no more than enough to replace the
enemy's losses; and although the right of our advance had definitely
been stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon
as it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my disposal. As has
already been pointed out, on the Cambrai side of the battlefield I had
only aimed at securing a defensive flank to enable the advance to be
pushed northward and northwestward, and this part of my task had been to
a large extent achieved.
An additional and very important argument in favor of proceeding with my
attack was supplied by the situation in Italy, upon which a continuance
of pressure on the Cambrai front might reasonably be expected to
exercise an important effect, no matter what measure of success attended
my efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for Italy
had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with this accession of
strength the prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good.
After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I decided to
continue the operations to gain the Bourlon position.
Nov. 22 was spent in organizing the captured ground, in carrying out
certain reliefs, and in giving other troops the rest they greatly
needed. Soon after midday the enemy regained Fontaine-notre-Dame; but
with our troops already on the outskirts of Bourlon Wood and Cantaing
held by us, it was thought that the recapture of Fontaine should not
prove very difficult. The necessary arrangements for renewing the attack
were therefore pushed on, and our plans were extended to include the
recapture of Fontaine-notre-Dame.
Meanwhile, early in the night of Nov. 22, a battalion of the Queen's
Westminsters stormed a commanding tactical point in the Hindenburg line
west of Moeuvres known as Tadpole Copse, the possession of which would
be of value in connection with the left flank of the Bourlon position
when the latter had been secured.